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Abstract_____________________________________________________
This study’s paramount objective is to examine the emergence of the Hindu Mahasabha as a political force 
and its campaign for Hindu unity and organisation in the context of the growing Hindu-Muslim conflict in colonial 
north India, mainly focusing on the United Provinces, in the early twentieth century. It explains that the 
Mahasabha articulated sangathan [Hindu consolidation] ideology as a means of constructing a distinct Hindu 
political identity and unity in conflict with Muslims in India. The work explores the way Arya Samaj and sanatan 
dharm influences, though different, were opportunistically drawn on by the Mahasabha in its sangathanist 
narrative. It examines the ambivalence between the Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress and at the 
individual level [M.M. Malaviya, etc], despite their ideological opposition. It argues that the Mahasabha with its 
Hindutva ideology had its focus on anti-Muslim rather than anti-colonial antagonism, adding to the difficulties 
over the Nehru report and the Round Table Conferences, but also showing its occasional alliances with the 
British, despite its fascist sympathies. It suggests that the Mahasabha had a limited class and regional base and 
was unable to generate much in the way of a mass movement of its own, but nonetheless developed a quasi­
military wing, besides its involvement in a number of popular, more or less single-issue campaigns -  shuddhi, 
cow protection, Nagari, etc. The work explains that the Mahasabha rejected the Congress’s vision of a secular 
territorial nation and instead advocated a state based on Hindu religion and culture, in effect a Hindu rashtra 
[nation] based on a Hindu majority rule, excluding Muslims and Christians from the India nation. The thesis 
bridges the gap in Indian historiography by focusing entirely on the Hindu Mahasabha’s politics and its 
sangathan ideology in the formative period in the UP.
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xv
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gauraksha cow protection
gaurakshini sabha cow protection society
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xvi
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xvii
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Introduction
The debate on Indian nationalism has been advanced over the past few decades through the exploration of 
the social and regional dimensions of ‘Muslim separatism’ and the Indian National Congress’s secular 
nationalist creed. The explanation of the partition of Indian subcontinent has centered mostly on the rival 
paradigms of the ‘two nation’ theory and the ‘secular nationalist’ worldview of the Congress. This work revisits 
the ‘great divide’ by exploring the third dimension of the Partition: the politics of Hindu nationalism and identity. It 
seeks to explain the long silence on the history of Hindu nationalism as articulated by Hindu publicists and 
leaders, for the politics of Hindu identity has been marginalised and explained away as ‘subordinate’ or 
‘separate’ in the narratives of the larger issue of India’s struggle for freedom. This study explores the ideological 
development of Hindu nationalism, which arose in a specific historical context as a counterweight to the Muslim 
League’s theory of a separate 'Muslim nation’. It examines the emergence of Hindu nationalism as a political 
ideology represented by the Hindu Mahasabha by exploring the campaign for Hindu unity and organisation -  
which was launched in the context of the growing Hindu-Muslim conflict in north India in the early twentieth 
century.
The United Provinces, comprising Oudh and Agra, was the largest Muslim minority province and also the 
most highly urbanised area of India in the colonial period.1 It had the second largest provincial population after 
Bengal [nearly one-seventh of India’s total population] and occupied about one-sixteenth of British India -  an 
area of 105,000 square miles.2 It was a relic of Muslim rule in north India and the homeland of the Muslim elite, 
which had fostered a distinctively Muslim culture and politics.3 Politically, the UP was India’s most dominant 
region in the 1920s and 1930s and the key province that had been at the forefront of the urban professional 
support for the Muslim League, the protagonist of Muslim separatism. The province had emerged as the pivot in 
the political projection of the League’s ‘two nation’ theory and the Pakistan demand in the 1930s and 1940s.4 
This study’s main focus will be on the provincial stage, in particular the UP.
Nationalism in India was an acutely contested and contradictory terrain in the first half of the twentieth 
century, with divergent religious and community impulses exerting pressure on the incipient nation. Two master
1 The British acquired the Banaras region in 1775 and the Ceded and Conquered Provinces in 1801 and 1803. The ‘Ceded and 
Conquered Provinces’ were renamed the ‘Upper Provinces’ in 1809. Banaras and the Upper Provinces, together with later 
additions in Garhwal and Bundelkhand, became in 1836 the North-Western Provinces under the control of a Lieutenant- 
Governor. Oudh was annexed in 1856 and separately administered by a Chief Commissioner until 1877 when the North-Western 
Provinces and Oudh were joined together under a single Lieutenant-Governor. In 1902 the NWP and Oudh was renamed the 
'United Provinces of Agra and Oudh’. Later in 1937 the province was made the ‘United Provinces’. William Gould, Hindu 
Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India, Cambridge, 2004, p. 1.
2 A.C. Turner, Census of India, 1931: United Provinces of Agra and Awadh Part I -  Report, Allahabad, 1932, p. 7.
3 Francis Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces’ Muslims, 1860-1923, Cambridge, 
1993 [1974], 11.
4 Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation: India’s Muslims since Independence, London, 1997, pp. 75-6.
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narratives -  secular nationalism and religious nationalism -  had emerged as the leading political idioms in India. 
Secular nationalism guided the Indian National Congress’s drive for a united front of all communities in India’s 
struggle for freedom from the English as the ruling ideology.5 The Congress, founded in 1885 and transformed 
into a mass organisation under Gandhian leadership in the 1920s and 1930s, had aspired to represent all 
communities by defining India as a multi-religious nation. Its universalist narrative, positing ‘unity in diversity1 as 
the essence of Indian nationhood, evoked the image of a nation as a neutral state in religious affairs.6 The 
‘secular1 nationalist ideal was sarvadharma samabhava, signifying the equality of all communities and the spirit 
of accommodation among them.7 This position was in contrast to the colonial view that the basic unit of Indian 
society was the community defined by religion, and that India’s religious differences were ‘irreconcilable’.8 In 
claiming to transcend religious differences, the Congress represented itself as ‘a truly nationalist movement to 
confront colonialism’ and ‘meet its criticisms -  to make India “better” ’.9
Religious nationalism -  both Hindu and Muslim -  was the chief competitor of secular nationalism in India. 
Muslim nationalism had led to the birth of Pakistan on the basis that the Hindus and the Muslims were not 
merely two different religious communities but two separate nations. Hindu nationalism, which had evolved into 
a coherent ideology of Hindu exclusivity and nationhood by the 1920s, on the contrary, viewed India as 
originally the land of the Aryans rooted in Hindu culture and homogenity: the Hindus must have a cultural and 
political primacy in shaping India’s destiny.10 Its discourse centred on Hindu culture, retaining an ambiguous yet 
important relationship with the ideals of Indian nationalism,11 even though it remained outside the Congress-led 
nationalist movement in the country.12 Nonetheless, it carried a potential for an anti-imperialist resistance and 
protest, conceiving freedom as the ultimate objective without giving up the sectional politics of Hindu interests.13 
Hindu nationalism represented an ideology in which territory, nationhood, and culture were cohesively 
articulated as the basis of a ‘Hindu nation’. The internal unity displayed by the Muslims as evident in the anti- 
Hindu riots during the post-Khilafat [1919-1922] period had provided the rationale for the growth of Hindu 
nationalist ideoliogy, which sought to resist the perceived ‘threat’ from Islam in India.14
5 Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India, New Haven, 2002, pp. 171-6.
6 G. Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India, Delhi, 1990, p. 210.
7 Prakash Chandra Upadhyaya, The Politics of Indian Secularism’, Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4,1992, pp. 815-53.
8 Ravindra Kumar, Essays in the Social History of Modem India, Delhi, 1983, pp. 31-3.
9 Peter Robb, Empire, Identity, and India: Liberalism, Modernity, and Nation, Oxford, 2007, p. 56.
10 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics 1925 to the 190s: Strategies of Identity-building, 
Implantation and Mobilisation [with special reference to Central India], London, 1996, p. 11.
11 John Zavos, The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism in India, New Delhi, 2000, pp. 8-9.
12 Chetan Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies and Modem Myths, Oxford, 2001, p. 41.
13 Home Poll., B, File No. 32-41, November 1909, NAI.
14 C. Jaffrelot, ‘Hindu Nationalism: Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 28, Nos. 12- 
13, 20-27 March 1993, pp. 517-24.
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Hindu nationalism was consciously articulated and codified as an ideology largely through the written work of
V.D. Savarkar in the early 1920s.15 In the pre-1920s formulations, ‘Hindu-leaning’ Indian nationalism did not 
demarcate the Muslims as exterior to the Indian nation, but within it.16 In the 1920s, however, Hindu nationalism 
was characterised by a confrontation against the Muslims as the ‘aggressor1 and primary ‘threat’ to the Hindus, 
situating them as an ‘outsider1 to Indian nationalism.17 It represented an ethnic conception of India as a ‘Hindu 
nation1; and its exclusivist, combative drive for Hindu identity was radically distinct from the Congress’s 
universalist nationalism.18
In the studies of ethnicity and sectarianism in India, the Hindu-Muslim conflict has been focused as being 
instrumental in the rise of Muslim separatism and Hindu nationalism in the early twentieth century. Recent 
debates have ranged from the assertions of the continuity of sectarian identities between the pre-colonial and 
colonial periods19 to native elites that had the primacy in determining the articulation of sectarianism -  be it by 
the Hindus,20 or the Muslims.21 There are three important arguments which offer an interpretation of what made 
the sectarian conflict emerge as the major force of political cleavage in north India. Paul Brass argues that the 
Muslim elites started to ask for preferential treatment in reaction to electoral politics, inducing the Hindu elites to 
mobilise the Hindu community for political action. Rivalries existed at two levels: the level of organised politics at 
the top where Hindu and Muslim elites had competed for the control of the government, and the level of tension 
and violence at the base in the localities of north India. In Brass’s ‘instrumentalist’ analysis, Muslim separatism 
was not ‘pre-ordained’, but a result of the conscious manipulation of the symbols of ‘Muslim identity1 as well as 
religious and cultural issues by the Muslim elite groups in political competition with the Hindus in north India.22
A second analysis advanced by Francis Robinson states that there existed long-standing essential 
differences between the Hindus and the Muslims in India.23 In this ‘primordialist’ assertion which was also the 
view of the leaders of Muslim separatism, Robinson explains that the Hindus and the Muslims had constituted in 
pre-modem times distinct civilisations destined to develop into separate nations once political mobilisation took 
place in the country. Robinson argues that the ‘religious differences’ between the Hindus and the Muslims in the
15 C. Jaffrelot, The Genesis and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab: from the Arya Samaj to the Hindu Sabha 
[1875-1910]’, Indo-British Review, Vol. 21, No. 1,1993, pp. 3-39.
16Bishen Narain Dar, president of the 1911 Congress, stressed natural affinities of the Hindus and the Muslims, calling the 
Muslims the ‘bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh' and criticising the ‘divisive’ British policy. Bishan Narain Dar, An Appeal to 
the English Public on Behalf of the Hindus of North-western Province and Oudh, Lucknow, 1893, p. 23.
17 Joya Chatterji, Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947, Cambridge, 1994, p. 2; Peter Heehs, 
Nationalism, Terrorism, Communalism: Essays in Modem Indian History, New Delhi, 1998, p. 117.
18 Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Movement, pp. 19, 24.
19 C.A. Bayly, The Pre-History of "Communalism”? Religious Conflict in India, 1700-1860’, Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, 
1985, pp. 177-203.
20 Chatterji, Bengal Divided, pp. 155-79.
21 Francis Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces’ Muslims, 1860-1923, Cambridge, 
2nd edn. 1993(1974], pp. 77-8.
22 P. Brass, ‘Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity among the Muslims of South Asia’, in David Taylor and M. 
Yapp [eds.], Political Identity in South Asia, London, 1979.
23 Francis Robinson, ‘Nation Formation: The Brass Thesis and Muslim Separatism’, Journal of Cmmonwealth and Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 15, No. 3, November 1977, pp. 215-34.
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nineteenth century before social mobilisation began were ‘fundamental’, and that some differences, particularly 
those on idol worship, monotheism, and cow slaughter, had helped to ‘set the Muslims apart’ as modem politics 
and self-governing institutions developed in the towns and districts of north India, more so the UP. The Muslims 
saw themselves as an identifiable and separate community with distinct political interests of their own, fearing 
that ‘the Hindu majority would not only interfere with their religious practices such as cow-sacrifice, but also ... 
would discriminate against them in education and employment’.24 At a deeper level, the Hindus and the Muslims 
in late nineteenth-century India were separate religious communities predisposed towards separate political or 
national groups, particularly when the new arenas of political power had come into existence since the 
introduction of separate electorates in the early twentieth century.25
A third analysis developed by nationalists puts the blame on the hegemony of the colonial state, which 
recognised the religious community as a fundamental organising principle of the political system in India. In 
nationalist historiography, it was the ‘divide and rule’ policy of the British that had created the sectarian cleavage, 
casting Indian society into two distinct religious communities by denying the existence of solidatities and 
common interests between the Hindus and the Muslims in the country.26 The sectarian conflict rendered the 
religious community an important site of political contestation, demonstrating the collective unity and affirmation 
of community identity by both the Hindus and the Muslims in the early twentieth century.27
This study focuses on the emergence and evolution of Hindu nationalism as part of a particular historical 
trajectory articulated by the Hindu Mahasabha in the colonial period.28 The reconstruction of the Mahasabha’s 
political narrative and activities centering on Hindu identity and politics forms an integral part of this project. It is 
an attempt to understand what Hindu nationalism signified at the point of the Mahasabha’s formation, how it 
conflicted with the Congress’s secular regime of power and democracy, and why it continued to be so deeply 
inflected with Hindu idiom in the country. This thesis argues that the Mahasabha’s sangathanist ideology was 
established in a particular historical moment, and that it made possible the articulation of new categories of 
Hindu identity and society as part of a political movement to construct a ‘Hindu nation’ in India. It examines how 
the construction of a homogeneous Hindu community operated in opposition to the perceived ‘hostile other1 -  
the Muslims -  in the country.
In the section on 'Hindu nationalism’, the first chapter examines the emergence of Hindu consciousness and 
unity in the Punjab in the early twentieth century by analysing the beginnings of an urban, upper-caste, self- 
conscious Hindu politics that represented the political idiom of Hindu nationalism. Hindu organisations in the
24 Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims, 13.
25 Francis Robinson, The Congress and the Muslims’, in Paul R. Brass and Francis Robinson [eds.j, Indian National Congress 
and Indian Society, 1885-1985: Ideology, Social Structure, and Political Dominance, Delhi, 1987, pp. 162-5,170.
26 Bishan Narain Dar, Collected Speeches and Writings of Pt. Bishan Narain Dar, Vol. 1, Lucknow, 1921, pp. 51-7.
27 John R. McLane, Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress, Princeton, 1977, p. 279.
28 Influential studies have been done on the Hindu Mahasabha in Bengal and the UP. See Chatterji, Bengal Divided, pp. 229-59; 
R. Gordon, The Hindu Mahasabha and the Congress’, Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2,1975, pp. 145-203.
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Punjab had made efforts to regenerate and consolidate the Hindu community by advocating a more exclusive 
form of Hindu politics, leading to the formation of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha in the UP in 1915.29 The 
Mahasabha’s formation was predicated on the new arenas of competition between the Hindus and the Muslims 
engineered by the colonial state through electoral politics in the country. In 1909 the Moriey-Minto reforms 
granted separate electorates to the Muslims in India’s legislatures not only in accordance with their numbers but 
also in line with their ‘historical and political importance’.30 The state’s institution of separate electorates in its 
search for potential loyal and conservative allies in Indian society had resulted in the creation of a separate 
Muslim electoral category in its own right, triggering propaganda and identity formation by Hindu publicists that 
became so prominent in the Mahasabha’s birth. The Mahasabha’s Hindu-oriented discourse and its emphasis 
on Hindu religion and culture as the basis of a national political order had effectively resulted from its perceived 
need to combat Muslim ‘domination and influence’ in India’s colonial politics in the early twentieth century.
Chapter 3 will study the nature and composition of the socio-economic base that became crucial for the 
emergence of the Hindu Mahasabha movement in north India. The Mahasabha had originated with the support 
and patronage of the very social groups that were once the patrons of the Congress, even though it heavily 
depended on the support of landed and aristocratic groups, business houses, and urban traders in north India. 
This study argues that the Mahasabha was an elite-led organisation like the pre-Gandhian Congress, but that its 
reliance on the influence of the aristocracy and notables with attendant conservatism and factionalism 
hampered its development as a mass organisation. The Mahasabha was conspicuously absent in the anti­
colonial mass struggles of the Congress and failed to attract the mass following in India.
In the section on ‘sangathan ideology1, chapter 4 explains that a grassroots organisation -  Hindu sangathan 
-  came into its own in the aftermath of the Khilafat movement and the Moplah massacres in the 1920s, 
representing an aggressive and militant anti-Muslim variety of nationalism in north India. The basis of sangathan 
ideology was a unified Hindu society, which emphasised community rather than hierarchy, and unity rather than 
division -  all presumed to create a monolithic Hindu community in opposition to the Muslims. The Hindu 
Mahasabha had relied on various means to create the semblance of a unified ‘Hindu’ society -- shuddhi [ritual 
purification], the abolition of untouchability, and caste uplift programmes that sought to integrate the lower 
castes and untouchables into the Hindu community.31 This study shows that there were several conflicts and 
divisions among the Hindus due to the institutional pervasiveness of the caste [vama] hierarchy.32 The
29 Kenneth W. Jones, Two Sanatan Dharma Leaders and Swami Vivekananda: A Comparison’, in William Radice, [ed.], Swami 
Vivekananda and the Modernisation of Hinduism, Delhi, 1998, pp. 224-43.
30 Shabnum Tejani, Indian Secularism: A Social and Intellectual History, 1890-1950, Ranikhet, 2007, pp. 113-17.
31 Rosalind O’Hanlon, ‘Acts of Appropriation: Non Brahmin Radicals and the Congress in Early Twentieth-Century Maharashtra’ 
in M. Shepperdson and C. Simmons [eds.], The Indian National Congress and the Political Economy of India 1885-1985,
Avebury, 1988, pp. 102-46.
32 Heinrich von Stietencron, ‘Religious Configurations in Pre-Muslim India and the Modem Concept of Hinduism’, in Vasudha 
Dalmia and H. von Stietencron [eds.], Representing Hinduism: The Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity,
New Delhi, 1995, p. 51.
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campaign for Hindu homogeneity, which Hindu identity politics treated as fundamental, was not a natural but a 
constructed form of closure, as the lower caste consciousness and untouchable uplift were not fully 
accommodated.33 The Mahasabha’s programme of Hindu unity and consolidation was driven by an apparent 
reconciliation of deeper caste tensions as well as the discourse of a ‘conflict’ with the Muslims in India.
Chapter 5 discusses the Hindu Mahasabha’s articulation of militant nationalism that was firmly set within the 
framework of the ideas and writings of V.D Savarkar -- the ideological father of Hindutva -  whose narrative 
demonstrated a shift from anti-British themes to an anti-Muslim antagonism in India.34 Hindutva -  or political 
Hinduism -  became a foundational doctrine devoted to explicating Hindu identity and the ideological contours of 
a Hindu rashtra [nation]. Savarkar’s notion of a ‘Hindu nation’ was based on territory, race and ethnicity, and 
culture; and the real enemy was not the British, but the Muslims.35 The primal patronymic, ‘Hindu’, was 
fundamentally antagonised in history through a conflict with the ‘Other’ -  the Muslims. This work suggests that 
Hindutva was firmly based on a conception of Hindu majoritarian rights counterposed against the potential rights 
of the minorities -  the Muslims and the Christians -  who were to be assimilated by their allegiance to Hindu 
cultre in the country. An anti-Muslim hostility was central to Hindutva narrative, which was predicated on the 
theory of a ‘Hindu nation’ and became profoundly aggressive and militaristic after Savarkar’s presidentship of 
the Mahasabha in the late 1930s.
Chapter 6 shows that in the UP, Hindu publicists -- comprising a disparate variety of reformers, revivalists, 
Arya Samajists, and sanatan dharmlsis [orthodox Hindus] -  carried a massive campaign against the Muslims 
and Islam in the early twentieth century. The campaign of anti-Muslim hostility, which had become the basis of 
the Hindu Mahasabha’s sangathan narrative, was accelerated in the 1920s. There were increasing conflicts with 
the Muslims related to issues such as cow slaughter and Hindu processional music outside mosques in north 
India.36 There were aggressive displays of strength in Hindu festivals with the increasing participation of the 
lower castes in the public arenas, aiding the expression of Hinduism as a ‘martial religion’.37 The UP had 
witnessed the most serious cases of ‘communal’ conflict in the entire colonial period, with 91 Hindu-Muslim 
clashes reported in the province from 1923 to 1927.38 Propaganda campaigns against the ‘abductions and 
conversions’ of Hindu women by Muslim men, if imagined, had provided occasions for abstract unities and 
militant Hindu articulations in the province.39 Sangathan had its ideological focus on an anti-Muslim antagonism
33 H. Owen, The Non-Brahman Movements and the Transformation of the Congress, 1912-1922’ in J. Masselos [ed.], Struggling 
and Ruling: The Indian National Congress, 1885-1985, London, 1987.
34 Ellen E. MacDonald, The Growth of Religious Consciousness in Maharashtra’, Indian Economic and Social History Review,
Vol. 5, No. 3, September 1968, p. 232.
35 V.D. Savarkar, Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?, 4th edn. Poona, 1949, rept. New Delhi, 2003, pp. 91-95.
36 ‘Legislative Assembly Resolutions: 24 August 1926 and 1 September 1926, regarding the regulation of religious festivals’, IOR 
L/P&J/6/1890, IOL; Nita Kumar, The Artisans ofBanaras: Popular Culture and Identity, Princeton, 1988, p. 51.
37 S.B. Freitag, Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India, Berkeley, 
1989, p. 101; Nandini Gooptu, The Politics of the Urban Poor in Early Twentieth Century India, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 130-74.
38 Statement of communal riots in the UP between 1922 and 1927’, IOR L/P&J/6/1890, IOL.
39 ‘Charu Gupta, Sexulaity, Obscenity, Community: Women, Muslim and the Hindu Public in Colonial India, Delhi, 2001, p. 322.
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rather than an anti-British struggle for India’s independence. The anti-Muslim orientation of sangathan ideology 
and its Hindu idiom had contributed in part to the persistence of the sectarian conflict in the UP in the 1920s and 
1930s.
Chapter 7 focuses on the Hindu Mahasabha’s programme of militarisation -  which was based on a 
perceived need to combat the Muslims in India. The growing realisation about the imminent assumption of 
power by the Indian parties after British departure made the Mahasabha support the militarisation drive in order 
to counter the ‘Muslim threat’, particularly in the event of an internal disorder in the country. The Mahasabha 
targeted the Muslims as the ‘enemy within’, making them the object of violence during the 1920s and 1930s.40
In ideological terms, sangathamsl narrative clashed with Gandhi’s doctrines of ahimsa [non-violence] and 
Hindu-Muslim unity.41 Chapter 8 explains that Hindutva ideology centred chiefly on the refutation of ahimsa, 
justifying a conflict with the Congress’s non-violent non-cooperation movement against the British in the country.
Chapter 9 argues that the development of the Nagari and cow protection movements had been widespread 
across the UP since the 1860s and 1870s, and that they were effectively appropriated by the Hindu Mahasabha 
into its discourse of Hindu unity. The Nagari campaign was at the heart of sangathan's mobilisation of the Hindu 
community in avowed conflict with the Muslim elite, resulting in an attack on Urdu that had remained the official 
vernacular of the colonial administration in the UP till 1900. The campaign for the promotion of the Hindi 
language, literature and print became a significant means of contest against the dominance of Urdu/Persian in 
the province.42 In a parallel development, the cow protection movement centred on the cow as a ‘sacred 
symbol’ and had the potential for a regional, cross-caste Hindu mobilisation in north Inia. The cow agitation was 
inflected with an upper-caste idiom, representing an avenue by which local grievances could be articulated in 
ways that were both anti-colonial and anti-Muslim, more so the latter.43 This study argues that the working of the 
Hindu consciousness through the narratives of Nagari and the cow was used as a source of political 
mobilisation and became the basis of sangathan's deeper hostility and antagonism against the Muslims in the 
UP.
In the section on ‘Hindu nationalism’, chapter 10 focuses on the marked ambiguity of relations between the 
Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress resulting the informal associations and nexus that had 
been widespread in the UP in the 1920s and 1930s. The implications of the nexus between the Congress’s 
stated views on nationalism and the sangathanist assertions of the Mahasabha is one of the key issues 
explored in this thesis. This work suggests that even though the Congress’s image at the all-India level
40 Susan B.C. Devalle, ‘Social Identities, Hindu Fundamentalism, and Politics in India’, in D.N. Lorenzen, Bhakti Religion in North 
India: Community Identity and Political Action, New York, 1995, p. 316.
41 Nandini Gondhalekar, ‘Indian Nationalism and “Hindu" Politics: Maharashtra and the Hindu Mahasabha, 1920-1948’, PhD 
Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1999, p. 17.
42 F. Orsini, The Hindi Public sphere 1920-1940: Language and Literature in the Age of Nationalism, New Delhi, pp. 3-7.
43 Peter Robb, ‘The Challenge of Gau Mata: British Policy and Religious Change in India, 1880-1916’, Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 
20, No. 2,1986, pp. 285-319.
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remained secular, a reliance on the use of Hindu idiom was not an alien feature of its programmes and activities 
in north India. The associations between the Hindu Sabhas and the Congress committees had persisted in 
more informal forms in terms of the personnel and programmes in the towns and districts of the UP until the 
Congress blacklisted the Mahasabha as a ‘communal organisation’ in 1938. The Mahasabha emerged as a 
political party under the leadership of V.D. Savarkar in the late 1930s, vigorously making efforts to emerge as 
the political challenger of the Congress in north India.44 This work argues that the Mahasabha rejected the 
Indian National Congress’s vision of a secular ‘territorial India nation’ and instead advocated a ‘Hindu state’ 
[Hindu rashtra] based on a Hindu majority rule. It made consistent efforts to distinguish its goals from the 
Congress’s programmes, claiming that it was the sole legitimate organisation to represent the Hindus in the 
country.
Chapter 11 examines the debates on the question of political safeguards -  reservations for the Muslims in 
India's legislatures -  which became crucial for India to emerge as ‘one nation’. The ideal of concessions to the 
Muslims had held sway since the 1910s, representing the possibilities of imagining a way for Muslim existence 
within a ‘united India’. The Hindu Mahasabha had consistently opposed the Muslim League’s demands for 
safeguards, arguing that reservations undermined India’s national unity. This study reveals that the 
Mahasabha’s Hindutva discourse predicated on the rule of a majority, defined as ‘Hindu’, as well as its 
resistance to the Muslim demands was one of the principal reasons for the breakdown of negotiations on 
constitution-making in India in the 1920s and 1930s. The ideal of secularism was at the heart of the Congress’s 
formulation of the Indian nation; but the Mahasabha contested the Congress’s secularism on the basis that 
there was an imperative need for creating a majority rule based ‘on one man, one vote’, which in turn implied 
the Hindu majority: India was a ‘Hindu nation’. The Mahasabha represented a formulation of nationalism that 
involved a discourse on community representation with the definitions of a democratic majority, viewed broadly 
as ‘Hindu’. Hindutva was made up of ‘majoritarianism’, which meant that the Indian majority had to be 
constructed as ‘Hindu’ to the exclusion of the Muslims. The Congress’s anti-colonial mobilisation failed to 
achieve unity in 1928, in part deepening the crisis on the path to the Muslim League’s demand for ‘Pakistan’ in 
the 1940s.
This study locates Indian historiography within the larger framework of Hindu nationalist ideology in colonial 
India. It aims to fill a void in historiography on the development and evolution of Hindu nationalist ideology as 
well as the emergence of the the Hindu Mahasabha as a political force in the 1920s and 1930s. It investigates 
the ‘sectarian’ consciousness that emerged from the social and cultural formation of the Hindu community in its 
contestations and conflicts with the Muslims and the colonial state. It offers a critique of the colonialist history 
[dominated by ‘the story of the British Empire in India’] and the mainstream nationalist discourse of the Indian
44 V.D. Savarkar, Samagra Savarkar Wangamaya: Writings ofSwatantrya Veer V.D. Savarkar, Vol. 6, Delhi, 2003, p. 115.
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nation, which leave out of account the social discourse of Hindu nationalists and publicists. Its purpose is to 
draw the links between the twin dialectics in modern South Asian history -  all-India nationalism and religiously 
based Hindu nationalism in the early twentieth century.45
45 John R.McLane, The Early Congress, Hindu Populism and Wider Society’, in R. Sisson and Stanley Wolpert [eds.], The
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PARTI 
Hindu Nationalism
2 
The Origins and Evolution of Hindu Mahasabha.
Early nationalism in India had diverse roots and varied character, representing the presence of both secular 
and Hindu idioms in its discourse. The most significant aspect of the Hindu idiom was Hindu nationalist ideology 
articulated by the Hindu Mahasabha as a political movement in north India in the early twentieth century.1 The 
Mahasabha claimed to represent Hindu consciousness and identity based on its vision of ‘Hindu pride and 
greatness' in India’s past and sought to construct a ‘Hindu nation’ on the basis of a homogeneous culture; and 
the explicit acceptance of Hinduness as the essence of India’s nationhood implied the assimilation of other 
religions into ‘Hindu culture’. Its nationalist narrative was an external factor and subsidiary to the Indian National 
Congress’s movement for India’s independence. The Congress viewed the nation as an entity inclusive of all 
religious and ethnic communities, including Hindus and Muslims -  a vision that conflicted with the Mahasabha’s 
discourse of an exclusive ‘Hindu nation’. The Mahasabha developed an alternative narrative to the Congress’s 
secular idiom in politics, rejecting the latter’s universalist nationalism. Its ideology centred on the discourse of 
religious identity, equating the Hindu community with the nation and situating Muslims outside the nation as the 
‘hostile other1. This chapter charts the development and evolution of Hindu nationalist discourse that culminated 
in the foundation of the Mahasabha. It argues that this process was central to the definition and codification of 
Hindu nationalist ideology, and that it reflected the deepening conflict between Hindus and Muslims in colonial 
north India.
Hindu nationalism emerged in north India as the ideology of the Hindus who required representation in 
colonial politics, aligning the idea of India and Indianness with ‘Hindu’ identity. The main arena for the 
emergence of this strand of politics was popular mobilisation on the issue of colonial constitutional reforms. The 
established ‘moderate’ discourse of the Congress put faith in the state’s constitutional gradualism and ‘symbolic 
representation’ on the assumption that civil rights would be gradually extended, eventually resulting in ‘self- 
government’. The moderates were interested in co-operation rather than a conflict with the state -  an approach 
that was attacked by the ‘extremist’ group as a politics of ‘mendicancy’; and, of course, the state was scarcely 
serious about its commitment to ‘self-rule’, or the ‘devolution of power1 to indigenous control. The ‘moderate’ 
group was progressively challenged by the ‘extremists’ who were critical of constitutional gradualism, resulting 
in the latter’s expulsion in the Surat split of the Congress in 1907, even though the ‘extremists’ had returned to 
capture the Congress by 1916. Hindu nationalists, drawing inspiration from Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s radicalism 
and his politics of ‘Hindu revival and regeneration’, supported the ‘extremist’ group; and the Hindu constituency
1 Bruce D. Graham, The Congress and Hindu Nationalism’, in D. A Low [ed.], The Indian National Congress: Centenary 
Hindsights, Oxford, 1988, p. 171; Bipan Chandra, Communalism in Modem India, Delhi, 1987 [1984], p. 100.
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gained importance as a counterpoint to the ‘moderate’ Congress. The conflict gave an impetus to the 
development of Hindu nationalist sentiments among India’s religious and political sections outside the Congress.
The Hindu nationalists viewed the freedom movement as crucial, yet an insufficient solution to India’s 
problems. The end of British rule would be of little use if the Indian nation was not based on ‘Hindu values’: 
reform had to come from within the ‘traditions’ of Hinduism. The belief in the superiority of Hindu values and 
indigenous knowledge over those of the west was central in the anti-imperialist movement. Colonialism deprived 
Indians of their self-honour, which could be revived with swaraj [freedom]; and the Hindus had to develop an 
understanding of the ‘glories’ of India’s history. From a defence of past glories through a criticism of the policies 
of the colonial state to an assertion of the inherent superiority of Hindu culture, the Hindu nationalists evolved an 
anti-colonial critique that was Hindu in idiom, excluding the Muslims.2 Hindu nationalism emerged as a popular 
challenge to the Congress’s definition of a ‘nation’, centring on the articulation of Hindu interests and political 
concerns and rejecting the Congress as no 'true representative’ of the Hindus.3 
I. Hindu Sabha Movement
The Hindu Sabha movement, the institutional exponent of Hindu nationalism, developed in the dominant 
Hindu commercial and religious culture of the Punjab, the ‘germ cell' of Hindu nationalism, aiming to provide a 
collective defence of the socio-political interests of the Hindus vis-a-vis the Muslims in the early twentieth 
century.4 The need to unify the Hindu community and regenerate Hinduism became central in the foundation of 
the Lahore Hindu Sabha in December 1882 by Hindu leaders, representing a challenge to the pro-British 
organisational activities of Sayyid Ahmed Khan and Aligarh College.5 Sayyid Ahmad believed that the reformed 
councils, dominated by the Hindus, would have no place for the Muslims who should remain outside the 
Congress, and that their best chance of protecting their interests in India lay in an active alliance with the 
British.6 The Lahore Hindu Sabha, led by Raja Harbans Singh and Lala Sangam Lai, had inevitably sought to 
protect Hindu interests through the advocacy of the political rights and privileges of the Hindu community on the 
basis of a perceived ‘threat’ from the Muslims and ‘organised Islam’.7
In the subsequent years, there was a strong Hindu resentment against the British efforts to favour the 
Muslims in the Punjab by preventing Hindu moneylenders from acquiring land under the Land Alienation Act of 
1901 and by restricting the Hindu elite’s access to administration. Ram Bhaj Datta, an Arya Samajist of the
2 Gail Omvedt, Cultural Revolt in a Colonial Society: The Non-Brahman Movement in Western India, 1873-1930, Bombay, 1976, 
p. 124.
3 Christophe Jaffrelot [ed.], Hindu Nationalism: A Reader, Delhi, 2007, pp. 4-5.
4 R. Gordon, The Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress, 1915 to 1926', Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2,
1975, pp. 145-203; Christphe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of 
Identity-building, Implantation and Mobilisation [with special reference to Central India], London, 1996, pp. 17-8; John Zavos,
The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism in India, Oxford, 2000, p. 100
5 See N.G. Barrier, The Arya Samaj and Congress Politics in the Punjab 1894-1908’, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No.
3, May 1967.
6 Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India 1916-1928, New Delhi, 1991, p. 53.
7 Kenneth W. Jones, Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 19P-Century Punjab, Berkeley, 1976, rept. New Delhi, 1989, pp. 65-6.
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College faction, founded the Hindu Sahaiak Sabha in Lahore in 1906 in protest against the government’s ‘pro- 
Muslim’ bias and ‘discrimination’. Datta called for a new type of Hindu politics; and a series of Hindu Sahaik 
Sabhas were established through the initiatives of local Arya Samajists in the cities of the Punjab.8 Sections of 
the middle class Hindus nursing a grievance against British ‘hostility1 embraced the Hindu Sabhas because the 
Congress and its secular discourse could not address their basic dilemmas and anxieties in the years before 
World War I.9 A broad unity on the basis of an emerging Hindu consciousness had gained momentum in the 
Punjab, where the Arya Samaj shaped the first blueprint of Hindu nationalism.10
The Hindu Sabha movement gained strength and influence after the formation of the first Hindu Sabha in the 
Punjab in 1906.11 The Sabha, founded in Lahore on 4 August 1906, had included prominent Arya Samaj and 
Hindu sanatamst [orthodox] leaders: Lala Lajpat Rai, Shadi Lai [Agarwal barrister], Harkrishna Lai, Raja 
Narendra Nath [ex-civil servant, landowner and leader of the Kashmiri Brahman community], Rai Bahadur Ram 
Saran Das [Khatri mill-owner and a major figure in the Sanatan Dharma Sabha], Ruchi Ram Sahini, Ram Bhaj 
Datta, and Lala Hans Raj.12 These leaders were dependent for their position on British loyalty and rarely carried 
Sabha activities beyond the ‘confines of their drawing rooms and the Governor’s durbar1.13 The Sabha’s main 
objective was limited: it aimed to improve the ‘moral, intellectual and material condition of the Hindus’ within the 
framework of loyalty to the British.14
A provincial Hindu Sabha was formed in Lahore in 1907 on the ground prepared by the Lahore Hindu Sabha 
to safeguard Hindu interests as a minority community under the proposed constitutional reforms in the Punjab.15 
The Sabha showed vigorous action on issues concerning Hindu issues, leading to the formation of new Hindu 
Leagues, or Hindu Sabhas.16 The new Hindu Sabhas, which consisted of the cream of the Arya and sanatanlst 
societies, were formed throughout the Punjab -  mainly in Multan, Sialkot, Gujranwala, and Lyallpur -  during 
1907-1908. The common theme marking their activities was the Hindu community’s unity and co-operation in 
the promotion of its social and political interests. The Sabhas did not have any crystallised ideology, but 
retained their religious and social roles to protect Hindu interests by reviving the 'feelings of self-respect, self­
8 N.G. Barrier, The Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900, Durham, 1966, pp. 49-71; idem, The Punjab Disturbances of 1907: 
The Response of the British Government in India to Agrarian Unrest’, Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4,1967, pp. 353-83; 
Jones, Arya Dharm, p. 208.
9 Jones, Arya Dharm, pp. 194,316; K.L. Tuteja and O.P. Grewal, ‘Emergence of Hindu Communal Ideology in Early Twentieth 
Century Punjab’, Social Scientist, Vol. 20, Nos. 7-8, July-August 1992, pp. 7-17.
10 N.G. Barrier, The Punjab Government and Communal Politics, 1870-1900’, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3, May 
1968, pp. 523-39.
11 The Tribune, 6 August 1906, p. 3, Microfilm, NMML.
12 The Tribune, 23 December 1906, p. 2, Microfilm, NMML.
13 B. Cleghorn, ‘Religion and Politics: The Leadership of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha: Punjab and Maharashtra 1920-1939’, in 
B.N. Pandey [ed.], Leadership in South Asia, New Delhi, 1977, p. 396.
14 The Tribune, 24 August 1906, p. 3, Microfilm, NMML.
15 Indra Prakash, Hindu Mahasabha: Its Contribution to Indian Politics, New Delhi, 1966 [1938], pp. 15-45.
16 Indra Prakash, A Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and Hindu Sangathan Movement, New Delhi, 2nd 
edn., 1952, [1938], pp. ii, v-vii; Jones, Arya Dharm, pp. 261-94.
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help and mutual co-operation’ in the community. They judiciously swore unswerving loyalty to the British, 
however.17
1.1. Separate Electorates
The wider context for the development of Hindu consciousness in the Punjab was set in part by the 
recognition of communal representation in the constitutional reforms introduced by the British, which betrayed 
the state’s ‘alliance’ with the Muslims. The state’s strategy, while pursuing reform for the introduction of self- 
government in India, lay in creating allies in stable sections of society in order to offset the destabilising effects 
of the nationalist agitation and militancy.18 Terrorism and political unrest evident during the 1905 Swadeshi 
movement had forced the state to look for potential allies in Indian society. The Muslim League’s policy of 
commitment and sustained loyalty to British rule in India in the early years and the predominance within it of the 
loyalist Aligarh elite encouraged the state to consider more seriously Muslim demands for concessions in 
representation.19
The demand that Muslim representation required a substantive consensus of the community became a 
persistent feature in the campaign for separate Muslim electorates in north India in the early 1900s.The notion 
of special representation had originated from the campaign of Muslim leaders against the ‘western’ principles of 
elective representation. In December 1896 the Indian Defence Association, founded by Sayyid Ahamad Khan, 
had called for the existing system of elective representation to be replaced by the institution of separate Muslim 
electorates, opposing the application of ‘majority rule’ in India.20 Sayyid Ahmad defended separate electorates 
on the basis that they were the means to ensure that the Muslims were really represented by Muslim councillors 
who would be elected by ‘exclusively Muslim constituencies’. ‘Western’ elective representation, he argued, was 
inherently unacceptable because it endorsed territorial constituencies that promoted predominantly ‘Hindu 
interests’.21 The unit of Indian society was not territorial but religious; and the community became the legitimate 
basis for Muslim political power and representation. The Muslims, it was argued, were a community with 
‘separate traditions, interests and religion’. Communal representation was desirable because it protected the 
Islamic principle of ‘solidarity’ in which the community not the individual was central: it represented the ‘Muslim 
consensus’ and became an instrument of social and political cohesion for the Muslims.22
The demand for separate Muslim electorates was formally mooted in the Simla Memorial of October 1906, 
which defended the exclusive right of the Muslims to elect Muslim representatives as an imperative measure to 
counter the effects of ‘western’ elective representation. In theory, political representatives were deemed to be
17 The Tribune, 28 January 1908, p. 6; 20 March 1908, p. 4; Microfilm, NMML; Cleghom, ‘Religion and Politics’, pp. 391-2.
18 Shabnum Tejani, Indian Secularism: A Social and Intellectual History 1890-1950, New Delhi, 2007, p. 114-7.
19 Matiur Rahman, From Consultation to Confrontation: A Study of the Muslim League in British Indian Politics, 1906-1912, 
London, 1970, p. 38.
20 F. Shaikh, Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India 186-1947, Cambridge, 1989, p., 119.
21 Cited in Shaikh, Community and Consensus, pp. 111-2.
22 Note by W. Lee Warner, 18 April 1907, John Morley Papers, MSS. EUR. D. 573, Vol. 32, IOL.
13
responsible to individual and group interests organised within territorial constituencies. The Simla Memorial 
rejected this principle of ‘western’ representation based on territorial constituencies. The election of a Muslim 
from a communally mixed territorial constituency, it stated, could not guarantee the ‘substantive representation’ 
of the Muslims as a community. Really representative men would emerge when the Muslims themselves, 
organised as a separate electorate, were empowered to elect Muslim representatives.23 Numerical strength was 
wholly inadequate as the basis of Muslim representation and power which, it was argued, emerged from their 
‘historical role’ in Indian society and politics. The Muslims of India, it was stated, had been the rulers of India 
until the arrival of British rule, that their previous tradition of rule gave them a ‘historical and political importance’ 
far beyond the numbers of the Muslim community, and that they were entitled to more than proportionate share 
of political power under British rule.24 ‘Western’ representation would continue to be problematic so long as it 
did not recognise the ‘political importance’ of the Muslims in India. It was proposed that the Muslims should be 
granted representation not merely in proportion to their actual numerical strength but in recognition of ‘the 
prestige and influence’ they exercised ‘a little more than a hundred years ago’.25 Parity, not political majorities, 
determined the debate on Muslim representation in India.26 In 1907 the London Committee of the All-India 
Muslim League led by Sayyid Ameer Ali, a former judge of the Calcutta High Court, through a petition to 
Secretary of State for India Sir John Morley, represented the Muslims in terms of their ‘political and historical 
importance’ as a basis for their claim to additional representation.27 In March 1908, the Muslim League 
formalised the demand, calling for measures which would enable ‘Mohammedan voters to elect their own 
representatives’ to legislative councils and local boards.28 It called for an end to Muslim ‘mandatories’ 
accountable to non-Muslim constituencies and emphasised the urgency of securing ‘really representative’ 
Muslims accountable to exclusively Muslim electorates.29
In the council reforms Act of 1909, the government under Viceroy Lord Minto granted separate electorates 
and ‘weightage’ for the Muslims in provincial legislative councils throughout India, ‘satisfying Muhmmadan 
claims to be represented in proportion not merely to their numbers, but also to their political and historical 
importance’.30 The Muslims were provided with representation in excess of their actual numerical strength in the 
councils and local bodies under the 1909 Act. Seats gained through separate electorates would comprise the
23 S.R. Wasti, Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905 to 1910, Oxford, 1964, pp. 166-90.
24 Address of the Simla Deputation, enclosed in Lord Minto’s note to John Morley, 4 October 1906, John Morley Papers, Vol. 9, 
Paragraphs 8,10,11,2, IOL.
25 Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan wondered in a speech delivered in Lucknow on 28 December 1887: ‘What is this nation of ours?’ ‘We 
are those who have ruled India for six or seven hundred years.’ A.M. Zaidi [ed.], Evolution of Muslim Political Thought in India,
Vol. I: From Syed to the Emergence ofJinnah, New Delhi, 1975, p. 42.
26 Address of the Simla Deputation, enclosed in Lord Minto’s note to John Morley, 4 October 1906, John Morley Papers, Vol. 9, 
Paragraph, 5, IOL.
27 P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 154-158.
28 Sir Alfred Lyall’s memo to John Morley, 15 February 1909, John Morley Papers, MSS. EUR. D. 573, Vol. 49, IOL.
29 Sayyid Ali Imam’s comments while moving the third resolution of the All India Muslim League, 31 December 1908, in Syed
Sharifuddin Pirzada, [ed.], Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents 1906-1947, Vol. 1, Karachi, 1990, p. 61.
30 Viceroy Lord Minto’s fetter to Sir John Morfey, dated 8 February 1909, Morley Papers, Vol. 33, IOL.
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majority of Muslim seats; and anything gained in general electorates and nomination would be supplementary -  
the ‘weightage’. In October 1909 the government stated that the ‘special representation of Muhammadans was 
only claimed and only conceded on the ground that so important a minority required protection’.31 The Indian 
Councils Bill of 1909 provided the Muslims with eight out of twenty-seven elected seats on the Viceroy’s 
Imperial Council: the separately elected seats constituted a total of 29.6 per cent representation against 24 per 
cent Muslim population in British India. In the elections held under the terms of the new Act in January 1910, the 
Muslims secured a total of 11 seats [separately and jointly elected], which brought the total Muslim 
representation in the council to 40.7 per cent.32 After 1909, the Muslim community, in its efforts to adjust to the 
introduction of the reforms, set about to unify the community for political representation and to seek government 
commitment to a legal definition of separate Muslim interests.33
Indian nationalist leaders argued that separate electorates were a classic expression of Britain’s ‘divide and 
rule’ policy, pitting the Hindus against the Muslims.34 Hindu publicists claimed that representation for the 
Muslims in the legislative councils in greater proportion than their numerical strength was excessive and at the 
expense of the Hindus. Shadi Lai, Hindu Sabha general secretary, voiced an extreme concern against separate 
electorates through a petition to Lord Minto as part of a welcome address to the latter in Lahore in April 1909. 
The petition opposed any concession or the claim of ‘excessive representation’ to any community on the basis 
of its ‘historical or political importance’. The Hindu community humbly submits,’ protested Shadi Lai, ‘... the 
claim of excessive representation advanced in certain quarters, in connection with the Reform Scheme, is 
opposed to the principles of justice and fair play ... 35 Separate electorates marked a turning point, resulting in 
the increasingly hostile and antagonistic relations between the Hindus and the Muslims in north India.36 In the 
Punjab where the Muslims were a numerical majority, separate electorates could not be justified, awakening in 
sections of the Hindus the fears of vulnerability, more so in view of the perceived 'Muslim domination’.37 The 
networks of Hindu Sabhas were formed in the Punjab by sanatanlst [orthodox] Hindus.38 The Hindu Sabha 
movement was a direct response to the fears that the Muslims as a constitutional minority would become
31 Confidential note on the New Legislative Councils, Appendix ii on Muhammdan Representation, John Morley Papers, MSS. 
EUR.. D. 573, Vol. 34, IOL.
32 Lord Minto’s memo to John Morley, 6 January 1910, John Motley papers, Vol. 23.
33 A.M. Zaidi [ed.], Evolution of Muslim Political Thought in India, Vol. Ill: Parting of the Ways, New Delhi, 1977, p. 686.
34 M.N. Das, India under Morley and Minto, London, 1964,99-101; Home Poll., Part A, Proceedings 29-31 December 1909, NAI.
35 The Memoranda of the Hindu Sabha, Home Department [Political Part A], Proceedings No. 29-31 and 50-53, December 1909, 
NAI.
36 Francis Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces’ Muslims 1860-1923, Cambridge, 
1993 [1974], pp. 135-47.
37 C.H. Philips [ed.], The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947: Select Documents, Vol. 4, London 1962, p. 86.
37 The Hindus were in a minority in the Punjab -- comprising 40.7 per cent of the population, against 51.3 per cent Muslims and 
7.5 per cent Sikhs [1881 census]. The Census of India 1881: Punjab Census Report, Calcutta, 1882, p. 77.
38 Home Poll., GOI, June 1911, File No. B 1-3, Weekly Report, 11 April 1911 NAI.
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dominant in an imperial system of collaboration engineered by the British under the council reforms of the 1909 
Act.39
1.2. ‘Declining’ Hindu Numbers
One significant context for the emergence of Hindu politics in colonial north India was the state’s 
categorisation and enumeration, which had a momentous significance for the birth of the Hindu Sabha 
movement in the Punjab. India’s decennial censuses had since the late nineteenth century classified the 
population according to religion, community and caste; and in the politics of India’s localities and provinces, 
representative institutions gave importance to communities defined by religion and assessed by their 
demographic weight.40 The British initially assisted this process by treating the Muslims as an official category 
for the purposes of census enumeration, distribution of government appointments, and education. This policy 
triggered the fears of a threat to the Hindus as an ‘enumerated’ community, becoming the basis of the politics 
and rhetoric of Hindu publicists.41 In the Punjab, the census revealed a steady decline of the Hindu population -  
from 43.8 per cent in 1891 to 36.3 per cent in 1911, against an increase of 5.7 per cent in the Muslim 
population42 The official 'loss' of the Hindus was perceived to be an outcome of conversions. The 1911 census 
showed that since 1901, 40,000 Hindus had been converted to Islam, and 120,000 to Christianity.43 The 
demographic growth rate of the Muslims proved equally alarming. O’Donnell, all-India Census Commissioner, 
had in 1891 pointed to the slower Hindu growth rates relative to the Muslims, claiming that the Hindus would 
cease to exist in 700 years.44 The ‘declining Hindu’ scare was raised again by Census Commissioner H.H. 
Risley in 1901. ‘Can the figures of the last census,’ he wondered, ‘be regarded in any sense the forerunner of 
an Islamic or Christian revival which will threaten the citadel of Hinduism ... or will Hinduism hold its own in the 
future as it has done through the long ages of the past.’45 The census report of 1911 stated: ‘It has long been 
known that Musalmans are more fertile than Hindus and that their chances of life are better; and the figures of 
the last decade merely strengthen this view ...,46 The ‘main factor1, remarked one census official, 'is natural 
growth, and ... this largely depends on strength of Mussalmans, who, as is well known, are more prolific than 
Hindus’.47 The official census projections precipitated the fears that the numerical ‘Hindu decline’ was an 
outcome of colonial rule that favoured the Muslims. The idea that numbers, demographic majorities and
39 Prakash, A Review, p. 12.
40 Kenneth W. Jones, ‘Religious Identity and the Indian Census’, in N.G. Barrier [ed.], The Census in British India: New 
Perspectives, Delhi, 1980, pp. 73-101.
41 Arjun Appadurai, ‘Numbers in the Colonial Imagination’, in Arjun Appadurai [ed.], Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of 
Globalization, Delhi, 1997, pp. 114-38.
42 K. Jones, ‘Religious Identity and the Indian Census’, in N.G. Barrier [ed.], The Census in British India, New Delhi, 1981, pp. 
87- 92.
43 The Census of India 1911: Punjab Census Report, Calcutta, 1912, p. 99.
44 The Census of India 1891, Bengal, Vol. 3, Calcutta, 1892, p. 146.
45 H.H. Risley, Tribes and Castes of Bengal: Ethnographic Glossary, Calcutta, 1981 [1891], p. 384.
46 Census of India, 1911, UP, Vol. 15, Part I, Allahabad, 1912, pp. 109-10.
47 L.S.S. O’Malley, The Census of India 1911: Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Sikkim, Vol. 5, Part I, Calcutta, 1912, p. 63.
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minorities were directly related to power in colonial politics had become a marked feature of the emerging Hindu 
consciousness as prominently articulated by Hindu publicists in north India.48
The ‘inadequacy1 and ‘disempowerment’ of the Hindus resulting from the ‘declining’ numbers strengthened a 
broad alignment for Hindu unity and consolidation49 In 1910 there was a storm of protest over India’s Census 
Commissioner E.A. Gait’s abortive circular, which proposed ahead of the 1911 census an exclusion from the 
‘Hindu’ category of the lower castes and tribal groups who did not worship the ‘great Hindu gods’ or were 
subjected to untouchability and pollution taboos.50 The Gait circular threatened to reduce sharply the number of 
officially recorded ‘Hindus’ by rejecting the ‘Hinduness’ of the lower castes and untouchable groups and 
reclassifying them as ‘non-Hindus’.51 Arya Samajists, Sanatana Dharm Sabhas, and Hindu leaders in the 
Punjab feared an ‘amputation of part of the numerical strength’ of the Hindu community.52 Lajpat Rai staunchly 
attacked the British policy, claiming that it aimed to ‘thin the Hindu numbers with a view eventually to make them 
politically impotent’.53 ‘The possibility of losing the [six crore] untouchables,’ he wrote, 'has shaken the 
intellectual section of the Hindu community to its very depths.’ 54 Local Hindu Sabhas in the Punjab were 
exhorted to adopt resolutions declaring the untouchables to be their ‘kith and kin’ in protest against the 
proposed ‘division’ of the Hindu community.55 The Hindu outcry and high caste protests did not focus on caste 
reform, but combined an argument of ‘Hindu unity1 with hierarchical inequality. The Gait circular was withdrawn 
in 1912, but the apprehensions it triggered were potent enough to strengthen the nascent consciousness of 
Hindu unity as a community. The Hindu demographic strength was an important factor that helped to deepen 
the emerging drive for Hindu identity and consolidation in the Punjab.56
The census as well as the implications was at the heart of significant literature produced during the early 
twentieth century. In June 1909 U.N. Mukherji wrote an essay that was serialised in the Bengalee of 
Surendranath Banerjea, entitled ‘A Dying Race’; and it was later published as an influential pamphlet -  Hindus:
48 Lucy Carroll, ‘Colonial Perceptions of Indian Society and the Emergence of Caste[s] Associations’, Journal of Asian Studies, 
Vol. 37, No. 2, February 1978, pp. 233-50; Nandini Gooptu, The Politics of the Urban Poor in Early Twentieth-Century India, 
Cambridge, 2001, p. 204.
49 Papia Chakravarty, Hindu Response to Nationalist Ferment Bengal 1909-1935, Calcutta, 1992, pp. 72-91.
50 The Tribune of Lahore published the Gait circular in November 1910: The Census Returns of Hindus’, The Tribune, November 
12,1910, Microfilm, NMML.
51 E.A. Gait’s Notes of 31 May and 14 June 1911: E.A. Gait, The Census of India 1911: Report, Vol. I, Parti, Calcutta, 1912, pp. 
115,121.
52 P.K. Datta, ‘“Dying Hindus” : Production of Hindu Communal Common Sense in Early Twentieth-Century Bengal’, Economic 
and Political Weekly, Vol. 28, No. 25,19 June 1993, pp. 1305-19: p. 1306.
53 Lajpat Rai, The Arya Samaj: An Aaccount of its Origins, Doctrines and Activities, with a Biographical Sketch of the Founder, 
Delhi, 1967 [1915], pp 124-5.
54 Rai, Arya Samaj, p. 124.
55 Cited in Zavos, Emergence, p. 123.
56 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Genesis and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab: from the Arya Samaj to the Hindu 
Sabha [1875-1910]’, Indo-British Review, Vol. 21, No. 1,1993, pp. 3-40; Harald Fischer-Tine, 'Kindly Elders of the Hindu Biradri: 
The Arya Samaj’s Struggle for Influence and its Effect on Hindu-Muslim Relations, 1880-1925’, in Antony Copley [ed.], Gurus 
and Their Followers: New Religious Reform Movements in Colonial India, New Delhi, 2000, p. 126._______________________
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A Dying Race.57 It sought to create a demographic scare through a selective use of the census data and 
projections on the ‘disappearance’ of the Hindus within the next 420 years due to a relative increase in the 
Muslim and Christian population. Mukherji pointed to an inexorable ‘decline’ in the Hindu numbers relative to the 
‘virile, energetic and united Muslims’. The threat of biological ‘Hindu extinction’, he argued, had a remedy in the 
uplift of the untouchables and tribals under the leadership of Brahmans, as they were vulnerable to conversions 
to Islam and Christianity.58 Mukherji’s analysis proved to be an influential and enduring work in strengthening 
the emerging Hindu nationalist consciousness and urge for unity.59
Swami Shraddhananda [1857-1926], the Arya Samaj ideologue and pioneer of the Hindu sangathan 
movement of the early 1920s, borrowed the idea of the Hindus as a ‘dying race’ from Mukherji, reiterating that 
the ‘conversions by violence, force and fraud of Muslim conquerors and Christian missionaries’ were largely the 
reason for the imminent ‘extinction’ of the Hindus. However, he argued, Hinduism showed resilience in the face 
of the 'corrupt and dishonest methods’ of conversion perpetrated by Islamic and Christian proselytisers.60 He 
proposed sangathan -- the strategic organisation of Hindu society -  as a solution to the crisis of ‘numerical 
decline’.61 The anxiety over Hindu numbers accompanied by alarming Muslim demographic growth was in part 
central to the narrative on the construction of a monolithic Hindu community, which had become an important 
endeavour of Hindu publicists.62
1.3. Lai Chand’s Vision of Nationalism
One prominent influence behind the birth of the Hindu Sabha movement in the Punjab was Rai Bahadur Lai 
Chand [1852-1912], an Arya Samajist, a judge in Lahore, first president for twenty years of the Arya Samaj’s 
Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore, and one of the founders of the Punjab National Bank, Lahore. Lai 
Chand, regarded by the Hindu Mahasabha as the founder of the Hindu nationalist movement in the Punjab, 
wrote in 1909 a series of 15 articles in the Punjabee of Lahore, the newspaper founded by Lajpat Rai, under the 
title ‘Self Abnegation in Politics’; and it was later republished as Self-Abnegation in Politics in 1938.63 Lai 
Chand’s Self-Abnegation, a Hindu version of the ‘two-nation theory1, anticipated much of the discourse of the 
Hindu Mahasabha on the political rights and representation of the Hindus and their ‘plight’ in colonial India. Lai 
Chand viewed the attitude of the Hindus towards politics as ‘self-denying’, which allowed the claims of the 
Muslims to take ‘precedence’. Separate electorates granted under the 1909 reforms, he argued, were the
57 The Bengalee, 22 June 1909: the essay was serialised from 1 June to 22 June 1909. U.N. Mukherji, Hindus: A Dying Race, 
Calcutta, 1909, pp. 19-21.
58 U.N. Mukherji, Hinduism and the Coming Census: Christianity and Hinduism, Calcutta, 1911, p. 16.
59 K. Jones, The Negative Component of Hindu Consciousness’, Indo-British Review, Vol. 19, No.1, September 1993, p. 63.
60 Swami Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan: Saviour of the Dying Race, n.p. 1926, pp. 79-80,91. p. 127. Shraddhananda first 
issued an appeal entitled ‘Save the Dying Race’ in 1923. He later wrote Hindu Sangathan in 1924, which was published in 1926. 
J.T.F Jordens, Swami Shraddhananda: His Life and Causes, Delhi, 1981, pp. 131-4,151-2.
61 Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan, p. 127.
62 P.K. Datta, Carving Blocs: Communal Ideology in Early Twentieth-Century Bengal, New Delhi, 1999, ch. 1; idem, ‘Dying 
Hindus’, pp. 1305-19; Sumit Sarkar, Beyond Nationalist Frames: Postmodernism, Hindu Fundamentalism, History, Bloomington 
[UK], 2002, p. 83.
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‘apotheosis of surrender1 by the Hindus. There was an ‘oppression’ and ‘discrimination’ of the Hindus due to the 
‘British bias’ that had promoted Muslim interests, leading to the fears about the ‘Muslim domination’ of India.64 
Lai Chand put the blame for the loss of Hindu self-assertion on the Congress, an organisation that ‘makes the 
Hindu forget that he is a Hindu and tends to swamp this communal individuality into an Indian ideal’, making him 
break with all his ‘past traditions and past glory1.65 The Congress ideal of a composite nationhood was 
‘erroneous’, he argued, and had become impossible under the declared ‘hostile attitude’ of the Muslims. Any 
concessions by the Hindus to Muslim separatism would end in failure. ‘My own belief,’ he explained, ‘is that if 
we succeed in establishing a strong independent Hindu organisation, the Muslims would in course of time join 
us in making common demand for redress of common grievances.’66 Lai Chand favoured Hindu politics as an 
alternative to the national politics of the Congress, proposing the substitution of Hindu Sabhas for Congress 
committees and of a Hindu press for the Congress press for the protection of Hindu interests. He justified the 
development of the Hindu Sabha movement on the basis that Hindu patriotism ought to be ‘communal and not 
merely geographical’.67 Lai Chand’s work set the pattern for the beginning and strengthening of Hindu Sabha 
ideology as a powerful symbol of Hindu unity and cohesiveness in the Punjab.
1.4. Punjab Hindu Sabha
The most significant event in the development of Hindu consciousness and politics in India in the early 
twentieth century was the formation of the Punjab Hindu Sabha in 1909 by prominent leaders of the Aray Samaj. 
Madan Mohan Malaviya presided over the Hindu Sabha’s first session in Lahore in October 1909. The Sabha 
was formed around a nucleus of the Arya Samajists -  Lala Lajpat Rai, Lai Chand, and Shadi Lai -  who were 
the first ‘political exponents’ of Hindu nationalism.68 The Hindu Sabha stated that it was ‘not sectarian, but an 
all-embracing movement’ with an aim to safeguard 'the interests of the entire Hindu community in all respects’.69 
Its ideology was determined in part by Arya Samajist nationalism, deriving India’s pride from the ‘Vedic golden 
age’ and ‘ancient Hinduism’.70 The Arya Samaj’s social reformism, particularly the removal of untouchability and 
the advocacy of widow remarriage, was not successfully assimilated by the Hindu Sabha. On the contrary, 
sanatan dharm [orthodox Hindu] ideology, represented by the Sanatana Dharma Sabhas and the Bharat 
Dharma Mahamandal, was to prove central in the articulation of a coherent image of Hindu unity projected by 
the Sabha. The Sabha worked as a pressure group, functioning through petitions to both provincial and central
63 Lai Chand, Self-Abnegation in Politics [foreword by Bhai Parmanand], Lahore, 1938, pp. 33,100,103,118,121.
64 Cited in Christophe Jaffrelot, ‘Hindu Nationalism: Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building’, Economic and Political Weekly, 
Vol. 20, Nos. 12-13, March 20-27,1993, p. 519.
65 Lai Chand, Self-Abnegation, p. 21.
66 Chand, Self-Abnegation, pp. 122-4.
67 Lai Chand, Self-Abnegation, p. 103.
68 Home Poll A, August 1909,182-184, p. 295, NAI; Prakash, Hindu Mahasabha, p. 11; Prakash, A Review, p. ii.
69 Cited in Praksh, A Review, p. 13.
70 Jaffrelot argues that the Hindu Sabha movement was an extension of Arya Samaj ideology. Jaffrelot, ‘Hindu Nationalism’, pp. 
26-33. Arya Samajists portrayed India as a glorious ancient civilisation, which ‘fell’ in the context of colonial rule. Har Bilas Sarda, 
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governments on various issues affecting the Hindu community. It expressed its anxiety over the composition of 
the Punjab Legislative Council, in which the number of representatives went up from 24 to 30, but to the 
detriment of the Hindus in relative numbers.71 Nonetheless, the Sabha swore loyalty to the British and rarely 
carried its activities to the masses.72
The Hindu Sabha sought to demonstrate the emerging unity of the Hindu community by organising the first 
Punjab Provincial Hindu Conference in Lahore in 1909.73 Lai Chand was made chairman of the reception 
committee, which included Ram Bhaj Datta, Hari Chand of Multan, Lala Sukh Dial, and Lala Shadi Lai.74 The 
presidentship was offered to Sir Pratul Chander Chatteiji, former Punjab High Court judge, Bengali vice- 
chancellor of the Punjab University and a patron of the Sanatan Dharma Sabha.75 The conference, which 
opened in Lahore on 21 and 22 October 1909, was attended by nearly 3,000 leaders and notables, drawn from 
the United Provinces, the North West Frontier Province, and other parts of the country. It stated its mission as 
one of ‘consolidation and homogenisation’, urging different sections of the Hindu community to promote ‘mutual 
brotherly feelings and unity’.76 Lajpat Rai, in his speech to the conference, emphasised the ‘desirability of the 
sentiment of Hindu nationality and Hindu unity1, reiterating that the Hindus constituted a ‘distinct and separate 
nation’ because they represented ‘a civilisation’ of their own. The Hindus needed to organise themselves in 
unity, he stressed, in order to defend themselves in view of the rapid expansion of the Muslim League and the 
continued ‘British hostility’.77 Lai Chand, in his address, revealed an anxiety over the 'numerical decline’ of the 
Hindus, urging the need to strengthen the relative position of the Hindus vis-a-vis the Muslims in India. 
‘Numbers,’ he stressed, ‘carry great weight in this age and help materially in deciding the fate of any struggle.’78 
The conference severely criticised the Congress for its ‘failure’ to defend the interests of the Hindu community 
and called for Hindu-centred politics. It urged the establishment of Hindu Sabhas all over the country, besides 
proposing the organisation of an annual all-India Hindu conference.79
Consensual issues became prominent in the Punjab Hindu Sabha’s programme. The resolutions passed by 
Lahore Hindu conference concerned chiefly the promotion of Sanskrit and Hindi, support for cow protection and
71 The Memoranda of Hindu Sabha, Home Department [Political Part A], Proceedings No. 29-31,50-53, December 1909, NAI.
72 Home Department [Political Part B] Proceedings No. 69-70, April 1910, NAI.
73 The Tribune, 21 October 1909, p. 1, Microfilm, NMML; Barrier, ‘Arya Samaj and Congress Politics’, pp. 378-9.
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Ayurvedic medicine, and the writing of a history of India’s ‘Hindu period’.80 Several resolutions echoing the Arya 
Samaj’s reformist vision -  the removal of untouchability as well as lower caste amelioration -  were not put 
before the conference due to sanatani apprehensions over caste reform. No change in status was urged for the 
untouchables and lower castes. ‘All that is needed,’ Lai Chand emphasised, ‘is to advocate the interests of the 
community at large and the moment we realise this germinal idea, this sacred obligation ... all self-imposed 
differences and schisms will vanish away like chaff.’ 81 The need for consensus and unity was a prominent factor 
in the Hindu Sabha’s movement.
The image of a politically unified and organised Hindu community assumed critical importance in the Hindu 
Sabha’s political programme. The Sabha proposed the establishment of a broad all-India Hindu organisation, 
which would provide strength to Hindu politics in securing benefits for the Hindus at the provincial and local 
levels.82 As part of its plan, it held five Punjab Hindu conferences from 1909 to 1914: the first Hindu conference 
was held in Lahore in 1909. The second conference was convened in October 1910 in Lahore, with Bahadur 
Hari Chand chairing the reception committee and Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh Bedi as president.83 The third 
conference was organised on 29 September 1911 in Amritsar with Lai Chand once more as president, who 
demonstrated ‘none of the old fire and old reverberation’.84 Its attendance was not impressive, except for the 
presence of M.M. Malaviya. Lai Chand’s death in January 1912 removed a prominent figure from the Hindu 
Sabha movement, which was hit by the old pattern of inaction and factional struggles in the Punjab. The fourth 
Hindu conference, which was convened in Delhi in January 1912 under the presidentship of Lala Shadi Lai, 
passed the usual resolutions, but disbanded. The December 1913 conference of Ambala, the fifth conference, 
as well as the sixth Hindu conference held in Ferozepur in 1914 had revealed the weaknesses and difficulties 
that frustrated attempts to bridge divisions within the Hindu community.85 The Punjab Hindu Sabha faced the 
future devoid of any dynamic leadership or plan by expressing the Hindu nationalist sentiment fr India’s freedom 
with little organisational activity. However, it led the drive for the formation of an all-India Hindu organisation.
II. Hindu Mahasabha’s Formation
The formation of an all-India Hindu Sabha in the United Provinces was largely an outcome of the 
development of a broader Hindu communitarian consciousness taking place in the Punjab in the early twentieth 
century. The UP was a stronghold of Hindu orthodoxy and santan dharm ideology, dominated by the holy cities 
of Banaras, Hardwar, and Allahabad as well as the influence of upper castes -  ten per cent of them Brahmans - 
- who had formed a large number of sanatan dharm associations and educational institutions through their hold
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over land, administration and trade. Powerful Hindu mercantile classes had emerged and Hindu corporate 
towns flourished, resulting in the growth of urban political culture and social ethos.86 These changes, as Sandria 
Freitag and Vasudha Dalmia explain, provided the context for Hindu revival and reform, which were evident in 
the proliferation of religious rituals and celebrations in the 'public arena’ and the expansion of activities of 
religious organisations like the Arya Samaj across the province. The growth of religious festivals and 
celebrations contributed to the elaboration of a ‘sustained ideology of community’ and the emergence of a 
cohesive sense of the Hindu community.87 In the forefront of religious and cultural revivalism in the UP were the 
Arya Samaj, the Hindu Samaj of Allahabad, the Bharat Dharm Mahamandal, and the Sanatana Dharma Sabha. 
The Sanatana Dharma Sabhas and the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal were the chief sanatamst movements in 
the province.88 The Mahamandal claimed in 1902 that it represented ‘the whole of the orthodox classes of the 
Hindus in India’.89 Admittedly, the emergence of Hindu revival and politics became extremely prominent in the 
UP, particularly in the eastern districts of Allahabad and Bhojpuri region, in effect becoming the basis for the 
development of the Hindu unity movement.
In ideological terms, the Hindu-oriented elite had been actively involved in the development of the Hindu 
Sabha movement in the UP since the early twentieth century. The key figure in the new direction of the Sabha 
movement was Madan Mohan Malaviya [1861-1946], the Bharat Dharma Mahamandala’s leading publicist and 
a prime mover in the Hindu University Society which had raised funds through the patrons of sanatan dharm. 
Malaviya started the Hindu Samaj [Hindu Society] in Allahabad in 1880 to promote Hindu institutions -- such as 
the local Magh Mela whose idolatry was criticised by Christian missionaries.90 The foundation of the Hindu 
University Society in 1912 helped to draw together local Hindu Sabhas, which had been formed in Allahabad, 
Banaras, and Kanpur.91 The Hindu Sabhas championed Hindu issues like cow-slaughter that provoked an 
endless agitation by Hindu publicists, but efforts to unify and strengthen the Sabhas on a provincial basis had 
not survived long.92 In addition, a variety of Hindu organisations had emerged in the UP towns in the context of 
deepening involvement in the projects of Hindu improvement and renewal in the early twentieth century.
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A formal move to form an all-India Hindu Sabha was made at the annual session of the Indian National 
Congress in Allahabad in 1910. A committee was set up with Lala Baij Nath, an Agarwala banker, a rais of 
Kanpur and president of the UP Vaish Conference, as president to draw up a constitution. Little progress had 
ensued, however.93 Similar concerns were expressed in 1910 when a meeting of Hindu leaders in Allahabad 
took the initial step of organising an all-India Hindu Sabha. The goals and rules of the Sabha were agreed and 
officers selected, but it could not become operational due to internal divisions and factional strife.94 The Punjab 
Hindu Sabha eventually led the drive for the founding of the all-India Hindu organisation. The Hindu Sabha, at 
its fifth session held in Ambala on 7 and 8 December 1913, passed a resolution to create the organisation. This 
Conference,’ it stated, ‘is strongly of opinion that in order to deliberate upon measures for safeguarding the 
interests of the Hindu Community throughout India and elsewhere it is highly desirable that a General 
Conference of Hindus of India be held at Hardwar on the occasion of the Kumbh in 1915, and it requests the 
following gentlemen to make necessary arrangements for the purpose.’95 Hindu leaders from all parts of the 
country, 26 in total, were nominated to the Hindu Sabha Committee. However, only five leaders attended the 
first preliminary meeting held in Dehradun on 24 September 1914, three of them belonging to Dehradun itself.96 
Office-bearers were appointed, and a budget of Rs 2,000 was passed for the proposed Sabha. But for ‘one 
reason or another the formation of the office and other measures contemplated in the... proceedings remained 
in abeyance’. Little progress had occurred on the creation of the all-India Hindu Sabha97
The Punjab Hindu Sabha finally renewed its plan to form the all-India Hindu Sabha in 1914. It reaffirmed the 
resolution of the Ambala conference at its sixth session held in Ferozepur in end-1914, at which ‘the venerable 
Rai Saheb Lala Murlidhar... of Umbala presided’.98 In early 1915, Lala Sukhbir Sinha, general secretary of the 
planned Hindu Sabha, sent a circular to all those who were supposed to assist in the preparations. The 
preparatory sessions of the all-India Hindu Sabha were to be held in Hardwar on 13 February 1915, on 17 
February in Lucknow, and a final one on 27 February in Delhi.99 In April 1915, the All-India Conference of 
Hindus was convened during the Kumbh Mela in Hardwar,100 where the Sarvadeshak Hindu Sabha -  the All- 
India Hindu Sabha -  was founded as ‘a grand front with a flourish of trumpets’ and pledges to represent the 
Hindu community.101 Gandhi and Swami Shraddhananda, who were among the speakers at the Kumbh Mela 
conference, strongly supported the formation of the Hindu Sabha.102 Maharaja Munindra Chandra Nandi of 
Kasimbazar, president of the conference, declared the Sabha’s loyalty to the British, however. It was the First
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World War period of crisis and turmoil. Munindra Chandra Nandi stated: ‘As Hindus, we are loyal to the King- 
Emperor and the government by virtue of our religion and our prayers are rising day and night to the Most High 
for the victory of British and of our Allies.’103 Hindu members of the Imperial Legislative Assembly and the 
commissioner of Meerut division were invited to the Sabha’s inauguration. The Meerut commissioner was 
euphoric about the Sabha’s loyalty: ‘I have been deeply impressed with the loyal enthusiasm showed [sic] by 
the vast audience assembled whenever any reference had been made to the person of His Most Gracious 
Majesty the King-Emperor or the British Government in the course of the President’s address.’104 The founding 
of the All-India Hindu Sabha marked a triumph for the ideology of Hindu unity, which had been actively 
propagated by Hindu publicists across the Punjab and the UP.
The All-India Hindu Sabha laid particular stress on Hindu solidarity and the need for social reform without 
identifying itself with ‘any particular sect or sects of the Hindu community’.105 A reference to 'Hindu political 
interests’ was made in the Sabha’s constitution, but only in passing in the sixth and last clause of the ‘Aims’.106 
A Subjects Committee passed a series of rules for the new organisation and defined its goals:
i. to promote greater ‘union and solidarity1 of the Hindus as ‘one organic whole’;
ii. to promote education among members of the Hindu community;
iii. to ameliorate and improve the condition of all classes of the Hindu community;
iv. to protect and promote Hindu interests ‘whenever and wherever it may be necessary1;
v. to promote good feelings between the Hindus and other communities in India and to act in a friendly way with 
them and in ‘loyal co-operation with the government’; and
vi. generally to take steps for promoting ‘religious, moral, educational, social and political interests’ of the 
community.107
Nevertheless, the Hindu Sabha lacked any radical programme to reform Hindu society and dropped 
controversial issues -  mainly untouchability and widow remarriage. It scrupulously avoided discussions on 
political questions, but pledged to develop a greater homogeneity of the Hindus on consensual issues: cow 
protection, and Hindi and Nagari.108 It remained on the whole strictly loyal to the British. Swami Shraddhananda, 
who had declined to join the Hindu Sabha at first, was critical about the exceedingly loyal, pro-British position 
taken by the organisation, ‘run by those Hindus in whose estimation every invader who snatched the
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Government of a country from its people was God personified’.109 The Hindu Sabha sought to consolidate its 
position as the representative of the Hindus without provoking hostility against the government and functioned 
mostly as a counterweight to the Muslim League.110 It demonstrated a drive to campaign on various Hindu 
issues by organising its annual sessions in different parts of India. It organised its second session in Bombay in 
1915 and the third conference in Hardwar [Dehradun] in 1916 with Madan Mohan Malaviya as president, which 
reiterated the need for the revival of the ‘ancient greatness of the Hindus’.111 The fourth session of the Hindu 
Sabha, which was held in Hardwar in 1917, expressed a desire to conciliate the Muslims. It conceded that the 
main cause of the Hindu-Muslim riots, which had occurred in 1916 in the UP, was chiefly the ‘mutual want of 
respect for the deep-seated and long-cherished religious sentiments’ of the communities. It urged the 
government to appoint a mixed commission of Hindu and Muslim leaders to inquire into the riots, offering its co­
operation.112 In 1918 under the impact of the UP Home Rule League, the Hindu Sabha held its fifth session at 
the venue of the Congress session in Delhi under the presidentship of Raja Sir Rampal Singh.113 During this 
period, the Hindu Sabha acted as an interest group to safeguard the sectional interests of the Hindus, but did 
not want to be labelled as ‘anti-British’.114
II. 1. Non-cooperation Movement 
The Congress launched the Non-cooperation-Khilafat movement in 1920 following a successful mobilisation 
against the Rowlatt Act of 1919 which attempted to make permanent the wartime restrictions on civil rights, 
including the detention without trial for minor offences -  such as the possession of seditious tracts.115 Gandhi 
integrated the goals of the Non-cooperation movement with the Khilafat issue, designed to prevent the allied 
dismemberment of Turkey, the Caliphate of Islam, afterWorld War I. The Hindus, he insisted, would support the 
Muslims in their quest to retain the Khilafat and prevent the 'dismemberment of the empire of the Khalifa against 
the dictates of the Islamic law1.116 ‘The Muslims and Hindus of India,’ he declared, ‘were not only united over the 
question of the Khilafat, but also on all political questions relating to their motherland -  India.’117 During the 
greater part of Non-cooperation, the All-India Hindu Sabha ceased to function formally: it met in annual session 
just once in 1919.118 The Sabha met at its sixth session under the presidentship of Maharaja Munindra Chandra 
Nandi later in Hardwar in April 1921, re-christening itself as the All-India Hindu Mahasabha [Akhil Bharat Hindu 
Mahasabha] on the Congress model. The Hindu Mahasabha amended its constitution to replace the ‘loyalty’
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clause with a clause committing the organisation to ‘a united and self-governing Indian nation', moving parallel 
to the Congress.119 It convened a special session in Delhi on 6-7 November 1921 -  where the general secretary 
and others delivered the speeches from the Congress platform. The session, which was presided over by Lajpat 
Rai and attended by Gandhi, C.R. Das, Motilal Nehru, and Jamna Lai Bajaj, passed resolutions echoing the 
Congress agenda, endorsing the Non-cooperation movement in respect of the boycott of foreign goods and the 
adoption of swadeshi. It appealed to all Hindus to give up employment in the military, police and civil services of 
the British government, besides resolving to boycott the visit of the Prince of Wales as part of Non­
cooperation.120 In this period, the Mahasabha broadly represented the politics of moderate Indian nationalism, 
even though it rejected the Congress as a ‘toothless’ and ‘unrepresentative’ organisation of India. It shadowed 
the Congress by adopting the latter’s agenda and programmes, but did not venture into mass agitational politics.
However, the Hindu Mahasabha remained ambiguous over its position vis-a-vis Indian nationalism. The 
Congress’s nationalist struggle made little impact on most Mahasabha leaders, who in general did not 
participate in the anti-Rowlatt Act Satyagraha and the Non-cooperation movement. The large number of them 
remained unaffected by the Congress’s doctrine of Hindu-Muslim unity. Sir Rampal Singh declared the 
Mahasabha’s commitment to Hindu interests as ‘higher patriotism towards which humanity has been gaining 
strength in this country’.121 The Khilafat movement was portrayed as an act of ‘betrayal’, ‘a proof of the extra­
national loyalties of the Muslim community as a whole’. The Muslims could, it was claimed, never share an 
‘emotional bond’ with India and were eternally ‘foreign’ because their spiritual home was the Islamic heartland of 
‘Turkey and Arabia’.122 In his presidential speech to the Congress’s special session in Calcutta in 1920, Lajpat 
Rai attacked the ‘religious objectives’ of the Khilafat agitation, protesting that ‘Mr Gandhi in his wisdom ... 
considered it necessary and proper in a way to tack the Indian National Congress to the Central Khilafat 
Committee’.123 Distancing itself from the composite nationalism that was the Congress’s creed, the Mahasabha 
saw little worth in a union with the Muslims, believing that there were irreconcilable differences between the 
Hindus and the Muslims, and that the nationalist vision of unity was ‘ill-conceived’ and an ‘idle and futile’ dream. 
The establishment of powerful Muslim organisations and the resultant Islamic fervour evident during the Khilafat 
movement in part motivated the Mahasabha to plan a larger mobilisation for Hindu defensive politics throughout 
India during the 1920s.124
The Non-cooperation movement involved the boycott of British goods and institutions -  chiefly the legislative 
councils, the courts, and colleges -- as part of the all-India strategy of the Congress. Madan Mohan Malaviya,
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while remaining within the Congress, first withdrew from the elections in 1920, but later came out strongly 
against all stages of the Non-cooperation movement, staying aloof from it. He attacked Non-cooperation as 
‘inimical to the long-term interests of the Hindu community’ of India.125 In his speech to a meeting in Allahabad 
in October 1920, he condemned the boycott of the schools and colleges as an ‘educational suicide’. It would be 
the ‘height of folly,’ he argued, ‘to cut off much-needed government financial aid to expanding educational 
institutions’, such as the Banaras Hindu University of which he was appointed vice-chancellor in 1919. The 
legislative councils should not be boycotted, he argued, because ‘the peasants have been relying on the 
nationalists to redress their grievances through the Councils’. 126 In the name of Islam, he protested, Hindu 
politicians were being asked to boycott the legislative councils and ‘sacrifice the achievements of years of 
political activity*.127 From 1923 onwards, Malaviya turned his attention to a successful political career in the 
legislatures in a marked hostility against the Non-cooperation movement. Krishna Kant Malaviya, Malaviya’s 
staunch follower in Allahabad, reportedly urged the delegates to vote against Non-co-operation at the Nagpur 
session of the Congress in December 1920.128 Malaviya’s supporters in the UP affiliated to the UP Kisan Sabha, 
the Sewa Samiti, and the radical Kayastha Pathshala of Allahabad -  prominently Iswar Saran and Ranjit Singh 
of Allahabad, Narayan Prasad Asthana and Prag Narayan of Agra, Jugal Kishore of Gorakhpur, and Awadh 
Bihari Lai of Oudh -  were strongly opposed to Non-cooperation and stayed aloof from it.129 For the Mahasabha, 
the unravelling of Non-cooperation was read as a ‘transitory phenomenon’, even though the period 1919-1922 
represented the heyday of Hindu-Muslim unity in the anti-colonial movement. The powerful anti-British 
sentiment that drove the Non-cooperation movement was either overlooked or denied.
Hindu Mahasabha leaders, particularly B.S. Moonje, N.C. Kelkar and M.R. Jayakar, opposed Gandhi’s move 
on council boycott and refused to resign from the legislative councils.130 In 1919 the Government of India Act 
devolved considerable powers to the reformed legislative councils and gave elected Indians a more prominent 
role in the governance of the provinces, while keeping the vital departments at the centre firmly in British control 
under ‘diarchy’. The Mahasabhaites had every incentive to take a decisive advantage of the 1919 Act and of the 
reformed councils, which were viewed as the ‘bastions of power’.131 Raja Narendra Nath, secretary of the 
Punjab Hindu Sabha, contested the elections of the Punjab Legislative Council in 1920 in spite of the boycott 
call given by the Congress. He attacked the Congress for its ‘indifferent attitude’ towards Hindu interests,
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insisting that the Hindu-Muslim unity achieved during the Non-cooperation struggle was ‘superficial’.132 In 
general, the Hindu Mahasabha was more concerned about issues on which it competed with the Muslim 
League to promote Hindu interests vis-a-vis the Muslims rather than an outright confrontation with the British.133
The Hindu Mahasabha adopted a new focus and determined position in the wake of its revival in 1922-23. 
Madan Mohan Malaviya, who assumed the presidentship of the Mahasabha from 1922 to 1925, effectively re­
launched the organisation on a firmer ideological basis at its Gaya session in December 1922, unveiling 
sangathan [Hindu unity and consolidation] as its first aim for the attainment of swaraj.m  He emphasised the 
need for a strong and unified Hindu community to achieve this objective. The Mahasabha’s Banaras session in 
1923 marked the emergence of a more militant Hindu nationalist orientation in its ideology, committing the 
organisation toa collective defence of the socio-political interests of the Hindu community.135 Sangathan 
ideology had developed into a defining principle of the Mahasabha’s programme in which the ‘hostile other’ was 
not the British, but the Muslims.136 The Mahasabha reinforced and deepened an overarching, all-embracing 
ideal of'Hindu unity’ based on anti-Muslim hostility throughout the 1920s and 1930s.
Conclusion
Hindu nationalism had emerged as an established feature of politics in north India, with its ideology 
represented in an institutional form by the Hindu Mahasabha, by the early twentieth century. The Hindu Sabha 
movement originated in the Punjab, the Arya Samajist stronghold -  where the Punjab Hindu Sabha was formed 
in 1909 and had spearheaded the movement for the formation of the All-India Hindu Sabha. The Mahasabha 
was founded in the UP on an explicitly Hindu nationalist agenda in 1915, campaigning over overriding Hindu 
issues: the propagation of Nagari and Hindi, cow protection, etc.137 It experienced a political decline between 
1919 and 1922 under the impact of the Non-cooperation movement that sought to define the Hindus and the 
Muslims as partners in an independent Indian nation. The Mahasabha mostly stayed out of the Congress 
struggle; and its ambiguity over Congress-led nationalism persisted, negating a confrontation with the British. In 
its articulation of nationalism, the Mahasabha distanced itself from the Congress’s anti-imperialist struggle, 
creating a ‘nationalist’ political programme in which opposition to British rule played little part.138 After its re­
launch in 1922, it aligned Hindu unity with national unity, articulating an aggressive Hindu self-strengthening and 
assertion as part of sangathan. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Mahasabha’s discourse assumed a stridently anti-
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Muslim hostility, viewing the presence of the Muslims as the main obstacle to the creation of a homogeneous 
‘Hindu nation’.139
139 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Idea of Hindu Race in the Writings of Hindu Nationalist Ideologues in the 1920s and 1930s: A 
Concept between Two Cultures’, in Peter Robb [ed.], The Concept of Race in South Asia, Delhi, 1997 [1995], p. 331.
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3Hindu Mahasabha’s Social Base and Organisation
The Hindu Mahasabha’s origins were located in the internal history of the United Provinces, where a ‘Hindu 
identity’ was constructed and given a political expression in the early twentieth century. The ‘Hindu identity1 
served to unite educated and wealthy Hindus, landowning groups, the urban professional intelligentsia, and 
business groups in the towns and cities of the province. The success of the propaganda about Hindu unity lay in 
creating a perceived coherence of interests among the Hindu groups. At its grassroots, the Mahasabha was 
made up of the elite social classes with divergent aspirations, many of which had little to do with Indian 
nationalism. Its propaganda sought to address typically middle class concerns; and its main support came 
predominantly from the traditional Hindu elites of the UP. The Mahasabha systematically sought the support of 
powerful landed interest groups, besides strengthening an active alliance with Hindu ruling princes in north India. 
It had a close connection with Hindu revivalist groups -  the Arya Sama] and the sanatan dharm movement -  
which had been active for some time before its emergence. The Mahasabha’s social roots had determined and 
demonstrated a structure of elite-led politics that hampered its ability to attract mass support: the party’s lack of 
mass mobilisation was in part the reason for its early decline. This chapter explores and assesses the 
Mahasabha's social base as well as its organisational structure and leadership in the UP in the 1920s and 
1930s. This period had proved critical for the ways in which the Hindu community and a Hindu politics emerged 
in north India.
I. Urban and High Caste Roots
The Hindu Mahasabha was largely but not exclusively urban in character, being concentrated in the largest 
trading cities of the UP -- Allahabad, Kanpur, Banaras, and Lucknow; and it was supported by the urban Hindu 
gentry and commercial groups. The development of towns and cities in the UP had since the late nineteenth 
century been influenced by the consolidation of British rule in north India after the suppression of the 1857 revolt 
and the proliferation of the railway network, coupled with the growth of local and long-distance trade.1 The 
impact of British rule brought economic decline to the rural qasbah towns dominated by the Muslim service 
gentry, while the commercialisation of agriculture and the growth of trade resulted in the prosperity of Hindu 
market towns \ganjs].2 The towns became important urban centres, all owing their growth primarily to trade and 
administration, and, in the case of Kanpur, to manufacturing industries. By the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, the landed service gentry and aristocracies had been gradually eclipsed by commercial groups in the 
towns in social and political importance. Traders and merchants, a majority of them being Hindu or Jain,
1 C.A. Bayly, The Small Town and Islamic Gentry in North India: The Case of Kara’, in K. Ballhatchet and J. Harrison [eds.], The 
City in South Asia: Pre-modem and Modem, London, 1980, pp. 20-4.
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constituted a cohesive social group; and their trade and credit institutions created a ‘corporate culture of great 
vitality’ in the ganjs? The social and commercial organisations of the merchant communities and the 'mutual 
code of honour1 that made efficient commercial transactions possible, Vasudha Dalmia argues, amounted to a 
‘virtual civic government’.4 Indeed, the commercial groups laid, Bayly notes, the foundations for a more 
cohesive ‘middle class opinion’ in the towns.5 The merchants and traders, in alliance with emerging professional 
and service classes, became the driving force behind the increasingly ‘purist’ or ‘reformist’ Hindu religious and 
social initiatives.6 The Hindu religious and charitable institutions as well as political associations were important 
in linking together the ‘respectable parts’ of Hindu society.7 The elite sections of Hindu society and the ‘middle 
class opinion’, dissociated from landed property and urban in its livelihood, in part formed the social base of an 
assertive Hindu revivalism -  which entered politics following the emergence of the Hindu mahasabha in 1915. 
The Mahasabha drew its support predominantly from politically organised and articulate urban Hindu groups. 
Eighteen members of the UP Hindu Sabha executive committee, elected in December 1915, were drawn from 
six of the principal cities in the UP, of which Allahabad alone accounted for ten, while three members came from 
the western divisions of Meerut, Agra, and Rohilkhand.8 The urban Hindu gentry and the Hindu traders, who 
had so long maintined local power and status, became the main supporters of the Mahasabha in the UP.
The Hindu Mahasabha succeeded in attracting support from among the Indian National Congress’s 
traditional supporters -- the ‘educated middle class’ leaders -- who had been disappointed by the tatter’s ‘failure’ 
to protect Hindu interests in the government and legislature of the UP. The issues which the Mahasabha took 
up -  employment in government services, the ‘oppression’ of the Hindus, the ‘destruction’ of Hindu temples, etc. 
-  were precisely those that worried the urban middle classes, who were disillusioned by the lack of effective 
remedies from the Congress. The Hindu classes that supported the Mahasabha were mostly Brahmans, Banias, 
Agarwals, and Vaishya groups. A closely-knit and highly organised group of ‘Brahman politicians’, whom 
Lieutenant-Governor James Meston termed the ‘main characteristic of UP political life’ in 1917, largely 
contributed to the growth of the Mahasabha.9 The 1915 UP Hindu Sabha committee included nine Brahmans -- 
four Kashmiris, two Malavis, one Gujarati Nagar, one Telugu, and one Kanyakubya.10 These Hindu groups, with 
an involvement in a range of Hindu revivalist and reformist movements across the UP, embraced the
2 C.A. Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of Britsh Expansion, 1770-1870, Cambridge, 1992 
[1983], pp. 449-57.
3 C.A. Bayly, The Local Roots of Indian Politics: Allahabad, 1880-1920, Oxford, 1975, pp. 19-46; idem, Rulers, Townsmen, pp. 
429-30, 451.
4 Vasudha Dalmia, The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions: Bharatendu Harishchandra and Nineteenth-century Banaras, Delhi, 
1997, pp. 87-8.
5 Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen, p. 452.
6 C.A. Bayly, ‘Patrons and Politics in Northern India’, Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3,1973, pp. 349-88.
7 S.B. Freitag [ed.], Culture and Power in Banaras: Community, Peformance, and Environment, 1800-1980, Berkeley, 1989, p. 8.
8 Richard Gordon, The Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress, 1915 to 1926’, Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2, 
1975, p. 156-7.
9 Cited in Gordon, ‘Hindu Mahasabha’, p. 155.
10 Gordon, ‘Hindu Mahasabha’, p. 161.
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Mahasabha because its campaign appealed to the notion of ‘Hindu unity* and the ‘welfare of the Hindu 
community1 as a whole.
The Hindu Mahasabha allied itself with north Indian commercial and industrial classes during the years after 
First World War I. In the UP, the members of the rich banking families were drawn mostly from the trading 
castes. The commercial magnates who were the Mahasabha’s chief patrons belonged to the three biggest 
banking houses in the province -  Prag Narayan Bhargava of Lucknow, Lala Bishambhar Nath of Kanpur, and 
Moti Chand Gupta of Banaras.11 The big business was the first to switch its allegiance from the Congress to the 
Mahasabha in the 1920s and 1930s. Sir Jwala Prasad Srivastava, a Kanpur industrialist who was president of 
the UP Hindu Sabha in 1942 and who served on the Viceroy’s Executive Council, admitted: ‘After the Congress 
assumption of office in UP in 1937, the leading industrialists -  all I think Hindu -  got together and decided to 
finance Jinnah and the Muslim League [sic] and also the Mahasabha.'12 Several business and banking houses 
believed that ‘paying a premium to the Mahasabha would provide a better insurance’ to them.13 The UP Hindu 
Sabha committee included six Kayasthas, seven Vaish, and two Rajputs. The Vaish were divided into three 
Agarwals, three Khatris, and one Bhargava. Of the 24 members of the committee, only two depended entirely 
on landed income, while the majority were professional and commercial men.14 Wealthy Marwari families 
contributed substantially to the Mahasabha’s funds. Seth Jugal Kishore Birla of Calcutta, whose family in the 
past had bankrolled many Congress campaigns, topped the list of donors who financed the Mahasabha. He 
was a key financial backer of the Mahasabha and one of the principal bankrollers of the shuddhi movement.15 
Ghanshyamdas Birla made donations towards the costs of the election campaign of Madan Mohan Malaviya’s 
Independent Congress Party in 1926, besides giving funds for the Mahasabha’s untouchable uplift drive and its 
propagation of the Nehru Report in 1928-29.16 Seth Bansidhar Jallan, Badridas Goenka, Radhakissen Kanodia, 
and Khaitan and Company of Calcutta made generous contributions to the Mahasabha.17 The Mahasabha was 
able to attract money in a relatively short period, as sections of Hindu businessmen had begun to shift their 
loyalties to the party by the 1930s.
A small group of urban professionals dominated the Hindu Mahasabha, with many of its leading personalities 
being lawyers by profession. Of the 24 members of the UP Hindu Sabha committee [1915-16], 16 were lawyers 
by profession, including Gokul Prasad, Mahadeo Prasad, Rama Kant Malaviya, and Iswar Saran. The 
committee comprised three zamindars who were also lawyers, six commercial and landed magnates, of whom 
one was a vakil, two taluqdars, and one journalist. Sarkar Bahadur Johari, an advocate of Allahabad, was
11 Prag Narayan Bhargava, Obituary, The Leader, 5 January 1917, p. 4; Home Public, File 623 of 1925, p. 121, NAI.
12 Cited in Sumit Sarkar, Modem India, 1885-1947, Basingstoke [UK], 1989 [1983], p. 358.
13 Cited in Joya Chatterji, Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947, Cambridge, 1994, p. 143.
14 Gordon, ‘Hindu Mahasabha’, p. 149.
15 Chatterji, Bengal Divided, pp. 136-7.
16 G.D. Birla, In the Shadow of the Mahatma: A Personal Memoir, Calcutta, 1953, p. 164
17 Chatterji, Bengal Divided, p. 137.
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president of the UP Hindu Sabha; and Wati Vishnu Swarup, a lawyer, was the leader of the Bijnore Hindu 
Sabha. Ram Mohan Lai, an advocate of Moradabad, and Rai Bahadur Vikramjit Singh, a lawyer of Kanpur, 
were leading lights of the Hindu Mahasabha movement.18 Gokaran Nath Misra and Brijnandan Prasad were 
lawyer-politicians associated with the Mahasabha, even though they had held small zamindaris. Most lawyers 
supporting the Mahasabha and its sangathan movement belonged to the upper castes, usually Kayastha or 
Brahman. Among such lawyers were men reputed to be earning the largest incomes at the High Court Bar in 
Allahabad, particularly Sir Sundar Lai Dave -- primarily an educationist. They and a few others in the Congress 
were close friends and attended dinner parties ‘at homes’ in Allahabad.19 Journalists and teachers, too, were 
associated with the Mahasabha: they were significantly men of considerable public experience and reputation, 
of an older generation. C.Y. Chintamani, editor of the Leader and a member the UP Hindu Sabha committee, 
became minister of education and exercised enormous control in the allocation of funds to the localities in the 
UP. Malaviya was sceptical about the professionals and referred to the 'distrust of the English-educated elite’, 
adding that such attitude ‘grieved’ him.20 However, the Mahasabha’s overwhelming and active support came 
from the middle class professionals in the UP.
The Hindu Mahasabha followed the existing pattern of elite politics, its leaders maintaining ties to several 
organisations across the United Provinces. Local Hindu Sabhas were indistinguishable from district associations, 
which were the hub of public life in the larger cities and watchdogs over local government elections as well as 
smaller mofussil bodies. At least ten members of the UP Hindu Sabha committee had been members of the 
Hindu University Society executive committee and the University Deputation in 1916,21 while six were members 
of the Council of the Banaras Hindu University.22 Seven were listed as patrons and members of the Nagari 
Pracharini Sabha, Banaras.23 Madan Mohan Malaviya, Pandit Deva Ratan Sharma, Raja Sir Rampal Singh, and 
Lala Ram Saran Das, who had been associated with the leadership of the Mahasabha since its foundation in 
1915, were influential leaders active in local government and a number of associations, religious bodies, 
educational trusts, and charities. Fourteen members of the UP Hindu Sabha committee were members of the 
legislatures, 12 of the provincial and two of the Imperial Legislative Assemly: Malaviya and Rampal Singh were 
the members of the Imperial Assembly. Of the 12 Hindu Sabha members in the UP Legislative Council, 11 were 
elected and one, T.B. Sapru, was nominated.24 The Hindu elites associated with the Mahasabha were linked to 
alliances with political and social organisations and religious institutions in the UP. Lala Bishambhar Nath, an 
Agarwala banker and rais, was president of the Kanpur Hindu Sabha in 1915, president of the Kanpur District
18 Gordon, ‘Hindu Mahasabha', p. 153; Sri Bharat Mahamandal Directory, Benaras, 1930, p. 50.
19 Motilal Nehru’s letter to John Morley, Secretary of State, dated 26 April 1907, UP J &P, 1544 of 1907, IOL.
20 The Leader, 10 June, p. 3; 29 August 1926, p. 2, Microfilm, NMML.
21 V.A. Sundaram [ed.], Benares Hindu University 1916-1942, Benares, 1942, pp. 90-1.
22 The Leader, 16 August 1916, p. 2, Microfilm, NMML.
23 The Leader, 10 August 1916, p. 4, Microfilm, NMML. The Nagari Pracharini Sabha, founded in 1893, claimed to have 1,228 
members in 1916.
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Association, president of the Chamber of Commerce of Kanpur, and a leading member of the Sanatan Dham 
Sabha and the Legislative Council. Dr Muratilal Rohtagi, a Vaish medical practitioner, held office at various 
times in the Congress, the Hindu Sabha, and the Arya Samaj, and was a vice-president of the Kanpur District 
Association. Lala Anand Swarup, a Kayasth lawyer, was a member of the Kanpur association and an office­
holder in the Congress, the Hindu Sabha, and the Arya Samaj. A member of the Legislative Council, he was 
influential in the Allahabad Bar circles and attended the Kayastha conferences in the UP. Mahasabha leader 
Lala Sukhbir Sinha was ex-president of the Vaish Conference, while Moti Chand Gupta, a Mahasabha man, 
was its president in 1916. Munshi Gokul Prasad, a Mahasabhaite, was president of the Kayastha Pathshala of 
Allahabad. The Mahasabha leaders and patrons with their diverse affiliations between them dominated most 
institutions of the provincial legislature as well as various social organisations in the UP.25
Ideologically, the Hindu Mahasabha was dominated mostly by the followers of sanatan dharm [orthodox 
Hinduism], even though it also represented the Arya Samaj and professional elements associated with the more 
progressive and reformist UP Social Conference.26 Sanatan dharm ideology sought to promote the hierarchical 
varna [caste] structure and orthodox causes and resisted social reform;27 and the religious affiliations of most 
Mahasabha patrons and leaders showed a pronounced bias to the sanatan dharm movement. Eighteen 
members of the UP Hindu Sabha committee were prominent patrons of sanatan dharm.28 The Mahasabha’s 
secretary -- Pandit Deva Ratan Sharma, a Punjabi Brahman of Dehradun -- had been a propaganda worker for 
sanatan dharm in the past. The Bharat Dharma Mahamandal was the most active sanathan dharm association 
with its base in Banaras in the eastern UP: by entering the legislatures, it hoped to sabotage all legislation 
interfering with vamashram dharm and secure separate representation for orthodox Hindus.29 The Maharaja of 
Darbhanga, a Mahasabha leader himself, formed the All-India Sanatan Dharma Sammelan in conjunction with 
the Hindu Mahasabha in Hardwar in 1915.30 At a Sanatan Dharma Sammelan conference in Delhi in March 
1920, he urged all Sanatan Dham Sabhas to support orthodox candidates at the elections to the UP Legislative 
Council later in that year.31 The sanatan dharm organisations and leaders exerted a revivalist and conservative 
influence on the ideological development of the Hindu Mahasabha as a Hindu political organisation.
Nonetheless, the core values of the Arya Samaj, which was in perpetual conflict with the sanatan dharm 
movement, increasingly influenced and determined the emergent milieu of Hindu nationalism articulated by the 
Hindu Mahasabha. The Samaj, founded by Dayananda Saraswati in 1875, was based on a radical reformist
24 Home Public D, June 1913, File No. 40, NAI; Bayly, Local Roots, p. 217.
25 Gordon, ‘Hindu Mahasabha’, pp. 168-9.
26 Raja Sir Rampal Singh presided over the UP Social Conference in 1908 and the Indian Social Conference in 1910. The 
Leader, 16 August 1916, p. 3, Microfilm, NMML.
27 ‘Short Note on the Shri Bharat Dharma Mahamandal, Benares’, Home Poll., File 313 of 1925, NAI.
28 John Zavos, The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism in India, Oxford, 2000, pp. 59-61.
29 Minute by Sir James Meston, 24 October 1917, Home Public A, May 1918,568-98, NAI.
30 The Sammelan met in 1916 and 1917 in Lahore. In 1917 it was amalgamated with the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal of 
Banaras. Din Dayal Sarma was founder secretary of the Mahamandal. The Leader, 25 February 1916, p. 4, Microfilm, NMML.
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programme: the denial of status to Brahmans, the rejection of idolatry, and a critique of the varna hierarchy. It 
contributed significantly to the development of Hindu nationalism through a dissemination of propaganda as well 
as an extensive network of local Samajs in the UP. The Mahasabha’s ideology was in part a reflection of the 
Arya Samaj’s vision of the organisation of the Hindu community on the ideal of the ‘ancient golden age’ vis-a-vis 
the perceived ‘threats’ from Islam and Christianity. The important advocates of Hindu sangathan -  Lai Chand, 
Swami Shraddhananda, Lajpat Rai, and Bhai Parmanand -  had originated in the Arya Samaj. Madan Mohan 
Malaviya regarded the Mahasabha and the Arya Samaj not merely ‘as members of the same family but as two 
brothers holding different and even opposing views on some aspects of religion, but united in their faith in and 
devotion to [India’s] ancient religion and civilisation’.32 The Samaj’s strength lay in Meerut and Rohilkhand 
divisions of the western UP: it was patronised by the Kayasths, the smaller Vaish and agricultural castes.33 The 
Samaj was not a political organisation, but used its ideological content for political and social purposes. It put 
sustained pressure within the Mahasabha for progressive and social reform, such as widow remarriage and the 
abolition of untouchability, which was resisted by sanatan dharm organisations.
In reflection of an ideological division, the Hindu Mahasabha pulled in opposite directions. There was an 
open clash between Arya Samajists and sanatan dharm supporters over various issues. Most sanatan 
dharm\sis rallied to the defence of traditional Hinduism and attacked legislative moves by the British to interfere 
in Hindu practices, preferring ‘reform from within’ the Hindu trdition.34 In 1917 a bitter controversy developed 
over the Inter-Caste Marriage Bill -- moved by V.J. Patel in the Imperial Legislative Assembly -- validating 
marriages contracted between persons of different castes. The Bharat Dharma Mahamandal, led by its 
secretary Din Dayal Sharma, and the Maharaja of Darbhanga campaigned throughout north India, rallying the 
sanatan dharm organisations to resist the Bill.35 In contrast, the Arya leaders, especially Swami Shraddhananda, 
strongly supported the Bill. The Bill did not become a law, however.36 The Mahasabha was unable to reconcile 
the conflicting discourses of the Arya Samaj and sanatan dharm, even though it drew its ideology strategically 
from both movements. Its social radicalism over various issues -  caste reform and untoucability, in particular -  
was in effect hampered due to the relative dominance of sanatan dharm within the ranks of the organisation.37
1.1. Rural Base
The Hindu Mahasabha with its urban roots had gained marginal support in the rural areas by the early 1920s 
and showed a marked expansion in the mofussil following its revival in 1923. M.M. Malaviya sought to expand
31 The Leader, 14 March 1920, p. 2, Microfilm, NMML.
32 Cited in S.L. Gupta, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya: A Socio-Political Study, Allahabad, 1987 [1978], pp. 298-9.
33 J.N. Farquhar, Modem Religious Movements in India, Delhi, 1967, pp. 316-23
34 Kenneth W. Jones, Arya Dharma: Hindu Consciousness in 19th Century Punjab, Berkeley, 1976, pp. 152-75.
35 UPCID Report, 23 June 1919, Home Poll. D, June 1919, 701-704, p. 37, NAI.
36 Statement by the UP Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, The Leader, 20 November 1920, p. 3, Microfilm, NMML.
37 N. G. Barrier, The Arya Samaj and Congress Politics in the Punjab 1894-1908’, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol 26, No. 3, 
1971, p. 379; Jeff Weintraub and Krishna Kumar [eds.], Public and Private in Thought and Practice, Chicago, 1997, pp. 38,182.
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the Mahasabha’s rural base and established the UP Kisan Sabha, a front organisation of the farmers, in 191 S.38 
Meetings of the peasants were held at the Kumbh Mela in Allahabad in 1918. The Kisan Sabha was 
subsequently absorbed into the Mahasabha organisation as a kisan sub-committee in September 1924.39 
However, the Mahasabha did not have the peasant base which the Congress had in the UP’s rural heartland. It 
shifted to a strategy of working through caste associations directly rather than attempting to organise the 
peasants in the rural UP. Between 1924 and 1926, the organisers of the Mahasabha were in constant touch 
with caste bodies in an effort to win their support. Malaviya assiduously attended the Rajput and Jat 
conferences as president of the Mahasabha.40 The Gujar and Ahir conferences were persuaded to pass 
resolutions in support of shuddhi, Hindi, and cow protection -  the issues championed by the Mahasabha41 Raja 
Rampal Singh, Oudh Hindu Sabha president, his brother Thakur Hanuman Singh, and Durga Narayan Singh, 
president of the Agra Hindu Sabha, toured the districts of the UP to form Hindu Sabhas; and they used the 
platforms of the UP Rajput Association and the Kshatriya Upkarini Sabha to enlist support for the Mahasabha.42 
The Mahasabha’s organisational activity no doubt represented some swing of support from the urban to the 
rural areas from the mid-1920s onwards.
The Hindu Mahasabha could not create a representative organisation in the rural areas of the United 
Provinces through the expansion of its branch structure, or adapt itself to local power structures in the 1920s 
and 1930s. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms shifted the political battle back into the provincial arena, giving the 
vote to a broad range of substantial rural interests: of the 46 million people in the UP in 1921, 89 per cent lived 
in the rural areas.43 The Government of India Act of 1919 gave the provinces a much larger measure of 
autonomy through enlarged provincial councils, making provision for a substantial elected majority and 
devolving control over departments such as local self-government, education, health, and agriculture to the 
provinces under ‘diarchy’. ‘Diarchy1 retained ‘reserved subjects’ under the governor’s control, but gave Indian 
ministers power and patronage in government departments, increasing competition for power at the provincial 
level.44 In the formulation of the 1919 Act, the government deliberately kept the number of urban seats at a 
minimum. In the UP Legislative Council, of the 123 members, 100 were elected [30 from Muslim constituencies] 
and 23 nominated. Of the 100 members, the government proposed that there should be 70 elected seats in 
general electorates, of which only ten were to be for urban interests. The large towns and cities which were to
38 Letter of H.D. Craik, Chief Secretary, Government of the Punjab, to S.P. O’Donnell, Secretary, Home Department,
Government of India, dated 20 April 1922, Home Poll., File 861 of 1922, p. 1, NAI. The Kisan Sabha was dominant in Allahabad 
district. CID Report, 2 February 1920, Home Poll, D, February 1920,75, NAI.
39 Rama Kant Malaviya was president and Dwivedi, secretary, of the UP Kisan Sabha. The members of the Hindu Mahasabha 
kisan sub-committee were: Rama Kant Malaviya, Krishna Kant Malaviya, Inder Narayan Dwivedi, A.P. Dube, and Sangam Lal, 
secretary of the UP Kisan Sabha. The Leader, 1 September 1924, p. 5, Microfilm, NMML.
40 The Leader, 8 January 1926, p. 2, Microfilm, NMML.
41 The Leader, 11 January, p. 3; 21 February 1924, p. 3; 22 November 1925, p. 6, Microfilm, NMML.
42 The Leader; 22 November, p. 2; 6 December 1924,4; 23 February, p. 4; 17 April 1925, p. 5, Microfilm, NMML.
43 Census of India, 1921: United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Volume XVI, Part I -  Report, Allahabad, 1923, p. 38.
44 P. Robb, The Government of India and Reform: Policies towards Politics and the Constitution, 1916-1921, Oxford, 1976, p. 87.
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receive representation were: Lucknow, Banaras, Allahabad, Agra, Kanpur, Meerut, Bareilly, Moradabad, 
Shahjehanpur, and Aligarh. Urban qualifications were pitched high, requiring men from the towns to prove a 
residence of four years in a rural constituency in order to contest an election there: rural landlords and 
agriculturalists did well under the reforms.45 The majority of the constituencies drawn up across 48 districts in 
the UP included predominantly rural areas -  where the district was the key territorial unit for political prties.46 
The fallout of the predominantly rural character of the electorate with the peasantry as its core under the 1919 
Act was that the reforms were ptched against the urban politician and in favour of the rural vote: the Mahasabha 
with its urban moorings suffered a political disadvantage.
The 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford reforms extended the franchise beyond the canvassing power of leaders in 
the United Provinces, most of whom were urban politicians. The franchise was accorded to income tax payers: 
in the urban areas, to those who paid house tax on property with a rental value of Rs 36 p.a., or who paid 
municipal income tax of Rs 20 p.a.; and in the rural areas, to those who paid land revenue of Rs 25 per annum, 
or rent for agricultural land of Rs 50 per annum. This resulted had in an increase in the electorate of nearly 1.3 
million voters [of whom about 816,000 were tenants and 333,000 landlords] in 1920 and of 1.6 million voters in 
1926. Whereas the elected members of the old 1909 Morley-Minto legislatures had been returned by indirect 
election, the 1919 Act increased the national electorate to an aggregate of around 5.5 millions. A direct election 
to the provincial legislature was a new departure, except in the case of a few Muslim seats filled through 
separate electorates that were extended under the 1919 Act. Rural questions like agrarian reform and the rise 
of the peasant movement quickly came to the centre of the political stage across the UP47 In the post-Montford 
period, the Hindu Mahasabha, not a full-fledged political party throughout the 1920s, had no effective branch 
structure or canvassing machinery to mobilise the electorate in the rural constituencies unlike the Congress. Its 
efforts of winning support remained limited. The Mahasabha’s heavy concentration in the towns and cities as 
well as its reliance on the influence of rich notables and urban commercial magnates largely hampered its 
attempts to build an organisational network in the mofussil areas of the UP.
1.2. Landed Aristocracy
In the districts of the United Provinces, the Hindu Mahasabha was increasingly supported by the large 
landowning magnates as well as taluqdars. The UP, comprising the two regions of Agra and Oudh, followed 
three distinct tenurial settlements. In Banaras district and small areas adjacent to it, a permanent settlement of 
the Bengal type was made with landlowners, or zamindars. In the rest of Agra province acquired brtween 1801 
and 1817, the mahal [estate, or village community] was taken as the unit of settlement. Finally in Oudh, the
45 Ayesha Jalal and Anl Seal, ‘Alternative to Partition: Muslim Politics Between the Wars’, Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3, 
1981, pp. 415-54.
46 David Page, The Partition Omnibus: Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control 1920-32,
New Delhi, 2002, pp. 30-1.
47 Robb, Government of India, p. 112; Page, Partition Omnibus, p. 32.
37
British returned to ‘the natural leaders of the people’ and made settlements with taluqdars. The revolt of 1857 
persuaded the British to follow a ‘landlord’ policy in the UP -- which emphasised the need to win over the 
aristocratic group that would prevent the broader alienation of north Indian society.48 The policy -  the ‘Oudh 
system’ -  laid stress on the social predominance and political importance of taluqdars who were introduced in 
1877 as the ‘natural rulers’ by Lieutenant-Governor William Charles Benett who, as his disciple Harcourt Butler 
put it, was the ‘father of Oudh history, the champion of Oudh policy’.49 The ‘Oudh system’ was based on 
personal contact between the administrators and the taluqdars. Sir Harcourt Butler, Lieutenant Governor of UP 
in 1918-20 and Governor in 1921-1922, proclaimed the landlords as the 'political mediators’ of the masses. ‘For 
political purposes,’ he stated, ‘the Taluqdars are Oudh. In times of peace, and still more in times of civil disorder, 
their voice will be the voice of Oudh.’ 50 The UP, it was claimed, was the most successfully governed of all the 
British Indian provinces because its government had this ‘aristocratic basis’.
The role which the ‘Oudh system’ assigned to the taluqdars required that there should be channels of 
communication between them and the government; and this was provided by the three associations formed 
among the landlords. The taluqdars were obliged to be members of the British India Association [BIA] formed in 
Lucknow in 1861; the UP Zamindars’ Association -  Muzaffamagar [UPZAM]; and the Agra Province Zamindars’ 
Association [APZA], which was established in Allahabad in 1914. The most effective use of the taluqdari elite 
was evident in its role as an ally in the governance of the UP; and the taluqdars numbereing well over 250 
controlled two-thirds of the territory and collected one-sixth of the total revenue in the districts of the UP.51 
Significantly, several big zamindars in the mofussil towns took up the cause of the Hindu Mahasabha; and they 
constituted ‘the largest group of attached landholders’ at elections in the province throughout the1920s.
The access to power and patronage acquired through the agency of the taluqdars remained the dominant 
element in the Hindu Mahasabha’s strategy of alliance with the landed classes. Raja Sir Rampal Singh of Kurri 
Sidhauli, the most influential Oudh taluqdar with strong Hindu nationalist procilivities, was president of the 
British India Association [BIA] in 1921-22. Rajeshwar Bali, a landlord from Bara Banki, Raja Suraj Baksh Singh 
of Kasmanda, and Nihal Singh were Mahasabhaites themselves and Raja Rampal Singh’s lieutenants in the 
BIA. Two taluqdars of Oudh, Rajeshwar Bali and Rajendra Singh, were members of the UP Hindu Sabha 
committee in 1915-16. Rajeshwar Bali had the support of officials and Hindu landlords in the Legislative Council 
and became minister for education and public health in early 1924. In Oudh with Lucknow as its centre, the 
Hindu Mahasabha was strong because taluqdars such as Raja Rampal Singh, Raja Suraj Baksh Singh, and 
Raja Biswanath Singh were its active patrons. Thakur Hanuman Singh, the older brother of Raja Rampal Singh,
48 GOI Home Poll, 443/1930, Extract from an ‘Agent’s Report’, 1 November 1930, NAI; Gyanendra Pandey, The Asecendancy of 
the Congress in Uttar Pradesh, 1926-34: A Study in Imperfect Mobilization, Delhi, 1978, pp. 13-5.
49 S.H. Butler, Oudh Policy: The Policy of Sympathy, Allahabad, 1906, p. iii.
50 Butler, Oudh Policy, pp. 6-8.
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who had been a member of the Legislative Council since 1921, was a notable leader of the Mahasabha. Rai 
Thakur Mahal Singh Bahadur, Oudh zamindar and leader of the Progressive Landlords party, and Thakur 
Jagannath Bakhsh Singh of Rae Bareli were thought to be ‘wholehearted on [Hindu] communal questions.’52 In 
Agra province, Raja Durga Narayan Singh of Tirwa mobilised the landed gentry in the Mahasabha’s interest. 
Kunwar Rajendra Singh, son of the taluqdar of Tikra, was a member of the Zamindar Party that dominated the 
UP Legislative Council from 1921 to mid-1926: he was an influential Mahasabhaite in his own right. The 
mofussil zamindars who were patrons of the Mahasabha had once been key supporters of the Congress, but 
they changed the strategy and backed the Mahasabha on the basis that it promised to defend their landed 
interests in a more determined fashion from the late 1920s onwards.
In the UP Legislative Council, the taluqdars and landlords were held together by mutual interests as a strong 
‘landlord party1. In the first elections to the Legislative Council held in November 1920, the landlords made an 
easy entry as the largest single group because of the Congress’s boycott in the Non-cooperation movement. In 
the elections to the Legislative Council in December 1923, the Congress re-entered political activity as the 
Swaraj Party. The main contest was between the Swarajists and the Liberals, both calling in their manifestos for 
full ‘Dominion’ status for India. The Swarajists were committed to bringing political advance by obstruction within 
the constitutional system, while the Liberals held to ‘constitutional’ means and were intent on implementing the 
reforms. The Liberals rejected Swarajist overtures for an electoral understanding between the two parties.53 The 
zamindars called for ‘self-government within the Empire’ and outlined a set of reforms.54 The landlord 
candidates belonging to the Zamindar Party -- a coalition of landlords, taluqdars and government ministers 
formed in 1921 -  used personal connections to secure the support of those they saw as the ‘influential 
controllers of votes’.55 In the end, the landlords provided the majority of members elected to the UP Legislative 
Council, winning some 50 seats in the House, in 1923.56
In the UP Legislative Councl elected in late 1926, C.Y. Chintamani was the leader of the Nationalist Party, a 
combination of the Liberals and the Independent Congress Party; and Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh, a staunch 
follower of Raja Rampal Singh, was the deputy leader of the party in the council. The Nationalist Party, the 
forerunner of the Hindu Mahasabha, was dominated by Hindu landlords, and its eminence grise was Raja
51 Francis Robinson, The Re-emergence of Lucknow as a Major Political Centre, 1899-- early 1920s’, in Violette Graff [ed.], 
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Rampal Singh, who later became president of the Oudh Hindu Sabha.57 Raja Bahadur Kushalpl Singh, a 
veteran landlord-politician whose qualities, as Governor Sir Malcolm Hailey commented, were ‘respectability, 
loyalty and Hinduism’, was a supporter of the Nationalist Party.58 The Nationalist Party contained a large 
segment of Hindu landlords, especially from Oudh.59 Jwala Prasad Srivastava, who represented the Upper 
India Chamber of Commerce constituency and had a considerable industrial and financial clout in Kanpur, was 
the leader of the Unionist group in the UP Legislative Council; and Srivastava later became leader of the Kanpur 
Hindu Sabha.60 The Unionist group included several landlords and was often found in the ‘landlord party1 that 
supported the government in the council.61 There was a drift of many passive or loyalist landlords to the Hindu 
Mahasabha through the Nationalist Party and the Unionist group, even though many backed the government 
during the nationalist movement in the UP.62
In the early 1930s, many landlords, disillusioned with the British and feeling the attraction of political forces, 
moved towards the notion of an alliance with the Hindu Mahasabha, particularly during the economic difficulties 
of the 1929 Depression. The Depression triggered by the Wall Street crash of October 1929 brought about a 
world-wide decline in the prices of agricultural produce, which seriously affected the landed groups in north 
India: zamindari rents declined drastically. In the UP, particularly the western districts of Meerut division which 
was the hardest hit because the slump followed a succession of poor harvests, there was a depression of prices 
throughout the 1920s and poor harvests in 1928 and 1929. The rise in the number of sales and transfers of 
holdings was particularly dramatic in the UP rural areas.63 The large body of non-occupancy tenants in Oudh 
and the eastern UP, who were badly hit by the slump, had by 1931 become critical in creating a popular base 
for the Congress’s Civil Disobedience movement, particularly no-rent movements, across the province. The 
landlord fears were rapidly heightened by the signs of increasing radicalism within the Congress. Jawaharial 
Nehru, in his presidential address to the 44th Congress session in Lahore in December 1929, stated that India 
would have to adopt a socialist programme to ‘end her poverty and inequality*. Any improvement in the 
conditions of the peasantry, he declared, depended on ‘a great change in the land-laws’ and the ‘present 
system of land tenures’, requiring the extension of ‘peasant proprietorship’ all over the country.64 The 1929 
Lahore Congress’s resolution authorised the All-India Congress Committee, 'whenever it deems fit’, to ‘launch 
upon a programme of Civil Disobedience -- including non-payment of taxes’ -- for complete independence.65 In 
consequence, tension grew between the landlords and the Congress, nonetheless.
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The Congress’s Civil Disobedience movement in general was seen as a direct threat to the landlords, who 
denounced the idea of complete independence from the Bitish Crown. They would, they stated, ‘oppose by all 
possible means’ any movement which would affect their ‘rights, titles and possessions’.66 In May 1931, Gandhi 
came to the UP to seek a settlement of the peasant problem by direct negotiations with Governor Macolm 
Haliey. He asked the landlords and the government to be liberal towards the tenants, declaring that the 
Congress aimed ‘not at the destruction of property but only at its lawful use’. If the landlords became trustees of 
their lands, he explained, the Congress would make sure that the tenants paid their rents.67 The landlords 
expressed fears, however, that the Congress was preaching ‘communism’ to the tenants. ‘Almost every day,’ 
Raja Rampal Singh informed T.B. Sapru, ‘meetings are held in rural areas [in Rae Bareli district] in which 
property rights are attacked.’68 UP Governor Hailey claimed that many landlords were afraid to stay on their 
estates during this period for fear of attack.69 The Congress, as the British India Association protested on 20 
December 1931, was starting a ‘class war* and the landlords would give the government all possible help in the 
fight againt the campaign.70 Many older taluqdars disavowed sympathy with the Congress. Alarmed at the 
challenge to their interests which the Congress semed to pose, the landlords retreated to safer ground in 
support for the government, or the Hindu Mahasabha. Steady landlord support for the Mahasabha, referred to 
as the ‘anti-Congress’ movement, indicated that this was the general landlord feeling.71 As an outcome, the 
Mahasabha acquired a strong presence of Hindu landholding and aristocratic membership in the 1920s and 
1930s, a factor that explains why it was more often attached to political moderation.72
1.3. Hindu Princely States
The Hindu Mahasabha sought the support of powerful Hindu ruling princes and Nepal in a new alignment of 
its allies in a drive to expand its base.73 About two-thirds of pre-1947 India was directly administered by the 
British, and the remaining third covered by the princely states. The Mahasabha rallied to a political alliance with 
the Hindu states, particularly after Bhai Parmanand’s election as president in 1933, by drawing its strategy from 
the Muslim League which had been extending its support to Muslim princes.74 It launched a systematic
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campaign to persuade the Hindu princes to take ‘a lively interest in the affairs’ of the party.75 Invitations were 
issued to the princes to preside at Mahasabha functions; and sympathetic notables such as Virendra Shah, 
Raja of Jagmanpur, UP, were deployed to help integrate other chiefs into the Mahasabha fold.76 In its policy of 
‘standing by the Hindu states’, the Mahasabha rejected the Congress’s charge that the states were an 
‘unnecessary burden’ -  or the ‘creatures of British Imperialism’, even though almost all of them were the active 
collaborators of the British.77 B.S. Moonje praised the Hindu princes as a set of ‘real leaders’, 'embodying manly 
virtues and commanding armies’. 78 He urged ‘all Hindus to respect and love their Hindu Princes as 
embodiments of Hindu pride and ... achievements’. The Hindu ruler, he continued, was ‘a representative of the 
Hindu Raj of the past’ who incorporated ‘in himself all [the] traditions of dignity, suffering and fighting for 
maintaining the Hindu Raj against foreign aggressors’.79 Moonje himself had benefited from the influence and 
financial support of Laxmanrao Raje Bhonsle, the heir to the old kingdom of Nagpur, and of an important 
landowner, M.G. Chitnavis.80 Laxmanrao Bhonsle of Nagpur was president of the the eighth session of the All 
India Hindu Mahasabha held in Poona in 1924.81 V.D. Savarkar viewed the Hindu states as ‘the bedrock of 
Hindu power1 in Indian subcontinent and defended the despotic powers of the Hindu rulers,82 describing the 
states as ‘citadels of organized Hindu power1. 83 He hailed Mysore, Travancore, Oudh, and Baroda as the 
examples of ‘progressive’ Hindu states.84 One objective of the Mahasabha was that it sought to end the growing 
influence of the Congress in the Hindu states, which were viewed as potential territories for the establishment of 
a ‘Hindu Raj in Hindustan’ 85 
The Hindu states had a great deal to offer the Hindu Mahasabha in terms of material support and resources 
as well as ideology. They maintained military and police forces and controlled vast territories and revenues 
across the country. When the Mahasabha needed funds, ‘the princes came forward’.86 Under the scheme of an
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all-India federation proposed in the India Act of 1935 which conferred on the states a disproportionate 
representation in the federal legislature, the princes would acquire considerable legislative and executive power 
in any future govemmement.87 The Mahasabha’s main assumption was that an association with the princess 
would confer on it much needed support in the form of resources and access to political power.88 The Hindu 
states for their part responded positively to the Mahasabha’s overtures as a means of security because when 
the transfer of power came to India they would have the Mahasabha as their ally to protect their interests.89 The 
Mahasabha actively supported the princely demand that the states should be allowed to exist even after the 
transfer of power as separate entities within an Indian federation.90 British intelligence admitted that ‘the 
Mahasabha leaders succeeded in making a good impression’ on the rulers, as they were able to convince them 
that the party had no policy to restrict their independence.91 A number of princely states -  chiefly Idar, Indore, 
and Bikaner -- began to subsidise the Mahasabha as a form of extra insurance. The political sympathies of 
Patiala, Baroda, and Bharatpur clearly lay with the Mahasabha.92 Tej Singhji of Alwar, Brijendra Singh of 
Bharatpur, and ‘Goerge’ Jayaji Rao Scindia of Gwalior were among the rulers in north India who had developed 
a close working relationship with the party.93 However, the Hindu states, notorious for maladministration, were 
mostly unsympathetic to the Muslims, reflecting the Hindu majoritarian principle actively promoted by the 
Mahasabha.94 They granted unfettered privileges and governmental perks to the Hindus -  all of which denied to 
the Muslims.95 The polity of the Hindu states in particular became more overtly anti-Muslim due to Mahasabha 
influence.96
II. Organisation and Leadership
In the formative period, the Hindu Mahasabha was not an all-India organisation in terms of the ‘extent of its 
organisation or the range of its activities’. It was, writes Richard Gordon, ‘an amorphous and straggling 
organization with a very loose all-India structure’.97 Its constituency remained vague, drawing upon caste 
associations, religious movements, language societies as well as local Hindu Sabhas, which elected delegates
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directly to its conferences.98 A person could become a member of the Mahasabha by paying 5 annas per 
annum; and the membership was open to Hindus above 18 years of age.99 The emphasis upon Hindi as the 
language of a ‘Hindu renaissance’ as well as cow protection effectively limited the Mahasabha’s appeal to the 
Hindi tracts in north India. The prominent workers of the Mahasabha with their links to the religious and cultural 
movements gave the Mahasabha a distinctly north Indian character.
The Hindu Mahasabha was supported by a desultory and skeletal framework as an organisation at the all- 
India level. It had its first headquarters located in Dehradun [Hardwar], the home town of Pandit Deva Ratan 
Sharma, its first secretary.100 In October 1915 the Mahasabha offices were shifted to Delhi, but moved back to 
Dehradun in 1916. In 1925 Lala Lajpat Rai shifted the party headquarters to Delhi during his presidentship, 
where they have remained ever since.101 The Mahasabha appointed 13 vice-presidents, including three 
Shankarachayas, in 1915. Lala Sukhbir Sinha became general secretary, assisted by four secretaries and 50 
councillors representing all the provinces in India.102 Provincial Hindu Sabhas were subsequently formed in the 
UP with headquarters in Allahabad in December 1915,103 Bombay city -  where the party’s annual conference 
was held in December 1915,104 and in Bihar.105 The Mahasabha organised the initial four annual sessions with 
the Maharaja of Kasimbazar as president and Deva Ratan Sharma as secretary. It held its regular annual 
sessions in important cities all over the country, presided over by ‘eminent and distinguished Hindu 
personalities’.106 The leaders who had been active in nationalist politics took control of the Mahasabha’s 
organisation at the national and provincial levels in India.107
In the early 1920s, the Hindu Mahasabha attempted a structural reorganisation following its revival at its 
Gaya session in 1922 and the subsequent Banaras session in 1923.108 The Gaya conference created an
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organising committee to establish Hindu Sabhas in all the provinces with a view to extending the organisation to 
the village level across India.109 The central organisation was remodelled on the Congress pattern: a Working 
Committee with its offices was established at Benares Hindu University. With Madan Mohan Malaviya as 
president and Deva Ratan Sharma as general secretary, the key positions were occupied by men who had 
been founders of the Mahasabha. For the purposes of organisation, the Mahasabha divided India into 23 
linguistic provinces on much the same pattern as the Congress. The provincial Hindu Sabhas were formed in 
the Punjab, Sind, Delhi, Bihar, Rajputana, Bengal, Bombay city, and Madras.110 However, the Mahasabha’s 
strength centred chiefly in north India, its growth being most prominent in the Hindi-speaking areas of the UP, 
the Punjab, Delhi, and Bihar. Of the 968 paid-up delegates attending the Mahasabha’s session in Banaras in 
August 1923, 56.7 per cent were from the UP alone. The UP, the Punjab, Delhi and Bihar together contributed 
86.8 per cent of the delegates. Madras, Bombay, and Bengal combined sent a mere 6.6 per cent of the 
delegates.111 The number of local branches varied from time to time in the provinces. In January 1924, the 
general secretary reported that the Mahasabha had a few provincial and local branches; and by August 1924 
only nine had been formed.112 A provincial Hindu Sabha was formed in Agra in September 1924, and its plans 
to hold a conference in 1925 had to be dropped due to poor response. Of the 362 affiliated local Hindu Sabhas, 
the UP and the Punjab together accounted for 60 per cent of the total, and if Bihar was added, 80 per cent: the 
UP comprised 160 local Hindu Sabhas, the Punjab 65, Bihar 65, Bombay Presidency 22, Central Provinces 16, 
Bengal 11, Madras Presidency 11, Burma 3, Rajputana three, Assam, Kenya, South Africa, England, and 
Mesopotamia one each.113 In the 1920s and 1930s, the Mahasabha showed a new focus and determined action 
through its organisational revamp, but its political activity and programmes were limited to north India.
In the maritime presidencies of Bombay, Madras, and Bengal, the Hindu Mahasabha was largely inactive. 
The Bombay branch was not active; and there was not much response to the organisation in Madras. In 
Maharashtra and the Central Provinces Marathi districts and Berar, the Hindu Sabhas were dominated by 
Mahratta Brahmans, mainly Chitpavans and Blal Gangadhar Tilak’s former lieutenants.114 N.C. Kelkar, a 
prominent Tilakite, became president of the Mahasabha at the Belgaum session in 1924; and B.S. Moonje, a 
Chitpavan doctor and Tilak’s lieutenant from Nagpur, assumed the Mahasabha’s presidentship in 1927. The 
Maratha Brahmans became more active in the Mahasabha because they preferred it over the Congress as a
109 Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan, p. 119.
110 Gordon, ‘Hindu Mahasabha’, p. 155.
111 UP 550 delegates; Bihar 172; Punjab 94; Bengal 46; Delhi 25; CP 25; Rajputana-Deccan 22; Bombay 12; Madras 6; Assam 
2; Burma, Patiala, Dumraon, Sind, Travancore and NWFP, 1 each. Total 960. Gordon, ‘Hindu Mahasabha’, p. 156.
112 Gordon, ‘Hindu Mahasabha’, pp. 160-1.
113 The Leader, 1 September 1924, p. 5, Microfilm, NMML.
114 The Government of Bombay reported in 1925 that there were only eight branches of the Hindu Sabha in the Presidency: 
Bombay city 1, Maharashtra 3 [Poona, Sangli and Ratnagiri], Gujarat 2 [Kaira and Surat], Sind 1 [Hyderabad], and Karnatak 1 
[Belgaum]. Home Poll., File 140 of 1925, NAI.
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means of resisting the non-Brahman movement in Maharashtra.115 In Bengal, the Mahasabha was effectively 
re-launched many years later in 1939 by V.D. Savarkar; and it was led by Shyama Prasad Mookherjee.116 The 
Mahasabha’s growth in the provinces was sporadic and uneven, even though it was strongest where riots were 
fiercest. The local Hindu Sabhas were weak and tended to be preoccupied by purely local questions. The 
Mahasabha’s Surat session in 1929 passed a resolution designed to ‘organize Hindu Sabhas in every village 
and town’, calling on ‘all Hindu leaders to establish Sabhas in places where they do not exist at the present’.117 
The appeal was not supported by a specific programme of organisational development. The Mahasabha had for 
the most remained a party of irregular growth in the provinces across India.118
In the United Provinces, the Hindu Mahasabha was strongest in eastern districts and Oudh -  the centre of 
orthodox Brahmanical Hinduism. In the western districts, the most prominent Mahasabha leader was Lala 
Sukhbir Sinha. Sukhbir Sinha, a Khatri banker and zamindar of Muzaffamagar, was an avid cow-protectionist, a 
patron of the sanatan dharm movement and a propagandist for ayurvedic medicine. He presided over the 
Mahasabha’s annual session in Lucknow in December 1916. The local Hindu Sabhas were confined mostly to 
the larger cities of the UP -- Lucknow, Allahabad, Kanpur, Banaras, and Agra. Allahabad was the nucleus of the 
activity of Madan Mohan Malaviya, Banaras the site of the Banaras Hindu University, and Lucknow the centre of 
the Hindi-Nagri movement.119 The Mahasabha preserved a continuity of its work and programmes through its 
association with the Arya Samaj, the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal, the Hindi societies, and caste associations. 
However, it had little local-level co-ordination and planning across the UP.
II. 1. Sangathan Hardliners
The Hindu Mahasabha’s pioneering leaders, Madan Mohan Malaviya and Lajpat Rai, controlled the 
organisation in the period 1923-1925. However, the Mahasabha had developed an ideological radicalisation by 
the mid-1920s under the leadership of sanatanist hardliners. The organisation was divided between the 
Malaviya-Lajpat Rai group which believed that it should be a forum for expressing the problems of the Hindu 
community by leaving politics to the Congress, and the explicitly Hindu sangathan radicals -  Raja Narendra 
Nath, B.S. Moonje, N.C. Kelkar, and Bhai Parmanand -  who demanded a political role. The Malaviya group was 
sympathetic to the Gandhian Congress, believing that it was the only organisation to lead a powerful struggle 
against the British.120 Lajpat Rai, Mahasabha president in 1925-1926, emphasised the need for sangathan 
[Hindu unity], the removal of untouchability, and commitment to Indian nationalism, but argued that on no
115 Home Poll, File 25 of 1924 and File 112 of 1925, NAI.
116 V.D. Savarkar launched the Hindu Mahasabha in Calcutta on 27 December 1939. Viceroy Lord Linlithgow’s letter to Secretry 
of State for India Lord Zetland, dated 23 January 1940, Zetland Collection, IOR MSS Eur D/609/19, IOL.
117 Prakash, A Review, p. 183.
118 Walter Anderson, The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh II: Who Represents the Hindus?’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 
7, No. 12,18 March 1972, pp. 633-40: p. 634.
119 Dalmia, Nationalization, pp. 50-145.
120 Malaviya presided over the Hindu Mahasabha session in Patna in 1935 for the last time: he died on 12 November 1946.
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account were the Hindus to give up the Congress which was to be supported.121 Nonetheless, the hardliners 
demanded increased political participation for the Mahasabha in avowed hostility and conflict with the Congress. 
Malaviya was distrusted as a leader more in the ‘pocket’ of the Congress. ‘He [Malaviya],’ B.S. Moonje wrote to 
M.R. Jayakar, ‘is like a creeper which can’t thrive without a strong support. He is a hopeless man in the matter 
of leadership.’122 The moderates became effectively marginalised within the Mahasabha organisation, as the 
hardliners had captured it on an explicit political agenda in challenge to the Congress by the late 1920s.123 In 
1926 the Mahasabha shifted its Working Committee offices from Banaras to Delhi and began to work effectively 
as an all-India political organisation. By 1926-end, it had established nearly 624 Hindu Sabhas all over India, 
having founded 130 new branches in 1926 alone.124 The hardening of sangathanist discourse and its anti- 
Congress hostility eventually set the stage for the transformation of the Mahasabha into a political party and a 
challenger of the Congress in the 1930s.
Conclusion
The Hindu Mahasabha drew its social roots from the traditional Hindu middle classes -- Brahmans, Agarwals, 
and Vaishya groups -  in the large cities and towns of the UP. It was an elitist constitutional party dominated by 
the Hindu gentry as well as professional and service classes, including small-town pleaders and journalists. To 
a large extent, it depended on the support of wealthy businessmen and urban banking and commercial 
magnates who constituted the chief source of its resources. Rich taluqdars and landlords, a conservative 
bulwark against the nationalist struggle, proved crucial for its organisational strength and political mobilisation in 
the UP during the 1920s and 1930s. The Mahasabha relied, too, on the patronage of the Hindu ruling princes, 
among whom it recruited its supporters. Nonetheless, the organisation was not equipped in the Montford era to 
focus on the political constituencies that now had the vote. After the introduction of the overwhelmingly rural 
electorate and the extension of the electoral franchise under the 1919 Act, the Mahasabha with its reliance on 
elite and aristocratic support could not survive the power sturggle at the provincial level in the UP, particularly 
owing to the predominant shift of political activity away from the towns back to the countryside. It did not break 
through to the classes below the landed and commercial classes, nor could it create a mass base as part of its 
organisational structure in the provinces of India. It did not become truly represented in elective institutions due 
to its little organisational growth and expansion. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Mahasabha remained an 
elite organisation in composition and conservative in character with no agitational methods. It sowed extreme 
hostility to the radical turn which the mass politics had taken under Gandhi’s leadership. Opposition to political
121 Speech by Lala Lajpat Rai, president, Eighth Annual Session, All-India Hindu Mahasabha, Calcutta, April 1925: V.C. Joshi 
[ed.], Lala Lajpat Rai: Writings and Speeches, 1920-1928, Vol. 2, Delhi, 1966, p. 257.
122 B.S. Moonje’s letter to M.R. Jayakar, dated 8 January 1930, File No. 436, Jayakar Papers, NMML.
123 ‘Proceedings of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha Working Committee of the Alllndia Hindu Mahasabha, Delhi, on the 9th,
10th,and 11th May 1926’, Jayakar papers, File No. 435, NMML.
124 A Hindu Sabha was established in Sind under the leadership of Jairamdas Daulat Ram, president of the Bombay Hindu 
Sabha. Prakash, Hindu Mahasabha, p. 26.
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radicalism implied the Mahasabha’s isolation from the the Congress’s anti-British struggles at a time when India 
entered the most turbulent phase of its politics in the 1920s and 1930s. Organisationally, the Mahasabha 
remained largely a north Indian venture and was scarcely organised outside the Hindi-speaking areas of the UP, 
the Punjab, and Bihar. By the late 1920s, it had come under the control of the sangathanist hardliners and made 
an unequivocal effort to be a rival to the Congress as a political party.125
125 Nandini Gondhalekar and Sanjoy Bhattacharya, The Ail India Hindu Mahasabha and the End of British Rule in India, 1939- 
1947’, Social Scientist, Vol. 27, Nos. 7-8, July-August 1999, pp. 49-66.
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PART II 
Sangathan Ideology
4Sangathan -  Unity and Organisation of Hindus
Hindu organisations such as the Arya Samaj and the Sanatana Dharma Mahamandal had made efforts by 
the late nineteenth century to unify the Hindu community, but such efforts became more aggressive and 
influential due to the emergence of Hindu nationalist ideology in the 1920s, signifying a sense of religious and 
community identity amongst Hindus in north India.1 The core feature of Hindu nationalist ideology was 
sangathan [Hindu unity] -  which emerged as a result of the unprecedented upsurge of sectarian rioting across 
northern India following the collapse of the Non-cooperation-Khilafat movement in the period 1919-1921.2 The 
United Provinces witnessed a greater number of riots in this period than any other province of British India;3 and 
the violence became the context and rationale for the development of sangathan ideology by the Hindu 
Mahasabha in the 1920s and 1930s.4 The Mahasabha acquired a more clearly Hindu nationalist orientation, 
dwelling on the ‘weakness’ of the Hindus and the need for a stronger, more assertive Hindu community. Its 
sangathan movement drew strength from the notion of a ‘unified’ Hindu community in conflict with Muslims and 
aimed to promote the self-assertion of the Hindus by united action against what was perceived as ‘onslaught’ 
and 'historical oppression’ by the Muslims.5 This chapter attempts to explore the conscious articulation and 
evolution of sangathan ideology, which developed through an intermittent process due to the extensive 
propaganda of the Mahasabha launched in the1920 and 1930s.
I. Sangathan Movement
The term ‘sangathan’ is derived from the Sanskrit root sam, ‘together1, and ghat, ‘to form or mould’, meaning 
‘organisation, formation, constitution’ -  or ‘an organised system, or society.6 The articulation of nascent 
sangathan ideology had first dominated the Punjab Hindu Sabha’s conference in Lahore in 1909.7 At the All- 
India Hindu Sabha’s session in Delhi in 1918, Raja Sir Rampal Singh, in his presidential address, similarly
1 Gyanendra Pandey, ‘Hindus and Others: The Militant Hindu Construction’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 26, No. 52,28 
December 1991, p. 2998.
2 G. Pandey, ‘Which of Us are Hindus?’, in G. Pandey [ed.], Hindus and Others: The Question of Identity in India Today, New 
Delhi, 1993, p. 244.
3 Riots broke out in Agra, Shahjahanpur, Saharanpur, Etawah, Fatehgarh, and Mainpuri in 1923; Lucknow, Meerut, and 
Muzaffamagar in 1924; Aligarh in 1925; and Allahabad in 1926. ‘Statement of communal riots in the UP between 1922 and 1927’, 
IOR L/PJ/6/1890, File No. 15,1927, p. 5, IOL; Prabhu N. Bapu, ‘Hindu-Muslim Conflict and British Policy in United Provinces 
1920-1929’, South Asia History Seminar, SOAS, University of London, October 2004, pp. 2-3.
4 John Zavos, The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism in India, Oxford, 2000, pp. 144-45; Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of 
Communalism in Colonial North India, New Delhi, 2006 [1990], pp. 233-35; Sandria B. Freitag, Collective Action and Community: 
Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India, Berkeley, 1989, pp. 220-48.
5 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movemen and Indian Politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity-building, 
Implantation and Mobilisation [with Special Reference to Central India], London, 1996, p. 19.
6 Heinrich von Stietencron, ‘Religious Configurations in Pre-Muslim India and the Modem Concept of Hinduism’, in Vasudha 
Dalmia and H. von Stietencron [eds.], Representing Hinduism: The Construction of Religious Traditions and National identity,
New Delhi, 1995, pp. 79-81; D. Gould, ‘Organised Hinduism: From Vedic Truth to Hindu Nation’, in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott 
Appleby [eds.], Fundamentalisms Observed, Chicago, 1994 [1991], p. 533.
7 Indra Prakash, A Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sangathan Movement, New Delhi, 
1952 [1938], pp. 5-13.
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echoed a sangathanist vision. The chief cause,’ he explained, ‘is that we [Hindus] are disorganised and 
disunited. It is for the Hindu Sabha to organise and unite the scattered atoms of our Community and to devise 
means for the amelioration of the whole, so that we might rise again to the same pinnacle of glory and 
civilisation which our forefathers had attained.’8 It is not clear when the appeals for Hindu organisation were 
translated into a notion of the sangathan movement. Indra Prakash argues that the sangathariisi programme 
was first mooted by Madan Mohan Malaviya during the Indian National Congress’s inquiry into the Multan riot in 
September 1922.9The riot prompted a series of appeals in the press for Hindu unity and organisation. The 
Vedic Magazine, an Arya monthly published in Lahore, expressed a sense of urgency for the Hindus to unite 
after the riot. The tragedy, deplorable as it is,’ it argued, ‘has a lesson for its victims. Organise yourself. Evolve 
unity in your own ranks. Develop strength, develop character.’10 Hindi vernacular newspapers and magazines 
in the UP emphasised the need for Hindu unity and consolidation in this period.11 On the eve of the Hindu 
Mahasabha’s session in 1923, Malaviya’s Leader strongly urged the need for the Hindus to become organised 
and united. 'Nothing is now left for the Hindus,’ it stated, ‘but to organise themselves ... They must as a 
community inspire respect before they can have unity on reasonable and equal terms with the Muslims.’12 ‘All 
our sufferings,’ declared the Abhyudaya, ‘will cease the day Hindu society is organised.’13 ‘Far-seeing Hindu 
leaders have for long fought against the communal spirit of the Mahommedans, but their efforts have been of no 
avail... Their [Hindus’] first duty, in their own interests, is that they should organise ...’14 The protection of Hindu 
community,’ it was asserted, ‘is the most important question at present... We have to search for new ways to 
make the Hindu community powerful ,..’15 ‘If the Hindus are well organised, no community will venture to 
perpetrate atrocities on them.’16 Evidence suggests that the sangathan movement gathered force in north India 
explicitly in the early 1920s.17
Swami Shraddhananda [1857-1926] first articulated the ideal of Hindu unity and consolidation, providing a 
more comprehensive exposition of sangathan in the early 1920s. He viewed the ideal of sangathan as an 
attribute of Aryan society -  a facet of the ‘golden age’. The Hindus, he explained, had undergone a steady
8 Cited in Prakash, A Review, p. 86.
9 Prakashh, A Review, p. 25.
10 Vedic Magazine, September 1922, Punjab Press Abstracts, 1922, No. 40, p. 81, IOL.
11 Interview with Kishem Chandra Sumen [bom in Meerut], an Arya Samajist, writer and journalist, by Hari Dev Sharma on 17 
September 1971, Oral History Transcript, No. 210, pp. 12-15, NMML. The Hindi newspapers and magazines which supported 
sangathan were: the Vartman [Kanpur], the Leader [Allahabad], and the Abhyudaya, a leading newspaper in Allahabad owned 
by the Malaviya family, the Vikram, and the Madhuri. File No. 25, June 1923, Home Poll., NAI.
12 The Leader, Allahabad, editorial, 2 April, 1923, p. 3, Microfilm, NMML.
13 Abhyudaya, 21 October 1922, p. 2, Microfilm, NMML.
14 Cited in Charu Gupta, ‘Articulating Hindu Masculinity and Femininity: Shuddhi and Sangathan Movements in UP in the 1920s', 
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 33, No. 13, 28 March 1998, p. 729.
15 Ayodhya Prasad Goyaliya ‘Das’, Sangathan ka Bigul, Delhi, 1926, p. 22, cited in Charu Gupta, ‘Obscenity, Sexuality and the 
“Other” : Gender and Hindu Identity in Uttar Pradesh, 1880s-1930s’, PhD Dissertation, School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London, 2000, p. 136.
16 Kartavya [Etawah, weekly; editor: Rikeshwar N. Raina; 25,900 copies], 21 August 1922, IOR L/R/5/97, File No. 14,1922, p. 4.
17 G.R. Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India: A Study of Controversy, Conflict and Communal Movements in 
Northern India, 1923-1928, Leiden, 1975, p. 164.
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decline since the Vedic age due to the perversion of the vama [caste] system, the proliferation of castes and 
untouchability, idol worship, child marriage, and the ban on the remarriage of widows.18 In his programme of 
sangathan, he proposed the building of Hindu rashtra mandirs [national temples] in every town and major city as 
a first step towards Hindu consolidation. The temples played a role analogous to that of mosques for the Muslim 
community, particularly in uniting and integrating the Hindus.19 The temples, in which the map of India would 
replace the image of the deity, were to regenerate Hindu society with the ‘social and religious cohesion’ which it 
lacked in comparison with the Muslims -  the ‘adversaries’.20 For Shraddhananda, the construction of a ‘Hindu 
nation’ implied seriously implementing the agenda of Hindu sangathan, which he defined as a movement to 
resuscitate the 'ancient glory of Aryan civilisation’ and combat the symptoms of degeneration and social disunity 
in Hindu society.21
The crystallisation of a distinct sangathan ideology occurred during the early 1920s when the first steps 
towards the mobilisation of the Hindus as a ‘nation’ had been initiated. V.D. Savarkar’s founding text, Hindutva, 
was written in 1923, with the ideology of political Hindutva constituting the chief basis of the sangathan 
movement.22The Hindu Mahasabha was re-launched after its Banaras session in 1923, promoting sangathan 
as the chief ideal of a ‘Hindu nation’. In the United Provinces, a section of the Congress leadership led by 
Madan Mohan Malaviya had increasingly adopted a Hindu rhetoric and promoted the activities of religious 
organisations as part of sangathan after the Non-cooperation movement.23 The growing power of the 
Mahasabha and the Arya Samaj was in part a reason for the increasing support for the sangathan movement in 
the province throughout the 1920s.24 Sangathan's key political ideas included the belief that the Hindus 
constituted of themselves a ‘nation’, that Hinduism was under a threat of ‘extermination’ in India, that the 
Muslims were ‘treacherous’ and had ‘extra-territorial designs’, and that there was an imperative need to 
militarise the Hindus. It rejected the view that sectarianism in India was a product of British policy in preference 
to the view of a ‘thousand-year war1 against the ‘Muslim aggression’.25 A projected need for the protection of the 
Hindus from the ‘aggressiveness and violence’ of the Muslims was at the heart of the sangathan movement.
18 Swami Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan: Saviour of the Dying Race, N.p., 1926, pp. 78,94,140-41.
19 The Hindu temples [mandirs] were to be devoted to ‘the worship of the three mother-spirits -  Gau-mata [Mother Cow], 
Saraswati-mata [Mother Saraswati -  the goddess of learning], and Bhoomi-mata [Mother Earth]’. Shraddhanand, Hindu 
Sangathan, p. 140. B.S. Moonje similarly proposed in 1923 the transformation of Hindu temples to achieve Hindu unity. B.S. 
Moonje, ‘Forcible Conversions in Malabar -  Dr Moonje’s Report’, Nagpur, 4 August 1923 Moonj Papers, 13,1923, NMML.
20 Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Movement, pp. 22-23.
21 Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan, p. 95.
22 Jose Kuruvachira, Hindu Nationalists of Modem India: A Critical Study of the Intellectual Geneology of Hindutva, Jaipur, 2006, 
p. 123.
23 Prakash, A Review, pp. 25-31; Gyanendra Pandey, The Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh, 1926-34: A Study in 
Imperfect Mobilization, Delhi, 1978, pp. 115-27; David Page, Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of 
Control, 1920-1932, Delhi, 1999 [1982], pp. 74-84.
24 Home Poll., File No. 140/1925, NAI; Richard Gordon, The Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress, 1915 to 1926’, 
Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2,1975, pp. 145-203.
25 Nandini Gondhaiekar, ‘Indian Nationalism and “Hindu” Politics: Maharashtra and the Hindu Mahasabha, 1920-1948’, 
Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1999, p. 43; Chetan Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies and 
Modem Myths, Oxford, 2001, pp. 77-8.
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The wider context for the launch of the sangathan movement was provided by the emergence of shuddhi as 
an issue of decisive importance in the early 1920s. Two developments -  the conversion of the Hindus in 
Malabar and the reconversion of Malkanas in the western UP -  renewed enthusiasm for shuddhi and increased 
its acceptance by traditional Hindu sections in north India. Shuddhi emerged as the cornerstone of the desired 
Hindu unity and strength, giving a powerful thrust in the direction of sangathan throughout the 1920s and 
1930s.26
1.1. Moplah Conversions and Shuddhi
The Moplah revolt of 1921 by Muslim leaseholders and cultivators against their Hindu landlords in Malabar -  
a result of both ‘Hindu landlord oppression’ and the perception of ‘Islam in danger1 -  triggered a self-conscious 
Hindu predicament.27 The revolt, resulting in the murder of over 600 Hindus, became significant due to its 
association with Islamic conversions. The Arya Samaj’s Pratinidhi Sabha undertook the reclamation of Hindu 
converts through shuddhi -  ritual purification -  under the leadership of Pandit Rishi Ram guided by the fourth- 
century text Devalasmriti, reconverting between 2,500 and 3,000 Hindus in Malabar.28 The violence as well as 
the forced conversions of the Hindus in Malabar, it was claimed, was an outcome of the evident ‘oppression’ 
and ‘disunity1 of Hinduism.29 B.S. Moonje [1872-1948], who headed the Nagpur commission on the Malabar 
riots, argued in his 1923 report that the ‘chronic disunity* and ‘weakness’ of the Hindus was exposed in the face 
of the organised ‘unity and violence’ of the Muslims.30 He catalogued the number of temples that had been 
destroyed by the Muslim rulers and alleged forcible conversions that had taken place. During the past 900 years, 
he claimed, India had lost seven crores of Hindus to Islam and Christianity. He proposed the settlement of ‘war­
like races, such as the Marathas, Rajputs, Sikhs, etc., in Malabar which alone, I think, can solve the Moplah 
terrorism over meek and helpless Hindus’. The Hindus should, he explained, resist the ‘aggressiveness’ of the 
Muslims and match their ‘virility1 through organisation and unity.31 The Moplah crisis signified the loss of the 
strength of Hindu society, driving the Hindu opinion to argue for consolidation.32 The protection and extension of
26 Chief Secretary, UP Government, to Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 2 January 1925, Home Poll., GOI, 
File No. 206/1926, NAI.
27 R.L. Hardgrave Jr., The Mappilla Rebellion 1921: Peasant Revolt in Malabar’, Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1,1977, pp. 
91-99; K.N. Panikkar, Against Lord and State: Religion and Peasant Uprisings in Malabar, 1836-1921, Delhi, 1989, pp. 179-82.
28 The Devala Smriti, a Sanskrit document, codified conditions for the reintegration into Hinduism of Hindu converts from Islam. 
B.S. Moonje claimed that he had discovered the Devalasmriti whilst ‘studying the smritis that I could get hold of in the libraries of 
Nagpur after witnessing the problems of the Moplah converts’. Cited in Zavos, Emergence, p. 201.
29 Home Poll., File No. 241/XII, 1921, p. 7, NAI; Prakash, A Review, p. 30; S. Sarkar, Modem India, 1885-1947, Madras, 1983, 
rept. Delhi, 1986, pp. 216-17. The challenge meant, in Christophe Jaffrelot’s words, a ‘strategic syncretism’ of Muslim unity. C. 
Jaffrelot, ‘Hindu Nationalism: Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 20, Nos. 12-13, 20- 
26 March 1993, pp. 520-21.
30 B.S. Moonje stated: The Hindus are divided into so many water-tight compartments, each having a social culture and life of its 
own, that there is hardly any association between them in the wider field of social activities... The Mahomedans on the other 
hand are one organic community, religiously well-organised.’ B.S. Moonje, ‘Forcible Conversions in Malabar1, Moonje Papers, 
File No. 13,1923, NMML.
31 B.S. Moonje, ‘Forcible Conversions in Malabar’, Moonje Papers, File No. 13,1923, NMML.
32 K. Jones, The New Cambridge History of India III. 1: Socio-Religious Reform Movements in Briish India, Cambridge, 1994 
[1989], p. 194; R.K. Ghai, Shuddhi Movement in India: A Study of its Socio-political Dimensions, Delhi, 1990, p. 87.
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the Hindu religion in the face of ‘conversions and violence’ by the Muslims was perceived as an immediate 
challenge to Hindu society.
The threat of Islamic conversions brought urgency to the Hindu Mahasabha’s attempts to unify the Hindu 
community. The Hindu Mahasabha’s Gaya session in December 1922 laid the foundation of sangathan, 
emphasising the need to unify all elements of the Hindu community and defend them from the ‘violence and 
attacks’ of the Muslims. Madan Mohan Malaviya, in his presidential speech, emphasised the need for 
sangathan, explaining that the Hindus were weak and degenerate as never before, and that there was an 
imperative to organise the community. Hindu-Muslim unity was possible, he argued, if ‘each should feel the 
other was strong enough to ward off successfully unjust attacks by the other... If the Hindus made themselves 
strong and the rowdy sections] among the Mahomedans were convinced they could not safely rob and 
dishonour Hindus, unity would be established on a stable basis.’33 He proposed the establishment of an all-India 
Hindu relief fund to help the victims of riots, calling on the Hindus to work for unity and self-preservation. He 
proposed the setting up of Hindu Sabhas right down to the village level across India in order to protect the 
Hindus from ‘Muslim attacks’.34 The Mahasabha acquired a new dynamism by incorporating sangathan as an 
integral part of its ideology in avowed hostility against the Muslims from the 1920s onwards.
Swami Shraddhananda, Hindu Mahasabha vice-president, in his speech to the Banaras session on 19 
August 1923, linked shuddhi to the need for the development of the sangathan movement. He moved two 
resolutions on shuddhi at the session. The first resolution dealt specifically with Malkana Rajputs, the nominal 
Muslims in the western UP, and the second more generally with shuddhi as a process of conversion from other 
religions, calling for the acceptance ‘by the whole Hindu community’ of converts regardless of which sect had 
performed the shuddhi rites.35 The Mahasabha adopted the first resolution, stating that the Malkanas ‘should be 
taken back into the Hindu fold in the castes to which they originally belonged’.36 On the second resolution, it 
stated at its special session on 4 February 1924: ‘Any non-Hindu was welcome to enter the fold of Hinduism,
33 M.M. Malaviya’s Presidential Address, All India Hindu Mahasabha, 1922, cited in S.L. Gupta, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya:
A Socio-political Study, Allahabad, 1987 [1978], pp. 297-300.
34 Kenneth W. Jones, ‘Politicized Hinduism: The Ideology and Program of the Hindu Mahasabha’, in Robert D. Baird, Religion in 
Modem India, New Delhi, 2005 [2001], p. 248.
35 The full text of the two resolutions stated:
‘1. Looking to the splendid enthusiasm which has been aroused among the Hindu public in the work of reclamation of Malkana 
Rajputs and their entry into their brotherhood this conference decides once and for all that all such Neo-Muslims whether they be 
Rajputs or Brahmins, Vaishyas, Jat or Gujars etc., who have always conformed to the Hindu customs and rites, be taken back 
into their several brotherhoods and be treated as Hindus for all intents and purposes.
‘2. In view of the fact that an overwhelming majority of Indian Mahomedans and Christians are the descendants of Hindu 
converts and in view of the catholicity of the ancient Vedic Dharma which absorbed non-Aryans into the community -  this 
conference resolves that non-Hindus converted by any sect of the Hindus according to the purification [ orayaschit] rites 
prescribed by the representative body of that sect be considered Hindus to all intents and purposes by the whole Hindu 
community.’ The Leader, 8 August 1923, p. 3, Microfilm, NMML.__________________________________________________
36 The Leader, 24 August 1923, p. 6, Microfilm, NMML.
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though he could not be taken into any caste.’37 Nonetheless, the Mahasabha became more explicit in its support 
of shuddhi as an integral part of sangathan, strengthening its drive to combat Islamic conversions in India.
Shuddhi represented a campaign to preserve the numerical and social strength of the Hindu community 
through a reconversion to Hinduism of those who had become Muslims or Christians. The Hindu Mahasabha 
resolved its differences with sanatani [orthodox] Hindus over shuddhi by stressing the need for Hindu unity and 
consolidation. It viewed shuddhi as a regenerating force ‘in order to maximize the Hindu potentialities of moral 
and ritual purity, physical strength, numerical increase and political power’.38 Malaviya, who had forged the 
Mahasabha’s alliance with the Arya Samaj on the shuddhi programme, stressed the need for Hindu unity, 
linking shuddhi to the sangathamsi efforts to reverse the perceived loss of Hindu political power.39 Hindu 
society, he argued, was physically, socially and morally feeble. There was a low birth rate and a high death rate. 
‘When now we are so badly treated with a numerical strength of 22 crores,’ he wondered, ‘what would be our 
condition in future with a much reduced Hindu population if we allow this rate of conversion from Hinduism and 
do not allow reconversion into Hinduism?’40 At its Nasik session held in February 1924, the Mahasabha 
amended its constitution to include shuddhi among its ‘aims and objects’, focusing on the reconversion [shuddhi\ 
of Hindus from Islam and Christianity.41 It declared the reintegration of apostates through shuddhi into Hinduism, 
traditionally a non-proselytising religion, to be ‘lawful’.42 Shuddhi was to be conducted by the All-India Shuddhi 
Sabha of the Arya Samaj and actively supported by the Mahasabha, confronting Islam more decisively than 
Christianity: the Muslims were viewed as a more serious threat to Hindu society. There were relatively fewer 
Hindu converts to Christianity, the religion of the state.43 Shuddhi was viewed as a pillar of the Hindu 
community’s consolidation, becoming a key initiative to reverse the 'damage done by Muslim conversions’ 
across the centuries in India.44
In the United Provinces, the Arya Samaj launched the programme of shuddhi on a large scale in 1923, 
making a determined bid to proselytise the Malkana Rajputs who had converted to Islam.45 The Malkana 
Rajputs, claiming descent from the Jadun Rajput caste, were neo-Muslims scattered over a large number of
37 The Leader, 8 February 1924, p. 5, Microfilm, NMML.
38 Home Poll., File No., 6/IX/1924; File No. 140/1925.
39 Gordon, ‘Hindu Mahasabha’, p. 170.
40 Gupta, Malaviya, pp. 298-9.
41 Gordon, ‘Hindu Mahasabha’, p. 170; Gupta, Malaviya, pp. 259,289-9.
42 Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan, p. 113; Kenneth Jones, ‘The Arya Samaj in British India, 1875-1947’, in Robert Baird [ed.], 
Religion in Modem India, New Delhi, 2005 [2001], pp. 27-54; Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations, pp. 161-2.
43 Varta, Kanpur, weekly, editor: Pandit Raja Ram, 28, cir: 1,000 copies, 21 August 1923, IOR L/R/5/97, File No. 15,1923, p. 2; 
Christophe Jaffrelot, ‘The Genesis and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab: from the Arya Samaj to the Hindu 
Sabha [1850-1910]’, Indo-British Review, Vol. 21, No. 1,1993, p. 17.
44 The Leader, Allahabad, 2 August 1923, p. 6, Microfilm, NMML; Kenneth W. Jones, Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 19th- 
Century Punjab, Berkeley, 1976, rept. New Delhi, 1989, pp. 150-1; J.F. Seunarine, Reconversion to Hinduism through Shuddhi, 
Madras, 1977, pp. 85-6. Muslim leaders countered shuddhi with their own tabligh [propaganda] and tanzim [organisation] in 
1922-23. Home Poll, File No. 6/IX, 1924, p. 19, NAI; R.K. Ghai, Tabligh and Shuddhi Movements in the Nineteen Twenties in 
the Punjab’, Past and Present, Vol. 20, Part I, April 1986, pp. 217-25.
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villages in Mathura, Agra, Etah and Mainpuri districts of the western UP.46 They had become Muslims during 
the Mughal period, having been converted to Islam in return for land grants given to them by the state: the term 
‘Malkana’ derived from ‘milkayat -  or ‘ownership of land’.47 In February 1923, the Bharatiya Hindu Shuddhi 
Sabha was founded with its headquarters in Agra with Swami Shraddhananda as its president;48 and more than 
30,000 Malkana Rajputs were stated to have been converted and rehabilitated as Hindu ‘kshatriyas’ till the end 
of 1923.49 The Arya Samaj’s drive for Malkana shuddhi became an important symbol of the sangathan 
movement with the active support of the Mahasabha and orthodox Hindu groups across the UP.
1.2. Integration of Untouchables
In the 1920s and 1930s, the Hindu Mahasabha in effect aimed to combat the threat of Islamic conversions 
as a significant objective of the sangathan movement. Nonetheless, a more crucial element of sangathan was 
untouchable uplift. The Mahasabha’s ambitious scheme was to forge and unite the disparate castes and tribes 
of the ‘Hindu family* into a greater Hindu political community. It aimed to create a monolithic Hindu identity, 
underplaying diverse caste identities in its discourse of sangathan. However, the crucial dilemma was the 
incorporation of antyajas [untouchables and tribals] -  a category of outcastes outside the varna hierarchy. They 
constituted the panchama [the fifth ‘estate’], posing a threat to the hierarchically conceived vamashrama 
dharma ~ the nobility and purity of upper castes.50 The Mahasabha underlined the need for solidarity among the 
different castes of Hindus and amended its constitution at its Hardwar session in April 1921, formally adding the 
‘lower castes’ to its definition of a ‘Hindu’ and declaring its commitment to ameliorate ‘the condition of all classes 
of the Hindu community’.51 Sangathanist discourse demanded a ‘unified’ Hindu community, a necessity that 
moved the Mahasabha into a position of radical caste reform.
In the early 1920s there were many highly emotional appeals in support of untouchable uplift.52 The Leader 
strongly pleaded for the uplift of the untouchables: ‘No prejudice ought to be allowed to hamper work in this 
direction.’ The ‘citadels of orthodoxy and social and religious tyranny1, it argued, ‘could best be assailed through 
an All-India Hindu organization’, such as the Hindu Mahasabha. It appealed for a ‘vyavastha [decree] from
46 Zavos, Emergence, p. 202.
47 The Census of India, 1911, UP, Vol. XV, Parti, Allahabad, 1912, p. 118; Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan, p. 120.
48 Jn March 1923, ‘Sanatani Hindu Pandits conducted the formal ceremony of yaggi [shuddhi] in the presence of Swami 
Shraddhananda’. The Leader, 11 March 1923, p. 7, Microfilm, NMML; Home Poll., File 140,1925, NAI.
49 The Hindu Sabhas carried out a few conversions: the Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Shuddhi Sabha, the Arya Samaj, and the 
Kshatriya Upakarini Sabha actually did most of the conversions through shuddhi. Vartman, 1 August 1925, IOR L/R/5/98, File No. 
30,1925, pp. 2-3; Yoginder Sikand and Manjari Katju, ‘Mass Conversions to Hinduism among Indian Muslims’, Economic and 
Political Weekly, Vol. 29, No. 34, 20 August 1994, pp. 2214-18. In the conversion of the Malkanas, the Arya Samaj stressed the 
giving up of Islamic customs: the burial of the dead, nikah, visiting of the dargahs and circumcision. Confidential note on 
‘Communal Friction in the United Provinces, 1924', by Assistant to Deputy Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation 
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50 Kenneth Jones, The Negative Component of Hindu Consciousness', Indo-British Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, September 1993, pp. 
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sanatan\si pandits of recognised eminence’ in favour of the removal of untouchability.53 The upper-caste Hindus 
were urged to ‘immediately bring lower castes within Hindu fold’; otherwise the latter were becoming Muslims. In 
turn, the lower castes were urged to ensure that they adopted upper caste manners and customs.54 The 
Madhuri, a prominent Hindi journal of early twentieth-century Lucknow, viewed the statistics of a decline in the 
Hindu numbers as an outcome of the ‘carelessness of the Hindu jati [race]’ and its ‘abhorrence’ of the lower 
castes.55 The popular emphasis was on untouchable integration, as a cohesive Hindu community was deemed 
to be central to sangathanist ideology.
The Hindu Mahasabha’s campaign to integrate the untouchables into Hindu society was motivated in part by 
political considerations, too. Under colonial rule, the numerical strength of religious communities would play a 
decisive role in determining the allocation of seats in India’s legislatures. The 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford 
reforms brought into a sharp focus the issue of the relative numbers of various religious groups, recognising the 
principle of representation on the basis of communities and classes in the legislatures.56 In the 1920s, elections 
to almost all local boards and district councils were contested on community lines, making the support of non- 
Brahmans and the depressed classes extremely crucial for the Mahasabha.57 M.R. Jayakar declared: ‘Now that 
the Montagu-Chelmsford Report has put a value on each individual... [i]f a single Hindu be taken out of his 
religious faith owing to causes which have nothing to do with religious change of mind -  we resent that 
conversion.'58 ‘Democracy,’ argued B.S. Moonje, ‘means a government which is based on the counting of heads. 
In India ... the Moslem heads and the Christian heads are yearly increasing in numbers and are hopefully 
aspiring to swallow up the majority community of the Hindus or to reduce it to a minority community.’59 The 
untouchables numbering over sixty millions in India were numerically important because they proved, if 
effectively reclaimed to Hinduism, critical to possible Hindu gains in terms of the greater share of provincial 
power in the country.60
In a reform of far-reaching significance, Swami Shraddhananda put the abolition of untouchability at the 
heart of the sangathanlsi agenda.61 At the Hindu Mahasabha’s Banaras session in August 1923, he called in a 
resolution for practical measures as ‘a prelude to the assimilation of the untouchables into the great body of the 
Aryan fraternity1.62 ‘The question of uprooting the curse of untuchability,’ he declared, ‘was the “sine qua non" of
53 The Leader, 2 April 1923, p. 7; 18 August 1923, p. 5, Microfilm, NMML.
54 Sukhnandan Prasad Dube, Chauchut ka Bhut, Lucknow, 1933, cited in Charu Gupta, Sexuality, Obscenity, Community:
Women, Muslims and the Hindu Public in Colonial India, Delhi, 2001, p. 323.
ss Madhuri, April 1923, p. 469, IOR L/R/5/98, File No. 33,1923, IOL.
56 Peter Robb, The Government of India and Reform: Policies towards Politics and the Constitution, 1916-1921, Oxford, 1976, pp.
55, 58.
57 Christophe Jaffrelot [ed.], Hindu Nationalism: A Reader, Delhi, 2007, p. 78.
58 Jayakar Papers, File 437, NAI.
59 Prakash, A Review, pp. i-ii of the preface by B.S. Moonje.
60 Gyanendra Pandey, Routine Violence: Nations, Fragments, Histories, Stanford, 2006, p. 160.
61 J.T.F. Jordens, Swami Shraddhananda: His Life and Causes, Delhi, 1981, p. 135.
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Nationality in India.’63 The task of Hindu sangathan could not become a reality if serious steps were not taken 
towards the ‘abolition of caste barriers and a full integration of the untouchables’.64 The Mahasabha voted in 
favour of Shraddhananda’s resolution, calling for the untouchables' access to roads, schools, wells, and even 
temples in Hindu society.65 Nonetheless, six months later at the Mahasabha’s session held at the Kumbh in 
Allahabad in January 1924, the orthodox sanatanists passed a second resolution on the caste system, largely 
nullifying Shraddhananda’s resolution. The Allahabad resolution stated that it was ‘against the scriptures and 
the tradition to give the untouchables the sacred thread \yagyopavif[, to teach them the Vedas or to inter-dine 
with them’. In the interests of unity, it declared, ‘Hindu workers would give up these items of social reform’.66 
Owing to a strong opposition from the Arya Samaj, the resolution was amended, reading: ‘As the giving of 
“Yagyopavit” to untouchables, interdining with them and teaching them Veda was opposed to the Scriptures 
according to very large body of Hindus, i.e. the Sanatanists, these activities should not be carried on in the 
name of the Mahasabha.’67 Most shuddhi rites conducted by the Arya Samaj amongst the untouchables and 
lower castes would not be recognised by the Mahasabha. The resolution implied a victory for the old core of the 
Mahasabha in the UP -- particularly its patrons and leaders hailing from the milieu of orthodox Brahmans, 
landlords, and princes who were alienated by the caste reform. A strong justification of the caste hierarchy was 
found in the interpretation of the Manusmrithi, which was considered sacred.68 Shraddhananda was deeply 
agonised over the sanatanist backlash and resigned from the Mahasabha in 1926.69 Caste, an integral part of 
the Brahmanical system, sat uneasily with the representations of a homogeneous Hindu community as 
propagated by the Mahasabha.
The objective of integrating the untouchables into Hindu society still continued to haunt the Hindu 
Mahasabha, particularly in its efforts to make the Hindu community politically and socially strong and powerful, 
in the 1920 and 1930s. In his presidential address to the Mahasabha’s Nasik session in February 1924, Dr 
Kurtakoti declared: ‘If in these hard times Hindus do not take seriously in hand this holy work of “Conversion” 
and prevent their brethren from embracing alien faiths through mistaken views, I say here as I stand that within 
ten decades you shall find no Hindu on the surface of this earth.’ The best way to prevent the ‘decline’ of the
‘With a view to do justice to the so-called depressed classes in the Hindu community and to assimilate them as part of an
organic whole in the great body of the Aryan fraternity, this conference of Hindus of all sects holds:
1. That the lowest among the depressed classes be allowed to draw water from common public wells. That water be served to
them at drinking posts freely as is done to the highest among other Hindus.
That all members of the classes be allowed to sit on the same carpet in public meetings and other ceremonies with the higher
classes, and that their children [male and female] be allowed to enter frely and, at teaching time, to sit in the same form with
other Hindu and non-Hindu children in government, national and denominational institutions.’ The Leader, 8 August 1923, p. 3, 
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Hindu numbers, he pointed out, was to remove social disabilities on the depressed classes.70 At a special 
session held in Belgaum in December 1924, the Mahasabha declared that its chief focus would be on the 
removal of untouchability. Madan Mohan Malaviya, in his presidential address, argued that the Hindus should 
oppose caste disabilities ‘out of a sense of duty to their brethren Untouchables ...’71 The Belgaum session 
amended the Mahasabha’s constitution, incorporating a broader definition of ‘Hinduism’ that recognised all 
those professing a faith indigenous to India as ‘Hindu’.72 Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs were deemed integral to 
the larger Hindu community on the basis that India was the country of their origin.73 At the Mahasabha’s 1926 
session, Dr Choithram Gidwani of Sind launched an appeal for the removal of the ‘blot of untouchability’, as the 
Muslims and Christian missionaries took advantage of the weakness of India’s social system.74 At its Jabalpur 
session on 8 April 1928, the Mahasabha reaffirmed its opposition to caste disabilities, passing a resolution on 
the removal of untouchability. N.C. Kelkar, in his presidential address, insisted that India must remove 
untouchability in order to justify its claim to swaraj [freedom]75 At the Akola session in Maharashtra in August 
1931, the Mahasabha invited the aboriginals to take on caste Hindu names and register their caste as 
‘Kshatriya’ in the census.76 The Mahasabha’s approach signified a new dynamism, combining the untouchables 
and lower castes in the broad category of ‘Hindu’ as part of its drive to widen and unify the Hindu community.77
By the 1930s, the Hindu Mahasabha had strengthened its reformist resolve on the removal of untouchability. 
It responded with great alarm to Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar’s threat that he would lead the untouchables out of 
Hinduism.78 Ambedkar [born in 1891], a Mahar from Maharashtra who had studied for a doctorate at the London 
School of Economics and a prominent advocate of untouchable rights, stated that he would not die a Hindu, 
urging the untouchables to renounce Hinduism because there was no likelihood of a reform within the Hindu 
community, even though he was a strong supporter of the freedom movement.79 On 13 October 1935 he 
declared in a speech to the Depressed Classes Conference in Yeola, a weaving town in Nasik district of eastern 
Maharashtra, that ‘it was not my fault that I was bom an untouchable ... I am determined that I will not die a 
Hindu.’ 80 His conviction was that religion should promote social justice, not bolster injustice and justify 
oppression. In an article entitled ‘Away from Hinduism’, he argued that the right to religion included a right to
70 Cited in Prakash, A Review, p. 90.
71 Cited in S.R. Bakshi, Madan Mohan Malaviya: The Man and His Ideology, New Delhi, 1991, p. 131.
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change one’s religion, since ‘life and the preservation of life constitute the essence of religion’. Hinduism was 
responsible for the degradation of the untouchables, he claimed, and even those who denied the existence of 
untouchability continued to practice it. That Hinduism is inconsistent with the self-respect and honour of the 
Untouchables is the strongest ground which justifies the conversion of the Untouchables to another and nobler 
faith’.81 The notion of varna [caste], he insisted, denied the masses access to knowledge and worsened the 
condition of the untouchables, not even touching the ‘conscience of caste Hindus’. Ambedkar pointed to the 
hostility many caste Hindus had shown to the untouchables in an ‘unjust’ Hindu society, declaring in his 
‘annihilation of caste’ speech: 'They hate me. To them I am a snake in their garden.’82 Ambedkar called for the 
rejection of the shatras [treatises] that justified the caste system, which was economically harmful because it 
subordinated the human powers to the crippling social rules in a closed community -  a system that was 
‘resistant to reform and killed public spirit’.83
Ambedkar’s conversion threat caused consternation among Hindu Mahasabhaites. B.S. Moonje entered into 
formal negotiations with Ambedkar to end the conversion threat and tried to ensure that if Ambedkar must 
convert, he should become either a Sikh or a Buddhist but on no account a Muslim or a Christian, which had an 
alien origin.84 The Mahasabha’s seventeenth session, held in Poona in December 1935, was mostly devoted to 
countering Ambedkar’s conversion threat.85 It adopted a resolution moved by Dr Kurtkoti, calling for the 
eradication of untouchability and reaffirming the Mahasabha’s ‘previous resolutions for giving equal access to all 
Hindus to all public amenities’ irrespective of their caste or creed.86 The Mahasabha drew several depressed 
class politicians into its orbit and developed close ties to the leadership of the Depressed Classes Association, 
the first all-India untouchable association. Two Hindu Mahasabhaites from Nagpur, G.A. Gavai and G.M. 
Thaware, were for many years the association’s general secretary and joint secretary.87 In December 1938, the 
Mahasabha amended its constitution at its Nagpur session under V.D. Savarkar’s presidentship, declaring that 
its main objective was to ‘remove untouchability and generally to ameliorate and improve the condition of the 
so-called depressed classes amongst Hindus’.88 In March 1939, Savarkar formally launched the Mahasabha’s 
untouchable uplift programme, which underlined the importance the party placed on Hindu unity. At a public
81 Cited in Rodrigues, Essential Writings, p. 229.
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meeting in Monghyr in Bengal, he received five Santal [tribal] boys into the Hindu community.89 In the interwar 
years 1939-1945, the Mahasabha’s sessions routinely passed resolutions, calling for the removal of disabilities 
on the untouchables and encouraging its leaders and local organisations to dedicate themselves to the 
emancipation of the untouchables as part of the sangathan movement.90
II. Caste Hierarchy
The sangathanist programme of untouchable integration failed to represent a radical critique of the caste 
system and faced resistance from orthodox Hindu classes. In the United Provinces, the high-born Hindus 
viewed with suspicion any movement that challenged the existing caste structure, viewing untouchable 
integration as a high degree of ‘impurity’.91 They expressed hostility, especially when the Hindu Mahasabha had 
voted to raise five lakh rupees to support the untouchable reform in the province in the 1920s.92 In many areas 
of the rural UP, entry into temples was accorded ‘wherever possible according to maryada’ [social custom], the 
untouchables were entitled to a separate well in every settlement but not access to the others, and provisions 
were made for the education of the untouchables in mixed schools but not in those of Brahmans only. In 1921 at 
Ujhyani village in Badayun district, a group of Chamars [untouchables] had been dissuaded from converting to 
Islam by being admitted to the village well; however, after this symbolic gesture, the wells were purified with 
Ganges water, perpetuating the crisis.93 The Arya Samaj’s plan to use shuddhi for raising the status of the 
untouchables had come under attack from sanatanists, who urged a restraint on the zeal of ‘caste-breakers’ in 
Hindu society.94 The Sanathan Dharm Sabha insisted that the Samaj’s reformist efforts were weakening the 
Hindu feelings of ‘nationality and national sympathy*.95 Din Dayal Sharma, secretary of the Bharat Dharma 
Mahamandal, asserted that the chief disagreement over untouchability was about the tendency of the Arya 
Samaj not to follow shasthc injunctions in making the proposed reforms.96 He called for the need to protect 
varnashrama dharma [caste hierarchy] and for the defence of Hinduism from critics both within the Hindu 
community and outside of it.97 In the UP, the drive for the assimilation of the untouchables into Hindu society 
through reform or shuddhi had scarcely succeeded in cultivating their identity as ‘Hindu’.
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The Hindu nationalist discourse on the construction of a single ‘homogenous’ Hindu community was 
fundamentally based on the sanctity of the varna [caste] hierarchy, which remained undiminished. Madan 
Mohan Malaviya, an important figure in initiating caste uplift programmes in the UP, upheld the validity of caste 
distinctions based on the vamashrama dharma, even while opposing the exclusion of the untouchables from 
public places and affairs, or temples.98 He argued that the untouchables should be given religious consecration, 
involving diksha [initiation] and sanskar [purification and reform]. A person thus consecrated, he believed, would 
‘become pure and religious’ and ‘cease to be called and treated as an untouchable’.99 In particular, he advised 
the untouchables to acquire proper religious instruction in Hinduism, which would make them ‘useful members’ 
of Hindu society.100 He attached great importance to primary education as ‘a sine qua non of efficiency and 
progress’, as it would solve the problem of ‘ignorance, untouchability and communal bitterness, etc’.101 However, 
in Malaviya’s reformist vision, the vama system was not to be altered. More usually, the reform drive against 
untouchability was intended to work within the acceptable framework of vama, or ‘sanskritisation’.102 The lower 
castes were encouraged to adopt the ritual practices of the twice-born by giving up some of the ritually ‘impure’ 
customs that marked them out as ‘degraded’.103 Sangathanists defended vama and preached strict obedience 
to caste rules, revealing a deep conflict with the radical edge of untouchable consciousness that contested 
caste distinctions in Hindu society.
The sangathanisi representation of a ‘Hindu nation’ in terms of a ‘unified and cohesive’ Hindu community 
underplayed deeper conflicts of the caste hierarchy. In his analysis of the boundaries of Hinduism, V.D. 
Savarkar, himself a Chitpavan Brahman, defended the caste system founded on the hierarchically conceived 
purity and nobility of upper castes [Vedic-Aryan ‘blood’]. He rejected the stigma of hierarchical vama [caste] 
oppression through the overriding commonality of ‘Hindu blood’, viewing the untouchables as an integral feature 
of Hindutva. ‘Santals, Kolis, Bhils, Panchamas, Namashudras and other such tribes and classes’, he declared, 
were ‘more emphatically Hindu than the so-called Aryans’, even though they practised a rather ‘primitive 
religion’.104They ‘inherit the Hindu blood and the Hindu culture ... and this Sindhusthan is as emphatically the 
land of their forefathers as of those of the so-called Aryans’.105 Savarkar urged the need for the removal of 
untouchability as a necessary part of Hindu consolidation, campaigning for the opening of public places and
98 Gupta, Malaviya, p. 333.
99 Gupta, Malaviya, 334.
100 Gupta, Malaviya, p. 296.
101 Gupta, Malaviya, p. 359.
102 M.N. Srinivas first formulated the notion of ‘sanskritisation’ through the emulation of higher-caste practices. M.N. Srinivas, 
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103 Susan Bayly, ‘Hindu Modernisers and the “Public" Arena: Indigenous Critiques of Caste in Colonial India’, in William Radice 
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105 Savarkar, Hindutva, pp 98-9; Savarkar, Samagra Savarkar, Vol. 6, p.77.
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temples for the lower castes.106 Even so, there were strong limits to Savarkar’s vision of Hindutva: he did not 
propose any form of social and political liberation which might lead to the rejection of Brahmanical authority. He 
supported B.R. Ambedkar’s movement against untouchability, but remained silent on the exploitation of the 
untouchables by the upper castes.107 He disagreed with the code of the Manusmriti, but criticised the burning of 
the ancient law book by Ambedkar in 1927. Such acts, he insisted, did not help in ‘securing basic human rights 
to the untouchables’.108 More alarmingly, Savarkar made a veiled threat to lower caste movements: Those of 
you who in a suicidal f i t ... dare to disown the name Hindu will find to their cost that in doing so they have cut 
themselves off from the very source of our racial Life and Strength.’109 Savarkar’s Hindutva was based on an 
adherence to the caste hierarchy, reiterating the binding together of the Hindus without disrupting the vama 
system, despite its internal divisions that were potentially disruptive to Hindu ‘homogeneity’.
In general, sangathanlsis visualised the existence of a ‘unified’ Hindu society within the traditional matrix of 
the institutional vama hierarchy.110 B.S. Moonje believed that it was important to bring about a total union and 
solidarity of the four castes [chaturvamas] rather than a complete eradication of the vama system, which was 
‘not detrimental to Hindu unity*. He proposed the creation of a ‘unified Hinduism’ on the basis of ‘common blood 
relations by promoting intermarriages between various sub-groups [vamasj. A real organic unity among the four 
sections of Hindu society*, he argued, could be brought about through the Vedic marriage custom [paddhati] of 
anuloma and pratiloma -- where the man’s caste is superior to that of his wife and vice-versa -- as provided in 
the Dharmashastras.111 The Mahasabha would in turn adhere to the ‘cause of social reform and abolition of 
untouchability*.112 In reality, Moonje’s sangathanlsi narrative sought to preserve the vama hierarchy in an 
amended form through intermarriages as a major pillar of the Hindu identity.113
Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar [1906-1973], the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s Hindutva ideologue, 
rejected the view that caste was an evil system or that it was exploitative, praising it as the ‘best social system’ - 
- a ‘great institution’ that served society as ‘a bulwark against Islam’.114 Caste helped to preserve Hindu identity 
against mlecchas [Muslims and Christians], ‘who do not subscribe to the social laws dictated by the Hindu 
religion and culture’.115 ‘A good country ... Nation,’ as he put it, ‘... should have all four classes of society as
106 V.D. Savarkar, Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches Delivered from the Hindu Mahasabha 
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conceived by Hindu Religion.’116 However, he affirmed, the RSS ‘simply does not recognise’ untouchability. He 
argued for the abolition of untouchability, urging the Hindus to uplift their ‘neglected brethren’. 117 The 
untouchables and tribals were indeed Hindus, he pleaded, even though they had no knowledge of Hinduism as 
a religion. The 'fault does not lie with them but with the Hindus’, who had a responsibility to teach them the 
traditions and customs of the Hindu community.118 In Golwalkar’s vision, Hindu unity was determined by a 
concern to remove untouchablity, yet the ‘natural order1 or the varna-vyavastha [caste order] with its underlying 
notions of purity and pollution was to be preserved. The sangathanlst vision of an ideal Hindu society continued 
to be based on the vama system in which different castes served complementary functions integral to Hinduism 
as a social organism.119 The Hindu culture which sangathanists championed was that of a higher tradition, 
bearing the marks of Brahmanical and high caste domination as revealed by the nature of the Mahasabha’s 
organisation and leadership, which was mostly a high caste, middle class preserve of Brahmans. Indeed, 
sangathanlsis rejected the lower caste movements and their anti-Brahman ideology as ‘divisive and disruptive’ 
to Hinduism in India.
II. 1. Adi Hindu Movement
In the 1920s and 1930s, an anti-Vedic ideology gained popularity among the mass of the untouchables who 
showed little interest in the upper-caste reform movements across the UP. In search of a new ideology to 
repudiate Vedic Hinduism based on caste, literate untouchable leaders -  chiefly Swami Acchutanand [1879- 
1933] and Ram Charan [1888-1938], an Adi Hindu leader of Lucknow -- drew upon bhakti heritage and 
formulated the ideology of Adi Hinduism.120 In 1924, local Adi Hindu Sabhas [associations] were organised in 
Kanpur, Lucknow, Banaras, and Allahabad to spread the message of Adi Hinduism.121 The Adi Hindu theory 
believed that the Aryan invaders had subjugated and imposed Vedic Hinduism on the original Indians [Adi 
Hindus] and deprived them of their bhakti religion, which they had practised prior to the advent of the Aryans.122 
Hinduim with its institutional caste system was rejected as a social creation of the Aryans who called 
themselves the higher castes: Brahmans, Kshatriyas, and Vaishyas. The central focus of Adi Hindu ideology 
was the denial of religious rituals and ceremonies prescribed by the higher castes for the untouchables and a 
strong defiance to the low social duties and labour imposed on them in Indian society.
Adi Hindu narrative found application in reforms spearheaded by various untouchable caste panchayats led 
by prominent leaders such as Ram Charan and Shiv Dayal Singh Caurasia in the UP from the 1920s onwards.
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In 1928 during the visit of the Indian Statutory Commission headed by Sir John Simon, Adi Hindu leaders led by 
the Adi Hindu Depressed Classes Association [1925], contrary to the Congress’s policy of boycott, resolved to 
give evidence to the commission with a view to securing rights for the untouchables in the province.123 The 
association put forward demands for separate political rights as well as government jobs and entry to schools 
and colleges for the untouchables. It demanded preferential treatment, access to education, better employment, 
and a voice in the representative institutions for the untouchable groups.124 In 1930-31 during the Round Table 
Conferences, all the Adi Hindu organisations in the UP campaigned to rally support for separate electorates to 
the untouchables.125 Large public meetings were held in Kanpur and Allahabad, where Adi Hindu leaders 
Swami Acchutanand and Shyam Lai delivered speeches in defence of separate electorates.126 At some of these 
meetings, Gandhi and the Congress became the targets of intense criticism for opposing separate electorates 
to the untouchables.127 Across the UP, the untouchables pursued the issues of social and economic 
opportunities for themselves and focused not on the critique of colonialism but of caste. Adi Hindu ideology 
mounted a powerful critique of the caste system as an instrument of oppression against the untouchables 
practised by the higher castes in India.
Conclusion
In the early 1920s, the threat of a united and well-organised Muslim militancy against the Hindus as evident 
in the post-Khilafat riots and the Moplah conversions produced the sangathan movement -- a significant force in 
Hindu nationalist ideology.128 Sangathan, a drive for the acquisition of strength through the consolidation of the 
Hindu community, became an articulated movement by building on the organisational base provided by the 
Hindu Mahasabha. It was characterised by the defensive arguments about Hinduism in danger of ‘extinction’, 
particularly in view of the conversions carried out by Islam in India.129 The Mahasabha made shuddhi an integral 
part of sangathan, designed to reconvert Hindu converts from Islam and Christinanity, in India. It supported the 
reconversion of the Malkanas in the western UP undertaken by the Arya Samaj. Shuddhi mostly targeted Islam, 
setting a hardening pattern for Hindu militancy against the Muslims.130 More crucially, the sangathan drive was 
marked by a new urgency to widen and unify the Hindu community by drawing all castes and sects into the 
Hindu fold: it focused chiefly on untouchable integration.131 The heavy interlinkage between community 
representation based on religious affiliations and the demands for more constitutional reforms in part shaped
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the Mahasabha’s discourse on untouchable integration, which aimed to strengthen Hindu political power.132 
However, untouchable integration had remained a partial and unfulfilled reform, as it hardly found a consensus 
in the face of sanatani resistance.133 The vama system created in terms of the dominant symbols of purity and 
pollution had dealt a blow to the Mahasabha’s notion of India as a ‘unified’ Hindu community.134 The appeals for 
untouchable uplift in the name of Hindu sangathan in particular markedly had an anti-Muslim hostility.135 The 
caste hierarchy was tied to the homogeneity of Hindu society from within so as to maximise the differences with 
the Muslims -  the real enemies.136 The construction of Hindu unity as the chief basis of sangathan ideology 
needed for its sustenance the notion of the Muslims as an ever-present existential threat; and the anti-Muslim 
hostility was actualised in the recurrent riots that broke out across the UP during the 1920s and 1930s.
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5Hindutva -  a Nation of Hindu Race and Culture
The notion of a Hindu rashtra [nation] -  India as a Hindu nation, the land of Hindus -  was first articulated by 
Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his theoretical work Hindutva -- an ideological text which provided a cultural 
justification for Hindu nationalism.1 Hindutva was Savarkar’s seed text which signified perhaps the first attempt 
to embody the ideology of a ‘Hindu nation’ and became the ideological basis of the Hindu Mahasabha, which 
had adopted it as a ‘long-term statement of objectives’ in the 1920-1940s.2 The doctrines and the theorisation of 
the Mahasabha were coherently defined and articulated in the 1930s, as Savarkar’s work had been read. 
Savarkar’s key aim was to provide a comprehensive definition of what constituted ‘Hinduness’, or ‘Hindu 
identity*, defining a ‘Hindu’ as one to whom India was both a ‘fatherland’ and a ‘holyland’. This definition, if 
religious, was only one component of Hindutva; and as important were criteria based on territory, race, and 
culture. Hindutva excluded Muslims and Christians from a ‘Hindu nation’ because of the radically different 
nature of their faiths, which were coextensive with their cultural identities. It equated India with a ‘Hindu nation’, 
ensuring the primacy of the cultural and political identity and interests of the Hindus in the country.3 This chapter 
seeks to examine Hindutva and its ideological implications as the basis of Hindu nationalism, which centred on 
the goal of creating a ‘Hindu nation [rashtra].
V.D. Savarkar [1883-1966] invented the overarching Hindutva ideology during the anti-British struggle of the 
early 1920s. He did his initial writing of Hindutva in the Andamans from 1910 until 1922, as he had been 
sentenced to transportation for life in the murder trial of A.M.T. Jackson.4 It was put into a final shape in 
Ratnagiri jail in 1923. Savarkar, a non-religious man and a practising atheist himself, defined Hindutva by 
explicitly denying the role of religion in determining ‘Hindu nationhood’.5 Hindutva, he explained, was only one 
attribute of ‘Hinduness’ or ‘Hindu identity’ and ‘not even the most important one’.6 It was not concerned with 
dogmas and religious practices associated with Hinduism, but embraced ‘all departments of thought and activity
1 V.D. Savarkar, Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?, New Delhi, 2003 [1st edition Nagpur, 1923; Poona, 4th edition, 1949], p. 23. The 
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of the whole Being of our Hindu race’.7 The term ‘Hindu’ signified both a race and a culture rather than merely a 
religion in contrast to the discourse of early nationalism propounded by Bankimchandra Chatterji and Aurobindo 
Ghose to whom ‘Hindu’ was basically a religious category. In Savarkar’s discourse, religion, if it entered at all, 
was important only for its ‘cultural’ connotations. Hindutva was a political ideology that centred on the 
articulation of ‘Hindu nationhood’ and attempted to create a homogeneous Hindu community in view of the 
perceived threat of the ‘Other’ -  the Muslims -  in India.8
I. Hindu ‘Self and Islamic ‘Non-self 
Savarkar defined Hindutva as ‘the life of a great race and a history1, confronting Islam and its ‘attacks and 
betrayals’ inflicted on India in the past. He viewed Islam as the ‘other* of a ‘Hindu nation’. ‘Aryavarta’ -  the land 
of the Aryans -- existed before the Muslim conquests; and Hindu identity was formed largely as a reaction 
against the Islamic ‘non-self. Islam and the Muslims constituted the primary definition of the ‘non-self in conflict 
with the Hindu ‘self, both sharing an antagonistic relation, followed by the English and Christianity.9 Savarkar 
eventually added Gautam Buddha and Gandhi to the unhappy category of 'non-selves’. He held Buddha’s creed 
of ahimsa [non-violence] responsible for the ‘decline and degeneration’ of the Hindus in the ancient times.10 
The ‘first degeneration of the Hindu nation’, he argued, had occurred with the expansion of Buddhism and its 
propagation of the ideals of love, righteousness, and toleration -  which ‘strangled India’.11 It was the Buddhist 
formulas of universalism and non-violence that allowed the invasion of India by ‘the Huns and Shakhas’, who 
were superior in ‘fire and sword’.12 After the fall of Buddhism, King Shalivahana in the Vikramaditya era 
reasserted the identity of Hindu nationhood based on a demarcation between the Aryans and miecchas 
[aliens/barbarians].13 After the wars of the Vikramaditya era, ‘Sindhustan [India] was left as an undisturbed 
nation of peace and plenty for nearly a thousand years’, followed by a period of wars against the Muslim 
rulers.14 In Savarkar’s narrative, the Muslim period was a history of resistance by the Indian nation for nearly a 
thousand years -  particularly since its invasion by the Muslim rulers of central Asia in the eleventh century.15
7 V.D. Savarkar’s presidential address, All-India Hindu Mahasabha session, Ahmedabad, 1937: V.D. Savarkar, Hindu Rashtra 
Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches Delivered from the Hindu Mahasabha Platform, Bombay, 1992 [1949], p. 10.
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Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 18, No. 15,9 April 1983, p. 597; Daniel Gould, ‘Organised Hinduism: From Vedic Truth to 
Hindu Nation’, in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby [eds.], Fundamentalisms Observed, Vol. 1, Chicago, 1994 [1991], pp. 
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In Hindutva ideology, Hindu identity was forged in a continuing process of the violent struggle against Islam 
and the Muslim rulers in India.16 India was ‘rudely awakened on the day when Mahmud of Ghazni crossed the 
Indus, the frontier line of Sindhusthan, and invaded her1. The invasion, Savarkar reflected, signalled ‘the day 
that the conflict of life and death began’. ‘Never had Sindhusthan a better chance and a more powerful stimulus 
to be herself forged into an indivisible whole as on that dire day, when the great iconoclast crossed the Indus.’17 
The ‘ghastly conflict’, Savarkar noted, had continued ‘day after day, decade after decade, century after century 
till such time as Shivaji established a Hindu Empire, a Hindu-Pad-Padshahi’, in western India.18 The raids into. 
the Punjab during 1001-1027 by Mahmud of Ghazni, the rise of the Delhi Sultanate in north India in the twelfth 
century, and the establishment of Mughal rule in 1526 decisively influenced the evolution and course of India’s 
history. Savarkar viewed the whole period from the eleventh century until the early decades of the nineteenth 
century through the logic of a single war between the Hindus and the ‘Muslim invaders and tyrants’; and the 
wars constituted an integral whole based on the defence of Hindutva by the Hindus against the Muslim rulers.19 
Muslim rule in India became ‘a period of despotism and anarchy1, being the historical justification for British 
intervention and conquest in the eighteenth century.20
The Muslim invasions became a narrative theme, usually the result of a series of ‘dreadful religious wars’ as 
well as the struggle of the Hindus against ‘Islam and Muhamadan power1.21 The conflict with the Arabs, the 
Turks, the Persians, the Tartars, and the Mughals defined Hindu identity and constituted the Hindus as a 
‘nation’. The struggle was ‘monstrously unequal’ because India was pitted against ‘nearly all of Islam in Asia’.22 
While all other civilisations conquered by Islam were destroyed, argued Savarkar, Hindu India had resisted 
Islamic rule. 'But here for the first time the sword succeeded in striking but not killing ... Vitality of the victim 
proved stronger than the vitality of the victor.’23 The Hindus fought under the banner of Hindutva, transcending 
the barriers of caste and creed. All castes, creeds and denominations, Savarkar explained, ‘suffered as Hindus 
and triumphed as Hindus’, permeated by Hindutva. In the course of the conflict, ‘our people became intensely 
conscious of ourselves as Hindus and we were welded into a nation to an extent unknown in our history1.24 
Although the Aryans had been a jati, a nation-community, Savarkar believed, they did not become a rashtra, a 
nation state, until they encountered the Muslim invaders -  the Islamic ‘Other1. Only through confrontation with 
the Islamic ‘non-self could the ‘resurrection, renaissance and rejuvenation’ of a ‘Hindu nation’ become a
16 Savarkar, Hindu Rahtra Darshan, p. 15.
17 Savarkar, Hindutva, pp. 42-3.
18 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 35.
19 V.D. Savarkar, Hindu-Pad-Padshahi Or A Review of the Hindu Empire of Maharashtra, 4th edition New Delhi, 1971 [Bombay, 
1925], p. 196; Savarkar, Hindutva, pp. 45-6,95.
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21 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 35.
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historical reality.25 What brought about Hindu unity was the presence of the ‘enemy1 -  the Muslims -  in India. 
Savarkar’s politics of integral Hindutva emerged through the antagonistic presence of the Muslims in India, who 
were internal to his imagination of a Hindu identity. In Hindutva belief, the Muslims were the most important in 
the league of foreign invaders;26 and British rule was a prelude to national resurgence: both were equally
‘alien’.27
In Savarkar’s reconstructive project focusing on India’s medieval period, the battles against the Muslim 
invaders comprised Hindu history, demonstrating the struggle of an ‘oppressed monolithic nation of the Hindus’ 
against Islam.28 The early poem Prithviraja-raso of Chanbardai recounted the battles of the early 1190s 
between Mohammed of Ghur and the Gahadavara ruler Jayachandra in alliance with the Rajput Chauhan king 
Prithviraj III. The battles of the Maratha king Shivaji against Aurangzeb’s general Afzal Khan in the mid-1600s 
were the instances of ‘Hindu resistance against Muslim invasion, tyranny and persecution' by the Marathas. 
Sikh leader Teg Bahadur’s resistance and death at the hands of Aurangzeb as well as Guru Gobind Singh’s 
battles against the Muslim governors were the struggles that aimed to defend ‘Hindutva and Hindu dharm 
[religion]’.29 A ‘Hindu’ consciousness found its expression in the seventeenth century in the empire of Shivaji, 
the torchbearer of the ‘golden age’ of Hinduism, and then in the Maratha confederation.30 Shivaji [1627-1680], 
the legendary warrior-king and founder of the Maratha state, had overthrown the Muslim invaders, freed 
Maharashtra from Islamic rule and established swaraj [freedom] in India. Under the Maratha confederacy, the 
forces of ‘Hindudom’ entered Delhi triumphantly in 1761 and ‘the Moslem throne and crown lay hammered at 
the feet of Bhau and Vishvas’. The establishment in 1761 of Hindu-Pad-Padashahi [Hindu Empire] was an 
instance of the Hindus regaining a sense of ‘freedom and self-possession’ vis-a-vis the Muslim rulers.31 In 
Hindutva narrative, it was important for the Hindus to seek retribution for the wrongs done to them as a ‘nation 
and race’ by the Muslim rulers. Hindu unity and nationalism had remained intact all through history, 
nonetheless.32
Hindutva was rooted in a fundamental mistrust and conflict bordering on the hatred of Islam and the Muslims 
in India. Savarkar rejected the view that the political strife between the Hindus and the Muslims in India was the 
result of British policies, arguing that it had instead arisen as a reaction to ‘Islamic occupation’.33 All the 
sectarian conflicts, he explained, 'are but a legacy handed down to us by centuries of a cultural, religious and
25 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 28; Savarkar, Samagra Savarkar, Vol. 5, p. 27.
26 Savarkar, Six Gorious Epochs, pp. 21-5.
27 Savarkar, Hindutva, pp. 34-6.
28 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, pp. 92-3.
29 Teg Bahadur was the ninth and Guru Gobind Singh the tenth guru of Sikhism.
30 Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Movement, p. 5.
31 Savarkar, Hindu-Pad-Padshahi, pp. 21-2.
32 Savarkar, Hindu-Pad-Padshahi, p. 21.
33 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, p. 90; Sharma, Hindutva, p. 128.
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national antagonism between the Hindus and the Moslems’.34 The internal conflicts and discords among the 
Hindus were the chief cause of disunity, resulting in the nation’s inability to maintain a united front against the 
‘Muslim threat’. The ‘centuries of cultural, religious and national antagonism’ lay in perpetuity between the 
Hindus and the Muslims in India.35
It was an irony that Savarkar who once demonstrated faith in Hindu-Muslim unity had transformed himself 
into a Hindutva ideologue since the advent of the 1920s. In his account of the 1857 revolt -- the ‘War of 
Independence of 1857' -  written in 1907 while he was in England, Savarkar portrayed the sepoy mutiny as a 
national revolt ‘as much to protect religion [swadharma] as to gain independence [swarajya] -  the two aims 
shared by both the Hindus and the Muslims in the anti-British struggle. The Hindus and the Muslims, Savarkar 
reflected, were ‘blood brothers’ who partook of the ‘same milk of the breasts of the Motherland’ and fought 
against the British ‘hand in hand, shoulder to shoulder* in national unity.36 Maulvis Ahmadullah Shah and Inayat 
Ali stood alongside the Rani of Jhansi, Nana Saheb, and Kunwar Singh as the heroes of the 1857 revolt.37 
However, Savarkar’s strong admiration for the ‘Hindu-Muslim feelings of mutual friendship and unity* in India 
was supplanted by a hostile critique of the Muslims as the nation’s ‘traitors and enemies’ a decade later in the 
early 1920s, marking his decisive conversion to Hindutva ideology.38 The early 1920s signified a radical 
departure in Savarkar’s career as a politician, revealing a seminal shift from an anti-British revolutionary to an 
anti-Muslim Hindutva crusader.39 The Muslims -  the threatening ‘Other* -  replaced the British as the real 
enemy of India, which Savarkar argued was vulnerable due to a conflict arising from ‘Islam and Pan-lslamism’ 40 
The anti-Muslim hostility formed a prelude to Savarkar’s ferocious denunciations of the Muslims as the ‘enemies 
of the Indian nation’ before and after India’s independence.
II. A Hindu Fatherland
In Hindutva theory, Savarkar defined India primarily as an ethnic community and a nation possessing first a 
territory and then sharing a unity of ‘Hindu race and culture’. India’s three great attributes of geographical unity, 
racial unity as well as a common culture originated from the mythical reconstruction of its Vedic ‘golden age’.41 
The first attribute of India as a ‘Hindu nation’ was the ‘sacred territory* of ‘Aryavarta’ -  the land of the Aryans42 
The Hindus were pre-eminently the descendants of the ‘intrepid Aryans’ who made Indian subcontinent their
34 Savarkar, Hindu Rashtra Darshan, p. 26.
35 V.D. Savarkar’s statement, no date, cited in Lise McKean, Divine Enterprise: Gurus and the Hindu Nationalist Movement, 
Chicago, 1996, p. 80.
36 V.D. Savarkar, The War of Independence of 1857’, Savarkar, Samagra Savarkar, Vol. 5, pp.106,228-9.
37 Savarkar, Indian War of Independence, p. ix.
38 V.D. Savarkar, Mazhi Janmathep, Bombay, 1950 [1924], pp. 278-81, cited in Nandini Gondhalekar, ‘Indian Nationalism and 
“Hindu” Politics: Maharashtra and the Hindu Mahasabha, 1920-1948’, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 
1999, p. 79; D.R. Goyal, Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, New Delhi, 2nd edn. 2000 [1979], p. 32.
39 V.D. Savarkar, An Echo from the Andamans: Letters Written by Barrister Savarkar to His Brother Dr. Savarkar, Nagpur, 1928, 
cited in Savarkar, Samagra Savarkar, Vol. 4. p. 281.
40 Savarkar, Hindutva, pp. 115-6.
41 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 84.
42 Keer, Veer Savarkar, p. 29.
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home and lighted their 'first sacrificial fire on the bank of the Indus’, a river which was the western border of 
Hindusthan.43 The Aryan theory was central to Savarkar’s narrative in that the Hindus had descended from the 
Aryans who had settled at the dawn of history along the Sapta Sindhu [the River Indus].44 The word Sindhu, 
Savarkar noted, ‘does not only mean the Indus but also the Sea -  which girdles the southern peninsula’ 45 The 
‘whole continental country girdled by the River Sindhu and the Sindhu, another name for the seas surrounding 
peninsular India, was ‘our whole Motherland’ -- a cohesive geographical unit, a ‘nation’ 46 This land, explained 
Savarkar, was ruled by the Aryans, who had been the progenitors of a great ‘Hindu nation’ in the ancient 
times.47
The term ‘Hindu’ originally derived from the Aryan name for the Sindhu, the River Indus, and was used 
successively by the Achaemenids, the Greeks, and the Muslims to denote the population living beyond the 
Indus.48 However, it was not appropriated by the Aryans who bore this designation, nor did they use it 
themselves till the medieval period. The crystallisation of the notion of the ‘Hindus’ as a race had originated in 
the ‘consciousness of being the amorphous, undefined, subordinate other’ in ancient India.49 Historically, 
Savarkar wrote, it was the infusion of Aryan blood, ideas and culture that provided the basis of a ‘Hindu race 
and nation’ originating in the Sindhu, the Indus.50 ‘The same Hindu people have built the life-values, ideals and 
culture of this country and, therefore, their nationhood is self-evident.’51 India emerged as a ‘Hindu nation’ out of 
the Vedic past; and the motif of the Aryan age, the original ‘golden age’, acquired a historical foundation in 
Hindutva narrative, with territory and ethnic unity being inseparable.52
In Hindutva discourse, the most fundamental criterion determining India’s nationhood apart from the territory 
was the inheritance of ‘Hindu blood’.53 Savarkar introduced the notion of ‘race’ for the identification of the 
Hindus, representing ‘common blood’ as the basis of the Indian nation.54 The term he used for a ‘race’ was jati. 
The Hindus,’ he declared, ‘... are not only a Nation but also a race -  ja t i... a race determined by a common 
origin and possessing common blood.’55 All the Hindus had in their veins the ‘blood of the Vedic fathers, the 
Sindhus’. Savarkar explained: ‘We feel that the same ancient blood that coursed through the veins of Ram and 
Krishna, Buddha and Mahavir, Nanak and Chaitanya ... courses throughout Hindudom from vein to vein,
43 Savarkar, Hindutva, pp. 4-5.
44 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 82.
45 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 20.
46 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 20.
47 Savarkar, Samagra Savarkar, Vol. 5, pp. 3-9.
48 R.E. Frykenberg, The Emergence of Modem Hinduism as a Concept and an Institution: A Reappraisal with Special Reference 
to South India’, in G.D. Sontheimer and H. Kulke [eds.], Hinduism Reconsidered, New Delhi, 1989, p. 30.
49Romila Thapar, ‘Syndicated Moksha?’, Seminar, No. 313, September 1985, p. 17.
50 Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, pp. 87-8.
51 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 9.
52 Savarkar, Samgra Savarkar, Vol. 5, pp. 20-1; Savarkar, Hindu-Pad-Padshahi, pp. 246-7,281.
53 Savarkar, Hindutva, pp. 56-7.
54 Savarkar, Hindutva, pp. 68-9,102.
55 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 53.
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pulsates from heart to heart.’56 He justified a view of the Hindus as racially undifferentiated and hence a discrete 
racial unit: beyond the Hindu community’s differences of caste or sect there existed an invisible bond of 
‘common blood’.57 A racial unity underlay the social diversity of the Hindus. No people in the world, Savarkar 
argued, ‘can more justly claim to get recognised as a racial unit than the Hindus and perhaps the Jews’.58 
Sanctioned ‘intermarriages’ -- the system of anuloma and pratiloma [regular and inverse] alliances -  had 
proliferated through the union of members of different castes; but all the castes were bound by the same blood, 
the same race. The very presence of caste, Savarkar claimed, demonstrated the ‘flow of blood from a Brahmtn 
to a Chandal’; the anuloma and pratiloma marriages mixed the ‘blood within the castes and of the four castes 
with those outside them’.59 The ‘commingling of the blood’ of the Aryans and the people they encountered gave 
rise to the Vedic-Hindu civilisation. The blood manifested itself as an effective structure in which the Hindus 
would claim their racial affiliation to their ancestors and hence to all Hindus in India. The motion of common 
blood as the basis of the ‘Hindu race’ was one significant component of Savarkar’s formula for the identification 
of the Hindus as a ‘nation’ -  the ‘Indian nation’.60
In Hindutva ideology, the principle of ‘racial purity’ or eugenics was absent, nonetheless. Hindutva was more 
concerned with the social, hierarchical unity of Hindu society, not a biological racism. In India, the vama [caste] 
system had been integrative and assimilative; and insofar as the caste hierarchy represented a system of 
gradation based on ritual purity, every ‘alien’ [mleccha] group could find a place in it -  at a subordinate rank 
below the Brahmans. Hinduism of the pre-modem period was not a uniform monolithic religion, but a 
juxtaposition of flexible ‘religious sects’. It recognised the existence of mlecchas [aliens/barbarians], who 
attracted discrimination not on the basis of ethnic criteria but because they did not conform to the Vedic rituals61 
The frontier between the Aryans and the mlecchas was relatively an open one; and the successive invaders 
such as the Greeks, the Shakas, and the Huns found themselves classed as Kshatriyas [warriors], accepting 
the ritual practices and authority of the Brahmans. From about the ninth century onwards, references to a large 
number of mlecchas began to decrease.62 Hindutva in part reflected India’s social system by not excluding the 
Muslims and the Christians -  the hostile ‘Other1 -  from Hindu society: they could be integrated, provided they 
paid allegiance to Hindu culture.63 ‘Hence dear Brethren,’ Savarkar stated, ‘most of you [Muslims] were Hindus
56 Savarkar, Hindutva, pp. 89-90.
57 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 73.
58 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 90.
59 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 85.
60 Savrakar, Hindutva, pp. 86,90.
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once and just because you have changed your religion you cannot become foreigners -  call yourself proudly 
Kshatriyas ... I tell you that once you call yourself Kshatriyas, that moment the Hindu-Moslem problem will 
vanish like mist before the powerful sun.’64 In Hindutva discourse, the consolidation of Hindu society presented 
a preliminary stage that could enable the Hindus to absorb the Muslims and the Christians -  the descendants of 
non-Aryan invaders -  in India.65
Sangathanists used the concept of race as the category of a homogeneous ‘ethnic nation’ -  a ‘Hindu nation’, 
not as a eugenic racism of exclusion or extermination. In effect, Hindutva ideology did not represent eugenics 
based on ‘racial purity and hygiene’, which had resulted in the extermination of the Jews as an integral pillar of 
the Nazi doctrine in Germany the 1930s and 1940s.66 Hindu society was based on the domination by the upper 
castes, not the racism of a biological kind.67 The Muslims and the Christians were urged to integrate into Hindu 
society by renouncing their culture -  a rejection of the eugenic programme; but if they chose to remain as 
‘aliens’, as M.S. Golwalkar, the Hindutva ideologue who drove sangathariisi transformation, argued, they could 
only occupy a position of inferiority -  ‘wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no 
privileges, far less any preferential treatment -  not even citizen’s rights’. 'Culturally, linguistically,’ insisted 
Golwalkar, ‘they [Muslims and Christians] must become one with the National race ... in short, they must be 
‘Naturalised’ in the country by being assimilated in the Nation wholly ... [they] must... adopt the Hindu culture 
and language, must leam to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion ...’ 68 However, the Hindutva theory of 
‘cultural assimilation’ hardly found favour with the Muslims or the Christians, nor did it succeed as a political 
programme in India.
The crucial defining feature of Hindutva, besides territory and race, was a common civilisation and culture 
[sanskriti]. The Hindus, stated Savarkar, ‘are bound together not only by the tie of the love we bear to a 
common fatherland ... but also by the tie of the common homage we pay to our great civilization -  our Hindu 
culture ...Sanskriti ,..’69 The civilisation shared by the Hindus comprised history, literature and arts, laws, 
customs, festivals, and rituals. The different places of pilgrimage in India constituted the ‘common inheritance’ of 
the Hindu race, a cultural heritage strengthened by the presence of Sanskrit -  'our mother tongue’.70 Sanskrit 
was ‘the real mother-tongue of our race’ in accordance with the classical Brahmanical texts -  ‘the tongue in 
which the mothers of our race spoke and which has given birth to all our present tongues’.71 Hindi was given the 
status of the ‘eldest daughter1 of Sanskrit. Sangathan ists urged the recognition of Sanskrit or Hindi as the
64 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 120.
65 M.S. Golwalkar, We, or Our Nationhood Defined [Foreword by Loknayak M.S. Aney], Nagpur,1947 [1939], p. 54.
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national language of India.72 The construction of a homogeneous ‘Hindu nation’ based on a common culture 
and history -- a ‘cultural unity1 -  was at the heart of ideological Hindutva.
In Hindutva narrative, the centrality of Hindu culture was the defining element of Indian nationhood. In a free 
India, Savarkar explained, there could only be one Hindu culture defining rituals and social roles, in which 
different communities/castes coexisted in a hierarchical relationship. Nationality did not depend so much on a 
common geographical territory as on the unity of race and culture. In the formation of nations, Savarkar argued, 
‘religious, racial, cultural and historical affinities counted immensely more than territorial unity1.73 He rejected the 
Indian National Congress’s theory of a ‘territorial nation’ -  a composite nation of all communities living as equals 
within the British India realm -  and emphasised the racial and cultural unity of the Hindus as the basis of the 
Indian nation.74 The Indian nation was culturally defined and based on culture -  perhaps not the territory alone. 
‘Our ancient and sublime cultural values of life,’ Savarkar stated, ‘form its [India’s] life-breath. And it is only an 
intense rejuvenation of the spirit of our culture that can give us the true vision of our national life ,..’75 
Sangathamsis attacked the Congress’s theory of territorial nationalism in that it did not recognise that ‘here was 
already a full-fledged ancient nation of the Hindus’, and that the Muslims and the Christians were there as 
‘invaders’. In pursuit of the ‘phantom of unity*, it was argued, the Congress denied the ‘essential reality of India 
as a Hindu nation’, and the time had come to ‘enlighten the people on the need for building a Hindu nation 
rather than a secular state on the western model’.76 In Hindutva discourse, the Indian nation was coterminous 
with the Hindu community as a cultural group.
Finally, Savarkar defined ‘who is a Hindu', a definition that had radically shaped and influenced the political 
discourse and programme of the Hindu Mahasabha in north India throughout the 1920-1940s.77 He defined a 
‘Hindu’ as one ‘who regards this land of Bharatvarsha, from the Indus to the Seas, as his Fatherland \pitribhu] 
as well as his Holyland jpunyabhu] that is the cradle land of his religion’.78 The definition was territorial [the ‘land 
between the Indus and the Seas’], genealogical [‘fatherland’], and religious [‘holyland’].79 The first requisite of 
Hindutva was citizenship by parental descent within the physically bounded territory of India. However, this was 
not a sufficient condition, for the term ‘Hindu’ signified more than a geographical territory. Savarkar proposed an 
essential requirement for Hindutva, indeed the most important one: the bond of common blood. A Hindu must 
be a descendant of ‘Hindu parents’.80 The crucial test was thus two-fold -  pitribhumi [fatherland] must be the
72 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 26.
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same as punyabhumi [holyland]. To every Hindu, from the Santal to the Sadhu ... this Sindhusthan is at once a 
Pitribhu and a Punyabhu -  a fatherland and a holyland.’81 The soil and the tie of common ‘holyland’ proved 
stronger in Hindutva narrative as the chief elements integral to being a ‘Hindu’, constituting the basis of Indian 
nationality.82
However, the ideology of Hindutva contained one major obstacle: the integration of the Muslims and the 
Christians into the Indian nation. The Muslims and the Christians were not part of Hindutva because they did not 
identify with Hindu culture as a whole, despite sharing the ‘territory and race’ with the Hindus. They belonged to 
an alien cultural matrix: their heroes, their objects of worship, and their fairs and festivals had little in common 
with Hindu culture.83 Savarkar explained: ‘For though Hindusthan is to them [Muslims and Christians] a 
Fatherland as to any other Hindu, yet it is not to them a Holyland too. Their holyland is far off in Arabia or 
Palestine. Their mythology and Godmen, ideas and heroes are not the children of this soil ... Their love is 
divided.’84 The Islamic reverence for prophets and sacred places outside the geographical territory of India 
made the Muslims suspect and potential ‘traitors’ in the eyes of sangathan ists. ‘Look at Mohammedans,’ 
Savarkar argued, ‘the Mecca to them is a sterner reality than Delhi or Agra. Some of them do not make any 
secret of being bound to sacrifice all India if that be to the glory of Islam...’85 The syncretic communities like the 
Muslim Bohras and Khojas of Gujarat were originally Hindu castes that had converted to Islam between the 
eleventh and fifteenth centuries in India. They possessed ‘all the essential qualifications of Hindutva’, but had to 
be excluded from a ‘Hindu nation’, for ‘India was not their holyland’.86 Hindutva excluded the Parsis and the 
Jews, too: India was not their ‘holyland’. In Hindutva discourse, ‘foreign religions’ were beyond the purview of 
Indian nationhood: reconversion to Hinduism was the only way to be integrated into Indian nationality.
In Hindutva theory, Savarkar turned to an explicitly religious criterion only once: the meaning of the Hindu 
religion [dharm]. The religion of the majority of Hindus, he explained, could be termed sanatan dharm, while the 
‘remaining Hindus’ could continue to call themselves by such names as Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, or Arya 
Samajists.87 The heterodox communities were all Hindu and equally well within their rights to reject the authority 
of dharmashastras [Hindu canonical texts]. The Hindu religion comprised all the Vedic and non-Vedic faiths that 
had originated in India. It incorporated Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism because India was the land of their 
‘birth and revelation’.88 In Hindutva belief, the faiths bom in India were accepted as part of Hinduism, and those 
coming from outside -  Islam and Christianity -  were excluded as ‘foreign’ in origin.
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III. Hindu Rashtra
The central theme in Savarkar’s articulation of Hindutva was the creation of a Hindu rashtra [nation]: the 
rashtra meant ‘not merely the state but an all-inclusive Hindu society1, becoming the basis of Hindutva 
nationalism.89 The ‘Indian state’, Savarkar declared, was a ‘Hindu nation’ based on the principle of ‘one man 
one vote’ and the ‘rule of the majority1.90 The Hindus were the overwhelming majority in India; and there could 
be no conflict between their communitarian and national duties which in turn were identifiable with the best 
interests of India as a whole.91 The Hindus were the ‘bedrock on which an independent Indian state could be 
built’.92 The foundation of the future Indian polity, Savarkar explained, was to be provided by the Hindus ‘whose 
interests, history and aspirations are most closely bound up with the land and who thus provide the real 
foundation to the structure of their national state’.93 India’s independence was inextricably linked to ‘the 
independence of our [Hindu] people, our race, our nation’.94 'India must be a Hindu land reserved for the 
Hindus.’95 Savarkar stated that the Indian state must be ‘established under the Hindu flag’. This dream would 
be realized during this or coming generation. If it is not realized, I may be styled a day-dreamer, but if it comes 
true, I would stand forth as its prophet.’96 Savarkar’s core belief was that the Hindus had to be ‘masters’ in India, 
necessitating the establishment of a ‘Hindu majority rule’.97
Politically, the Hindu Mahasabha defined India as a nation ‘primarily for the Hindus’. It resolved in 1936 that ‘all 
the alien faiths must be made to understand that Hindusthan is primarily for the Hindus’, and that ‘the Hindus 
live for the preservation and development of the Aryan culture and the Hindu Dharma’.98 India could not belong 
to the ‘converts, or those who are the descendants of those barbarous invaders who spoiled our very sacred 
land, demolished our sacred temples ...’"  Dr Kurtkoti declared in his presidential speech to the Mahasabha’s 
Lahore session 1936: ‘I affirm that in Hindusthan the national race, religion and language ought to be that of the 
Hindus ... in every part and province of the state ...’100The Mahasabha adopted a revised constitution at its 
Ahmedabad session in December 1937, declaring its aim as ‘the maintenance, protection and promotion of the 
Hindu race, Hindu culture and Hindu civilisation and advancement and glory of Hindu Rashtra, and ... to attain
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Purna Swaraj, i.e. absolute political independence for Hindustan by legitimate means’.101 The existence of non- 
Hindu minorities in India challenged the idea of a homogeneous ‘Hindu nation’. The establishment of a Hindu 
rashtra implied that the minorities would have the rights to political representation and citizenship, but 
commensurate with their numerical strength in the country.102 In sangathanist theory, the Hindus who formed 
the majority would rule; and the Muslims or the Christians constituted the lost fulcrum of the Indian nation.103
In ideological terms, the concept of ‘historical enemy’ -  the Muslims -  was implicit in Hindutva theory, which 
had originated from a deep-rooted hostility against Islam.104 The Muslims, Savarkar argued, were ‘anti-Hindu, 
anti-Indian’ -  too closely tied to ‘extra-territorial’ loyalties to play a role in the building of the new Indian 
nation.105 They would ‘not be loyal to India due to their ‘perfidy and fanaticism’ and had a ‘secret urge goading 
them to transform India into a Moslem state’.106 Savarkar condemned the Muslim League’s ‘separatist politics’, 
which he said aimed to ‘humiliate the Hindus' and establish ‘Muslim domination’ in India. If the Hindus in India 
grew stronger in time, he wondered, ‘these Moslem friends of the League will have to play the part of German- 
Jews’.107 Savarkar argued that the Muslims had ‘betrayed the Hindus through their co-operation with the 
British’.108 They were responsible for creating ‘obstacles’ in the path of achieving independence for India and did 
not co-operate with the Hindus. It was the Hindu sangathamsts alone who had remained the ‘vanguard’ of the 
anti-British independence struggle in India.109 In a public message to the Muslims, Savarkar asserted: ‘If you 
come, with you; if you don’t without you; and if you oppose, in spite of you the Hindus will continue to fight for 
their national freedom.’110 Savarkar explained that the Hindus were ‘at war at once with the Moslems on the one 
hand and the British on the other1. ‘India,’ he declared, ‘cannot be assumed today to be a ... homogeneous 
nation ...’ ‘There are ‘two antagonistic nations living side by side in India’ ... the Hindu [sic] and the Moslems’. 
He insisted: ‘I have no quarrel with Mr Jinnah’s two-nation theory. We, Hindus are a nation by ourselves and it is 
a historical fact that Hindus and Muslims are two nations.’ 111 In Hindutva theory, the Hindus and the Muslims 
were two different racial types locked in a historical conflict, compounded by the impossibility of a ‘peaceful 
coexistence’. Hindutva’s hostility to the Muslims had largely influenced Hindu nationalist ideology, emerging as 
its core feature in India throughout the 1930s and 1940s.
101 Savarkar, Hindu Rashtra Darshan, pp. 55-7.
102 Savarkar, Hindu Rashtra Darshan, p. 54.
103 Savarkar, Hindu Dhwaja, pp. 232-3.
104 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 38; A.G. Noorani, Savarkar and Hindutva: The Godse Connection, Delhi, 2002, p. 25.
105 Savarkar, Hindu Rashtra Darshan, p. 49.
106 Savarkar, Hindu Rashtra Darshan, pp. 53,89.
107 Savarkar, Hindu Rashtra Darshan, pp.
108 Savarkar, Samagra Savarkar, Vol. 5, pp. 95-6.
109 Ainslie T. Embree, The Function of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh: To define the Hindu Nation’, in Martin E. Marty and 
R. Scott Appleby [ed.], Accounting for Fundamentlisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements, Chicago, 2004, p. 632.
110 V.D. Savarkar’s statement of 9 February 1937, New Delhi, File C 73, AIHMS, Hindu Mahasabha Papers, NMML.
111 Savarkar, Hindu Rashtra Darshan, p. 14-5,20, 24.
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The two-nation theory was first launched by Mohammad Ali Jinnah in the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim 
League in 1940 on the basis that the Muslims were a ‘separate nation’.112 Jinnah argued that the cultural 
distinctiveness of Islam constituted the rationale for a separate nation-state of Pakistan. The differences 
between the Hindus and the Muslims in India were seen as not merely religious differences, but as entirely 
different ways of life and thought. The Hindus and the Muslims in India were ‘distinct peoples, with different 
religious philosophies, social customs, literatures, and histories’. 'Islam and Hinduism ...,’ Jinnah declared, ‘are 
not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact different and distinct social orders... [T]hey belong to 
two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions ...’113 It was for more than 
a thousand years, he insisted, that the bulk of the Muslims had lived in ‘a different world, in a different society, in 
a different philosophy and a different faith’.114 As such, it was inconceivable that the Muslims could live as a 
minority in a ‘Hindu-dominated’ India as a nation. Rather, they must have a state of their own in which they 
would establish their own constitution and make their own laws. There was one crucial difference, however 
Jinnah proclaimed the existence of two nations, but sangathamsts held that only one nation -- the 'Hindu nation’ 
-  existed in India.
Conclusion
V.D. Savarkar discovered Hindutva, a fusion of Hindu cultural identity and nationalism, in his study of the 
threatening ‘Others’, the Muslims, in the early 1920s when a nationwide anti-colonial struggle had been 
launched in India. Savarkar, not a believer in God but a rationalist himself, articulated the claim that the Hindus 
constituted an exclusive nation, which had originated from the Vedic past.115 The Aryans who had settled in 
India at the dawn of history in the Vedic era formed a nation now embodied in the Hindus. Hindu identity was 
formed through a conflict with the ‘non-self: Islam and the Muslims. India’s history became an endlessly 
repeated tale of ‘aggression by the Muslim conquerors and resistance by the Hindus’.116 The conflict with the 
Muslim rulers had defined Hindu identity and constituted the Hindus as a ‘nation’. For Savarkar, Indian 
nationality, or Indian nationhood, did not depend so much on a common geographical territory as on the ‘unity of 
Hindu race and culture’. The Hindus were a ‘race’ \jati\, possessing a common culture and civilisation. Savarkar 
explicitly rejected the territorial concept of the Indian nation as championed by the Congress and insisted that 
India was culturally defined as a nation.117 Hindutva defined a Hindu as one who inherited the blood of the race 
of Vedic-Aryan forefathers and who claimed its culture as one’s own -  India being both a ‘fatherland’ and 
‘holyland’. The Muslims and the Christians could not be incorporated into the Indian nation because India was
112 A. Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge, 1985, p. 157.
113 Muhammad ali Jinnah’s Presidential Address at the all-India Muslim League, Lahore Session, 23 March 1940, in Jamil-ud-Din 
Ahmad [ed.], Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah, Lahore, 1942, p. 153.
114 Cited in Ahmad [ed.], Some Recent Speeches, p. 154.
115 Savarkar, Samagra Savarkar, Vol. 4, pp. 121-2.
116 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 11; Savarkar, Six Glorious Epochs, pp. 121-135.
117 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 58-9,
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not their ‘holyland’. 118 India was a Hindu rashtra [ntion] to be governed by a ‘Hindu majority rule’. In 
sangathanist narrative, the enemies of the Indian nation were chiefly the Muslims whose inclusion in India was 
premised on their assimilation to Hindu culture and the acceptance of the social and political centrality of the 
Hindus as the basis of Indian nationhood.119
118 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 95.
119 V.D. Savarkar’s speech on 29 July 1939, Pune, cited in Marzia Casolari, ‘Hindutva’s Foreign Tie-up in the 1930s: Archival 
Evidence’, Economic and Political Weekly, 22 January 2000, p. 223.
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6Masculine ‘Hindu Nation’ and the Muslim ‘Other’
In the early twentieth century, the Hindu Mahasabha showed an ideological commitment to the strengthening 
of the Hindu community through sangathan, which was viewed as a means of national ‘regeneration’ in the face 
of ‘demilitarisation and emasculation' perpetrated by the British on Indians. Its sangathan discourse was 
pervaded by the representation of masculinity and physical strength as the chief ideals of a ‘Hindu nation’ in 
resistance to the colonial prejudice that the Hindus were ‘cowardly1 and ‘weak’.1 Sangathan configured Hindu 
‘masculinity’ by emphasising the martial prowess, physical strength and patriotic fervour of the Hindus as a 
defence against the image of the ‘powerful’ British in India.2 Nonetheless, the emphasis on Hindu masculinity 
was not merely a resistance to British rule, but a product of the new and changing context -  the conflict with 
Muslims -- in the country in the 1920s. The Mahasabha’s ideology was driven by an urge to overcome the 
perceived ‘weakness’ by expunging the threatening ‘Other* -  the Muslims; and its hostility was far more deeply 
entrenched against the Muslims as the 'enemy within’ than the British.3 It carried out a hostile propaganda, 
homogenising and stigmatising the Muslims as a ‘historical enemy1 of the Indian nation.4 This chapter examines 
the process by which national ‘regeneration’ through Hindu masculinity and militancy became a central symbol 
of the Mahasabha’s sangathan narrative and was transformed into an anti-Muslim propaganda in the United 
Provinces in the 1920s and 1930s.
I. Ideal of Hindu ‘Masculinity’
The ideal of Hindu ‘masculinity’ was anchored within the Hindu Mahasabha’s discourse of a ‘Hindu nation’ 
and remained central to its interpretation of sangathan ideology. The Mahasabha’s notion of masculinity was 
drawn from the reformist discourse of Dayananda Saraswati, the founder of the the Arya Samaj, as well as the 
early nationalists who had stressed physical strength as an essential element in rebuilding the Indian nation.5 A 
strong body was the precondition for a healthy nation; and the ideal Hindu male was represented as a ‘virile, 
physically strong and ardent nationalist’.6 The recuperation of masculinity lay at the heart of a quest for national 
strength in the face of oppressive colonial rule and its stereotypes.7 The British criticised the Indians -  the
1 Chandkaran Sharda, ‘Hindu Jati ki Durdasha ke Karan aur uske Nivaran ke Upaye’, Madhuri, Vol. 3, Nos. 1,2, September 
1924, IOR L/R/5/98, File No. 32,1924, pp. 290-5, IOL.
2 G.R. Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India: A Study of Controversy, Conflict and Communal Movements in Northern 
India, 1923-1928, Leiden, 1975, p. 158.
3 Thomas Blom Hansen, ‘Recuperating Masculinity’, Critique of Anthropology, Vol. 16, No. 2,1996, pp. 137-172.
4 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity-Building, 
Implantation and Mobilisation [with special refrence to Central India], London, 1996, pp. 35-6.
5 Ainslie T. Embree, ‘The Function of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh: To Define the Hindu Nation’, in M. E. Marty and R.
Scott Appleby [eds.], Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements, Chicago, 2004, p. 627.
6 Paola Bacchetta, ‘Hindu Nationalist Women as Ideologues: The “Sangh", the “Samiti” and their Differential Concepts of the 
Hindu Nation’, in C. Jaffrelot [ed.], Sangh Parivr: A Reader, New Delhi, 2005, p. 128.
7 Joseph S. Alter, ‘Celibacy, Sexuality, and the Transformation of Gender into Nationalism in North India’, The Journal of Asian
Studies, Vol. 53, No. 1, February 1994, pp. 45-66.
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‘martial races’ apart -  for being ‘physically weak, morally soft, effeminate, and lacking in Victorian masculinity, 
even while the state had depended on their talents as service groups in the administration.8 The physical 
organisation of a Hindu, proclaimed Lord Macaulay, ‘is feeble even to effeminacy... His pursuits are sedentary, 
his limbs delicate, his movement languid.’9 The state drafted the newly defined ‘martial’ races into its 
reorganised armies after the revolt of 1857 in order to combat ‘weak elements’ in the Indian military. It 
constructed the martial races -- mainly the Marathas, the Sikhs, the Pathans, and the Rajputs -  in terms of a 
‘masculine, aggressive and virile’ image in contrast to the ‘non-martial’ ones -- the ‘effete’ Bengali, or the 
mercantile vaishya [trader] ~ who were barred from the army. The negative image of ‘effeteness’ triggered the 
nationalist response from the various leaders and reformers who had sought to re-invigorate Indian character 
through a revival of interest in physical culture and wrestling.10 In nationalist vision, the Indians were to become 
‘brave, self-confident, able-bodied and strong citizens’ in order to create a healthy and dynamic nation of self- 
rule.11
In the early 1920s, the concern for national ‘regeneration’ that informed much of Hindu nationalist writing had 
prompted a search for a glorious national Hindu past. The writings and tracts of this period aimed primarily to 
inculcate a spirit of national pride and heroic history among the Hindu classes, constructing a past Hindu 
‘masculinity’ in an anti-colonial contestation.12 There were many tracts and pamphlets written in the United 
Provinces, highlighting the tradition of Hindu ‘masculinity that once existed in Indian society. Hindi vernacular 
newspapers emphasised the need for organisation and physical culture among the Hindus. The protection of 
[the] Hindu community,’ it was argued, 'is the most important question at present... We have to stop producing 
emasculated and weak Hindus ... We have to search for new ways to make the Hindu community powerful ,..’13 
In ‘physique’, stated the Madhuri, ‘the Hindus are second to none ... the physique of Hindus from the Punjab 
even matches those of Europeans’. 14 An appeal for volunteers in 1923 urged that ‘the first requisite is that 
Hindu boys should be good athletes and not puny bone bags’.15 During the Janmasthami festival in 1925, the 
Hindu press in the UP published articles in all the special numbers, urging military spirit among the Hindus: 
Krishna’s teachings to Arjun asking him to murder his kinsmen mercilessly were specially stressed.16 Symbolic
8 Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity. The ‘Manly Englishman’ and the ‘Effeminate Bengali’ in the Late Nineteenth Century, 
Manchester, 1995, pp. 31-55.
9 Cited in Leonard A. Gordon, Bengal: The Nationalist Movement 1876-1940, Delhi, 1974, p. 6.
10 Sikata Banerjee, Make Me a Man! Masculinity, Hinduism, and Nationalism in India, Albany, 2005, pp. 51-5.
11 Gandhi advocated physical fitness and applauded wrestling ideals -- 'manliness, virility, and a strong physique’ -  needed for a 
strong nation. M.K. Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi [CWMG], New Delhi, 1988, Vol. 18, p. 505; Vol. 24, p. 118. 
Motilal Nehru was an advocate of physical education; and B.G. Tilak and G.K. GokhaJe actually engaged themselves in exercise.
12 Indira Chowdhury Sengupta, The Frail Hero and Virile History: Gender and the Politics of Culture in Colonial Bengal, Delhi, 
1998, p. 57; Chetan Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies and Modem Myths, Oxford, 2001, p. 75.
13Swami Satyadev Paribrajak, Sangathan ka Bigul, Dehradun, 1926, 3rd edn, p. i, cited in Charu Gupta, ‘Articulating Hindu 
Masculinity and Femininity: Shuddhi and Sangathan Movements in UP in the 1920s’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 33, No. 
13,28 March 1998, p. 729.
14 Madhuri, November 1926, p. 579, IOR L/R/5/98, File No. 18,1926, p. 5, IOL.
15 Cited in Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations, p. 169.
16 Hamdam, 22 August 1925, IOR L/R/5/98, File No. 33,1925, p. 3, IOL.
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references in this model included Lord Rama and Hanuman of the Ramayana, who represented the evident 
ideal of ‘masculinity’. A speech reportedly made by Guru Govind Singh was published, exhorting the Hindus to 
bear arms and fight against the Muslim rulers.17 The heroic Rajputs, the Marathas, and the Sikhs became the 
common ancestors of the Hindus; and Maharana Pratap, Raja Chattrasaal, and Shivaji -  who had resisted the 
Mughals -- were the icons of a chivalrous Hindu past and models of a militant, aggressive ‘Hindu nation’.18 Nana 
Sahib, Rani of Jhansi, Tatia Tope bravely embodied the virtues of Hindu soldiers as the heroes of the revolt of 
1857.19 The driving sentiment behind the nationalist urge was patriotic; and the past heroism against the ‘alien 
rulers’ was recalled or invented to inspire the Indian nation.20 The ideal Hindu character was portrayed as 
‘courageous’ and ‘strong’ -- willing to fight for the nation’s freedom.21 The true Hindu dharm [religion], it was 
stated, was the Kshatriya or warrior dharm; and the identity of the Hindus was viewed through characteristics 
associated with the warrior culture of the Kshatriyas.22 In the UP, the preoccupation with ‘masculinity’ and 
‘Kshatriya’ status was evident among the peasants; and a large number of peasant and caste associations had 
invoked kshatriyahood to assert their martial valour and argue for a higher social status under the British 
census.23 Hindu nationalist narrative appropriated the nationalist fervour in a drive to build India’s national 
‘renewal’ and envisioned an ancient, virile, manly, unified Hindu community striving to eradicate the country’s 
past ‘humiliations’ inflicted by the British.
Sangathanist ideology articulated a masculinist vision of India, aiming to find the means by which the Indians 
could become a healthy and strong nation. A self-controlled and healthy nation would have the necessary moral 
fibre for self-rule; and athletic rhetoric and metaphors were used to portray an image of the state as ‘fit, virile 
and heroic’, which was indeed the model for India.24 The sangathan ist notion of a resurgent ‘Hindu nation’ 
based on the principles of physical training valued the building of muscular youth movements as a front line for 
swaraj [freedom]. The attainment of physical strength and vigour would, it was argued, exorcise the ‘feeble and 
timid’ Hindu within and awaken the dormant strength of a ‘Hindu nation’ 25 Physical culture and discipline offered 
a utopian vision of nationalism that made the body, indeed the masculine physique, the primary object of India’s 
struggle to combat the colonial state and it bias of ‘Christian manliness’ which offered an apologia for English
17 Pratap, Kanpur, 22 August 1925, IOR L/R/5/98, File No. 33,1925, p. 3, IOL.
18 Chauhani Talwar, Benaras, 1918 depicts the early struggles of King Prithviraj of Delhi with the Muslim invaders of India. Tod's 
Annals in Rajasthan became so popular that many Hindi works were inspired by it, such as Maithilisharan Gupfs, Rang Mein 
Bhang, Jhansi, 9th edn. 1927. Sudipto Kaviraj, ‘Imaginary History’, Occasional papers in History and Society, 2nd Series, No. 7, 
NMML, 1988, pp. 16-7.
19 V.D. Savarkar, The Indian War of Independence 1857, Bombay, 8th edn., 1970 [1947], p. 30.
20 Joya Chatterji, Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 160-1.
21 Chatterji, Bengal Divided, p. 161.
22 Banerjee, Make Me a Man!, pp. 69-71.
23 Nandini Gooptu, The Politics of the Urban Poor in Early Twentieth-Century India, Cambridge, 2001, p. 225; idem, The Urban 
Poor and Militant Hinduism in Early Twentieth-Century UP’, Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4,1997, pp. 130-174: p. 135.
24 Joseph S. Alter, ‘Somatic Nationalism: Indian Wrestling and Militant Hinduism’, Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 28. No. 3,1994, pp. 
557-88: p. 559.
24 Police Abstracts of Intelligence [PAI], Lucknow, UP, No. 40, 20 October 1923.
25 Joseph S. Alter, Gandhi’s Body: Sex, Diet, and the Politics of Nationalism, Pennsylvania, 2000, p. 139.
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rule in India.26 Sangathan repeatedly asked the Hindus to avenge past humiliation, regain courage and become 
warriors as a proud ‘Indian race’.27 It constantly engaged with the notions of Hindu masculinity, attacking the 
image of a ‘passive, docile, virtuous Hindu’ in India.28 Shuddhi was interpreted in terms of ‘masculine power1 -  
power for both the Hindu community and the nation -  by emphasising the need to draw in Rajputs [Malkanas] 
who were associated with the culture of Kshatriya prowess.29 In sangathan\s\ narrative, India was to be 
energised by masculine Hinduism, which signified martial prowess, military strength, and unquestioning 
patriotism to the nation.30
The Hindu Mahasabha had incorporated the self-strengthening views of the early Hindu nationalists in its 
sangathan programme, emphasising ‘virility’ and ‘masculinity’ as the chief ideals of a ‘Hindu nation’. Swami 
Shraddhananda favoured the necessity of physical culture as part of sangathan in an attempt to create a 
‘fighting class’ among the Hindus.31 He proclaimed the virtues of eating meat and prescribed a diet rich in meat 
for the development of military skills and physical valour among the Hindus.32 Early marriages and conception, 
he argued, led to physically weak children in India -  hence a source of weakness for the ‘Hindu race’. In 
contrast to the conventional lower minimum age for the marriage of Hindu boys and girls, he urged 
Dayananda’s prescriptions of 25 years for males and 16 years for females to produce 'strong men’ in India.33 
The Hindu community was to be a community of ‘militant and masculine men -  on the model of Brahman and 
Kshatriya men’.34 B.S. Moonje insisted that the Hindus must acquire masculine virtues and aggressiveness, 
which they had lost through the ‘centuries of colonial subjugation’ in India.35 V.D. Savarkar evoked the idea of 
Hinduism as a ‘masculine, aggressive and violent’ faith, attacking the colonial critique of Indian ‘effeminacy’ -- 
the lack of a martial spirit or the absence of patriotism.36 The Hindus were a ‘martial race’, he insisted, with a 
history of great men who had shown the path of manliness in the face of Muslim and colonial aggression.37 The 
attempt to establish swaraj in India had failed in 1857 due to British superiority in war tactics and the ‘treachery 
of our own countrymen’, he explained, but the masculine Hindu spirit temporarily retreated to the background,
26 Banerjee, Make Me a Man\, p. 67.
27 Bacchetta, ‘Hindu Nationalist Women’, p. 128.
28 Charu Gupta, ‘Obscenity, Sexuality and the "Other” : Gender and Hindu Identity in Uttar Pradesh, 1880s-1930s’, PhD 
Dissertation, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2000, p. 134.
29 (ndra Prakash, A Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sangathan Movement, New Delhi, 
1952 [1938], pp. iv-v; William R. Pinch, Peasants and Monks in British India, Berkeley, 1996, pp. 81-114.
30 V.D. Savarkar, Samagra Savarkar Wangmaya: Writings of Swatantrya Veer V.D. Savarkar, Vol. 5, Poona, 1964, rept. New 
Delhi, 2003, p. 230.____________________________________________________________________________________
31 Swami Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan: Saviour of the Dying Race, n.p., 1926, p. 141.
32 C. Jaffrelot, ‘Hindu Nationalism: Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 20, Nos. 12- 
13, 20-26 March 1993, p. 520.
33 Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan, pp. 46-8.
34 Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan, p. 93.
35 B.S. Moonje a Maratha Brahman, introduced himself as ‘a Brahman by caste and by temperament perhaps a Kshatriya’: he 
was a hunter and not a vegetarian. B.S. Moonje’s letter to Maharajah Scindia, dated 23 April 1932, Moonje Papers, Microfilm, 
Reel No. 7; B.S. Moonje’s letter to Raja Ichalkarang, dated 18 May 1936, Moonje Papers, Microfilm, Reel No. 11, NMML.
36 V.D. Savarkar’s Presidential Address, ‘Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha 20th Session’, Nagpur, 1938. V.D. Savarkar, Hindu 
Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of Presidential Speeches Delivered from the Hindu Mahasabha Platform, Bombay, 1992 [1949], p. 
104.
37 V.D. Savarkar, Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?, Poona, 4th edn., 1949, rept. New Delhi, 2003, pp. 25-6.
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waiting to be resurrected.38 A ‘strong, unified, militarised Hindu nation’ would imminently awaken to realise her 
‘martial spirit and reassert herself.39 ‘It is in this spirit,’ Savarkar declared, ‘that I want all Hindus to get 
themselves re-animated and re-bom into a martial race. Manu and Shri Krishna are our law givers and Shri 
Ram the Commander of our forces. Let us re-leam the manly lessons they taught us and our Hindu Nation shall 
prove again as unconquerable ...’40 ‘Strength’ was a decisive category in sangathan\s\ narrative, as it would 
make the Hindus more ‘manly1 and help correct the instances of ‘slight, injury, or persecution’ inflicted by the 
British.41 The ideal state of nationhood, implicitly a ‘Hindu nation’, could only be realised through the cultivation 
of strength, physical and spiritual42 ‘The Hindus, grown weak,’ it was asserted, ‘must become strong again if 
they are to protect their women, their property and their rights.’ The world understood nothing but the language 
of strength; and the ‘true Dharma’ was the ‘Kshatra [warrior] Dharma’.43 To the Hindu Mahasabha, the emphasis 
on physical strength linked ‘rejuvenated masculinity1 to weapons and violence, equating the revitalisation of the 
Indian nation with the resurrection of an imagined past masculinity.44
1.1. Akharas
In the 1920s and 1930s, Hindu nationalism became explicitly linked to physical training practised through 
akharas [wrestling gymnasiums], which had promoted body building in order to create strong and heroic men in 
India.45 In the United Provinces, Hindu organisations and mercantile notables had made financial donations for 
the establishment of akharas and gymnasiums as a form of expression of Hindu power.46 The akharas 
proliferated in Banaras, Gorakhpur, and Lucknow as the centres of physical culture, wrestling, sword and club 
wielding, and lathi fighting. An estimated 13 Hindu akharas staged displays of arms and drills with 300 
participants in the towns of the UP in late 1923.47 About ‘150 Hindus in nine akharas leamt swordsmanship and 
wrestling in Allahabad in one week’ in 1923. Over 5,000 were involved in the display of swordsmanship in 
Allahabad in 1924.48 The akharas placed a greater importance on celibacy [brahmacharya] -  a practice which
38 Savarkar, Indian War, p. 179.
39 V.D. Savarkar, Hindu-Pad-Paddashahi Or A Review of the Hindu Empire of Maharashtra, Bombay, 1925, rept. 4th edn. New 
Delhi, 1971, p. 288.
40 V.D. Savarkar’s Presidential Address, ‘Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha 22nd Session’, Madurai, 1940: Savarkar, Hindu 
Rashtra Darshan, p. 154.
41 Gyanendra Pandey, ‘Hindus and Others: The Militant Hindu Construction’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 26, No. 52,28 
December 1991, p. 3004; Partha Catterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse, London, 1986, 
pp. 91-105.
42 M.S. Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts, Bangalore, 2000 [1966], pp. 65-6.
43 Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts, pp. 377-8.
44 Walter K. Anderson and Shridhar D. Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu 
Revivalism, New Delhi, 1987, p. 11.
45 The Mallapurana, a sixteenth-century text, describes and justifies the martial vocation of the Jyesthimallas -  a caste of 
medieval professional Brahmin wrestlers in Gujarat. Joseph S. Alter, The Wrestler’s Body: Identity and Ideology in North India, 
Berkeley, 1992, rept. New Delhi, 1997, pp. 73-5.
46 S. Freitag, Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India, Berkeley, 
1989, pp. 16-17,91-93,122; Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Movement, p. 35.
47 PAI, No. 40, 20 October 1923; No. 41, 27 October 1923.
48 Alter, Wrestler’s Body, p. 73.
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aimed to develop and maintain power [shakti] in semen and enhance masculine strength.49 They became the 
basic units of mobilisation for a collective action by Hindu volunteer corps -  such as the Bhimsen Dal, the 
Abhimanyu Dal, and the Mahabir Sena Sangh -  which had grown in the towns of the UP.50 The name in most 
common use was the Mahabir Dal [Group of the Brave], which connected physical culture to the epic hero and 
deity Ram Chandra. In 1923 numerous branches of the Mahabir Dal were formed in the UP, particularly in 
Banaras and Kanpur. Popular self-assertion by the lower castes [Shudras] in the akharas and their active 
participation in festivals as ‘the army of Mahavir1 represented a martial and militant image to Hinduism.51 The 
akharas were often in conflict with the state and suspected by the British as ‘dangerous societies’, hatching 
plots ‘which have as their object the corruption of youth and spread of revolutionary ideas’.52 Hindu-Muslim 
antagonism was sometimes fostered through the akharas, which could become the basis for gangs to operate 
during the clashes of violence as revealed by the implication of many akhara members in the Kanpur riot in 
1931. Neighbourhood akhara-based conflicts overlapped with local Hindu-Muslim rivalries over jobs or land in 
the towns of the UP.53 Nevertheless, the akharas were implicitly viewed as the centres of revitalisation and 
salvation for Hindu society, as they emphasised physical culture as a means of promoting self-development and 
the values of citizenship for a strong Indian nation.
The Hindu Mahasabha adopted the akharas as the centres of building Hindu strength and power, defining 
the aspects of physical culture in the framework of Hindu nationalism. It drew its drive for akhara promotion from 
the Indian National Congress, which had pioneered prabhat pheris [drills in groups held each morning] -  the 
earliest form of nationalist mobilisation -  on the model of akharas in order to strengthen the Indian nation 
physically and spiritually in the freedom struggle.54 The programme of wrestling and gymnastics practised in the 
akharas with an emphasis on the glorification of India’s military and religious heroes and selfless service to the 
nation remained central to the Mahasabha’s ideology. The organisation of akharas and physical fitness troupes 
was among the most popular activities undertaken by the local Hindu Sabhas across the UP. The formation of 
akharas and armed volunteer armies was defended as a vital means of building India’s ‘national strength’;55 and 
there were appeals for the creation of provincial, district, tahsil and village Hindu Sabhas which would arrange 
for the ‘compulsory physical education of Hindus’ in the country.56 Madan Mohan Malaviya, in his presidential 
address to the Hindu Mahasabha’s Gaya session in 1922, proposed a programme to establish akharas and
49 Joseph S. Alter, The Celibate Wrestler: Sexual Chaos, Embodied Balance and Competitive Politics in North India’, in Patricia 
Uberoi [ed.], Social Reform, Sexuality and the State, New Delhi, 1996, pp. 109-31.
50 Nita Kumar, The Artisans of Banaras: Popular Culture and Identity, 1880-1986, Princeton, 1988, p. 118.
51PAI, No. 35,8 September 1923; PA! No. 36 ,15 September 1923.
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local volunteer corps in order to protect the Hindus during riots in the country.57 At the Mahasabha’s Banaras 
session in 1923, he urged the building of a small Hanuman temple and an akhara in each village and mohalla 
[urban quarter] of India.58 He proposed to establish an All India Central Athletic Association, which would 
‘organize competitions and plan measures for improving the health of the youth of the country’.59 He viewed 
wrestling as a means of national reform, insisting that the Hindus should ‘establish akharas, listen to the 
Mahabharat and the Ramayan and leam to become fighters’ in India's struggle for freedom.60 In 1923 the 
Mahasabha resolved that Samaj Sewak Dais [Community Service Corps] were to be formed on the model of 
akharas in every village and town of India for ‘the social service of the Hindu community and its protection when 
necessary’.61 Lajpat Rai made the formation of akharas an integral part of the sangathan programme as 
president of the Mahasabha in 1925.62 In the UP, the Hindu Sabhas actively promoted the ideal of ‘defence of 
community and nation’, reinforcing notions about a 'Hindu nation’ built on physical strength. The UP Hindu 
Sabha established the Lajpat Physical Training Camp in Ghazipur in the early 1920s. The Agra Hindu Sabha 
planned to establish physical training centres in different parts of the UP and appointed Harihar Rao Deshpande 
to help launch the physical training programmes across the province.63 In 1928 N.C. Kelkar, [1872-1947], 
Mahasabha president, proposed that Hanuman be regarded as the presiding deity of the Hindus, and that the 
Mahasabha encourage the formation of local sports clubs and gymnasiums to revive the strength of the Hindus 
in the country.64 Evidently, the new constitution adopted by the Mahasabha at its Ahmedabad session in 
December 1937 pledged to ‘improve the physique of the Hindus and promote martial spirit’ by establishing 
military schools and volunteer corps in India.65 The Mahasabha emphasised military valour and training as an 
integral part of sangathan, urging sangathanisis to whip up military enthusiasm for the promotion of Hindu 
strength and power in the country.66 Its commitment to the promotion of physical culture had enhanced its 
image as an organisation dedicated to the ‘improvement and renewal’ of Hindu society and the eventual 
creation of a ‘Hindu nation’ in India.67
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II. Muslims -  the ‘Historical Enemy’
The Hindu Mahasabha’s discourse on the building of masculinity and physical strength as a path to India’s 
national ‘regeneration’ had become an expression of not merely resistance to British rule but a perceived need 
for defence against the Muslim 'Other1 in the country. It conflated the denunciations of ‘weakness and cowardice’ 
of the Hindus with the images of the 'cruel and lustful’ Muslims in the context of the wider sectarian propaganda 
of the 1920s in the United Provinces. Hindu masculinity was constructed in opposition to the Muslims -- against 
whom the Hindus and their women had to be defended and protected. Hindu organisations in the UP had 
increasingly campaigned to create a self-image of the Hindu community being at ‘war over the aggression and 
rapacity of the Muslims’ -  ‘the enemy within’, even though the Muslim community was not homogeneous and 
split by sects and economic disparities in the country.68 The Hindus, it was argued, must develop the physical 
potential so as to protect their 'temples and their women from the insults they are subject to every day1 by the 
Muslims.69 The Hindus gave in too easily, it was insisted, so Muslim rowdies could ‘oppress the Hindus’.70 
Pandit Devaratan Sharma, Mahasabha general secretary, lamented that the Hindus had physically and 
numerically degenerated in the country. At a public meeting at Ultadinghee, Calcutta, in April 1925, he 
wondered that ‘when calamities like that of Kohat, Saharanpur, Malabar and Ajmer befell them [Hindus], they 
were defenceless’ in conflict with the Muslims.71 The implication was that the Hindus could no longer resist the 
Muslims physically and in turn were dying in greater numbers due to ‘physical liquidation’ in the riots and 
violence in the country.72 B.S. Moonje believed that the Hindus had to organise themselves to ‘defend their 
country1 -  if not with swords then at least with lathis -  against the Muslims.73 The Muslims had the ‘virile 
vigilance with which they [could] protect their racial interests... which, alas, is visibly lacking in the present-day 
Hindu race’ in India.74 Moonje attributed ‘Muslim virility, their readiness to kill and to be killed’ to their diet of 
meat and the Islamic practice of sacrifice, urging the rehabilitation of the ‘Vedic institution of yajnathag’ [animal 
sacrifice] that would accustom a Hindu to the sight of spilling blood and killing.75 The aim was to remove ‘docility 
and mildness’ from the temper of the Hindus and prepare them to counter the ‘aggressiveness’ of the 
Muslims.76 If the Hindu youths improved their physique, Moonje argued, ‘they could wrest swaraj without the
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Muslims’.77 Military-style training would, it was suggested, help Hindu men in the protection of the Hindu 
community, which could not become strong unless it was ‘fanatical’ enough to confront the Muslims more 
effectively.78 The celebration of manliness and physical strength expressed in the ties of the larger Hindu 
community through sangathan had manifested itself in the recurrent outbreak of anti-Muslim riots and violence 
across north India by the 1920s and 1930s.
The ideological development of an anti-Muslim hostility constituted a significant aspect of the formation of 
Hindu identity that was to become central to sangathaiisi narrative in north India in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Sangathamst ideology was deeply influenced and reinforced by a large body of Hindu propaganda which 
portrayed the IVKjslims as ‘fanatical and sinister*, determined to desecrate Hindu temples and construct 
mosques on Hindu sacred sites in India. Islam, it was argued, was ‘bom of violence’ and would always remain 
tied to a ‘religious warfare’, resulting in the ‘slaughter, forced conversion, enslavement and destruction of non- 
Muslims’.79 The Muslims had inherited and embodied a ‘doctrinal inflexibility and fanaticism’ associated with 
Islam and had a propensity to violence, secrecy and dominance.80 They were inherently ‘intolerant and 
obscurantist’ and did not allow even a ‘reasonable criticism of Islam’.81 Their residence in India of 2,000 years, it 
was claimed, had not succeeded in removing the ‘Islamic prejudice and unkindness’, which was a bar to all 
fellowship between the two races in India.82 The Quran never enjoined the Muslims to ‘forgive and forget’ when 
the Hindu community was ranged against them.83 The Muslims had often caused the ‘ruin and destruction of the 
Hindus’ as evident in the Kohat riots of 1924 when they forced the latter to embrace Islam in the NWFP.84 An 
image of the violence and immorality of the Muslims was actively portrayed in the propaganda of Hindu 
publicists, reinforcing sangathan ist notions about ‘Muslim atrocities on the Hindus, their historical treachery and 
oppression’ in India’.85
There were the phenomenal numbers of polemical tracts published in the United Provinces, attacking Islam 
and the Quran, during the 1920s and 1930s86 The Arya Samaj, drawing upon Swami Dayananda’s Satyartha 
Prakash, portrayed Islam as a ‘religion of slaughter, both animals and men, motivated by brutality and
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sensuality1.87 The Quran was attacked for its ‘bigotry’, and the Prophet Mohammad condemned as a ‘sensualist, 
a pleasure-seeker and a cheat’.88 Islam, argued the Arya Samajists, offered the best example of Muslim 
‘ruthlessness’ as an ‘aggressive faith of fanaticism’ in India. Beneath the sanctioned brutality of a ‘holy war1 lay 
the concept of an ‘infidel’ -- a person beyond the realm of Islam who should be exterminated.89 The publications 
of Vichitra Jivan and Rangila Rasul in 1923-24, which were the Arya Samaj’s caricatures of the Prophet 
Mohammad, had resulted in court disputes.90 Swami Shraddhananda was assassinated on 23 December 1926 
by Abdul Rashid of Bulandshehar, who was hailed as a 'ghazf [destroyer of infidels] in the Muslim press.91 In 
the wake of the Punjab High Court’s verdict upholding the death sentence for Abdul Rashid in 1927, B.S. 
Moonje and other Hindu sangathan\s\s received threatening letters from Muslim activists.92 Arya Samaj leaders 
Badrishah and Bhairo Singh were murdered in Bahraich and Mount Abu in what was believed to be an 
‘organised Muslim conspiracy’ in 1927.93The Aryan Conference in November 1927 asked the UP government 
to unearth the conspiracy behind the ‘murders of the Hindu leaders’ and initiate action against Muslim threats to 
the Hindu leaders in north India.94 The Arya Samajists shared an ideological symbiosis with sangathai7ists; and 
both were ardently nationalist and revivalist opposed to Islam. In sangathanlsi narrative, Islam was represented 
as an ‘alien faith’ external to the all-embracing ‘Hindu culture’ of India.95
One historical trope of sangathanist narrative that was a recurrent motif in the reading of national history was 
that ‘Muslim despotism and the corrupting influence of Islam’ had resulted in the ‘misery and enslavement’ of 
India over the centuries. Muslim rule in the medieval period was represented as a ‘disruptive force in Indian 
society’, full of conflicts and persecution.96 The lust for 'plunder and conquest’ was the motivating factor for the 
Muslim invasions of India in the eleventh century.97 The Muslims had come to India as ‘invaders’, it was argued, 
and carried out a ‘systematic destruction of Hindu religion and national honour*. They ‘demolished Hindu 
temples and places of pilgrimage, desecrated Hindu womanhood and converted the large numbers of Hindus to
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Islam at the point of sword’.98 The period of the Delhi Sultanate and Mughal rule was portrayed a story of the 
‘oppression of the Hindus’ in the country. 'Sekandar [Sikander Lodi] destroyed temples’ at many places; and the 
Mughals were ‘plunderers and religious fanatics’.99 Babur was a 'fanatic and an invader1, and Aurangzeb ‘a 
butcher of Hindus and a destroyer of Hindu temples’, being an ‘anti-Hindu zealot’ himself.100 The entire Muslim 
period was categorised as the ‘dark age of unrelieved tyranny1, during which the Hindus and their culture had 
suffered a ‘terrible fall -  a fall into the depths of slavery and foreign subjection’. It was a period of ‘evil, of 
denationalization of the Hindus and of a great conflict'.101 Apart from suffering the massacres, it was asserted, 
the Hindus were subjected to ‘wholesale campaigns of forced conversions’.102 The ‘wounds in the heart’ were 
kept ‘green by the sight of a mosque’ that stood beside th6 sa6ired tempte of Vishwanath in Varanasi, UP.103 
The ‘tyranny and destructiveness’ of the Muslim rulers resulting in attacks on Hindu society and its culture, it 
was argued, did not represent any efflorescence of a 'composite culture’, or ‘cultural synthesis’ as popularly 
believed. The bhakti movement, it was asserted, was an attempt to disarm Islam with a clear message that 
equality before God was as much part of Hinduism as it was of Islam: it was a form of Hindu resistance to 
Islamic rule, not an attempt at ‘synthesis’.104 Muslim rule was juxtaposed to the British conquest of India in the 
eighteenth century. Compared to the ‘ruthless and oppressive’ Muslim rule which had perpetrated a ‘genocide 
of the Hindus’, it was asserted, the British were providential in design to protect the Hindus from the ‘Muslim 
tyrants’ -- a construction that denied the association of British rule with the economic exploitation of India.105 
Islam became the history of a ‘foreign conquest’, its heritage remaining ‘external’ to India -  in effect an 
‘occupying force’.106 National history was appropriated into sangathan ist narrative through a sectarian approach 
that played a considerable part in the stigmatisation of the Muslims, echoing a denunciatory attitude towards 
Islam in India.
In the context of the sectarian conflict and propaganda of the 1920s, sangathan ist hostility against the 
Muslims had deepened and spread to social and political issues through a multiplicity of discourses in north 
India.107 The Hindu community as well as the unity of the Indian nation was feared to be under a threat due to 
the ‘moral and social degeneracy1 of the Muslims.108 Madan Mohan Malaviya argued that in every instance the 
Muslims were the aggressors and the Hindus the victims of ‘horrible inhumanities’ in the country. The culprits
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responsible for sectarian violence were not ‘good and gentle Mohammedans’, but ‘rogues, vagabonds and bad 
elements of Muslim society’.109 The most striking expression of the ‘Hindu moral decline’, he explained, was the 
failure of the Hindus to defend their own religion and their reluctance to lay down their lives for Hindu dharm 
[religion] against Muslim attacks.110 B.S. Moonje asserted that the fight for swaraj was against not only the 
British but also the Muslims -- the ‘internal aggressors’. It was merely a continuation of the struggle which had 
been initiated by Prithviraj Chauhan when 'the Hindu Raj, culture, and religion was [sic] first assailed under the 
Muslim impact’.111 The Hindus, he insisted, should not act on the ‘law of love in their relations with the Muslims’, 
but convert ‘Hindustan into a Hindu home’.112 Swami Shraddhananda denounced the ‘threat of Islam’, arguing 
that the Hindus should not participate in Muslim religious festivals, venerate Muslim pirs [saints], or visit Muslim 
shrines. The chief task of national survival, he explained, depended on the education of the Hindus in the Hindu 
religion, a plan begun by the Arya Samaj, in order to counter the 'threat of Islam’ in India.113 M.S. Golwalkar 
claimed that the Muslims continued to be an ‘internal threat' to the Indian nation, as they had schemed for the 
‘enslavement of India’ for more than a millennium. Islam was bound to become a ‘disruptive force’ in India 
because the Muslims were the ‘old enemies’ of the Hindus in the country.114 India, it was claimed, was a land of 
warfare, as it was the duty of the Muslims to ‘convert’ the Hindus to Islam.115 All the Muslims living in India, 
declared Ashutosh Lahiry, Hindu Mahasabha general secretary, were not ‘true nationals’ of the Indian nation.116 
The Muslims who could not approximate themselves to the standard of nationalism were ‘aliens’; and the 
Hindus had to resist the ‘aggressive policy of the Muslims’, otherwise they would be ruined.117 The Khilafat 
movement was portrayed as an act of ‘Muslim betrayal’, a proof of the ‘extra-national loyalties’ of the Muslims 
who had the designs of ‘domination over the Hindus’ in India.118 The ‘homogeneous’ Hindu community 
threatened ‘from within’ by the presence of the Muslims became a consistent political imagery in sangathan\s\ 
discourse in north India throughout the 1920s and 1930s.
Sangathanisi narrative questioned whether Hindu-Muslim unity was possible or desirable, stressing the need 
to exclude the Muslims from India’s freedom struggle.119 The task of Hindu revival and liberation, it was stated, 
was interrupted by the British conquest, which was made possible by the help of the Muslims. The Muslims ‘did 
not participate in the freedom struggle’, and Hindu-Muslim unity was ‘no longer necessary for the attainment of
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swaraj.120 The Muslims stood in the way of India’s united struggle against the British, argued Bhai Parmanand, 
on account of their ‘separatist demands and conspiracies’. By supporting and siding with the British, they had 
tried to 'monopolise all political power1 in India.121 India had been brought closer to swaraj primarily because of 
the efforts of ‘Hindu sangathanists alone’.122 The Muslim community had become ‘a sincere supporter’ of the 
British, V.D. Savarkar stated, and Islam as well as the Muslims was far too ‘greater an enemy of India’s 
nationalism’.123 Lajpat Rai believed that Muslim sectarianism was instrumental in the ‘co-operation with the 
British and opposition to self-rule of Sayyid Ahmed Khan and the Aligarh elite’, who had become 
characteristically ‘anti-Hindu and pro-government’.124 The Non-cooperation movement had been frustrated and 
defeated because of the ‘separatist politics’ of the Muslim community, which had not accepted ‘our concept of 
India’ and was ‘not Indian’. 125 The Muslims needed a ‘change of heart’, argued Lajpat Rai, and their leaders had 
to remove the idea that the Hindus were ‘kafirs’.126 N.C. Kelkar explained that the Hindus not only wished to 
‘attain political freedom in India, but they also wish to have their proper share of i t ... Swaraj will not be worth 
having if we ... purchase i t ... [at] the loss of Hinduism itself.’127 Sangathan\s\ discourse appropriated Indian 
nationalism as a specifically ‘Hindu essence and virtue’, as nationalist awareness and patriotic sentiments were 
bom of a ‘higher sensibility, a higher culture’ -  all possessed by the Hindus. The Muslims, it was contended, 
were culturally backward and could never be awakened to the nationalist cause because nationalism was 
foreign to their ‘essential nature’. Sangathan ists denied the possibility of Muslim participation in India’s freedom 
struggle on the basis that the Muslims could never be the ‘true national citizens’ of the country.128
II. 1. ‘Abductions’ of Hindu women
In sangathamst ideology, Muslim strength was linked to ‘virility’ with all its negative associations of ‘lust, 
lechery and debauchery. Charges over the rape, abduction and kidnapping of Hindu women were rampant in 
the towns of UP in the 1920s and 1930s. There was an organised campaign by a large section of Hindu 
publicists in the province about the ‘forcible abductions’ of Hindu women and children by the Muslims for
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western Punjab, Sind, and eastern Bengal] as a solution to the Hindu-Muslim problem. Joshi [ed.], Lala Lajpat Rai, Vol. 2, p. 213.
127 N.C. Kelkar’s Preidential Speech, All-India Hindu Mahasabha Session, Jabalpur, December 1925, H.N. Mitra [ed.], Indian 
Annual Register, 1925, Vol. 2, July-December, Calcutta, 1924, p. 351.
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conversion to Islam.129 Madan Mohan Malviya, in his attempt to create a history of ‘abductions’, claimed that the 
British had instigated the Muslims to attack the Hindus, and that the first instances of the abduction of Hindu 
women had occurred during the 1906 Jamalpur riots in Bengal and in the North West Frontier Province [NWFP] 
in the 1910s.130 In the UP, rumours and kidnapping scare stories were widely reported in Agra, Pilibhit, Meerut 
and Unao between 1923 and 1927.131 Khwaja Hasan Nizami’s Urdu pamphlet Dae-i-lslam was linked to a 
conspiracy to ‘kidnap Hindu women and children’ as part of a plan to convert ‘one crore of Hindus’ to Islam.132 
At the annual anniversary meeting of the Arya Samaj in Moradabad in 1923, Murali Lai of Bulandshahr urged 
that every Hindu girl keep a dagger so that no Muslim could dishonour her.133 The Hindu woman was not to limit 
herself to ‘self-protection’, but actually ‘commit violence’ by herself.134 The Meerut Hindu Sabha held a meeting 
in June 1924 attended by some 2,000 to discuss the means of countering an ‘organised campaign by the 
Muslims to kidnap and forcibly convert Hindu women’.135 The secretary of the Allahabad Hindu Sabha warned 
the Hindus in July 1925 against the kidnapping activities of ‘Muslim goondas’ in the towns and villages of the 
UP.136 In sangathan ist narrative, a strategy was urged to counter the threat of 'abductions’, as the Hindus were 
appealed not to allow their women and children to have any dealings with Muslim traders, teachers and 
servants in the UP.137
A special connection was established between Hindu widows and the Muslims, triggering fears that Hindu 
wombs were producing Muslim progeny in India.138 The large numbers of Hindu widows, stated a sangathan ist 
tract, were now ‘entering the homes of yavanas and mlecchas [Muslims], producing children for them and 
increasing their numbers’.139 ‘Our sexually unsatisfied widows especially are prone to Muslim hands and by 
producing Muslim children they increase their numbers and spell disaster for the Hindus...’140 The Hindu taboo 
against widow-marriage was attacked as a medieval practice that led to the ‘elopements of Hindu widows’ with 
the Muslims, resulting in the ‘decline of the Hindu numbers' in India.141 Swami Shraddhananda proposed that all 
child widows be allowed to remarry, besides providing various remedies for unconsummated marriages and
129 Hindustani, 2 July 1924, IOR UR/5/98, File No. 27,1924, p. 2, IOL.
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132 Arya Patra, 2 July 1924, IOR UR/5/98, File No. 27,1924, p. 4, IOL.
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135 PAI, Lucknow, No. 25,28 June 1924, p. 204.
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[eds.], Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History, New Delhi, 1989, p. 217.
139 Cited in Gupta, Sexuality, p. 306.
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widowhood.142 The abductions and elopements evoked the centuries-long image of the ‘sexually powerful’ 
Muslim male and ‘Muslim debauchery’, revealing the vulnerability of the Hindu community -  a significant theme 
that provided sangathan ists with a rationale for the larger mobilisation of the Hindus for unity in north India.143
II. 2. Boycott of Muslims
Hindu publicists launched an aggressive campaign to end nearly all the spheres of Hindu-Muslim interaction 
in parts of the Unite Provinces in the 1920s and 1930s.144 There were endless lists of suggestions and advice 
for discipline and a code of conduct for the Hindus to end all dealings with Muslim tailors, milkmen, vegetable- 
sellers, bangle-sellers, policemen, bhands, washermen, and na'is in the towns of the province.145 On 12 and 13 
January 1911, several small meetings of the Hindus were organised by the Arya Samaj in Agra, where it was 
decided that neither Muslim dancing girls nor musicians would be employed in Hindu weddings. On 18 and 19 
January 1911, there were about thirty Hindu marriage processions in Agra, and not a single Muslim dancing girl 
or bandsman was employed except in one instance.146 There was an economic boycott of the Muslims in 
relation to employment in parts of the province. At the District Hindu Conference in Dehradun on 4 March 1924, 
Kedar Nath, assistant secretary of the UP Hindu Sabha, proposed the boycott of all Muslims and was supported 
by Swami Vicharanand.147 At a nagarkirtan [town procession] meeting in Gorakhpur on 14 November 1925, the 
Hindus were advised to boycott all Muslim shops in the town.148 In June 1926 the Yatri Sabha in Hardwar 
prevented Hindu pilgrims from engaging tongas driven by the Muslims.149 Posters were distributed in Badaun in 
1926 by the Dharam Rakshini Sabha, advising the Hindus to abstain from social intercourse with the 
Muslims.150 The Hindus were asked to take up professions which were exclusively under the domain of the 
Muslims.151 Class and caste among the Hindus were combined to demarcate the Muslims and restrict the 
shared economic arenas of interdependence. The spectre of 'Muslim strength and cohesion’ was given as a 
reason for the active participation of Hindu publicists in the propaganda for the boycott the Muslims in the UP.152
142 Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan, pp. 46-8; J.T.F. Jordens, Swami Shraddhananda: His Life and Causes, Delhi, 1981, pp. 
140-43.
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III. Militancy of Hindu Festivals
By the 1920s and 1930s Hindu revivalism had become an aggressive force, helping to consolidate 
sangathamst ideology and rhetoric in northern India. Hindu festivals and celebrations sponsored by powerful 
Hindu mercantile classes and local notables had become increasingly strident and warlike in display, providing 
the context for Hindu revival in the ‘public arena’ in the towns of the UP.153 Regular prayers were introduced 
with elaborate ceremonials at previously abandoned temples. In Allahabad, stated a police report, '... it is 
noticeable that in every temple, even those which have been practically disused, "artipuja" [religious ceremony] 
and conch blowing have been restarted with great vigour1.154 New festivals and more elaborate modes of 
celebration were introduced. Shivaratri and Janmastami, which had hitherto been minor festivals, were 
celebrated on a large scale alongside Ramlila and Holi in the province.155 In 1925 Hindu papers published 
instructions issued by the All-India Hindu Mahasabha for the proper celebration of Janmastami -  the birthday of 
Lord Krishna.156 Huge processions began to be organised for the Janmasthami festival for which no such 
tradition had existed in the past. There was a dynamic pattern in the celebration of Ramlila: an image of Shivaji 
as the ‘defender of Hinduism’ featured alongside the images of Ram, Lakshman, and Sita in the 1922 Ramlila in 
Allahabad.157 The Ramlila processions, which had been confined to the higher castes, eventually included the 
lower caste groups, as the patrons of the Ramlila wished to enlarge the scale of festival celebrations with a view 
to projecting the image of a ‘cohesive’ Hindu community. During the 1923 Ramlila in Allahabad, the inclusion of 
the lower caste groups by the Ramlila committees ‘had as its motive the raising of a force of men used to 
handle lathis, in order to impress the Mohammadans’.158 The lower castes, particularly the Shudras, participated 
massively in the festivals not because of any greater commitment to Hinduism but in ‘their quest to carve out a 
more prominent position for themselves in urban society’.159 For sangathamsis who began to encourage lower 
caste participation, the expanding celebration of Ramlila was a means of demonstrating the wider ‘unity and 
physical prowess’ of the Hindus. There were organised efforts to exclude the Muslims from Hindu festivals, 
which had witnessed the recruitment of akharas and self-defence squads in times of riots in the UP.160 Tension 
increased due to overlapping festivals -- particularly in the north-western districts of the UP which had a huge 
Muslim population. Ramlila overlapped with the Muharram in 1924. The religious processions in Allahabad, an 
observer noted of the festival, ‘... had been devoted largely to the display of weapons and physical force by both
153 C.A. Bayly, ‘Patrons and Politics in Northern India’, Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3,1973, pp. 387-8; Freitag, Collective 
Action, pp. 131,198.
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Power in Banaras: Community, Performance and Environment, 1800-1980, Berkeley, 1989, pp. 223-4.
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Mohammedans and Hindus ... Weapons and ammunition were purchased in large quantities by the inhabitants 
in September [1924].’161 Violence inevitably broke out, revealing the existing pattern of force and mobilisation, 
particularly by the Hindus. The ethos and celebration of Hindu festivals frequently became the arena for riots, 
targeting Muslim groups in the towns of the UP during the 1920s and 1930s.162
IV. Hindu Processional Music 
The dispute about music before mosques and the routes of religious processions was one of the principal 
reasons of discord in the UP in the 1920s and 1930s. The issue was whether Hindu processional music could 
be played outside mosques during the hours of prayer [namaz].163 Under British rule, festivals were regulated 
on the principle of established ‘procedure’, a policy of ‘non-interference’ based on the traditional religious 
practices of both the Hindus and the Muslims.164 Queen Victoria’s proclamation of 1858 had stated the policy to 
be one of ‘non-interference’ in the customs and traditions of Indians. The central problem for the colonial 
officials was how to uphold the state’s pledge of ‘non-interference’ while determining whether a particular 
practice was integral to the traditions of one community or another. The Hindus began to take processions past 
mosques during the time of prayer, claiming it to be their ancient custom; and the Muslims demanded that it was 
their time-honoured tradition to pray in silence.165 In Allahabad quarrels over Hindu religious processions were 
followed by a riot during Ramlila in October 1924 -  in which 12 people were killed.166 In 1924 the holding of a 
Muslim prayer [namaz] at Aminabad Park, Lucknow, resulted in a major riot in the city, as the namaz had 
become an ‘obstacle’ in the way of every Hindu procession.167 The All-India Hindu Mahasabha claimed that 
Muslim opposition to the playing of music near mosques was not based on any Teal religious feelings’ but was 
due entirely to ‘communal fervour1. It called upon all the provincial and local Hindu Sabhas to render the 
necessary guidance and assistance to the Hindus whose religious rites and processions were interrupted by 
either the Muslims or the government.168 The playing of music in Hindu processions had often resulted in the 
display o f‘Hindu strength’, using the Muslim ‘aggressiveness’ as a legitimising factor in the UP.169
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The UP Hindu Sabha controlled by Madan Mohan Malaviya had opposed any restrictions on Hindu religious 
processions and aggressively promoted the right of the Hindus to ‘honour their gods’ as they saw fit.170 It 
refused to be bound by the decisions of the Delhi Unity Conference in 1924, which had reached agreement on 
the question of Hindu processional music. Repeated calls by the Muslim leaders in the UP -  Maulana Vilayat 
Husain, Zahur Ahmad, and Badruddin -- for a five-ten minute break in music during evening prayers as a 
compromise were rejected.171 In 1926 the Hindu Sabha attacked the UP government’s orders stopping music 
outside mosques in Allahabad, Lucknow, and Mussorie as an ‘unscientific and inequitable policy’.172 It accused 
the government of ‘partiality’ to the Muslims, claiming that the state had imposed restrictions on the playing of 
music outside mosques, while the Muslims continued to ‘observe Moharram and Bakr-ld joyfully1. 173 In 
September 1926, Malaviya presided over a protest meeting attended by over 10,000 Hindus in Allahabad and 
attacked the ‘obstructive’ attitude of the Muslims. ‘Meeting invites attention ...’ he declared, ‘to deep and 
universal pain which said attitude [of the authorities] has caused Hindus.’174 In March 1927 the UP government 
passed two orders, which were to be enforced in the absence of any clear evidence as to the existing practice 
or any definite agreement between the Hindus and the Muslims: [1] that processions with music would not pass 
mosques, temples and churches during the hours of public worship; [2] and that in case of disputes whether a 
building came within the above categories, it would be referred to the district officer for decision.175 However, 
the Hindu Sabha protested against the orders and advised the Hindus not to stop music outside mosques.176 
Sangathari\sis argued that the demand for the stoppage of music outside mosques on the basis of shariat was 
‘dangerous’ and ‘reprehensible’ -  indeed an imposition on non-Muslims, and that it was the duty of the Hindus 
to make a struggle in defence of their rights.177 The inflammatory sangathan ist propaganda over the issue of 
music had largely precipitated an anti-Muslim hostility and antagonism, contributing to the outbreak of riots in 
the towns and villages of the UP during the 1920s and 1930s.178
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Conclusion
Sangathan provided an ideological cohesion and self-representation of the Hindus by focusing on 
‘masculinity’ -- a ‘martial, muscular1 creed -  as the chief ideal of a ‘Hindu nation’ in the early twentieth century. It 
constructed a full bodied Hindu masculine male with the increasing assertions of Hindu community identity in 
opposition to the image of the ‘emasculated and effeminate’ Indian created by British prejudice. Its aim was to 
eradicate the evil effects of the 'emasculated existence’ of the Hindus and infuse ‘manliness’ into them in an 
anti-colonial contestation against the state. The Hindu Mahasabha stressed ‘masculine virtues’ and the recovery 
of the ‘martial heritage’ of the Hindus as the basis of a strong ‘Hindu nation’. It adopted the akharas as part of 
the sangathan programme, stressing the need to make the Hindu body more ‘masculine’ in order to produce 
citizens who embodied ‘national integrity and strength’ in India.179 However, the Mahasabha’s fundamentally 
Hindu characterisation of physical strength conceived to promote unity and rejuvenate the Hindu community 
had taken shape in defence against not only the British but also the Muslims. In reality, the sangathanlst battle 
was waged far more stridently in contestation against the Muslims, seen as ‘warlike’ and ‘fanatical’, than British 
rule.180 The notion of Hindu-Muslim unity as the essential basis of India’s struggle for freedom was 
denounced.181 Hindu publicists focused on the Muslim male, who was depicted as a ‘rapist, an abductor, and an 
immediate threat’ to Hindu society in India.182 The Hindu community was mobilised over the ‘abductions’ of 
Hindu women; and violence against the Muslims became a necessary condition of redeeming ‘Hindu male 
honour1 in the towns and villages of the UP. In the 1920s and 1930s, Hindu festivals became the occasions for 
militant Hindu resurgence, demonstrating intense hostility against the Muslims in the province. Common 
participation in religious festivals and organisational activities in the province brought diverse groups, 
particularly the Shudras, into the public arena and presented an image of the ‘martial prowess’ of the Hindus 
vis-a-vis the Muslims. In addition, the Muslim grievances over Hindu processional music outside mosques had 
become a thorny issue, defying a settlement due to sangathanist resistance and propaganda. Sangathan 
strategists discovered the Muslims as a common element of ‘danger to all the Hindus’, intensifying the anti- 
Muslim campaign across the UP in the 1920s and 1930s.
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7The Militarisation of Hindu Society.
The Hindu Mahasabha launched a militarisation programme in order to create an assertive militant ‘Hindu 
nation’ as part of sangathan ideology in the 1920s and 1930s. The new emphasis on the need to strengthen and 
militarise the Hindu community dominated its ideology as the basis of a Hindu political identity. Hindutva was 
not only a means of Hinduising the polity but also of militarising the Hindus in India.1 The Mahasabha’s 
militaristic policy had become radicalised under V.D. Savarkaris leadership by the late 1930s, developing an 
anti-Muslim orientation in view of the wider and deepening sectarian conflict in north India. Besides the 
Mahasabha, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [the National Volunteer Corps] emerged in the mid-1920s as 
the most successful and articulate institutional voice of Hindutva, attempting to define and defend a ‘Hindu 
nation’ with military training. Both the Mahasabha and the RSS were inspired by a goal to unify and build the 
strength of the Hindus and resurrect a ‘Hindu nation'.2 This chapter attempts to explore the Mahasabha’s 
discourse of militarisation, which was fundamental to its conception of the emergence of a ‘Hindu nation’ in India.
I. Hindu Militarisation
The Hindu Mahasabha’s militarisation drive was pioneered by Dr Balkrishna Shivram Moonje [1872-1948], a 
sangathan ist intellectual, in the late 1920s.3 Moonje, an ophthalmologist by profession and the Mahasabha’s 
working president from 1927 to 1933, had a close affinity to the royal family of Bhonsles, Nagpur: his forefathers 
had served in the Bhonsle armies.4 He had worked in the Boer War, South Africa, before returning to join 
nationalist politics in India in the late 1910s. He became Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s most trusted political associate 
and an influential anti-Gandhi critic in Congress politics in the Central Provinces [CP]. He launched the Nagpur 
Hindu Sabha in 1923 and subsequently established the Hindu Sabhas in all the three parts of the CP to counter 
the influence of the Gandhian Congress.5 A member of the Central Legislative Assembly in the 1920s, he had 
demanded that a greater number of Indian youths should be given military training and recruited in India’s 
defence services, stressing the need to Indianise the army.6 The Skeen committee eventually echoed Moonje’s 
demand in 1926, proposing that 'a substantial and progressive scheme for the Indianization of the Indian Army 
should be adopted without delay’. It recommended an increase in the Indian places at the Royal Military
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Academy, Sandhurst, England, from ten to 20 in 1928 and the addition of four furher places for Indians each 
year until 1933. The army would be half-lndianised by 1952!7 Moonje’s worldview as well as ideology was 
determined by an extreme fixation for war and militarism, which had become definitive of his sangathanlsi 
discourse.8 In his belief, only the Mahasabha could fight for the country’s freedom, a notion that shaped his 
vision of the military reorganisation of Hindu society in India.9
In Ideology, Moonje was influenced in part by Italian fascism, which had strengthened his goal to militarise 
Hindu society across the country. He visited important military schools in Italy as part of his Europe tour after 
attending the First Round Table Conference in London from 12 November to 19 January 1930.10 He visited the 
Military College, the Central Military School of Physical Education, and the Balilla and Avanguardist organistions 
in Rome in March 1931.11 The Balilla institutions organised the military training and fascist indoctrination of boys 
from the age of six up to 18.12 In his meeting with Mussolini on 19 March 1931 in Rome, Moonje revealed the 
Hindu Mahasabha’s commitment to the introduction of militarisation in India. ‘During the British Domination of 
the last 150 years,’ he stated, ‘Indians have been waived away from the military profession but India now 
desires to prepare herself for undertaking the responsibility for her own defence and I am working for it.’13 
Moonje’s central aim was to introduce militarisation in Indian society and demonstrate Hindu strength on the 
model of the Italian fascist movement.
In the early 1930s, Moonje initiated the militant reorganisation of Hindu society by creating Hindu para­
military organisations and youth movements in Maharashtra, western India.14 He worked for the foundation of 
aeroclubs and indeed formed rifle clubs in the province under the auspices of the Hindu Mahasabha. He 
founded the Central Hindu Military Education Society in the Hindu pilgrimage city of Nasik built on the River 
Dama in Maharashtra in 1935; and the society aimed to train Hindu youths in the ‘science and art of personal 
and national defence’ in India.15 He subsequently started the Bhonsle Military School in Nasik in June 1937, 
which was inaugurated by the Scindias of Gwalior in March 1938.16 The Bhonsles, after whom the school was 
named, were the first to contribute the funds, as were the Holkars of Indore, the Gaekwads of Baroda, and the
6 The Mahratta, April 12,1931, ‘Dr B S Moonje on Round Table Conference’: Special interview to The Mahratta, paragraph 
entitled ‘National Militia’, cited in M.N. Ghatate, ‘Dr B S Moonje: Tour of European Countries’, in N.G. Dixit [ed.], Dharmaveer Dr. 
B.S. Moonje Commeomoration Volume: Birth Centenary Celebrations 1872-1972, Nagpur, 1972, p. 68.
7 C.H. Philips [ed.], The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858-1947: Select Documents, London, 1962, pp. 531-2.
8 M.B. Niyogy, ‘Dharmaveer Dr. Balakrishna Shivram Moonje’, in Dixit [ed.], Dharmaveer, pp. 59-60.
9 Nandini Gondhalekar, ‘Indian Nationalism and “Hindu” Politics: Maharashtra and the Hindu Mahasabha, 1920-1948’, 
Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1999, p. 52.
10 Moonje Papers, File No. 23,1934-36, Microfilm, Reel No. 1, NMML.
11 Marzia Casolari, ‘Hindutva’s Foreign Tie-up in the 1930s: Archival Evidence’, Economic and Political 
Weekly, 22 January 2000, pp. 218-27.
12 Ghatate, ‘Dr B.S. Moonje’, pp. 68-9.
13 Casolari, ‘Hindutva’s Foreign Tie-up’, p. 220.
14 Moonje Papes, File No. 3/1939, NMML.
15 Moonje Papers, File No. 24,1932-36, NMML.
16 B.S. Moonje’s letter to Appasahib Kelkar, dated 25 February 1936, Microfilm, Reel No. 10, Moonje Papers, NMML.
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Maratha states of Dewas and Dhar.17 The school’s chief objective was to give instruction to Hindu youths with a 
view to arousing and training their ‘latent instincts for martial pursuits’ across the country.18 It aimed to impart 
physical and martial education to Hindu youths based on ‘recruitment from all the provinces of India’. Under 
Moonje’s leaderhip, the Mahasabha had demonstrated a strong commitment to the introduction of military 
education by moblising support for its scheme in India.
The militarisation programme was intensified as an ideological doctrine of the Hindu Mahasabha under the 
presidentship of V. D. Savarkar in the late 1930s.19 The revolutionary phase in Maharashtra’s history and the 
anti-imperialist thrust of India’s freedom struggle had a deep impact on Savarkar.20 The major influence on his 
thinking was the writings of Bal Gangadhar Tilak [1856-1920] and S.M Paranjpe, both nationalists offering a 
fierce critique of British rule in India. Tilak, a fellow Chitpavan Brahman from Ratnagiri [Maharashtra] like 
Savarkar, had legitimised the use of violence in the anti-British struggle, rehearsing violence as an ethical 
philosophy in Srimad Bhagavadgita-Rahasya [The Secret Meaning of the Bhagavad Gita], or Karma Yoga 
Shastra written by him in Marathi in 1915.21 Tilak read the Gita in political and activist terms, giving prominence 
to the philosophy of activism [karma yoga] which had become a rallying cry for Indians to ‘fight the British by 
violence, if necessary, in order to regain political supremacy1 in the country.22 Tilak was sentenced to six years’ 
transportation in Mandalay jail, Burma, following his trial in Bombay in July 1908, as several of his articles in the 
Kesari had condoned ‘revolutionary acts' against the state.23 Savarkar, a Tilakite himself, adopted a political 
culture that combined nationalism with violence in the same vein as his mentor, putting faith in the efficacy of an 
armed revolution against the state. Similarly, Dr Shivram Mahadeo Paranjpe, Tilak’s right-hand man, a prolific 
writer and editor of the extremist Marathi newspaper Kal, exerted a profound influence on Savarkar. Paranjpe 
argued that when Mahamud of Ghazni had invaded India, the ‘Hindu religion’ and the ‘Indian nation’ became 
weak and suffered a social and political decline. The country’s language changed ‘from Sanskrit to Urdu’, and 
the people were converted from ‘Hinduism to Islam’.24 The narrative of ‘national pride’ evident in Paranjpe’s 
historical works, particularly those on the battles fought by the Marathas against the Mughals, lay at the heart of
17 The Bhonsale Military School exists today as the Bhonsale Military Academy, dedicated to instilling in its cadets 'the power of 
military knowledge’. B.S. Moonje’s letter to N.C. Kelkar, dated 10 April 1936, Microfilm, Reel No. 11, Moonje Papers, NMML.
18 Home Poll., File No. 4-37,1,1937, NAI.
19 Christphe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity-building, 
Implantation and Mobilisation [with special refrence to Central India], London, 1996, pp. 17-8; idem, ‘Opposing Gandhi: Hindu 
Nationalism and Political Violence’, in D. Vidal, G. Tarabout, and E. Meyer [eds.], Violence/Non-Violence: Some Hindu 
Perspectives, Delhi, 2003, pp. 299-324.
20 V.D. Savarkar, Veer Savarkar’s ‘Whirl-Wind Propaganda’ [Statements, Messages and Extracts from the President’s Diary of 
His Propagandists Years: Interviews from December 1937 to October 1941], Bombay, 1941, p. 51.
21 B.G. Tilak, Srimad Bhagavad Gita-Rahasya, or Karma Yoga Shastra, Poona, 1915 [first Marathi edition], English edition, 1935, 
cited in Philip H. Ashby, Modem Trends in Hinduism, New York, 1974, pp. 96-7.
22 Stanley Wolpert, Tilak and Gokhale: Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modem India, Berkeley, 1977 [1962], pp. 259, 
262-3; Mark J.Harvey, The Secular as Sacred? -  The Religio-political Rationalization of B.G. Tilak’, Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 
20, No. 2,1986, pp. 321-31: p. 321.
23 ‘Trial of Mr Tilak, Editor of Kesari Newspaper: Conviction and sentence for sedition -- Appeal to Crown’, IOR L/P&J/6/877, File 
No. 2436,1908, IOL.
24 Cited in Shabnum Tejani, Indian Secularism: A Social and Intellectual History, 1890-1950, Ranikhet, 2007, p. 89.
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Savarkar’s discourse on revolutionary nationalism. Savarkar was committed to a violent and revolutionary 
insurrection against British rule, advocating political assassination, sedition, and armed methods in India.
Savarkar and his older brother Ganesh Savarkar started the Mitra Mela, an underground revolutionary 
organisation, in Nasik in 1903, which had held meetings where members read the biographies of Shivaji, 
Ramdas, and the works of ‘patriotic revolutionists’ and debated the means of attaining freedom for India. The 
Mitra Mela was active until June 1906 when Vinayak Savarkar left for England to study for barristorship at 
Gray’s Inn, London; and it later became the Abhinav Bharat, or Young India Society -  a title borrowed from 
Giuseppe Mazzini’s ‘Young Italy* [Giovane Italia] movement.25 The Abhinav Bharat in its meetings discussed 
‘how the English could be driven out of India ... The means suggested were the collection of arms, killing 
Englishmen by arms or bombs... and not to mind the loss of fifteen natives if only one Englishman was killed.’26 
Duing his years in London, Savarkar continued the revolutionary propaganda and activities against British 
rule.27 He drew his violent nationalism in part from Giuseppe Mazzini [1805-1872], the revolutionary icon of 
national liberation, who had theorised and developed the tactics of secret societies and guerrilla warfare in 
Italy.28 He wrote a Marathi version of Mazzini’s autobiography Life and sent it to his older brother Ganesh 
Savarkar, who published it in Nasik in 1907.29 Savarkar reiterated his firm belief in revolutionary methods, 
preaching the necessity of an armed resistance to end British rule in India.30
Savarkar’s revolutionary propaganda eventually led to the assassination of Lt. Col. Sir William Curzon-Wyllie, 
aide-de-camp at the India Office, London, by his follower Madanlal Dhingra in 1909. Judge A.M.T. Jackson, 
district magistrate of Nasik, was later assassinated by Anant Laxman Kanhare, 17, a Chitpavan Brahman and 
an arts student in Aurangabad, in December 1909.31 The murder of Jackson revealed a much larger 
‘revolutionary conspiracy’ linked to the Abhinav Bharat, which had ‘advocated, prepared for, and conspired to 
bring about an armed rebellion or revolution and ... to overthrow the Government by criminal force or show of 
criminal force’ in India.32 The masterminds of the conspiracy were identified as the Savarkar brothers. In his 
confession to the trial court, Chutterbhuj Jhaverbhai Amin, of India House, London, admitted that Savarkar had 
instructed him to pack a parcel containing 20 Browning automatic pistols, plus ammunition during his travel to 
India from London in 1908. It was confirmed that one of these pistols had been used in Jackson’s
25 ‘From the Judgement of the Savarkar Case, Trial and Conviction and Question of Extradition in case of failure at the Hague’: 
IOR L/P&J/6/1060, File No. 359,1911, IOL; Keer, Veer Savarkar, Bombay, 1988 [1966], pp. 140-51.
26 Statement of Chutterbhuj Amin: IOR 'L/P&J/6/978, File No. 4762,1909, IOL.
27 Home Department [Political], Procedings for the year 1910, IOR L/P&J/9454,1 April 1910, File No. 847, p. 8713, IOL.
28 Harindra Srivastava, Five Stormy Years: Savarkar in London, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 3-4; Enrico Fasana Trieste, ‘From 
Hindutva to Hindu Rashtra: The Social and Political Thought of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar [1883-1966]’, 1994, p. 21; D.D. 
Pattanaik, Hindu Nationalism in India, Vol. 2, New Delhi, 1998, p. 71.
29 Jyotirmay Sharma, Hindutva: Exploring the Idea of Hindu Nationalism, New Delhi, 2003, p. 154. Savarkar’s first published 
work -- Joseph Mazzini Yanche Atmacharitr va Rajkaran [Autobiography and Politics of Giuseppe Mazzini] -  summarised the 
political teachings of Mazzini in a 26-page introduction [Prasfavna].
30 V.D. Savarkar, Hindu Pad-Padashahi, Or A Review of the Hindu Empire of Maharashtra, New Delhi, 1971, p. 31.
31 Keer, Veer Savarkar, pp. 153-4; Srivastava, Five Stormy Years, pp. 137-8.
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assassination.33 Savarkar was charged in the Jackson murder trial and sentenced to transportation for life: he 
was imprisoned in the Cellular Jail of the Andaman Islands in 1910 and denied the barristership at Gray’s Inn, 
London.34 He appealed for clemency -  first in 1911 and then again in 1913.35 He was finally released 
unconditionally in 1937 after 27 years in jail and did not participate in any anti-British agitation thereafter, 
transforming himself from a revolutionary nationalist to a staunch proponent of Hindutva.36 A scholar, a poet and 
a historian, Savarkar’s anti-British activitism in England had significantly contributed to the ideological 
development of militarism as a cenral doctrine of the Hindu Mahasabha in the 1930s and 1940s.
Savarkar’s militarisation discourse had remained at the heart of sangathan ideology since he became the 
Hindu Mahasabha president in 1937: he led the Mahasabha as its ‘supreme dictator’ until 1944. Savarkar 
viewed military power as the foremost goal of a ‘Hindu nation’: it was ‘steel and gun-powder that decide the 
destinies of nations’. 37 The organised state power was identified to be martial and administrative, with 
militarisation forming the essential basis of the state. Two military corps -- the Hindu Swayam Sewak Dal and 
the Hindu Women’s Protection Corps -- were organised during Savarkar’s presidentship in Nagpur in 1937, 
which adopted military-style training in Maharashtra. The aim was to build Hindu militancy, which could defend 
the Hindus from ‘external and internal threats’ in India’s provinces.38 In 1939 the Mahasabha established a 
national militia, a uniformed youth corps, which emphasised physical and military training for the ‘defence of the 
Hindus’ during riots in the country.39 B.S. Moonje declared at a meeting in Pune on 8 October 1939: ‘I have the 
pleasure in bringing to your notice a resolution of the Hindu Mahasabha for the organisation of the Hindu Militia 
in the country for the purpose of taking part in the defence of India both from external and internal 
aggression ...’40 The Hindu Militia, better known as the Ram Sena [the Army of Ram], was inaugurated, despite 
British restrictions against military and paramilitary organisations, in Poona on 17 March 1940; and Moonje was 
appointed its president for five years41 Mahasabha secretary-general J.P. Verma later directed the Ram Sena’s 
operations; and after his untimely death in July 1940, V.G. Deshpande took over the organisation.42 The 
provincial Hindu Sabhas were instructed to enrol volunteers for the organisation of the Sena, which pledged 
loyalty to the British and sought government support for the defence of Hidu interests in anticipation of riots. The
32 ‘From the Judgement of the Savarkar Case’: Trial and Conviction and Question of Extradition at The Hague, IOR 
L/P&J/6/1069, File No. 778,1911, IOL.
33 ‘Assassination of Mr Jackson: Discovery of Conspiracy at Nasik’: IOR L/P&J/6/978, File No. 4762,1909, IOL.
34 Savarkar was arrested on 13 March 190 in London; and the British courts passed final orders in June 1910, extraditing 
Savarkar to face trial in Bombay. Cases and counter-cases followed his trial -  including his appeal at the Heague, and he was 
sentenced in 1910. IOR L/P&J/6/1077, File No. 1131,1911, IOL.
35 J. Kuruvachira, Hindu Nationalists of Modem India: A Critical Study of the Intellectual Geneology of Hindutva, Jaipur, 2006, p. 
118.
36 Keer, Veer Savarkar, p. 164.
37 V.D. Savarkar, Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches Delivered from the Hindu Mahasabha 
Platform, Bombay, 1992, p. 152; V.D. Savarkar, Historic Statements [Eds. S.S. Savarkar and G.M. Joshi], Bombay, 1967, p. 260.
38 Gondhalekar, ‘Indian Nationalism’, p. 113.
39 B.S. Moonje’s letter to K.B. Hedgewar, dated 18 October 1939, Moonje Papers, File No. 51,1939, NMML.________________
40 B.S. Moonje’s circular Letter of 27 September 1939, Moonje Papers, File No. 51,1939, NMML.
41 ‘Hindu Militia’ [Ram Sena]’, File No. 91, M.G. Chitnavis Papers, NMML.
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Mahasabha’s aim was to counter the ‘threat’ of the Muslims through the organisation of the Hindu Militia, 
particularly during the riots in India.43
Nonetheless, the Hindu Mahasabha’s most organised paramilitary organisation which had eventually 
eclipsed the Ram Sena was the Hindu Rashtra Dal: it was formed under the leadership of Nathuram Godse, a 
staunch loyalist of Savarkar, in Poona in 1942.44 The Rashtra Dal received the support of the ‘Tilakites’, labelled 
by the British as the ‘Kesari group’; and its objective was to help the Mahasabha in its fight for the protection of 
the ‘Hindu religion and culture’ in India.45 The militant idiom gradually become embedded in the Mahasabha’s 
programme concerning Hindu society and national identity in the 1930s and 1940s.46
II. Mahasabha and RSS Nexus
The Hindu Mahasabha’s militarisation discourse was most clearly evident in its close relations with the 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [RSS].47 A ‘major influence’ on the thinking of Dr Keshav Baliram Hedgewar 
[1889-1940],48 revered as the founding father of the RSS, was ‘a handwritten manuscript o f ... Savarkar’s 
Hindutva which advanced the thesis that the Hindus are a nation’.49 ‘One of the early visitors to Savarkar in 
Ratnagiri,’ writes Dhananjay Keer, ‘was the great founder of the RSS ... The interview took place in [March] 
1925 at Shirgaon, a village on the outskirts of Ratnagiri.’ Before starting the RSS, Hedgewar had ‘a long 
discussion with Savarkar over the faith, form and future of the organization’.50 The RSS was envisioned to 
propagate Hindutva ideology and infuse new physical strength and power into the Hindu community through 
military training.
The RSS was established on the Vijaya Dashmi day in 1925 in Nagpur by Hedgewar. The inaugural meeting 
was attended by Dr B.S. Moonje, Dr L.V. Paranjpe, Dr B.B. Tholkar, and Ganesh Savarkar -  all Hindu 
Mahasabhaites and Tilakites -- focusing on the weakness of existing Hindu organisations and the Hindus’ role in 
combating ‘Muslim rowdyism’ [violence] in India.51 Hedgewar believed that the struggle against British 
colonialism lacked ‘a sense of moral purpose and Hindu nationalism’, and that the Congress had ‘no positive 
vision of a Hindu nation’.52 He declared: ‘It is therefore the duty of every Hindu to do his best to consolidate
42 V.G. Deshpande, ‘Brief Life Sketch of Late Mr. J.P. Verma’, File No. 91, M.G. Chitnavis Papers, NMML.
43 Mahratta, 16 February 1940, cited in Walter Anderson, The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh I: Early Concerns’, Economic and 
Political Weekly, Vol. 7, No. 11,11 March 1972, p. 595.
44 Walter K. Anderson and Sridhar D. Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu 
Revivalism, New Delhi, 1987, pp. 43-4.
45 Ram Lai Wadhwa, Hindu Maha Sabha, 1928-1947, New Delhi, 1999, p. 209.
46 Henrik Berglund, Hindu Nationalism and Democracy, Delhi, 2004, p. 72.
47 D.E.U. Baker, The Muslim Concern for Security: The Central Provinces and Berar, 1919-1947’, in Mushirul Hasan [ed.], 
Communal and Pan-lslamic Trends in Colonial India, New Delhi, 1985, pp. 237-9.
48 Anderson, The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh I’, p. 591.
49 Anderson and Damle, Brotherhood, p. 33.
50 Keer, Veer Savarkar, p. 175.
51 D.R. Goyal, Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, New Delhi, 2nd edn. 2000 [1979], pp. 59-60; Walter K. Anderson and Shridhar D. 
Damle, ‘RSS: Ideology, Organization, and Training’, in C. Jaffrelot [ed.], The Sangh Parivar: A Reader, New Delhi, 2005, p. 24.
52 Cited in Ashby, Modem Trends in Hinduism, p. 100.
104
Hindu society.’53 Hedgewar’s objective was to build a strong nation of the Hindus in India -  ‘a moral integration 
in which no other elements came between the nation and the individual’.54 The RSS aimed to re-create a nation 
ruled by the Hindus by building a numerically small but devoted and efficient organisation of patriotic men who 
could provide leadership to the Hindu community in India.
The RSS sought to impart a martial, masculine accent to the spiritual ideals of good and virtuous behaviour 
[samskaras] as well as an ideological training [baudhik] through shakhas in India.55 The shakha, which had a 
close affinity to the traditional akhara, was the basic unit of the RSS. Hedgewar looked to the akharas to rally 
some of his first recruits in the shakhas in 1925. He said: ‘Go to the akharas, but come to the shakhas also.’56 
He introduced the daily shakhas in May 1926 as the permanent units of the RSS first in Nagpur city and later in 
the villages and towns of Maharashtra.57 The shakhas aimed to create ‘new men’ -  the ‘patriotic selfless 
individuals loyal to the Hindu nation’ -  who were physically well trained, manly, courageous, self-disciplined and 
capable of organising the Hindus in India. They concentrated on ‘physical exercise and cultivation of the mind’, 
besides acting as the 'building blocks of RSS expansion’ in the country.58 Swayamsevaks, referred to as 
‘Hedgewar’s volunteers’, pledged -  a life oath initiated in 1928 -  to consecrate themselves entirely to the RSS 
‘with whole body, heart, and money, for in it lies the betterment of Hindus and the country1; and the ‘Hindu 
nation’ was identified as the ‘living God’.59 The RSS was developed as a cohesive and disciplined body of 
swayamsevaks and workers on the basis that they would have a broad influence on many areas of Hindu 
national life in India.60 A fundamental Hindu characterisation of ‘physical culture’ by the RSS had largely 
shaped the formation of armed volunteer groups, which were defined in the framework of Hindu nationalism, 
across Maharashtra in the 1920s and 1930s.61
The Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS belonged to the same political milieu and militaristic background in 
India.62 The icon of Shivaji, bhagwa dhwaj [the saffron flag -  the ‘true guru’ -- to which Hedgewar demanded 
that obeisance be paid], and Shivaji’s guru Ramdas were prominent in the rituals of both organisations, 
suggesting a strong influence of military tradition.63 The bhagwa dhwaj -  the saffron flag once used by Shivaji
53 Cited in Pralay Kanungo, RSS’s Tryst with Politics: From Hedgwar to Sudarshan, Delhi, 2002, p. 68.
54 Ainslie T. Embree, The Function of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh: To Define the Hindu Nation’, in Martin E. Marty and R. 
Scott Appleby feds.], Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements, Chicago, 2004, p. 619.
55 Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modem India, Princeton, 1999, p. 93.
56 Interview with Nana Deshmukh, RSS leader fom Akola, Maharashtra, 25 February 1994, New Delhi, cited in Jaffrelot, Hindu 
Nationalist Movement, p. 38.
57 J.A. Curran, Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics: A Study of the RSS, New Delhi, 1951, pp. 12,33-5.
58 Antony Copley, ‘Debating Indian Nationalism and Hindu Religious Belief, in Antony Copley [ed.], Hinduism in Public and 
Private: Reform, Hindutva, Gender, and Sampraday, New Delhi, 2003, p. 12.
59 Anderson, ‘Rashtiya Swayamsevak Sangh I’, p. 593.
60 Tapan Basu, Pradip Datta, Sumit Sarkar, Tanika Sarkar, and Sambuddha Sen, Khaki Shorts and Saffron Flags: A Critique of 
the Hindu Right, Delhi, 1993, p. 16.
61 M.S. Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts, Bangalore, 2000 [1966], pp. 24-5.
62 Christophe Jaffrelot, The RSS: A Hindu Nationalist Sect’, in C. Jaffrelot [ed.], The Sangh Parivar: A Reader, New Delhi, 2005, 
p. 58.
63 Anderson and Damle, Brotherhood, p. 36.
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and Maharana Pratap -- rather than the tricolour was regarded as the true ‘national flag’ of India.64 The 
Mahasabha and the RSS were centralised command structures, controlled respectively by the president and the 
Sarsanghchalak [the supreme dictator] who wielded enormous powers. The top leadership was not open to a 
democratic election; and the leaders were appointed, revealing an ‘authoritarian institutional secrecy1 that 
concealed internal working and conflicts in order to project an image of ‘Hindu unity’ in the country.65 Both 
organisations repudiated the Congress’s anti-British struggles, abstaining from the anti-Rowlatt agitation, the 
Non-Cooperation Movement, and the Civil Disobedience Movement in India.66 The ideal of militant Hindu 
nationalism became central to the ideology of both the Mahasabha and the RSS in a goal to propagate India as 
a ‘Hindu nation’ by constructing a 'defensible and militaristic’ Hindu identity.67
The RSS maintained an institutional affinity and continuity with the Hindu Mahasabha as a parallel Hindu 
movement, drawing support from the latter for its expansion and development across India. Most of its patrons 
belonged to the Mahasabha. In addition to the patronage of M.M. Malaviya, stated the British secret service, the 
RSS ‘owe[d] its growth to Dr Moonje and his journeys in the UP region’.68 B.S. Moonje, celebrated by the RSS 
as ‘Dharmaveer’ [a hero in the religious struggle], had a prominent role in the formation of the RSS, being one 
of its five founding members and the mentor of Hedgewar. For Moonje, Hedgewar was perhaps the most loyal 
follower in Nagpur politics throughout the 1920s and 1930s.69 When the Hindu Sabha had been organised in 
Nagpur under the presidentship of Raja Laxmanrao Bhonsle of Nagpur, Moonje became its vice-president and 
Hedgewar the secretary.70 As Hindu Mahasabha president, Moonje played a crucial role in organising the RSS 
branches in Maharashtra and the Central Provinces in the late 1920s, even though the organisation’s structure 
was the result of Hedgewar’s vision and leadership. Moonje explained: ‘Our institution, the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh of Nagpur under Dr Hedgewar is o f ... kind, though quite independently conceived. I shall 
spend the rest of my life developing and extending this institution of Dr Hedgewar all throughout Maharashtra 
and other provinces.’71 Moonje was instrumental in the expansion of the RSS as a nationwide organisation in 
India, reinforcing a deeper commitment to sangathan ideology. The RSS had penetrated Hindi-speaking north 
India with the help of the Mahasabha. Ganesh Savarkar brought the RSS in touch with Mahasabha activists in
64 Ramananda Chatterjee, Hindu Mahasabha presiden, first unfurled the saffron flag as a Hindu symbol at its Surat session in 
1929; it was adopted by the All-India Hindu Mahasabha as the pan-Hindu flag of the ‘Hindu nation’ in Lahore in 1936. Savarkar, 
Hindu Rashtra Darshan, p. 106.
65 Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Movement, p. 45; Anderson and Damle, Brotherhood, p. 88.
66 Basu and Sarkar et al., Khakhi Shorts, p. 20.
67 Christophe Jaffrelot, ‘Hindu Nationalism: Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 20, 
Nos. 12-13, 20-27 March 1993, p. 521; K.R. Malkani, The RSS Story, New Delhi, 1980, p. 25.
68 ‘Note on the Volunteer Movement in India prepared by the Intelligence Bureau -  28 September 1940’, IOR L/P&J/17, File No. 
C81.1940.
69 K.B. Hedgewar lost his parents in a plague outbreak in Nagpur when he was 13 in 1902. B.S. Moonje brought up Hedgewar 
and later sent him to the National Medical College, Calcutta, where the latter joined the Anushilan Samiti. Hedgewar joined the 
Congress as a follower of Tilak in the Central Provinces -  Moonje being his father figure. Narayan Hari Palkar, DrK.B. 
Hedgewar [Translated from Marathi by Mrinalini Dhavale], Poona, 1964, pp. 36,41,59,117.
70 Moonje’s Diary 1927: entries on 4 May, 4 June, 11 June, 13 June, Reel 1, Microfilm, Moonje Papers, NMML.
71 Moonje Papers, Microfilm, Diary, Reel No. 2,1932-36, NMML.
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Delhi and Banaras; and the influence of the Savarkar family had enabled the RSS’s expansion among the upper 
castes of western Maharashtra. Padam Raj Jain, Mahasabha general secretary, helped Vasant Rao Oke 
establish an RSS shakha in the central office of the Mahasabha in Delhi in 1936.72The RSS attracted new 
patrons due to its association with the Mahasabha, some of them being Hindu princes and rulers anxious to find 
a counterweight to Muslim paramilitary groups in India.73 The RSS’s links to the Mahasabha had served to 
introduce it into fairly ‘wider and militant circles’ in north India in the 1920s and 1930s74 
In its organisational activities, the RSS was linked to the Hindu Mahasabha through membership and 
leadership, though it remained independent of it. Officials in the Home Department noted that the RSS was the 
‘volunteer organisation of the Hindu Mahasabha’.75 Sections of the RSS activists were office-holders in the 
Mahasabha; and many leaders were members of both the Mahasabha and the RSS, as dual membership was 
common.76 An early indication of the nexus was the career of Nathuram Godse -  who joined the RSS in 1930 
and became a prominent organiser of the Sangh. He left the RSS for the Mahasabha two years later because 
‘Hedgewar refused to make the RSS a political organization’.77 Lacking in trained youth power, the Mahasbha 
leadership was anxious to get the support of the RSS cadres. The Mahasabha, at its Delhi session in 1932, 
passed a resolution, officially recognising the RSS and encouraging provincial Hindu Sabhas to support its 
expansion and assist in making it a ‘strong organization of Hindus’.78 It commended the RSS as ‘the only 
militant and well-disciplined force of Hindus’ in India.79 Groups of RSS militants gathered at public meetings to 
celebrate Savarkar’s release from jail in 1937.80 During the RSS officers’ training camp held in Pune on 27-29 
May 1943, which was attended by M.S. Golwalkar, Ganesh Savarkar, and B.S. Moonje, Savarkar expressed his 
admiration for the ‘display of march and drills by swayamsevaks in great numbers’. He was ‘proud’, he said, ‘to 
see the branches of the Sangh spread throughout India during his visits to various places’.81 Savarkar instructed 
Hindu Sabhas throughout India to observe a day of mourning for Hedgewar when the latter died on 30 June 
1942.82 Savarkar died in 1966: an honour guard of 2,000 RSS workers attended his funeral procession in 
Bombay.83 The RSS stayed outside political campaigns, insisting that it was strictly a cultural organisation 
concerned with the renewal and regeneration of a ‘Hindu nation’ through character building, whereas the
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Mahasabha, a political party, was interested in the role of the state.84 Nonetheless, both the Mahasabha and the 
RSS shared an ideological affinity based on Hindu unity and militancy, being committed to the militarissation of 
Hindu society in India.
III. Radicalisation of Miltarisation
The Hindu Mahasabha’s militarisation programme had become radicalised by the late 1930s, particularly 
during the Second World War period. In the wake of Britain’s declaration of war on Germany in September 1939 
and the subsequent statement of Viceroy Lord Linlithgow unilaterally committing India to the war, the Indian 
National Congress’s provincial governments resigned en masse in protest against the war effort. In contrast, the 
Muslim League declared support for Britain and celebrated the Congress withdrawal from the government as a 
‘Day of Deliverance’.85 The Mahasabha for its part adopted a policy of 'responsive co-operation’ with the British 
in order to secure ‘Hindu intersts’ under a ‘Dominion’ status; and it anticipated that Britain would make the war 
the occasion inter alia to ‘militarise the Hindus and Indianise the army in entirety’.86 Savarkar renewed the 
militarisation drive as a declaration of the reliability of the ‘Hindu race’ in a situation of war.87 ‘His Majesty’s 
Government,’ he explained, ‘must now turn to the Hindus and work with their support... now that our interests 
were so closely bound together the essential thing was for [Hindusthan] and Great Britain to be friends; and the 
old antagonism was no longer necessary.’88 He justified co-operation with the British on the ‘nationalist grounds 
and in the interests of the country1 during the war period, even though the government’s overall strategy was to 
create a counterweight to the nationalist opposition and isolate the Congress in the country.89
The Hindu Mahasabha’s policy of co-operation justified India’s participation in the military activities. The 
Mahasabha declared in September 1939 that the provincial and district Hindu Sabhas would undertake the task 
of forming Hindu Sainikikaran Mandals [Hindu military boards] across the country.90 It resolved that the 
propaganda drive should be carried into the rural areas, particularly those inhabited by the ‘martial races’.91 
Regional ‘militarisation boards’ were formed under the leadership of V.D. Savarkar, Ganesh Savarkar, B.S. 
Moonje, and N.C. Chatterjee.92 At the Mahasabha’s Calcutta session in December 1939, Savarkar asked all the
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universities, colleges, and schools ‘to make military training compulsory to students’ and ‘secure entry into 
military forces for your youths in any and every wa/ in the country.93 At the Mahasabha’s session in Madura in 
December 1940, he outlined the party’s policy of ‘militarising’ Hinduism, encouraging Hindu men to join various 
branches of the British armed forces en massed He urged the Viceroy to appoint the Mahasabhaites to the 
advisory councils of the government and the war committees in India.95 On his fifty-ninth birthday celebrated in 
conjunction with a Militarisation Week in 1941, Savarkar launched the Mahasabha’s rallying cry: ‘Hinduise all 
politics and militarise all Hindudom’.96 He declared that if the Hindus helped Britain militarily, they would be 
doing service to ‘Hindudom’ -  to ‘defend our hearths in an internal anti-Hindu anarchy1.97 The Hindu Sabhaites 
had become members of the war committees set up by the government in the United Provinces, Bengal, and 
the Bombay Presidency.98 Such enlistment in the regular army ran parallel to the growth of militias in north 
India.99 Intelligence reports expressed alarm about a sudden increase in the two volunteer organisations -  the 
Ram Sena and the Hindu Rashtra Dal -  of the Mahasabha.100 The Mahasabha was ‘building up its armed 
volunteer forces numbering around 100,000 members’ and had links to other ‘Hindu groups which possessed 
firearms’.101 The UP, which had witnessed the rapid growth and militant sessions of the Mahasabha, faced 
‘communal anarchy unless very strong ... immediate action is taken to restrain the activities of volunteer 
bodies’.102 Throughout the war period, the Mahasabha had shown a strong determination to take the ‘fullest 
advantage’ of Britain’s war needs as part of its militarisation programme in India.103
The war period seemed to offer the Hindu Mahasabha a chance of much greater importance within any 
constitutional negotiations which might take place involving the British and the Muslim League in India. The 
Mahasabha hoped to conduct whatever Indian national activities that lay within its scope and hence assume 
‘the leadership of all political parties in the country1.104 B.S. Moonje wrote to the Viceroy assuring him of the 
Mahasabha’s co-operation and soliciting the favour of the government. ‘Hindustan’, he stressed,'... is the one 
stable factor in its choice of its allies for its permanent safety and prosperity... Thus, Hindustan and Britain are 
allied together in unshakeable bond of union for long years to come.’105 Between ‘the two communities,’ he 
explained, ‘the Hindu Mahasabha ... will be in a position to give immensely large help in men, material and
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Iintellect than the Muslim League can hope to do’.106 Moonje advised the Viceroy not to be deceived by the 
party's ‘status and importance’ from the mere fact that it did not fare well at the ballot box.107 Savarkar assured 
Lord Linlithgow: ‘No help the Moslems have given or can ever give to the Government can ever outweigh the 
help which the Government has already received and is sure to receive in future from Hindudom as a whole in 
India.’108 The Mahasabha’s strategy of co-operation aimed to establish its hold at the national level and capture 
the political stage from the Congress as a viable alternative political party in the country.
During the war period, the Hindu Mahasabha was focused in its drive to fight the ‘internal enemies’ -  the 
Congress and the Muslims -  rather than the British whom it wanted to succeed.109 It vigorously rejected the 
Congress’s claim to represent all Indians or Hindu interests, claiming that it should be recognised by the British 
as the sole legitimate party representing the whole Hindu population of India. Savarkar condemned the 
Congress as ‘pro-Muslim, anti-Hindu, and anti-national’, while fiercely opposing the Muslim League.110 B.S. 
Moonje attacked the Congress’s politics of self-government as a ‘vain talk’, as the Hindu community could not 
protect itself from ‘humiliation by the Muslims’, wondering ‘if, in the mutually antagonistic and clashing 
ideologies, the Charka [the Congress] were to come into conflict with the Rifle’ [the Mahasabha]!111 In the 
programme of the Mahasabha, Hindu sectional interests received the priority, not the anti-colonial struggle.112 
In the wake of the Congress’s Quit India Resolution on 8 August 1942, Savarkar instructed the Hindu Sabhaites 
who happened to be 'members of municipalities, local bodies, legislatures or those serving in the army ... to 
stick to their posts’ across the country.113 The Mahasabha did not take part in the Quit India movement, even 
though its rank and file had sympathised with the Congress’s struggle.114 Evidently, the Mahasabha was not 
considered an adversary or proscribed by the British, as it had shown a clear disavowal of the Congress’s 
nationalist movement.115
The Hindu Mahasabha’s militarisation programme revealed an aggressive hostility against the Muslims, 
including a threat of ‘civil war1 against them.116 Its drive for militarisation was in part motivated by a plan to 
increase the number of the Hindus in the military which would eventually help combat take the Muslims -  the 
‘real enemies’ -  in the country.117 Savarkar stated that ‘the Muslims [Afghanistan and other Muslim nations]
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have tacitly declared war on Hindustan’ and were likely to ‘sabotage the state from within as well as attack from 
outside’. He continued: To forestall and counteract this Islamite peril our state must raise a mighty force 
exclusively constituted by Hindus alone, must open arms and munitions factories exclusively manned by Hindus 
alone and mobilize everything on a war scale.’118 He argued that volunteer armies were necessary for the 
protection of the Hindus against ‘hostile activities of Muslim volunteer groups’, such as the Muslim National 
Guards.119 The Hindus, stated B.S. Moonje, lived under ‘two dominions, the political domination of the British 
based on their strongest of of machine guns and the domination of Mahomedans based on their aggressive 
mentality1. He insisted: ‘We shall have to fight both the government and the Moslems ...’12° The Mahasabha 
justified militarisation on the basis that the Hindus had to prepare for the eventual ‘struggle for power* with the 
Muslims when the British finally departed from India.121 Ganpat Rai, Mahasabha secretary-general, explained: 
‘What the Hindus require at this juncture is a regular army, when communal riots break out in the cities of India, 
Hindus cry out for rescue force ...’122 Military preparedness was needed in the event of ‘internal disorder1 in the 
country.123 The Mahasabha’s militarisation drive ran parallel to its anti-Muslim orientation, evoking fears about 
the ‘conspiracies’ of the Muslims against the Indian nation.124
However, the Mahasabha’s drive to enlist recruits for the army and negotiate with the British for its 
representation on various government councils was far from a success in India. The British interest in it had 
proved transitory; and the party’s poor performance in the 1937 elections strengthened its rejection by the 
officials who refused to acknowledge its political claims.125 Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for India, argued: 
‘I doubt if it would serve the interests of India to attempt to do business with the Mahasabha and artificially 
enhance its bargaining status. Its leaders feud among themselves, would merely act as a stalking horse for 
Congress.’126 The ‘Mahasabha,’ remarked new Viceroy Lord Wavell, ‘is a curious body; [as] many of its rank 
and file seem to [be] Congressmen, and on big political issues w[ould] follow Gandhi rather than Syamaprasad 
Mookherjee or Savarkar1.127 At the Simla Conference in June 1945, Lord Wavell invited the Congress and the 
Muslim League for negotiations on power sharing, but not the Mahasabha, believing that it was the Congress
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which largely represented the Indians in the country.128 Despite all of its efforts to establish itself as the main 
organisation of the Hindus in the war period, the Mahasabha could not overtake the Congress which had 
remained the most popular party in the country.129 In the face of a hostile attitude by the government, the 
Mahasabha continued to favour militarisation: there was little enthusiasm within the party for an anti-British 
confrontation because of its limited social base across the country.-130 The evident outcome of the Mahasabha’s 
militarisation policy was that the party had tried to secure British favour by further moderating its position on 
India’s independence and distancing itself from the Congress’s nationalist movement in the country.
Conclusion
The Hindu Mahasabha began its transition to a profoundly militant Hindutva nationalism which was fixated 
on militarisation theory and severity in the late 1920s. The militarisation policy became the dominant motif of 
sangathan\s\ discourse, aiming to consolidate the Hindus into a unified and militant ‘Hindu nation’. Parallel to 
the growth of the Mahasabha, the RSS emerged as a strong Hindu nationalist organisation in the 1920s, 
inheriting most of its ideology from Savarkar’s Hindutva. Its paramilitary style reflected an attempt to introduce in 
Hindu society a drive for physical strength based on militarisation. The Mahasabha perceived the RSS as the 
embryo of a ‘Hindu army’, even though the latter showed its divergence by abandoning any involvement in 
politics.131 The Mahasabha aimed to capture power as a full-fledged political party, whereas the RSS was more 
concerned with the socio-political aspects of building a ‘Hindu nation’ in the country.132 The Mahasabha’s 
militarisation programme had become radicalised under the leadership of Savarkar, who intensified the process 
of militaristic training involving collaboration with the British during the Second World War period. The 
Mahasabha’s struggle was for its acceptance as the main representative party of the Hindus in India in conflict 
with the Congress. The fear of ‘internal enemy’ was persistent in its narrative, which focused on the fight against 
the Congress and the Muslims rather than the British.133 The successful organisation of militarisation helped to 
sharpen and crystallise sangathanlsi ideology targeting the Muslims -- the formidable ‘antagonists’ -  in the 
country.134 The Mahasabha’s vision and activities stressing the importance of national strength and survival 
through militarisation became extremely crucial in the development and evolution of sangathan ideology in India 
in the 1920s and 1930s.
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8Gandhi and Hindu Mahasabhaites
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi gained unprecedented authority over the Indian National Congress in the 
1920s and 1930s through a complex process that had brought him into conflict with the Hindu Mahasabha and 
its elite politics. The Mahasabha’s old style of politics had collapsed since Gandhi’s emergence as the leader of 
the mass campaigns in India following the Khilafat-Non-cooperation movement in 1919-1921.1 The Gandhian 
Congress was transformed into a mass organisation and strove to attract a wider cross-section of the population 
to its fold, diverting much of the support that the Mahasabha had received from the Hindu classes.2 Gandhi”s 
leadership represented a challenge to the Mahasabha’s definition of nationalism -  a representation of the Indian 
nation that excluded Muslims -- by emphasing on an ‘inclusive’ Indian nation based on the coexistence of 
diverse creeds and religions. His ideals of ahimsa [non-violence] and Hindu-Muslim unity constituted the basis 
of India’s struggle for freedom and conflicted with the Mahasabha’s discourse of a majoritarian ‘Hindu nation’ 
and militarism. Gandhi’s dominance of the national-level politics blunted the Mahasabha’s leadership, which had 
resisted his nationalist stuggles most strongly in India. This chapter examines Gandhi’s dialogue and conflict 
with Hindu Mahasabha leaders over the methods of the freedom struggle and the nature of the future nation­
state that was to emerge in India in the twentieth century.
I. Gandhi’s Religion
Gandhi courted Hindu nationalist organisations and tried to grapple with the enigma of Hinduism, which had 
represented his strongest bond and the greatest influence on him. His understanding of Hinduism was ‘largely 
based on reading and reflection, and remained shallow and abstract... he made up his brand of Hinduism as 
he went along.’3 He had read Vivekananda’s Rajayoga, M.N. Dwivedi’s two commentaries on the Yoga Sutras, 
and the Bhagavadgita -  the principal scripture that had greatly influenced him with the idea of aparigraha [non­
possession] and renunciation.4 He described the Hindus as that branch of the Aryans who had migrated to the 
trans-Indus region of India. ‘Aryanism,’ he claimed, ‘would have been a better descriptive word than Hinduism.’ 
‘A thousand years ago,’ he explained, ‘the army of Ghazni invaded India in order to spread Islam. Hindu idols 
were broken and the invasions carried as far as Somnath ...’ ‘Thus we have seen how there have been three 
assaults on Hinduism, coming from Islam and then Christianity, but on the whole it came out of them 
unscathed.’5 In an article entitled ‘Why I am a Hindu’ written in 1927, Gandhi defined Hinduism as the ‘most 
tolerant of all religions known to me’ -- in which non-violence found the ‘highest expression and application’. ‘Its
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freedom from dogma... gives the votary the largest scope for self-expression. Not being an exclusive religion, it 
enables the followers of that faith not merely to respect all the other religions, bu t... to admire and assimilate 
whatever may be good in the other faiths.’6 Hinduism ‘is as broad as the Universe and takes in its fold all that is 
good in this world’, and ‘what of substance is contained in any other religion is always to be found in it’.7 Gandhi 
claimed that he was a sanatani Hindu, meaning a Hindu who was grounded in the ancient and traditional beliefs 
and values of Hinduism. ‘I am a Hindu not merely because I was born in the Hindu fold, but I am one by 
conviction and choice.’ ‘As I know it and interpret it [Hinduism],’ he confessed, ‘it gives me all the solace I need 
both here and hereafter.’8 Gandhi declared: ‘I have been bom a Hindu and I shall die a Hindu, a Sanatani 
[orthodox] Hindu. If there is salvation for me, it must be as a Hindu.'9 He had little interest in the outer forms of 
the Hindu religion, its rituals or pilgrimages and expressed an outright condemnation of untouchability, animal 
sacrifice and the devadasis system -  the custom of ‘consecrating’ youn girls to God.10 Placing reason above 
scripture as authoritative where the two conflicted and relying on an ‘inner voice’ -  the ‘still, small voice that 
| must always be the final arbiter1, Gandhi represented a tradition of modernity and reform within Hinduism.11 
| Gandhi showed respect for all faiths.12 He did not regard ‘Jainism or Buddhism as separate from Hinduism’.13 
Buddhism, he held, arose in India not as a new religion, but as a reform of Hinduism. ‘He [Buddha] taught 
Hinduism not to take, but to give life. True sacrifice was not of others, but of self.’14 Similarly, Jainism -  the 
‘most logical of all faiths’ -- was the same as Hinduism, part of the Hindu religious universe.15 Gandhi’s family 
had very close Jain conections; and he found in Rajchandra Mehta [Raychandbhai], a Jain jeweller, a poet, a 
saint and his religious mentor, great support and spiritual guidance.16 Outside Buddhism and Jainism there was 
scarcely any religious tradition that made non-violence the comer-stone of its ethical principle. Gandhi was very 
positive about Islam, the key doctrine of which was ‘its levelling spirit’ of equality for all.17 He had read Shibli 
Numani’s biographies of Muslim heroes, books of Hadith, and Amir Ali’s works on Islamic history, admiring the 
Koran's stress on ‘self-surrender, returning good for evil, the need for renunciation’ as well as the Prophet 
Mohammad’s fasts and prayers based on heart which was open to the ‘small, still voice’.18 He considered Islam
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a young religion, ‘still... in the making’ and ‘still groping for its great secret’.19 Gandhi believed that Christianity 
in India had considerable influence, too, as it pointed out some of the glaring defects of Hinduism.20 'The spirit 
of the Sermon on the Mount competes almost on equal terms with the Bhagavad Gita for the domination of my 
heart.’21 He urged Christian missionaries, however, to concentrate on philanthropic work in India, rejecting their 
‘irreligious gamble’ for converts. With the help of the Jain doctrine of syadavada [‘many-sidedness of reality1 -  
the theory of ‘relative truth’], Gandhi had ‘established long ago the unity of all religions’ by discovering their core 
truths [commonalities rather than differences] and grafting them inwardly onto his own religious aspirations.22 By 
religion, he did not mean a formal religion, or a customary religion, but that religion which underlay all religions, 
which brought them face to face with their Maker.23 As a Vaishnavite Hindu, his desire was to remove 
boundaries, underlining his conception of religious pluralism or the principle of the equality of religions, which 
had formed the basis for the Congress’s secular nationalism in that no single religion was to be identified with 
the state or be promoted by it in India.24 Gandhi’s Hinduism was inclusive and tolerant; and being a good Hindu 
and having respect for other religions -  Islam or Christianity -  were not contradictory.25
Gandhi’s association with the Arya Samaj was perhaps his earliest to develop with a Hindu organisation in 
India. The first Hindu leader with whom he had come into contact was Bhai Parmanand, a prominent Arya 
Samajist and later Hindu Mahasabha president. In 1905, Bhai Parmanand visited South Africa as an Arya 
Samaj missionary. Gandhi praised Parmanand’s learning and vigor, but criticised his ‘anti-Muslim’ sectarianism 
-- urging him to promote education not religious reform in Africa.26 He described the Arya Samaj as ‘a body that 
has done most useful and practical work apart from its religious doctrines’, lauding its ‘patriotism’. The Samaj, 
he stated, ‘does not represent any established orthodox religion of India’, but ‘is still a cult struggling for 
existence and catering for converts’.27 He insisted that the Indians were not yet ready for religious missionary 
work, exhorting the Samaj not to undertake any missionary work in South Africa.28 Gandhi did not permit 
religious proselytisation because the Muslims had been the backbone of his satyagraha movements in the 
Transvaal and Natal, South Africa, and India.29
After his return to India, Gandhi attended an Arya Samaj conference in Surat and performed the opening 
ceremony of its new temple there in 1916. In his speech, he said that even though he was not an Arya Samajist
19 Cited in Rudrangshu Mukherjee [ed.], The Penguin Gandhi Reader, New Delhi, 1993, p. 211.
20 Gandhi, CWMG, Vol. 4, p. 407.
21 Gandhi, CWMG, Vol. 8, p. 220.
22 The Jain principle that deeply influenced Gandhi was anekantavada -  the many-sidedness of reality which leads to the 
epistemology of syadavada: the doctrine that every statement only presents a partial view of reality. Gandhi, CWMG, Vol. 19, p. 
522; CWMG, Vol. 23, p. 20.
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himself, he admired ‘Swami Dayananda, the adored founder of the Arya Samaj’, as a ‘rare man, and I must 
I acknowledge that I have come under his influence’.30 Dayananda was ‘a grand, lofty and fearless character of 
impeccable chastity*, who had advocated a revival of Hinduism as it existed in Vedic times and rejected the 
‘accretions of Hinduism’: idolatry, caste hierarchy, child marriage, and taboos against widow remarriage.31 
However, Gandhi added, his main work, the Satyarth Prakash, was very disappointing. It misrepresented 
Jainsim, Islam, Christianity, and Hindiuism to a high degree. ‘He [Dayananda] has tried to make narrow one of 
the most tolerant and liberal of the faiths [Hinduism] on the face of the earth.’32 Gandhi insisted that Arya 
Samajists could do better work if they reformed themselves and did not enter into ‘a violent controversy1 to gain 
conversions in India.33 An Arya Samaj ‘preacher is never so happy as when he is reviling other religions’ -- 
Islam and Christianity -  which did ‘more harm than good’ in the country.34 In 1924 he strongly attacked the 
Arymy Samaj in an article entitled ‘Hindu-Muslim Tension -  Its Cause and Cure’, provoking a stormy reaction 
from the Arya Samajists.35 Gandhi showed special respect for the Samaj, however, but rejected its missionary 
approach as well as its belligerence and sectarianism that were directed against Islam and Christianity in India.
II. Hindu Mahasabha Ties
In the 1920s and 1930s, Gandhi had an evolving relationship with Hindu Mahasabha leaders and managed 
to rally a significant number of them behind him. He attended the inaugural meeting of the All-India Hindu 
Sabha in Hardwar in April 1915 and spoke strongly in support of it.36 His passionate speech made an impact on 
Swami Shraddhananda, who had collected funds for Gandhi’s work while the latter was in South Africa.37 
Gandhi admired Shraddhananda’s educational work, but was critical of his aggressive sangathan programme 
that had the ‘unjustifiable ambition of bringing all Muslims into the Aryan fold’ and ‘exacerbated Hindu-Muslim 
tensions’ in India.38 Shraddhananda threw his support behind Gandhi in the 1919 Non-cooperation movement 
because the letter’s politics was different, being imbued with a ‘spirit of religion’.39 He was a central figure in the 
1919 anti-Rowlatt satyagraha and often portrayed as a unique symbol of Hindu-Muslim unity because of his 
preaching of national unity at the Jama Masjid, Delhi.40 After Shraddhananda’s assassination in 1926, Gandhi 
wrote several times in praise of his work. He deeply admired Shraddhananda’s ‘bravery and unselfish service’,
30 Gandhi, CWMG, Vol. 28, p. 51.
31 Kenneth Jones, Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 1 ^ -Century Punjab, Berkeley, 1976, p. 32.
32 Gandhi, CWMG, Vol. 28, pp. 52-3.
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34 Gandhi, CWMG, Vol. 28, pp. 56-7.
35 Gandhi, CWMG, Vol. 24, p. 228-31, 264-6.
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appealing to the Hindus and the Muslims to ‘purge the atmosphere of mutual hatred and calumny1 in the 
country.41
Of the other Hindu Mahasabha leaders, Gandhi showed great admiration for Lajpat Rai and Madan Mohan 
Malaviya. He rejected the charge that ‘Lalaji and Malaviyaji are sworn enemies of Islam’. The Muslim press 
used ‘foul language against these patriots’.42 He deeply respected Lajpat Rai, a key figure in the pre-Savarkarite 
Hindu Mahasabha of which he became president in 1925. ‘His [Lajpat Rai’s] desire to purify and strengthen 
Hinduism,’ Gandhi stated, ‘must not be confounded with hatred of Mussalmans or Islam. He was sincerely 
desirous of promoting and achieving Hindu-Muslim unity.’43 After Lajpat Rai’s death in 1928, he was involved in 
collections for the proposed Lajpat Rai Memorial. Gandhi had worked closely with Madan Mohan Malaviya, too, 
whom he called his ‘elder brother’, praising him as ‘a great leader of India and a patriarch of Hinduism’.44 
Malaviya threw his support behind Gandhi, despite his opposition to the Non-cooperation movement in India in 
1919. Gandhi stated that ‘hatred’ was alien to Malaviya. ‘He and I are temperamentally different, but love each 
other like brothers.’45 Speaking on a resolution passed by the Congress to stop cow-slaughter and music before 
mosques by mutual consent in 1927, Gandhi declared that ‘if there be one Hindu who can guarantee such 
protection on behalf of the Hindus, it is Malaviyaji’. ‘My Mussalman friends have always belittled my faith in his 
[Malaviya’s] bona fides and nationalism as against communalism. I have never been able to suspect either even 
where I have not been able to share his views on Hindu-Muslim questions.’46 A moderate within the Hindu 
Mahasabha, Malaviya had remained Gandhi’s trusted ally for his entire life, even though his unyielding anti- 
Muslim hostility was blamed in part for the failure of the Congress’s initiative on a settlement of Muslim 
safeguards. Nonetheless, Gandhi’s association was volatile, often bordering on hostility, with the Hindu 
Mahasabha’s hardliners -- chiefly V.D. Savarkar, B.S. Moonje, Bhai Parmanand, and N.C. Kelkar -- who had 
eternal disagreement and conflict with him over various issues in India.
II. 1. Gandhi and Savarkar Conflict
Of all the Hindu Mahasabha leaders, Gandhi had the most hostile and traumatic relationship with V.D. 
Savarkar. A Barrister-at-Law in 1888-1891 of the prestigious Inner Temple [London] himself, Gandhi met 
Savarkar, 22, a student of law at Gray’s Inn, London, first on Sunday, 21 October 1906. He had long 
discussions on the efficacy of revolutionary methods with him, Shyamji Krishnavarma [1857-1930],47 the 
founder of India House, and other radical students of India House, north London. Shyamji Krishnavarma, the
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founder of the Indian Home Rule Society [London], J.C. Mukerji, who wrote a weekly London letter for Gandhi’s 
Indian Opinion, and Savarkar were prominent men of India House at the time. Gandhi was leading a South 
African Indian deputation in 1906 to London and seemed to be a liberal imperialist: he believed that Indians 
should have increasing participation in government, and that England and India were to stay joined in the 
Empire which had an ‘admirable effect of English civilization on India’. London, ‘the centre of the power1 and 'the 
capital of the greatest empire’, he mused, was 'transforming India’.48 Savarkar, on the contrary, believed in 
revolutionary nationalism based on the legitimacy of armed and violent insurrection and militarism as part of the 
struggle to end British rule in India. The India House radicals led by Shyamji Krishnavarma -  a Tilakite, a 
barrister, a former Reader in Indian languages at Oxford and the editor of The Indian Sociologist -- fervently 
believed that India was to attain freedom from Britain only through violence, including terrorism and 
assassination. Gandhi labelled the India House radicals as the 'modems’ and ‘extremists’, but admitted that 
they were ‘earnest spirits possessing a high degree of morality, great intellectual ability and lofty self- 
sacrifices’.49 Evidently, there was a conflict in the worldview and ideology of Gandhi and Savarkar over the 
methods and means of attaining independence for India.
During his second visit to England in 1909, Gandhi and Savarkar had a closer ideological confrontation, even 
though no evidence exists on the details of the meeting. Gandhi ‘accepted unhesitatingly1, as he put it in a letter 
to Henry Polak, a request to speak as the chief guest at a subscription dinner at India House on the 
Vijayadashami day -- Dasara.50 On 24 October 1909, he presided over a Dasara Sammelan attended by 125 
students celebrating the ‘First War of Independence’ at India House, where Savarkar spoke. The Ramayana 
was the theme of the celebrations. Savarkar stated: 'Hindus are the heart of Hindustan ... Nevertheless, just as 
the beauty of the rainbow is not impaired but enhanced by its varied hues, so also Hindustan will appear all the 
more beautiful across the sky of the future by assimilating all that is best in the Muslim, Parsi, Jewish and other 
civilizations.’51 Lord Rama, he stressed, had established his ideal kingdom only after slaying Ravan, the symbol 
of ‘oppression and injustice’, and non-violence would be ineffectual without physical force. He put emphasis on 
the fierce goddess Durga, the avenger in whose honour Navratri -- the nine-day fast which preceded Vijaya 
Dashami -- was observed. Reporting the Vijayadashami meeting in his Indian Opinion of 27 November 1909, 
Gandhi referred to Savarkar as a ‘revolutionary1, noting that he had ‘delivered a spirited speech on the great 
excellence of the Ramayana'.52 However, he expressed an alarm that most Indians he had met in London
47 Shyamji Krishnavarma was born at Mandavi in Kutch district of Gujarat in 1857. He did his BA at Cambridge and became the 
first Indian to recieve an MA degree degree at Oxford. He later served as Diwan to the Indian princely states of Ratlam, Udaipur, 
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believed in violence.53 He declared: ‘I have met practically no one who believes that India can ever become free 
without resort to violence.’ ‘I have endeavoured specially,’ he explained, ‘to come into contact with the so-called 
extremists who may be better described as the party of violence ... One of them came to me with a view to 
convince me that I was wrong in my methods and that nothing but the use of violence, covert or open or both, 
was likely to bring about redress ...,54 Gandhi argued that violence as well as the armed route to India’s 
independence advocated by Savarkar and the India House revolutionaries stood no chance of success against 
the apparatus of the British.55 Admittedly, Savarkar and the India House radicals rejected Gandhi’s methods of 
petition and passive resistance as ‘humiliating’, but admired his struggle in the Transvaal, South Africa, which 
was one example of Indians carrying on ‘a sustained campaign’ against British rule.56
The conflict between Gandhi and Savarkar, particularly over the means to achieve India’s independence, 
had continued for the whole of their lives. Gandhi presented ahimsa [non-violence] as his answer to violence 
and projected it as a defining principle, arguing that it was through its adoption that India would be liberated.57 
He argued in Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule -  written in Gujarati on his voyage from London to South Africa 
in 1909 and published in 1910 -- that India would never gain true swaraj [freedom] by violent means. ‘Do you 
not tremble,’ he argued, ‘to think of freeing India by assassination? ... Whom do you suppose to free by 
assassination? The millions of India do not desire it ,..’58 The force of arms is powerless’, he wrote, ‘when 
matched against the force of love or the soul’. ‘Truth-force’, or ‘soul-force’ [satyagraha] was not only ‘a method 
of securing rights by personal suffering’ but also a ‘speciality of India’.59 The doctrine of satyagraha, which had 
grown from ‘passive resistance’ as a movement of political protest, meant a ‘non-violent non-cooperation’ 
employed to convince an adversay of the truth in consonance with the ‘highest law of being’ of one’s cause.60 
Gandhi viewed ahimsa -  located in Buddhism, Jainism and the Hindu tradition -- as the ‘essence of Hinduism’. 
His own commitment to ahimsa, he insisted, would remain unaffected even ‘if I suddenly discovered that the 
religious books ... bore a different interpretation’.61 The most distinctive and largest contribution, he explained, 
of ‘Hinduism to India’s culture is the doctrine of ahimsa. It has given a definite basis to the history of the country 
for the last three thousand years and over ...’62 In Gandhi’s vision of a political development, ahimsa and
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satyagraha were situated as ‘pathways to a moral regeneration’ of the Indian nation -- or ‘atmashuddhi’ 
[purification of the soul] of the nation.63
Savarkar, a votary of revolutionary nationalism, denounced Gandhi and his doctrine of ahimsa, however.64 
He was influenced in part by Herbert Spencer, a philosopher and a naturalist, whose theory was that ‘absolute 
non-resistance or absolute non-violence hurts both altruism and egoism’.65 Savarkar viewed Gandhi as a 
significant, if ‘misguided’, adversary in the struggle for India’s freedom -- in which the doctrine of non-violence 
was a ‘weak-kneed response’.66 His antagonism to non-violence was based on his view, unchanged since his 
early days, that ‘resistance to aggression in all possible and practicable ways is not only Justifiable but 
imperative’. Absolute non-violence in the face of the state’s aggression was ‘immoral’.67 ‘No masses can ever 
stand against the organized military strength of a government for a long time.’68 Savarkar argued that ‘the belief 
in absolute non-violence condemning all armed resistance even to aggression evinces no mahatmaic 
saintliness but a monomaniacal senselessness’.69 He declared: ‘We denounce the doctrine of absolute non­
violence ... Relative non-violence is our creed and therefore, we worship the arms as the symbols of the Shakti, 
the Kali... ‘‘Hail to Thee Sword” .’70 There could be ‘no substitute for force to achieve complete freedom’, which 
could only be done by ‘physical force’.71 The abandonment of arms, Savarkar insisted, was inimical to all public 
good, risking the destruction of virtue and dharm [righteousness] at the hands of the wicked.72 Only power, 
authority and the strength of arms could bring about a genuine ahimsa in India.73 The teaching of Gandhi’s 
satygaraha creed, Savarkar explained, sought to ‘kill the very martial instinct of the Hindu race and had 
succeeded to an alarming extent in doing so ...’74 He deplored the ‘adverse results’ of Gandhi’s satyagraha in 
the Chauri Chaura and Jalliawala Bagh crises, claiming that the aim of satyagraha was to ‘pacify the killers, 
tyrants and aggressors'.75 On account of ahimsa, he continued, the ‘glorious struggle for national freedom’ 
which had lasted one thousand years was ‘shamelessly surrended in the 30 years of Gandhi’s leadership’, and 
the Hindus were forced to accept the ‘unchallenged domination of the aggressor [the Muslims and the British]
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over huge portions of our land’.76 A believer in assassination as a weapon of political action, Savarkar believed 
that ‘justifiable aggression’ defined individual or collective morality, and that the ethical premise of violence 
represented a dynamic hostility and aggression as the legitimate means of ending British rule in India.
Savarkar imagined of the tradition of violent nationalism as having its roots in the Gita. He rejected Gandhi’s 
reading of the Gita, which was the main source from which the latter drew his doctrine of ahimsa. The moral 
theory advocated by the Gita, Gandhi believed, ruled out violence.77 However, Savarkar moved more definitely 
towards militarism, arguing that the Gita taught himsa [violence] not ahimsa, and that military organisation was 
an ‘integral part of Hindu culture’.78 His ideology of armed revolution was influenced in part by Bal Gangadhar 
Tilak’s advocacy of karmayoga [path of action] and his apologia for violent political activism in India.79 Tilak had 
strongly opposed Gandhi’s doctrine of ahimsa, denouncing its syncretism. Savarkar shared Tilak’s rejection of 
non-violence and viewed military strength as a necessary attribute of India if the Hindus were to be welded into 
a ‘single, homogeneous nation’.80 Dhananjay Keer, a strong Savarkarite himself, writes that Savarkar’s narrative 
was a result of his ‘deep reflection and intense reaction’ to Gandhi’s non-violence and his vision of the nation, 
which had ‘surrendered to the antinational demands of the Muslim reactionaries’. It was ‘his righteous duty*, 
Savarkar believed, ‘to remove ruthlessly the web of Gandhism that had choked the political life of Hindustan’.81 
Evidently, it was under Savarkar’s leadership that the Hindu Mahasabha had expressed by far the most explicit 
and virulent critique of Gandhi’s ahimsa in India.
Gandhi was diametrically opposite to Savarkar over the shape of the nation that was to emerge in India, 
representing a universal vision of nationalism. He refused to accept Hinduism as a singular religious basis to 
India.82 ‘In reality,’ he argued, ‘there are as many religions as there are individuals ... In no part of the world are 
one nationality and one religion synonymous terms ... nor has it been so in India.’83 In his vision, Hinduism was 
not a religion but represented a cultural system that had evolved over thousands of years, assimilating new 
influences throughout its history. Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism had all emerged from within Hindu traditions 
and their followers were part of the same broad cultural form.84 But, argued Gandhi, this was no less true of the 
Muslims and the Christians.85 Islam may have originated in Arabia, but those who converted to Islam were of 
the same cultural, ethnic and racial stock as the Hindus.86 ‘Indian culture is therefore Indian. It is neither Hindu,
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Islamic nor any other, wholly. It is a fusion of all.’87 Thus Gandhi’s prayer meetings were not held in temples, but 
under the open sky by including recitations from the Hindu, Muslim, Christian and Buddhist scriptures. India was 
the homeland of all bom and bred in it, no matter what religion they professed.88 In Gandhi’s belief, religion was 
not a basis for Indian nationality, and India was a multi-religious society based on the coexistence of different 
creeds and faiths, representing unity in diversity.89
Gandhi spoke of absorbing the Muslims, the Christians, and others into one ‘indivisible nation’, having 
common interests: such absorption or assimilation trancended the realities of religious identities, but did not 
subordinate the minorities to the Hindus.90 It moved in the direction of a spiritual unity, meaning 'a brotherhood 
or a confederation of communities’ -  a confederation dedicated to the ‘non-violent pursuit of truth’.91 Tolerance 
was a celebration of diversity -  of the richness of alternative ways of religious believing and existence -  
between diverse creeds and faiths in India.92 Differences between the Hindus and the Muslims, Gandhi argued, 
were a result of the divisive effects of colonial rule in India. Conflicts over cow protection and music before 
mosques could easily be settled with love and good will on both sides through the mode of mitrata [friendship] 
as well as negotiation.93 To Gandhi, Hindu-Muslim unity was a prerequisite for swaraj. ‘I have no doubt,’ he 
declared, ‘that one who is an enemy of the Muslims is also an enemy of India.’94 In the proper strengthening of 
Muslim bond lay ‘the realization of Swaraj’.95 In 1919-21 he presided over the All-India Khilafat Committee, an 
institution founded to defend the Khilafat of Turkey for the Muslims; and the Khilafat issue lay at the heart of a 
movement which was articulated by Gandhi as the first national satyagraha in India.96 India was not to be 
described as a ‘Hindu nation’ whether culturally or religiously.97 Gandhi wrote to the Hindu Mahasabha secretary 
in 1927 objecting to the use of the national flag on Hindu temples. ‘For the service of India,’ he wrote to 
Mahasabha president B.S. Moonje in 1928, ‘Mussalmans, Jews, Christians should be Indians, even as Hindus 
should be Indians.’98 He rejected the militancy and anti-Muslim rhetoric of the Mahasabhaites as ‘vicious’.99 In 
his famous speech to the All-India Congress Committee on 8 August 1942, shortly before it passed the Quit 
India resolution, Gandhi declared: Those Hindus who like Dr. Moonje and Shri Savarkar believe in the doctrine 
of the sword may seek to keep the Mussalmams under Hindu domination. I do not represent that section. I
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represent the Congress.’100 After the resolution was passed, he recalled his ‘lifelong aspiration’ for Hindu- 
Muslim unity, stating that the Congress wanted independence not for itself or the Hindus alone but ‘for all the 
forty crores of the Indian people’.101 He explained that his understanding of democracy was not restricted to a 
majoritatarian rule, and that communal majorities were inevitably prone to become tyrannical, as there would be 
minorities left behind on the wrong side of the divide.102 In Gandhi’s vision, the value of religious pluralism was 
paramount, and Hinduism as a religious doctrine could not provide the basis for India’s national identity.103
Gandhi’s universalist definition of the Indian nation clashed with Savarkar’s cultural nationalism. Savarkar, 
defining the nation within Hindu markers, believed in the dominance of Hinduism as a political category and 
claimed that India was a ‘Hindu nation’. He defined swarajya as the political independence of the Hindus, 
insisting that the notion of territorial independence was woefully inadequate for India’s future. India once had 
territorial independence under Aurangzeb, but this had meant ‘death for the Hindus’. He declared: To the 
Hindus independence of Hindustan can only be worth having if that insures their Hindutva -  their religious, 
racial and cultural identity.’104 To us Hindus, Hindustan and India mean one and the same thing.’105 The 
Congress’s idea of the Indian nation was acceptable if it meant that there would be no special provisions for the 
minorities -  the Muslims. Savarkar asserted that the Hindus must be given their due share as a majority, and 
that the Muslims and the Christians would have to accept the cultural and political dominance of the Hindus in 
the country.106 He rejected Gandhi’s ideas of religious assimilation, which to him meant assimilation of Islam 
and Christianity to a single cultural community -  the Hindus. The Indian state was to be a ‘Hindu state’ in which 
all citizens viewed the nation as their ‘fatherland’ and ‘holyland’.107 Savarkar’s Hindutva advocating the creation 
of a ‘Hindu nation’ clashed with Gandhi’s ‘inclusive’ Indian nation; and the confrontation marked a wide rift 
between Indian nationalism and political Hinduism as competing ideologies in India during the 1920s and 1930s.
III. Opposition of Sangathanists
Gandhi’s differences with the Hindu Mahasabha as an organisation of the Hindus had remained 
irreconcilable throughout the 1920s and 1930s. He. shared the Mahasabha’s goal of organising and 
strengthening the Hindu community as a cultural entity, but differed on crucial issues -  untouchability and 
shuddhi. Gandhi’s denunciation of untouchability and appeal for caste reform had brought him closer to the 
Mahasabhaites in their drive for Hindu unity, but he was different in that he did not favour the communal 
arithmetic to boost the Hindu numbers in India. In his belief, the eradication of untouchability was integral to the
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objective of freedom, being directed towards the moral transformation of caste Hindus and their need for 
‘repetence’. ‘A rigidly orthodox Hindu [myself],’ he stated, ‘I believe that the Hindu Shastras have no place for 
untouchability of the type practised now... [and] the moment I am convinced that untouchability is an essential 
element of Hindu religion, I would immediately renounce my religion.’108 Caste distinctions had fossilised and 
led to the exploitation of the untouchables, Gandhi pointed out, appealing for a transformed ‘Hindu conscience’ 
in India. He insisted that all talents should be held in trust, and that all should be subject to the law of bread- 
labour and do their own scavenging.109 The untouchables must not be considered as falling ‘outside Hinduism’, 
but treated as ‘respectable members of Hindu society5 and assigned the varnas [castes] according to their 
vocations.110 Hinduism to Gandhi was to be made ‘tolerable and humanistic’ through a reform and negation of 
‘hierarchical oppression’ in Hindu society.111 However, the Mahasabha believed in a compact, closed Hindu 
society based on the vama hierarchy as part of its drive to construct a monolithic Hindu community in opposition 
to the Muslims. It did not advocate a reform of caste domination in India.
Gandhi’s chief criticism was on the Hindu Mahasabha’s shuddhi movement for the re-conversion of Muslims 
and Christians to the Hindu religion. He rejected the Mahasabha’s aim to link the goal of freedom to Hindu 
strength by maximising the numerical-political strength of the Hindus through shuddhi.m  He argued that 
proselytism was alien to the spirit of Hinduism and accused the Mahasabha of imitating the Christian concept of 
conversion in a way that was contrary to Hindu culture. The real shuddhi movement,’ he explained, ‘should 
consist in each one trying to arrive at perfection in his or her own faith.’113 It must be a conversion of heart within 
one's tradition [atma parivartan], not a conversion across religious traditions [dharmantar]. In response to the 
Mahasabha’s appeal for a memorial for Swami Shraddhananda, Gandhi insisted: ‘For my part I still remain 
unconvinced about the necessity of the shuddhi movement... And I question its use in this age of growing 
toleration and enlightenment ...’114The work of shuddhi and conversions would result in 'a great communal 
division’, he argued.115 The Mahasabhaites, however, denounced Gandhi’s views on conversions as 
‘misconceived’, asserting that he was wrong to believe that shuddhi formed no part of Hindism. To them, the 
representation of the Indian nation using ‘Hindu culture’ could be enforced through religious conversions, and
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shuddhi was a prerequisite for freedom in India.116 N.C. Kelkar reiterated that the Hindus ‘have no claim to get 
swaraj so long as they do not obtain all their rights ... and fulfil the object of shuddhi and sangathan'.m  In the 
Mahasabha’s narrative, the ideal of national unity based on the construction of a Hindu religious unity through 
shuddhi was a prerequisite for nation-building in India.
111.1. Ahimsa and Hindu-Muslim Unity
Hindu sangathanists rejected the Gandhian principles of ahimsa and Hindu-Muslim unity to be the basis of 
India’s struggle for freedom in the 1920s and 1930s. Sangathan represented the Hindu nationalist and politically 
violent ideology of a distinct Tilakite variety that differed strikingly from the Gandhian tradition of ahimsa.m  It 
deemed the doctrine of ahimsa as antithetical to the national interests of the Hindus who needed to arm 
themselves in order to fight against ‘foreign enemies’ -  both the British and the Muslims -  in India. ‘Non­
violence,’ it was claimed, ‘is the highest religion. This teaching is, however, unknown in the Vedas, the 
philosophies, the Upanishads and all other books anterior to the Mahabharata ... To refrain from punishing 
malignant enemies and allow tyrants to do whatever they like is, however, tantamount to committing serious 
violence. The Vedas permit us to kill our enemies, both human beings and animals.’119 And ‘between a policy of 
appeasement or abject surrender, or a policy of resistance even to the extent of last ditch and last drop of blood, 
they [Hindus] preferred the latter’.120 Sangathanists believed that ‘the sermon of ahimsa has emasculated the 
Hindu nation. We have to follow the teachings of Lord Krishna.’121 ‘As a result of following non-violence, it was 
asserted, ‘Hindus have become so forbearing and non-violent that they remain passive even at the sight of their 
women being assaulted, houses being looted and burnt ..,’122 Ahimsa was believed to have spelled India’s 
‘humiliation’, being an impediment in the fulfilment of ‘a martial, forward-thrusting, unforgiving and aggressive 
Hindu nation’.123 Sangathanists rejected any sanction for ahimsa in the Hindu tradition and attacked Gandhi for 
meeting Muslim ‘aggression’ with non-violence, urging the Hindus to take up arms in defence of their religion 
and culture.124
Sangathan asserted the primacy of Kshatriya values in opposition to ahimsa in a drive to reinvent India’s 
‘golden age’: only through strength and military force would freedom come in the country.125 India’s ‘real 
tradition’ was that of the ‘Kshatriyas’, it was stated, and the doctrine of non-violence would ‘destroy the
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nation’.126 B.S. Moonje attacked Gandhi’s ahimsa as a form of ‘renunciation and cowardice’, insisting that a 
martial ethos not ahimsa should be introduced among the Hindus in India.127 Speaking on the occasion of Til 
Sankranti’ celebrations in Nagpur on 1 January 1933, Moonje favoured ‘offence’ rather than ‘defence’ and 
advocated a policy of ‘strike first’. The readiness of the Hindu community had to be demonstrated in ‘self- 
defence’ so that the Hindus were not taken unawares as happened in the Multan and Saharanpur riots.128 ‘In 
our religion violence in the defence of one’s rights is not condemned,’ he claimed, urging an end to ‘the un- 
Vedic principle of ahimsa\ 129 Moonje declared: ‘Hindu Mahasabha wants independence but does not believe 
that it can be achieved through non-violence. It therefore wants to organise violence on the most up-to-date 
western scientific lines ... ‘13° Lajpat Rai rejected ahimsa, claiming that this doctrine was ‘a gangrene that 
poisons the system’, and that it was ‘lawful to resort to violence in defence of one's own self, family and 
nation’.131 Bhai Parmanand argued that the theory of non-violence preached by Gandhi and accepted by the 
Congress was against the ‘culture, tradition and history of the Hindus’ in India.132 N.C. Kelkar -- who had 
promoted an anti-Gandhi propaganda through the Kesari and the Mahratta, Tilak’s newspapers of which he was 
editor at different times -- stated that non-violence and satyagraha would prove ‘to be useless in the longer run’ 
in India. ‘When 1921 drew to a close Gandhi’s promise to the nation of sawaraj [through ahimsa] within a year 
[had] remained unfulfilled.’133 Sangathanists argued that the experiment in nation-building was almost ‘undone 
by ahimsa’, which was in conflict with the interests of the ‘masculine Hindus’ whose vitality it sapped in India. 
The Hindus should be able to ‘defend themselves in times of stress’, and the image of a non-violent and 
unworldly Hindu promoted by Gandhi was a ‘myth’.134 The Hindu Outlook, the Hindu Mahasabha’s mouthpiece, 
praised the military brutality of Franco, Mussolini and Hitler -  all European dictators -  throughout the 1930s.135 
In ideology, sangathan favoured a self-reliant and militant Hindu community of Kshatriya virtues, expressing 
contempt for the image of a non-violent, tolerant and peaceful Hindu as preached by Gandhi.
The sangathanist ethic of violence and militarism was one core element that had dominated the speech of 
Nathuram Vinayak Godse in Gandhi’s murder trial in the Red Fort, echoing a strong repudiation of ahimsa. 
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assassinated Gandhi at 5pm on Friday, 30 January 1948. In his trial speech, Gadse claimed that Gandhi’s non­
violence consisted in enduring ‘the blows of the aggressor [Muslims] without showing any resistance either by 
weapon or by physical force’, and that it had led ‘the nation towards ruin’.136 ‘I firmly believed,’ Godse stated, 
‘that the teaching of absolute Ahimsa, as advocated by Gandhiji, would ultimately result in the emasculation of 
the Hindu community and thus make the community incapable of resisting the aggression or inroads of other 
communities, especially the Muslims.’137 India needed to become a ‘modem nation’, 'practical, able to retaliate, 
and powerful with armed forces’. The Hindus would have to redeem their ‘masculinity1 by fighting and defeating 
the Muslims and the British. Godse looked to Savarkar not Gandhi as the true leader of the Hindus in India: 
Savarkar was his guru and principal inspiration, someone who bore a touch of divinity. ‘Millions of Hindu 
Sangathanists,’ he declared, ‘looked up to him [Savarkar] as the chosen hero, as the ablest and most faithful 
advocate of the Hindu cause. I too was one of them.’138 All the sangathanists charged in Gandhi’s assassination 
case -  Narayan Apte, Vishnu Karkareh, Madanlal Pahwa, Gopal Godse, and Dr Dattatray Parchure -- were 
committed Hindu Mahasabhaites deeply loyal to Savarkar as their leader in the country. Godse’s Hindu Rashtra 
Dal was a semi-volunteer organisation that had aimed to propagate ‘unalloyed Savarkarism’ in hostility to 
a/7/msa; 1 3 9 and his Marathi-language newspaper Agrani -  later relaunched as the Hindu Rashtra -  was violently 
anti-Gandhian, articulating the Savarkarite belief that Gandhism was ‘emasculating’ the Hindus through ahimsa 
in the country.140 Gandhi posed a threat to sangathanists and their new political culture of violent Hindu 
nationalism based on militarism through his rejection of violence and his consistent emphasis on pacifism.141 In 
sagathanist worldview, ahimsa as a doctrine with a claim to tolerance through its ability to coexist with rival 
religions like Islam and Christianity discredited Gandhi’s claim to represent the Hindus in India.
In sangathanlst narrative, Gandhi’s principle of Hindu-Muslim unity was considered the single greatest 
obstacle in building a strong and militaristic Indian nation. It viewed the prospects for swara] as inconsistent with 
the goal of Hindu-Muslim unity, stressing the need to exclude the Muslims from India’s freedom struggle. 
Sangathan's claim to unify and protect the Hindu community from the ‘threat’ of the Muslims was drawn in part 
from Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s nationalist ideology based on the defence of the Hindu religion in India. In Tilak’s 
vision, India was the land of the Aryans whose religion was Hinduism, and India by right belonged to the Hindus. 
Tilak closed the space between ‘Indian’ and ‘Hindu’, as Hindu dharm became the historical, philosophical and
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social basis for Indian nationality.142 His aligment of India with Hindu through a re-reading of ancient history 
served as the foundation for sangathanists -- to whom India was essentially a 'Hindu nation’ 'betrayed and 
oppressed’ by the Muslims across the centuries.
Gandhi’s doctrine of Hindu-Muslim unity as a prerequisite for India’s freedom came under a fierce attack 
from sangathanists. V.D. Savarkar blamed Gandhi for ‘selling India to the Muslims’ and attacked his idea of 
Hindu-Muslim unity as a 'pipe dream’.143 M.R. Jayakar asserted that Gandhi had 'aimed at a most artificial and 
unreal unity between Hindus and Muslims’ and in so doing had awakened ‘sentiments and impulses in the latter 
community which like Frankenstein, it is now very difficult to allay’.144 M.S. Golwalkar argued: Those who have 
declared “No Swaraj without Hindu-Muslim Unity” have thus perpetrated the greatest treason on our society. 
They have committed the most heinous sin of killing the life-spirit of a great and ancient people.’ If the Hindus 
united, they were ‘strong enough to do it [win freedom] alone’.145 B.S. Moonje believed that Gandhi’s life-long 
mission of achieving Hindu-Muslim unity was thoroughly impracticable, appealing to Gandhi to give up his ‘pro- 
Muslim’ mentality. The ‘appeasement’ policy of the Congress was the ‘breeding source of misunderstanding and 
quarrel between the Hindus and the Congress and those in the Hindu Mahasabha’. Indeed, the Congress’s 
‘favouritism’ towards the Muslims had resulted from an ‘unnecessary attachment to the charkha and non­
violence’. Moonje explained: ‘Congress believes that Swaraj can’t be achieved without the cooperation of the 
Muslims. We believe that when time will come, we can win Swaraj even in spite of the Muslim opposition.’146 
Gandhi was accused of showing ‘partiality’ towards the Muslims by not discouraging the revival of the Muslim 
League and the existence of the Khilafat committees in the country in the 1920s and 1930s.147 He was seen as 
a ‘pro-Muslim zealot’ responsible for instigating Muslim ‘obscurantism and bigotry1 -- a ‘Hindu-hater*, a 'Muslim 
loveri, and an ‘enemy’.148 In sangathanist thinking, Gandhi’s goal of Hindu-Muslim unity and the Congress’s 
‘pandering to the Muslims’ had destroyed the opportunity for building an Indian nation with the values of 
uncompromising Hinduism. The consolidation of the Hindu community was viewed as the true means of 
achieving swaraj in India; and the nation could be served by first looking into practical ways of strengthening the 
Hindu community, not Hindu-Muslim unity.149 The main objective of sangathan was to organise and strengthen 
the Hindus, ‘first to overcome Mohammedans and finally to oust the British’ from India.150
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Conclusion
Gandhi accepted Hinduism as his religion on the basis of its tolerance and peace, linking it to satyagraha 
and non-violence. Ahimsa to him was integral to Hinduism and the Indian soil, rejecting the insurrectionary 
methods of political opposition in the country.151 He was in an ideological conflict with the Hindu Mahasabha 
and its sangathan ideology. The doctrine of ahimsa was a direct challenge to the Hindu Mahasabha’s 
revolutionary nationalism and violence, which had constituted a greater part of its drive for India's 
independence.152 V.D. Savarkar believed that India could never become free without resort to violence, and that 
ahimsa deprived India of all its ‘masculinity and strength’. Gandhi and Savarkar were in a conflict over the 
shape of the nation that would emerge in India after freedom from British rule. Gandhi did not accept the Hindu 
religion as the basis of Indian nationality; and India to him was a multi-relgious nation. His vision of India was 
not a 'Hindu nation’ but a secular state that included all the diverse races and creeds -  the Hindus and the 
Muslims -  existing on an equal basis.153 Savarkar, on the contrary, envisioned a Hindu rashtra [nation] in which 
the interests of other communities, particularly the Muslims, were subordinate to the Hindus. The dialogue and 
hostility between Gandhi and Savarkar over the efficacy of revolutionary methods in the struggle for India’s 
independence and the nature of the future Indian nation had continued for the greater part of their lives. 
Gandhi’s core belief was that ahimsa and Hindu-Muslim unity were essential to secure independence for 
India.154 Sangathan ideology was explicitly hostile to these twin Gandhian doctrines that had coalesced as 
strategies in the Non-cooperation and Civil Disobedience movements against British rule in the 1920 and 1930s. 
Gandhi’s conflict with Hindu sangathanlsis had remained fundamental and irreconcilable; and his universalist 
and reformist Hinduism as well as his ‘inclusive’ Indian nation did not leave much room for them to manouvre in 
politics in India, leading to his assassination in 1948.
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9Nagari and Cow -- the Symbols of a ‘Hindu Nation’
Nagari and the cow constituted the basis for the articulation of a self-aware modern ‘Hindu’ identity and 
consciousness as the cultural symbols of India in the early twentieth century. The Hindu Mahasabha adopted 
and assimilated the Nagari and cow protection movements, which had emerged in the 1860-1870s with the 
active role of Hindu publicists and organisations, in its sangathan discourse for the consolidation of the Hindu 
community in north India. Its campaign to establish Hindi as the national language of India was one significant 
element of its ideology that aimed to assert a distinct ‘Hindu’ identity, redefining Nagari as the symbol of a 
‘Hindu nation’ in conflict with Urdu and Muslims.1 Also the Mahasabha imagined of a ‘Hindu nation’ through the 
metaphor of the cow as a ‘sacred symbol’.2 Cow protection became an important issue in the sangathan 
programme, demonstrating the cow’s affiliation to the harmony of Indian culture and tradition as well as the 
rationale for the assertion of a ‘Hindu’ identity in an explicit antagonism against the Muslims.3 This chapter aims 
to explore the historical context and process in which the issues of Nagari and cow protection were integrated 
into sangathan ideology as the central symbols of a ‘Hindu nation’ and became integral to the unity and 
consolidation of the Hindus in north India in the 1920s and 1930s.
I. Hindu Campaign for Nagari
The United Provinces, the core of the ‘Hindi heartland’ in north India, was an area previously under the rule 
of the Mughals and the successor states to which Persian had been the court language for more than two 
centuries from 1526 to 1761. Since the annexation of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh [NWP&O] in 1805, 
the British had retained Persian-Urdu as the ‘official vernacular* in north India. Urdu had the pre-eminence as 
the language of colonial administration and education, carrying an identity linked to the Muslim past in the UP. 
Persian-Urdu became as much a part of Muslim identity and cultural heritage as Islam itself.4 In 1837 India’s 
Governor-General in Council introduced Hindustani in the Perso-Arabic script, which primarily meant Urdu, 
replacing Persian as the language of the courts and administration in the UP.5 However, the conflict began in 
the late 1860s in the eastern cities of Banaras and Allahabad, the core of the ‘Aryavarta’ [the land of classical 
Aryan life], which had seen the ‘gathering momentum of opinion’ in favour of Nagari -  a sentiment viewed by the 
colonial officials as the expression of ‘a patriotic feeling on the part of the Hindoos’ against Urdu.6 Banaras was
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connected for two and a half millennia with a tradition of Hindu pilgrimage, cremation and worship in north India. 
A centre of Brahmanic learning, the city’s Hindu culture had proliferated due to the support of the Hindu 
maharaja and the newly emerging Hindu middle classes of the region.7 And Allahabad became the seat of the 
UP provincial government in 1858, with the High Court moving from Agra to Allahabad in 1868. The raison 
d’etre of the campaign for Hindi in the Banaras-Allahabad region was the dissatisfaction with the colonial 
education policy based on Urdu, which evoked a specific view of history -  a view of Hindu society’s ‘moral 
decline’ under foreign influence.8
Nagari proponents attributed Urdu’s popularity in the UP wholly to government patronage, accusing the 
British of insidiously trying to ‘smother and stifle’ Hindi by imposing a language [Persian] that was ‘almost as 
foreign to the people as English’.9 Raja Shivaprasad Singh [1823-1895], an influential official, compiler of 
textbooks and a prominent advocate of Nagari, argued that the official encouragement given to the study of 
Urdu and Persian in the province was ‘crippling the study of Hindi and the development of primary education’, 
and that Hindi had been the ‘language of the country’ before the Muslim invasions of India.10 In a memorandum 
submitted to the government in 1868, he attacked the British language policy as one which ‘thrusts a Semitic 
element into the bosoms of Hindus and alienates them from their Aryan speech ... and which is now trying to 
turn all the Hindus into semi-Muhammadans and destroy our Hindu nationality1.11 It was true that Nagari was in 
wider usage than Urdu in the general population as revealed by the correspondence from 1796 to 1820 
between the officials of the East India Company and diverse writers spread across north India.
Bharatendu Harishchandra [1850-1885], a leading literary figure of Banaras, strongly criticised the British 
patronage of Urdu, reiterating the autonomous, pre-Muslim existence of the Hindi language in north India. He 
called on the ‘Arya brotherhood’ to unite in the cause of Hindi and propagate it for official use in the courts and 
administration of the UP.12 In his evidence to the 1882 Education Commission headed by Sir William Hunter,13 
Harishchandra attacked Urdu as ‘the language of dancing girls and prostitutes’.14 He contested Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan’s assertion that ‘Urdu is the language of the gentry and Hindi that of the vulgar*. The statement is not only 
incorrect but unjust to the Hindus.’15 The Hunter commission declined to deal with the language controversy,
7 Diana L. Eck, Banaras: City of Light, London, 1983, pp. 4-5; A.L. Basham, The Wonder that was India: A Survey of the History 
and Culture of the Indian Sub-Continent Before the Coming of the Muslims, London, 1967, pp. 165, 200.
8 Christopher R. King, One Language, Two Scripts: The Hindu Movement in Nineteenth Century North India, Bombay, 1994, pp. 
50-3; Amrit Rai, A House Divided: The Origin and Development of Hindi-Urdu, Delhi, 1984, pp. 91-2.
9 Harish Chandra’s Magazine, Anglo-Hindi monthly, Benares, November 1874. IOR: L/R/5/51,1874, pp. 72-3, IOL.
10 Shivaprasad, Memorandum: Court Characters in the Upper Provinces of India, Benares, 1868, p. 4.
11 Shivaprasad, Memorandum, pp. 5-6.
12 Vasudha Dalmia, The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions: Bharatendu Harishchandra and Ninettenth-century Banaras, Delhi, 
1999 [1997], pp. 192-3, 205.
13 The supporters of Hindi submitted to the Hunter commission 118 memorials from the cities and towns of the North Western 
Provinces, signed by some 67,000 persons, in 1882. Brass, Language, Religion, p. 130.
14 Cited in Sudhir Chandra, ‘Communal Consciousness in Late 19th Century Hindi Literature’, in Mushirul Hasan [ed.], Communal 
and Pan-1 slamic Trends in Colonial India, Delhi, 1981, pp. 180-195.
15 Cited Dalmia, Nationalization, p. 208.
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however.16 The nationalist writers and publicists in effect claimed Hindi’s status as the ancient heritage of the 
Hindus and appealed to the government to adopt Nagari for use in the courts and administration of the UP.
The turmoil over colonial education was linked to the neglect and inadequacy of teaching in Hindi, justifying 
the movement for the propagation of Nagari in the UP. Urdu, a prerequisite for government jobs, had displaced 
Hindi as the core language in the schools of the province.17 Between 1860-1 and 1872-3, the proportion of 
Urdu learners was far in excess of the proportion of the Muslims in the schools;18 and by 1872, no less than 
22,074 students had been learning Urdu, Persian, or Arabic, whereas only 4,959 students opted for Hindi or 
Sanskrit. By 1874, the number of Urdu and Persian learners had multiplied by more than four times to 48,229, 
whereas the number of Hindi learners increased by a third to 8,820.19ln 1884 the residents of Kanpur sent a 
petition to UP Lieutenant-Governor Alfred Lyall, which was backed by Pratap Narain Mishra [1856-95] -- a close 
associate of Harishchandra and editor of the Hindi journal Brahman. The petition pointed to the promise made 
in Wood’s Educational Despatch of 1854 that the people of India would receive education in their own language, 
insisting that this was precisely what had not happened in north India.20 The official encouragement given to the 
study of Urdu and Persian, ‘the language of Muslim rule’, continued to spread intense discontent and agitation 
among Nagari activists in the UP.
The Nagari-Urdu conflict represented a competition between the old service elites and the new groups for 
jobs and status in the United Provinces. Urdu had ensured the monopoly of the Muslim service gentry and a few 
Hindu Kayastha and Brahman elites on employment in the colonial services, placing many educated Hindus at 
a serious disadvantage. A shift to Hindi as the official language would, it was argued, greatly benefit Hindu 
aspirants [educated in Hindi-Sanskrit] in government employment.21 The education of Hindu women would also 
receive a ‘major stimulus’ if the educational system included instruction in Nagari, it was stated. Women’s 
education in Nagari was not intended for employment, but envisaged as an instrument of self-improvement 
partly due to Hindi’s association with ‘religion and devotional texts’.22 The ‘mother-tongue’ of the Hindus, it was 
stressed, could only be the language ‘spoken and understood’ by their women in Indian society.23 The British 
patronage of Urdu had remained a strong reminder to the Hindu literate upper castes of their subservient 
position vis-a-vis the Muslim aristocracy in matters of the colonial administration in the UP.
16 Education Commission Report by the North-Wester! Provinces and Oudh Provincial Committee: with Evidence Taken before 
the Committee, and Memorials Addressed to the Education Commission, Calcutta, 1884, pp. 390-1.
17 Report by M. Kempson, director of public instruction, NWP, 12 February 1870. IOR: V/23/129, pp. 234-7, IOL.
18 M.M. Malaviya, Court Character and Primary Education in the North-West Provinces and Oudh, Allahabad, 1897, pp. 20,28.
19 Malaviya, Court Character, p. 28.
20 Education Commission Report, pp. 379-81.
21 The Vaishya Conference [est. 1891] and the Kayastha Conference [est. 1887] passed resolutions in favour of Nagari in 1889 
and submitted a memorandum to this effect to NWP&O Governor Anthony MacDonnell.
22 Evidence of Miss M. Rose Greenfield, Ludhiana, to the Hunter Commission, 1882. Ghulam Husain Zulfiqar [ed.], Select 
Documents on National Language, Vol. I, Islamabad, 1985, pp. 20-2.
23 Krishna Kumar, ‘Quest for Self-identity: Cultural Consciousness and Education in Hindi Region, 1880-1950’, Economic and 
Political Weekly, Vol. 25, No. 23,9 June 1990, p. 1247-55; Madhu Kishwar, ‘Arya Samaj and Women’s Education: Kanya 
Mahavidyalaya, Jalandhar’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 21, No. 17,26 April 1986, WS-9-p. 24.
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The Hindi-Urdu divide reflected a struggle for cultural self-assertion with several symbolic undertones in the 
UP.24 Nagari supporters dismissed Urdu as a spurious offspring of Hindi in Persian guise, which reminded one 
of the centuries of ‘enslavement by alien Muslim rulers’ in India.25 Babu Biseshwar Mittra, a pleader in the High 
Court of the NWP, told the Hunter commission in 1882 that the people regarded the recognition of Urdu as the 
court language ‘as a pure and simple survival of the old Moslem tyranny1 in India.26 The memorial presented to 
UP Lieutenant-Governor Sir William Muir in 1873 argued that the Persian script had a foreign origin and 
facilitated the use of ‘incomprehensible’ Arabic and Persian words, making court documents ‘illegible’ and 
encouraging ‘forgery and fraud’.27 The adoption of Nagari, it was asserted, would quicken the slow pace of the 
lower judiciary, where legal documents were ‘written one way and read in another1.28 Pandit Gauri Datta, who 
had founded the Devanagari Pracharini Sabha [Society for the Promotion of Devanagari] in 1882 and published 
the Devanagari Gazette, suggested that Urdu’s ‘immorality1 took several forms, its script leading to a great deal 
of ‘fraud’ in society and government.29 Urdu corrupted the Hindus, noted novelist Sohan Prasad, and led them 
astray from their own ‘religious and cultural heritage’ into a ‘dark era of Muslim misrule and tyranny1.30 Hindi, it 
was asserted, exercised a ‘beneficial and positive moral influence’ on the people, while Urdu enticed them to 
lead ‘dissolute and immoral lives’. The introduction of Hindi in administration and education would help the 
public read religious books and avoid ‘the immoral effects of so many Urdu love stories’.31 The common refrain 
was that the teaching of Persianised Urdu tended to ‘degenerate’ the Hindus; and that Hindi was in essence a 
personification of ‘Hindu culture and a pride’ in India’.32
One major Hindu reform movement that had led a campaign to develop Hindi as the medium of modem 
education in north India was the Arya Samaj. In the Arya Samaj’s programme of organising a reformed Hindu 
society, the development of a lingua franca of the Hindus -- or the Aryas -- took an important role. The fifth of 
the 28 basic rules of the Samaj established Hindi as its public language: ‘In the main centre there will be several 
books in Sanskrit and in Aryabhasha.’33 Dayananda Saraswati was a great scholar of Sanskrit, which he had 
used for his discourse until he met Keshub Chandra Sen, Brahmo Samaj leader, in Calcutta in 1872. Sen gave
24 Christopher R. King, ‘Forging a New Linguistic Identity: The Hindi Movement in Banaras, 1868-1914’, in Sandria B. Freitag, 
Culture and Power in Banaras: Community, Performance, and Environment 1800-1980, Berkeley, 1990, p. 179.
25 Education Commission Report, p. 400.
26 Education Commission Report, p. 400.
27 ‘Memorial Presented to Government in 1873 Praying for the Restoration of Nagri Characters in Courts and Public Offices’ to 
Sir William Muir, LL.D.K.C., S.I., Lieut.-Govemor, North-Western Provinces, in Malaviya, Court Character, Appendix, pp. 74-5.
23 Jagat Samachar, Meerut [Nagari], 19 April 1869. IOR: L/R/5/46, p. 198, IOL.
29 Pandit Gauri Datta, Nagari aur Urdu ka Svang [The Melodrama of Nagari and Urdu’], Meerut, N.d. p. 11, cited in Charu Gupta, 
‘Obscenity, Sexuality and the “Other”: Gender and Hindu Identity in Uttar Pradesh, 1880s-1930s’, PhD Dissertation, School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2000, p. 119.
30 Sohan Prasad, Hindi aur Urdu ki Larai, [‘A Quarrel between Hindi and Urdu’], Gorakhpur, 1886, cited in Christopher R. King, 
'Images of Virtue and Vice: The Hindi-Urdu Controversy in Two Nineteenth-century Hindi Plays’, in Kenneth W. Jones [ed.], 
Religious Controversy in British India: Dialogues in South Asian Languages, Albany, 1992, pp. 124-147.
31 The Hardoi Union Club’s memorial presented to the Hunter commission, 1882: Education Commission Report, p. 543.
32 The opinion of Rev. C.W. Forman, Lahore, to the Hunter Commission, 1882. Zulfiqar [ed.], Select Documents, Vol. 1, p. 18.
33 Cited in Francesca Orsini, The Hindi Public Sphere, 1920-1940: Language and Literature in the Age of Nationalism, New Delhi,
2002, p. 112.
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Dayananda the inspiration to use Hindi as a medium for the propagation of religious and social reform in India. 
Two years later, Dayananda gave his first lecture in Hindi in Banaras -  in which ‘hundreds of words, and even 
sentences still came out in Sanskrit’.34‘If you want freedom,’ Dayanand exhorted, 'you must have your 
language.’35 He translated the Vedas into Hindi -  an act termed by Hindu nationalists ‘the boldest act of his 
life’.36 Sangathamsts hailed Dayananda as the ‘first Hindu leader1 who had given a conscious and definite 
expression to the view that Hindi should be the national language of India and admired his Satyartha Prakash 
for its use of ‘simple and untainted Hindi’.37 The Arya Samaj was closely associated with the emerging Nagari 
movement in the late nineteenth century, seeking to transform Hindi from a spoken language into a ‘high 
vernacular of administration, education and public discourse' in north India.38 The Samaj’s influence proved 
extremely crucial in the sangathanist invocation of Hindi as the state language of India as well as its ideological 
denunciation of Islam and Urdu-Persian in the 1920s and 1930s.
The campaign for Hindi's prominence found institutional support in the Hindu Sabhas that had mushroomed 
in the towns of the UP by the late nineteenth century.39 The propaganda in support of Hindi figured as one of the 
aims of the Prayag Hindu Samaj [1880] and the Madhya Hindu Samaj [1884] of Allahabad -- in which Madan 
Mohan Malaviya had emerged as a champion of Nagari.40 Malaviya was the first professional ‘Hindi politician’ 
to use Hindi as the language of politics and journalism in the UP by promoting Nagari through the short-lived 
Hindi political daily Hindosthan, which was launched by Raja Rampal Singh of Kalakankar, Allahabad, in 1883. 
Hindi was one significant element of Malaviya’s politics that aimed to unite the Hindus through the Hindu 
Sabhas, cow-protection societies, and newspapers in the province.41 The provincial Hindu Sabhas urged the 
government to substitute the Nagari script for Persian in the courts and offices of the UP, as the introduction of 
Nagari would lead to ‘a simpler style closer to the language of the people’ and expedite communications at the 
all India level.42
In the aftermath of the UP government’s resolution passed by Lieutenant-Governor Sir Anthony MacDonnell 
in April 1900, Nagari was given equal status alongside Urdu in the courts and administration of the province.43 
In reality, however, little change had occurred in the dominance of Urdu in the official sphere. The complaints of 
discrimination against Hindi were galore at the time. Proceedings and orders continued to be written in
34 J.T.F. Jordens, Dayananda Sarasswati: His Life and Ideas, New Delhi, 1998 [1978], p.129.
35 V.D. Savarkar, Hindu Rashtra Darshan: A Collection of the Presidential Speeches Delivered from the Hindu Mahasabha 
Platform, Bombay, 1992 [1949], p. 108.
36 Orsini, Hindi Public Sphere, p. 227.
37 Savarkar, Hindu Rashtra Darshan, p. 108.
38 Home Poll. Deposit, April 1912, File No. 4, NAI; Kenneth W. Jones, Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness ini9th- Century 
Punjab, Berkeley, 1976, rept. New Delhi, 1989, pp. 90-3; idem, ‘Communalism in the Punjab: the Arya Samaj Contribution’, The 
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, November 1968, pp. 47-50.
39 Krishna Kumar, Political Agenda of Education: A Study of Colonialist and Nationalist Ideas, New Delhi, 1991, p. 12.
40 C.A. Bayly, The Local Roots of Indian Politics: Allahabad 1880-1920, Oxford, 1975, p. 105.
41 S. Chaturvedi, Madan Mohan Malaviya, New Delhi, 1988 [1972], pp. 1-3; Orsini, Hindi Public Sphere, p. 121.
42 Malaviya, Court Character, pp. 40-55. Malaviya founded the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan [Society for Hindi Literature] of
Allahabad in 1910 to actively lobby in favour of Hindi as official vernacular. Bayly, Local Roots, pp. 105-6.
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Persianised Urdu in the courts for the next four decades.44 The courts persisted in the practice of using Urdu 
characters where Hindi ought to have been used;45 and ‘secret efforts’ were allegedly made against the use of 
Hindi in the Allahabad High Court46 Babu Madan Mohan Seth, the munsif of Bisauli in Badaun district, was 
transferred to Etawah for recording the evidence of witnesses and allowing petitions in Hindi; and his transfer 
was challenged by the Nagari Pracharini Sabha in the High Court47 Gorakhpur deputy collector Saiyid lltija 
Husain had allegedly ‘declined’ to accept statements or applications written in Hindi, despite their being 
repeatedly submitted to him by Chandi Prasad, a vakil.48 Court summonses were published in the District 
Gazettes in ‘unintelligible Urdu’ in parts of the UP.49 The legislative proceedings were still conducted mostly in 
‘English or Persianised Urdu’ in many municipalities of the province.50 The draft rules of the municipalities were 
often published in Urdu;51 and the municipal boards had issued orders ‘prohibiting the use of Hindi’ in the 
reports of some municipal schools in the province.52 The unreasonable ‘prejudice’ shown against the use of 
Nagari was attacked as a violation of the ‘feelings of all lovers of Hindi’ across the UP.53
By the early 1900s, however, the Hindi movement had achieved its significant literary status due to an 
upsurge of pro-Hindi activity by the newly emerging Hindu middle class in the UP. The Hindi Sahitya Sammelan 
of Allahabad [1910] and the Nagri Pracharini Sabha of Banaras [1893] led the drive for the promotion of Nagari 
by launching a campaign to strengthen the work of missionaries and textbook writers in Hindi across the 
province.54 Newspapers and journals like the Chand, by far the most celebrated Hindi magazine in the UP, and 
the Abhyudaya became the means of literary and linguistic expression for the assertion of ‘Hindu’ identity in the 
province.55 The champions of Hindi included Shivanath Sharma,56 Rupnarayan Pandey, Dularelal Bhagava, 
Newal Kishore,57 Mahavir Prasad Dwivedi,58 novelist and journalist Ratan Nath Sarshar, and politician and 
editor Ganga Prasad Varma.59 They constituted a vocal and influential section of the Hindu middle class trying
43 NWP&O Gen. Admn. Deptt., October 1900, pp. 117-118, NAI.
44 The Report of the Nagari-Pracharini Sabha, Benares, from 1893-1902, Banaras, 1902, p. 14.
48 Abhyudaya, Allahabad, 9 November 1918, IOR L/R/5/94, File No. 46,1918, p. 71, IOL.
46 Arya Mitra [Agra, weekly, editor: Pandit Sarvanand, cir: 1,800 copies], 27 April 1916, IOR L/R/5/91, p. 360, IOL.
47 Abhyudaya [Alllahabad, weekly, editor: Krishna Kant Malaviya, 29], 15 January 1916: IOR L/R/5/91, p. 68, IOL.
48 Pratap, Kanpur, 9 December 1918, IOR L/R/5/94, File No. 50,1918, p. 721, IOL.
49 Veda Prakash, Meerut, April 1918, IOR L/R/5/94, File No. 22,1918, p. 361; Arya Mitra, Agra, 6 June 1918, IOR L/R/5/94, File 
No. 24,1918, p. 407, IOL.
50 Avadhbasi [Lucknow, weekly, editor -  Sheo Bihari Lai, 45; 2,000 copies], 4 April 1916, IOR L/R/5/91, p. 291, IOL.
51 Arya Mitra [Agra, weekly, Pandit Sarvanand, Brahman, 29,1,800 copies], IOR L/R/5/92,1916, p. 835, IOL.
52 Anand, Lucknow, 14 January 1918, IOR L/R/5/94, File No. 31,1918, p. 60, IOL.
53 Abhyudaya, Allahabad, 6 July 1918, IOR L/R/5/94, file No. 43,1918, p. 473, IOL.
54 Naresh Prasad Bhokta, ‘Marginalization of Popular Languages and Growth of Sectarian Education in Colonial India', in 
Sabyasachi Bhattacharya [ed.], The Contested Terrain: Perspectives on Education in India, New Delhi, 1998, pp. 201-17.
55 Nandi Bhatia, Twentieth Century Hindi Literature’, in Nalini Natarajan [ed.], Handbook of Twentieth Century Literature of India, 
Westport, 1996, p. 137; Sanjay Joshi, Fractured Modernity: Making of a Middle Class in Colonial North India, Delhi, 2001, p. 39.
56 Shivanath Sharma [b. 1895], publisher and editor of the Anand, was a crusader for the promotion of Hindi and the Devanagari 
script. Initially he had edited the Hindi journal Vasundhara, owned by Jwalaprasad Shama.
57 Newal Kishore was the publisher of the Oudh A kbar-the first daily vernacular newspaper of the UP.
58 M.P. Dwivedi was editor of the Saraswati, a Hindi magazine published from Allahabad, in the early 1900s.
59 Ganga Prasad Varma [b. 1863], a founding member of the Congress in the UP, edited and published the Advocate- an 
English-language bi-weekly paper in Lucknow, and followed it with the Hindustani in Urdu.
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to fashion a new collective ‘Hindu’ identity around Hindi in the UP. The Malaviya group based in Allahabad -  
Purshottam Das Tandon, Gauri Shankar Misra, and Shiva Prasad Gupta -  had been actively involved in the 
work of Hindi propaganda and journalism in the province.60 A vocal section of the Congress nationalists was at 
the centre of explosion in Hindi literary writing in this period. Sampurnanand, a champion of Hindi, emphasised 
that Urdu was ‘unacceptable’ and certainly ‘no t... suitable for adoption as a national language’ of India.61 The 
growing interest in Hindi was reflected in the increase in the number of Hindi periodicals -  which by the 1920s 
had exceeded those in other vernaculars across the UP.62 The new Hindu middle class began to speak of the 
mass aspirations in favour of Hindi, which was transformed into a symbol of a distinctive ‘Hindu’ identity in north 
India.
For Hindu leaders, educational enterprise had become a favourite sphere of mobilisation for Hindi in the UP. 
The foundation of the Banaras Hindu University [BHU] by M.M. Malaviya on 6 February 1916 as a modem 
institution with a religio-cultural agenda gave considerable strength to the self-image of the Hindi literati in entire 
north India. Gandhi attended the inauguration of the university, where he admitted in English that it was ‘a 
shame that I am compelled this evening under the shadow of this great college, in this sacred city, to address 
my countrymen in a language that is foreign’.63 English was introduced as the medium of instruction at the BHU, 
but the location of the only Hindu university of the country on the banks of the Ganges in the heart of Banaras 
had an obvious cultural significance for the growth of Hindi. The university produced the overwhelming majority 
of literary writers and critics of Hindi as well as trained teachers all over the Hindi region. The educational 
institutions like the Kashi Vidyapeeth and Allahabad University helped to promote interest in Hindi through the 
standardisation of syllabi and textbooks in the schools and colleges of the UP. A process of cultural 
homogenisation had occurred by the 1920s, inducing a new and broader sense of the ‘Hindu community’ and a 
movement for the popularisation of Hindi as the language of the nation. In view of the growing support for Hindi 
among intellectuals and its politicisation on the wave of the Congress struggle in the 1920s, a strong consensus 
had emerged in the ranks of the nationalist leaders, particularly Gandhi and Bal Gangadhar Tilak, that Hindi was 
‘the language of the people’ and the national language [rashtra bhasha] of India.64
1.1. Hindi -  India’s National Language
In the 1920s and 1930s, the Hindi movement reached its culmination in the 'Hindu unity* discourse of the 
Hindu Mahasabha -  which adopted Nagari as an integral part of sangathan ideology.65 The Punjab Hindu
60 P.D. Tandon, former editor of M.M. Malaviya’s Abhyudaya, was the founder and prime organiser of the Hindi Sahitya 
Sammelan and the Provincial Hindi Conference in the UP.
61 Sampumanand’s speech to the Kashi Nagri Pracharini Sabha in August 1938, cited in Orsini, Hindi Public Sphere, pp. 235-6.
62 William Gould, Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India, Cambridge, 2004, p. 60.
63 Gandhi’s speech at Banaras Hindu University, 6 February 1916: M.K. Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi 
[CWMG], 100 volumes, New Delhi, 1958-1994: Vol. 13, pp. 210-16.
64 Gandhi’s speech at Common Language Conference, Lucknow, 29 December 1916: Gandhi, CWMG, Vol. 13, p. 321.
65 Benedict Anderson explains that a print language creates the base for the emergence of national consciousness and the 
nation. B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London, 2006 [1983], p. 45.
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Sabha, at the Lahore Hindu conference convened by on 21-22 October 1909, had first passed a resolution to 
promote Hindi and Sanskrit, emphasising the need to re-write the history of the ‘Hindu period’ with a view to 
reinforcing the ‘cultural unity1 of the Hindus in India.66 Lai Chand, the founding Hindu Sabha leader, argued that 
Persian and Urdu were ‘alien to the genius’ of the Indian people. Thousands and tens of thousands of Hindus 
who ought to be familiar with the truths of the Upanishads and Bhagavat Gita3 were irretrievably committed to 
the knowledge of Urdu, he lamented, making an appeal for the development of 'Hindi and indigenous literature’ 
in the country.67 The later Hindu Mahasabha appropriated the concept of Hindi as the language of the Hindus, 
drawing its strength from the earlier history of the Hindi movement and the increasing interest shown in Nagari 
by Hindu organisations in north India. Nagari became a crucial issue in its discourse of the ‘progress and 
reform’ of the Hindu community in the country. Swami Shraddhananda urged the introduction of a uniform 
Devanagari script and Hiridi as a ‘vital necessity1 in India, emphasising that Nagari was part of the sangathan 
programme on the ‘progress and reform’ of the country.68 Lajpat Rai was eloquent in his support for a 
Sanskritised form of Hindi, insisting that Nagari should be introduced in the UP, while the Persian script might 
be used in the courts and schools of Sindh, the Punjab, and the North-West Frontier Province.69 Sangathanists 
urged all the papers in the different provinces of India to publish parts of their vernaculars in the Nagari script.70 
In sangathanist ideology, Nagari as well as Sanskritised Hindi was propagated and hailed as the national script 
and lingua franca of India.
In the Hindu Mahasabha’s discourse, the primacy of territory, a common race or blood, and the unity of 
culture and language constituted the main tenets of a ‘Hindu nation’.71 The paramount attribute of a ‘Hindu 
nation’, V.D. Savarkar declared, was the ‘coherence and unity1 of the language -  first Sanskrit and later modem 
Hindi -- which was viewed as the carrier of the ‘cultural essence’ of India72 He explained: ‘As the growth and 
development o f ... our genuine national tongue was parallel to and almost simultaneous with the revival and 
popularization of the ancient names Sindusthan or Sindhu, or Hindusthan ... it was but a matter of course that 
language being the common possession of the whole nation should be called ... Hindi.’73 The Hindus who alone 
constituted the Indian nation, sangathanisis argued, were ‘the original inhabitants and sole creators of its 
society and culture’.74 The growth of the national language was but an ‘outward expression of this inward unity
66 The Tribune, 21 October 1909. IOR: L7R/5/56,1909, p. 291, IOL.
67 R.B. Lai Chand, Self-Abnegation in Politics, Lahore, 1938, pp. 35,39.
68 Swami Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan: Saviour of the Dying Race, N.p., 1926, p. 138.
69 Cawnpore Gazette, 1 May 1918. IOR: L/R/5/94,1918, p. 329, IOL.
70 Indra Prakash, A Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sangathan Movement, New Delhi, 
1952 [1938], p. 144.D; Keer, Veer Savarkar, Bombay, 1988 [1966], p. 172.
71 Savarkar, Hindu Rashtra Darshan, pp. 8-10; Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffmn Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in 
Modem India, Princeton, 1999, p. 78.
72 V.D. Savarkar’s presidential speech to Mahasabha’s 21st session, Calcutta in 1939: Savarkar, Hindu Rashtra Darshan, p. 107.
73 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 33.
74 M.S. Golwalkar, We or Our Nationhood Defined, Nagpur, 1939 [4th edn. 1947], p. 18.
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of our national life’.75 Hindi was inextricably woven into the ‘all-round life of the Hindu race’ and became an 
‘ingredient of great importance’ in India’s history. It was a symbol of the ‘mythologised Hindu past’ -  ‘original
Hinduism’ -  in India.76 India as a nation found expression in Hindi literature, which had become a cultural
symbol tied to the writing of its ‘national history1; and the country was to keep her 'mother tongue alive, its 
heritage undefiled, and its values unaffected’.77 In sangathanist narrative, Hindi reflected ‘the ancient traditions 
of the Hindus’ -  their culture, religion, and history -  in India.78
The Hindu Mahasabha's central aim was to make Hindi the national language of India. Savarkar viewed
Hindi as the ‘richest and most cultured of all the ancient languages’, and Nagari -  the ‘script of the Hindu 
scriptures’ -- as phonetically by far the ‘most perfect in the world’.79 ‘Long before either the English or even the 
Moslems stepped into India,’ he stated, Hindi in its general form had already come to occupy the position of ‘a 
national tongue throughout Hindustan’.80 Hindi was the language used by ‘the Hindu pilgrim, the tradesman, the 
tourist, the soldier, the Pandit’ in the country.81 The notion of Hindi as the state language provided a basis to re­
compact the Hindus educated in regional vernaculars into a homogeneous ‘Hindu community’. In India, every 
province had its own language; yet Hindi provided ‘a linguistic unit/ across the country. ‘Sanskrit... is common 
to all from the Himalayas to ... [the] South ,..’82 Hindi, drawn from Sanskrit, was potent enough to communicate 
with the entire, multilingual nation, being a product of the ‘nationalist feelings’.83 Sangathanists argued that the 
provincial languages in India would grow and flourish in an affinity and relationship with Hindi.84 The projection 
of Hindi as the national language represented the 'inner life of the nation’ and was determined by a process of 
internal cohesion, whereby Hindi appropriated the space of the vernacular languages -- Brajbhasha, Avadhi, 
Bengali, Marathi, Tamil, and Telugu -  which were regarded as ‘not autonomous’ in cultural tradition but 
‘deviations from sanatan dharm'. 85 In sangathanlst thinking, Hindi’s ‘territorial communication and 
‘homogenisation’ was a strong source of the national solidarity of the Hindus in India.
The Hindu Mahasabha’s propagation of Hindi as the national language of India involved an attack on Urdu, 
which was considered a ‘threat’ to Nagari. Urdu’s status as the official language in British administration 
rendered it unsuitable for a role in India’s freedom struggle. The Mahasabha emphasised the Aryan Hindu 
identity, demarcating Hindi as the Aryabhasha [the language of the Aryans] from Urdu, the language of the
75 V.D. Savarkar, Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?, Poona, 1949, rept. New Delhi, 2003, p. 34.
76 Savarkar, Hindu Rashtra Darshan, pp. 108-10; Golwalkar, We, pp. 27,51.
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Muslims.86 It viewed Urdu as the legacy of Muslim rule in India -- alien to Hindu culture and urged the removal of 
Urdu and Persian words from Hindi and their replacement with words derived from Sanskrit.87 Savarkar rejected 
any attempt of ‘our Mahommedan zealots’ to thrust on the Hindus the Urdu script. ‘We must not,’ he insisted, 
‘allow the influx of alien words into our language without... testing their necessity.’ ‘But as mother-tongue and 
national language it [Urdu] had no place in Hindu culture...’ 88 ‘It is our bounden duty,’ he argued, ‘to oust out... 
all unnecessary alien words whether Arabic or English from every Hindu tongue, whether provincial or 
dialectical.’89 An exclusively Indian language and literature could be derived by systematically excluding all alien, 
mainly Muslim, vocabulary as well as all the literary production of Muslim writers in the country. The purity of the 
Hindi language was emphasised as the purity of ‘Hindu culture’. The sangathanist drive to make Hindi India’s 
national language sought to strengthen a Hindu cultural unity by removing Urdu and hence ‘Muslim’ influence 
from the country.
The Hindu Mahasabha launched a drive for the ‘Sanskrit Nistha’ Hindi, disowning any affinity to the ‘hybrid’ 
‘Hindustani’ proposed under Gandhi’s Wardha scheme. Sangathanists denounced Gandhi’s appeal for the re­
merging of Hindi and Urdu into ‘Hindustani’ -- a fusion of Persian-Arabic, Sanskrit, and Hindi -- as a common 
language of the masses in the country. Support for ‘Hindustani’ among the Hindi literati was scarce: Premchand 
was the only major writer who supported ‘Hindustani’.90 The two powerful institutions working for the promotion 
of Hindi -- the Nagri Pracharini Sabha and the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan -- vigorously opposed ‘Hindustani’. The 
Mahasabha attacked ‘Hindustani’ as a ‘linguistic monstrosity’, a ‘language of the bazaar* which could hardly fulfil 
the requirements of a state language.91 Only Sanskritic Hindi could become India’s national language, it was 
asserted. As an outcome, in the UP Urdu publishing had gradually declined under the impact of the 
sangathanlsi campaign by the 1920s and 1930s; and writers like Premchand found it difficult to get Urdu 
publishers and shifted to Hindi writing. In 1925 Urdu books amounted to just one-sixth of Hindi publications and 
even decreased in absolute numbers: there were over 33 Hindi vernacular newspapers in the UP with a total 
circulation of 7,509.92 A dichotomy between Hindi and Urdu was established in the public sphere; and Hindi 
gained autonomy, while Urdu was excluded as the language of the Muslims. In sangathanlst ideology, the 
severance of a historical and cultural link with Urdu and the Muslims was paramount, demarcating Hindi sharply 
from the ‘alien’ which Urdu had come to represent in India.
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II. Cow Protection Movement
Cow protection was a central pillar of the Hindu reform movements in north India in the late nineteenth 
century.93 The issue of cow slaughter rose to prominence in the 1890s when cow protection societies 
[gaurakshini sabhas] had become the feature of a broader Hindu nationalist agenda in the country.94 In the 
Satyartha Prakash [The Light of Truth’] published in 1875 and a later pamphlet Gokarunanidhi [‘Ocean of Mercy 
of the Cow1] written in 1881, Dayananda Saraswati linked the protection of cows to his critique of Hindu society 
and attacks on the British and the Muslims, making an emotional appeal to the Hindus to devote themselves to 
cow protection in the country95 He used the networks of the Arya Samaj to disseminate an imagery of the cow 
as the ‘mother’ of a ‘Hindu nation’ and included cow protection among the practices needed to strengthen India. 
Most importantly, he explained, there was a pressing need to combat ‘malnutrition and physical degeneration’ 
brought about by a scarcity of milk in the country. For this he blamed cow slaughter and called for its immediate 
end.96 A ban on all animal slaughter was an ethical ideal, he argued in Gokarunanidhi.97 Dayananda established 
his first gaushaia [cattle sanctuary] in Rewari in 1879; and a cow protection society was formed in Agra in 
1881.98 In 1882, a year before his death, he had set up a committee in Calcutta in co-operation with the 
Maharaja of Banaras to seek all-India Hindu involvement in an agitation to prevent cow-killing. Eventually, the 
Society for the Preservation of Homed Cattle was established in Bombay in 1887 and engaged in the building of 
gaushalas in Gujarati and Marathi areas.99 By 1892 cow protection societies had spread to the eastern UP, 
followed by an outbreak of cow protection riots at Azamgarh, Ballia, and Mhow in the province in 1893.100 By the 
early 1900s, the colonial officials had held the Arya Samaj responsible for cow protection riots across the 
province.101 The strong presence of the Arya Samaj in the UP was a potent factor in the emergence of a Hindu 
revivalist movement that aimed to prevent the killing of cows in north India.
In the UP, the cow protection societies produced petitions and memorials addressed to the local officials, 
urging that cow slaughter be prohibited on the grounds of public health.102 Many argued that cow slaughter, 
particularly since the advent of Muslim and British rule, had devastated India’s economy and resulted in the
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undernourishment of its vegetarian population, representing a grievous attack on the Hindu religion.103 
Protecting cattle from slaughter, it was argued, 'increased the resources of the country and protected and 
improved agriculture’.104 Petitioners strove to present the societies as ‘purely philanthropical and in no way 
political’ for fear of their being banned as ‘seditious’.105 In terms of the social composition, the patrons of the 
cow protection societies -- Hindu princes, zamindars, merchants and rural-based notables -  had constituted the 
social elite that was prominent in the leadership of local Hindu Mahasabha networks co-ordinating anti-Muslim 
violence across the UP in the early twentieth century.106
In north India, cow slaughter signified simultaneously the ‘illegitimacy’ of British rule and the ‘threat’ of the 
Muslims to Hindu society: both were targeted.107 The nature of anti-cow killing appeals and riots explicitly 
brought the Muslims into the picture alongside the British. Hindu publicists first made appeals to the British to 
curb cow-killing by the Muslims, and the riots were almost all anti-Muslim before they had become anti-British. 
Katherine Prior argues that the colonial officials intervened in cow protection disputes as a means of 
establishing the ‘local custom’ in the country;108 but in reality, such interference to regulate cow sacrifice often 
sparked Hindu reprisals.109 Peter Robb explains that the government feared that cow protection provided a 
'common platform’ on which all the Hindus could unite, and that the objective, as of the Congress, was ‘the 
overthrow of English rule’ from India.110 The movement represented a form of disloyalty towards the British, 
even though it was ostensibly directed against the Muslims.111 The consensus among the British officials was 
that the Hindus were the ‘aggressors’, resulting in the policy of repression directed against them; and there was 
a shift in the British alliance to the Muslims who had begun to insist on their social rights in India.112 In the end, 
cow protection eventually led to a resistance to all colonial intervention in Hindu practices, reviving regularly as 
a way of opposition and dissent against British rule in the country.113
102 Chief Secretary, NWP&O, to Chief Secretary, Government of India, Home Dept., 28 August 1893, Home Public, IOR: 
L/P&J/365, File No. 169, November 1893, p. 5.
103 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity-building, 
Implantation and Mobilization [with special reference to Central India], London, 1996, pp. 17,67.
104 ‘Note on the Cow-Protection Agitation’, IOR: L/P&J/365, File No. 84,1894, p. 3, IOL.
105 Kenneth W. Jones, The New Cambridge History of India III. 1: Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India, Cambridge, 
1994 [1989], pp. 90-4.
106 Ay [Benares, daily, editor: Babu Rao Vishnu Paratkar], 11 January 1921, IOR: L/R/5/96, File No. 3,1921, p. 36.
107 Van der Veer, Religious Nationalism, p. 90.
108 K. Prior, ‘Making History: The State’s Intervention in Urban Religious Disputes in the North Western Provinces in the Early
Nineteenth Century’, Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1,1993, pp. 179-204: pp. 191-203.
109 Gyanendra Pandey, ‘Rallying Round the Cow: Sectarian Strife in the Bhojpur Region, c. 1888-1917’, in Ranajit Guha [ed.], 
Subaltern Studies II -  Writings on South Asian History and Society, Delhi, 1983, pp. 89-95.
110 Peter Robb, The Challenge of Gau Mata: British Policy and Religious Change in India, 1880-1916’, Modem Asian Studies, 
Vol. 20, No. 2,1986, pp. 285-319: p. 292.
111 ‘Note on the Agitation Against Cow Killing’, 24 January 1894, L/P&J/3/96, File No. 257, IOL.
112 Robb, ‘Challenge of Gau Mata’, pp. 293,300-2.
113 The Age of Consent Bill [1891] provoked a committee of cow protectionists and Bharat Dharma Mahamandal members to 
meet at the Hardwar Kumbha Mela in 1892. At this meeting, it was ‘decided to attack with increased vigour the Muhammedan 
practice of kine-killing as a mark of the displeasure at the new [Age of Consent] Act and also to prevent further interference in 
Hindu religious matters’. McLane, Indian Nationalism, p. 299.
141
The cow protection movement appealed alike to the orthodox, traditionalists and reformist Hindus across 
north India. The movement’s organisational structure, Sandria Freitag argues, united the urban centres and 
their rural surroundings’, with the cow providing a popularly revered symbol that could be mobilised in the name 
of a putative ‘Hindu community’.114 Cow protection centred on the tenets of high-caste Hinduism, including 
vegetarianism, temperance, and the norms of purity and pollution.115 The festivals, public meetings, and 
pamphlets that had proliferated over cow protection provided meanings and a common ground between the 
elite and popular cultures in Indian society. The untouchables and lower castes -  the former ate beef -  also 
participated in the cow protection campaigns, making a shift in their self-conception as the 'Hindus’. Gyanendra 
Pandey emphasises that the colonial archive classified cow protection riots as part of the wider ‘sectarian 
conflict’ between the Hindus and the Muslims in north India; but those who had participated in the riots ‘did not 
embrace the idea of themselves as Hindus’.116 The lower caste participation in the cow protection campaigns 
implied an alignment with the upper-caste Hindu idiom, nonetheless. The cow protection movement on the 
whole made a successful impact in the UP -- chiefly due to the predominance of Brahmanical culture with its 
popular emphasis on cow worship in the region.117
II. 1. Cow-the Mother of a ‘Hindu Nation’
The Hindu Mahasabha adopted the cow protection campaign as part of sangathan ideology with one major 
effect, targeting initially the British and then most prominently the Muslims in India. The Delhi session of the 
Hindu Sabha, which was presided over by Raja Rampal Singh on 26-28 December 1918, passed a formal 
resolution for the first time against cow slaughter in India.118 The Mahasabha eventually lobbied the Indian 
National Congress to pass a resolution banning cow slaughter, stressing the economic necessity of protection in 
the country. However, the Congress refused to incorporate cow protection in its nationalist programme -  
particularly as the basis of Hindu-Muslim unity against British rule.119 Gandhi condemned the protectionists’ 
calls for an end to the Muslim slaughter of cows in return for Hindu support during the Khilafat-Non-cooperation 
movement in 1920-21.120 The Hindus’ participation in the Khilafat,’ he stated, ‘is the greatest and the best 
movement for cow-protection.’121 ‘As soon as the Muslims realize that for their sake the Hindus are ready to lay 
down their lives, they will desist from cow-slaughter ...’122 The conservative Muslim press insisted that cow
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protection should not be made a condition of Hindu-Muslim unity, and that the Hindus could not expect the 
Muslims to give up what was enjoined by Islam.123 For the Mahasabha, the cow had emerged as a symbol of 
Hindu unity in its drive to promote a specifically sangathanist form of nationalism through the defence of 
traditional Hindu religious practices against Islam and Christianity in India.124
In the early 1920s, the Hindu Mahasabha focused chiefly on the colonial state’s failure to respond to the 
Hindu demands for cow protection in India. At the Banaras session in October 1921, the Mahasabha criticised 
the government for not bringing in legislation for the prevention of cow slaughter, demanding the import of beef 
for the army in order to end slaughter in the country.125 At the Gaya session held under the leadership of Madan 
Mohan Malaviya in 1922, it launched an appeal against the ‘slaughter of cows for the military and the export of 
beef to other countries’, resolving on non-cooperation against British rule until cow slaughter ended in the 
country.126 The propaganda of sangathanists against the ‘destruction of cattle’ highlighted the magnitude of the 
government’s ‘cruelty1.127 Lala Sukhbir Sinha, leader of the UP Hindu Sabha, stated in April 1921: There are 
70,000 British troops in India and 7,000 tons of beef are supplied to them in one year.'128 The colonial rule was 
viewed as a threat to the ‘stability and natural orderi of Hindu society.129 The Brahmanical ideals and popular 
Hindu associations with vegetarianism were evoked to explain the ‘decadence’ of British rule, which had 
perpetrated ‘meat-eating and forms of consumption’ in the country.130 Overwhelmingly, though, the cow imagery 
proved important in mobilising the Hindu community in the context of slaughter in which the state was held to be 
complicit in India.131
By the mid-1920s, the Hindu Mahasabha had imparted a definite Hindu nationalistic meaning to the cow 
symbol, making a departure from its apparent anti-British hostility. It incorporated cow protection, a resistance to 
the accretion of non-Hindu beliefs and practices, in its sangathanist discourse -  which was characterised by an 
anti-Muslim hostility and antagonism. The Muslims sacrificed cows during Bakr-ld festival, even though it is 
disputed whether cow sacrifice was essential to the Muslim religious ritual in the country.132 Cow slaughter was 
emphasised as an outcome of the ‘evil practices’ of the Muslims; and the Hindu religion as well as culture was
A.M. Zaidi [ed.], Evolution of Muslim Political Thought in India, Vol. II: Sectarian Nationalism and Khilafat, New Delhi, 1975, p. 
217.
123 Al Bureed [Kanpur, bi-weekly, editor: Fazl Hasan, Shaikh, 43, cir: 1,050 copies], 7 June 1922, IOR: L/R/5/97, File No. 5,1922, 
p. 3; Oudh Akhbar [Lucknow, daily, editor: Naubat Rai, Kayasth, 42, cir: 500 copies], 13 July 1922, IOR L/R/5/97, File No. 5, 
1922, p. 3, IOL.
124 McLane, Indian Nationalism, pp. 275,280,282-4.
123 Oudh Akhbar, 11 November 1921, IOR: L/R/5/96, File No. 47,1921, p. 482, IOL.
126 M.M. Malaviya’s presidential address to All-India Mahasabha’s Gaya session, 30 December 1922: cited in D.D. Pattanaik, 
Hindu nationalism in India, Vol. 3, New Delhi, 1998, p. 125.
127 Speech of Anand Prakash, 14 April 1921, ‘Anti cow-killing movement in UP’, 1920, GAD Box 138 File No. 214/1921, UPSA.
128 Speech of Lala Sukhbir Sinha, 10 April1921: ‘Anti cow-killing movement in UP’, 1920, GAD Box 138File 214/1921, UPSA.
129 Therese O’Toole, ‘Secularising the Sacred Cow: The Relationship between Religious Reform and Hindu Nationalism’, in 
Antony Copley [ed.], Hinduism in Public and Private: Reform, Hindutva, Gender, and Sampraday, New Delhi, 2003, pp. 89-90.
130 Pratap [Kanpur, weekly, editor: G.S. Vidyarthi], 4 December 1920, IOR L/R/5/95, File No. 50,1920, p. 487, IOL.
131 Gould, Hindu Nationalism, p. 79.
132 Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims, p. 285.
143
seen to be ‘vitiated not only by the British but by the Muslims through cow-slaugtiter1 in India.133 The Muslims, it 
was claimed, had not only increased the suffering of the Hindus, but dispossessed them of their chief wealth, 
the cow. Cow slaughter began with the coming of the ‘foreign invaders [Muslims]... They took to various types 
of barbarism such as conversion, demolishing [of] our temples and ... cow-slaughter.’134 Pandit Lekh Ram, an 
Arya Samajist, stated: ‘Islam indulged in jihad [holy war], Hindus were converted to Islam forcibly, temples 
demolished, and cows slaughtered.’135 In view of the wide prevalence of ritual slaughter in north India, 
sangathanists targeted Islam, urging the Hindus to protect the cow from the ‘threat of Muslims’, the ‘enemy of 
the nation’.
Historically, the cow protection propaganda had proved effective in the mobilisation of the large sections of 
the Hindu community against the Muslims in the UP during the 1910s and 1920s.136 The cow protection 
campaigns were particularly influenced by the anti-Muslim sentiments as evident in the village campaigns of the 
gaurakshini sabhas in the province.137 There was a build-up of anti-Muslim tension over cow slaughter in many 
places in 1915 and 1916 in the eastern UP.138 Before the outbreak of the riots in Shahabad, Bihar, in 1917, the 
gaurakshini sabhas had distributed patias [chain letters] in the villages by urging the Hindus to take direct action 
against the Muslims, which often culminated in physical attacks on the Muslims and their property.139 In Rasra 
tahsil of Gorakhpur district, UP, the Muslims 'did not observe Muharram’ in 1918 due to the ‘aggressive attitude’ 
of the Hindus over cow-slaughter.140 A serious riot broke out at Kattarpur village, Hardwar, during Bakr-ld in 
September 1918 over the issue of cow sacrifice; and the ‘burnt corpses of 30 Muslim males, 10 females and 7 
children [i.e., 47 in all]’ were discovered in the village after the violence.141 In the late 1920s, it was a regular 
occurrence, especially during Bakr-ld, for riots to flare up in the UP.142 In 1926 there were four separate riots 
over cow slaughter in Allahabad, Fatehpur and Barabanki districts of the UP.143 The cow defiled those Muslims 
who believed in the necessity of cow sacrifice during Bakr-ld.144 To prevent cow sacrifice at Bakr Id, the 
Muslims were subjected to boycott and compelled by Hindu groups to sign agreements [ikramamas] promising
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not to sacrifice cows in the towns of the UP.145 A form of social and physical coercion was deployed against 
Hindus who sold cattle to the Muslims.146 In Gorakhpur the Naths, Banjaras and especially Chamars [the 
untouchables] were targeted.147 A language of ‘morality, purity, civilisation, and religion’ was deployed and the 
‘demonic’ character of the Muslim butcher highlighted. In almost all the riots in the UP, an anti-Muslim 
identification was a marked feature, even though the rifts between the Hindus and the Muslims were often 
healed after the outbreaks of violence in the province.148
In sangathanist discourse, the cow was linked to the building of a strong nation -  a nation of Hindu men who 
had grown ‘weak and poor* for lack of milk in India.149 The life-giving, pure quality of cow milk was associated 
with the ‘purity and strength’ of the nation.150 The decline in the physical strength of the Hindus and an increase 
in child mortality were linked to the decline of cows in the country. The ‘indiscriminate slaughter* of cows was 
interpreted as a 'grave injury* caused to agriculture and national health.151 In appeals to ban cow-killing in towns 
like Mathura and Ayodhya, religious and emotional arguments were extensively deployed. Mathura was seen as 
the birth-place of Krishna, the ‘keeper and protector of cows’. Kriparam Mishra, general secretary of the 
Garhwal Radha-Krishna Gaushala, Mathura, stated: ‘Today our mother cow is being slain by the infidels in 
innumerable numbers ... Our helplessness, mental weakness and physical impotency [sic] is explicitly telling us 
that among the many reasons for such changes, the main one is the decline of cow wealth.’152 Sangathanists 
defended cow protection as a ‘powerful factor’ in creating the ‘physical development and strength of the Hindu 
community’ in India.153 Bhai Parmanand insisted that cow protection should be promoted for the ‘greater 
strength and welfare’ of a ‘Hindu nation’; and K.B. Hedgewar fiercely opposed any harm to the cow, which was 
needed for the ‘well-being of India’ as a nation.154 In sangathan\s\ belief, the cow’s utility rested in producing 
brave and strong men who could build and defend a strong nation; and the cow -  which gave sanctity to family, 
community and the nation -  was turned into the symbol of a ‘strong Hindu nation’.155
In sangathan ist narrative, the crucial theme was the metaphor of the ‘sacred cow* -  which was synonymous 
with Hindu society and the Indian nation. The degree to which the sacredness of the cow was affirmed signified 
at once a judgment of the moral character of the state as well as the stability of Hindu society in India. The cow
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became the mother of a ‘Hindu nation’.156 The body of the cow was invested with the divine; and she herself 
became a ‘proto-nation’. 157 The cow’s body was viewed as more sacred than the real -  the ‘physical, birth- 
giving mother1.158 The cow’s sacredness meant ‘inviolability, non-slaughterability1; and the Aryan race was 
called upon to protect her in India.159 The emotional appeal of the cow symbol turned cow-killing into a 
‘matricide’.160 The sacred cow was associated with Hindu patriarchy and conceptions of the female body. The 
sacred object to be recuperated and protected was a feminine figure -  the cow, the abducted Hindu woman, 
and the motherland.161 In sangathanist campaigns, the cow became a symbol of the fragility and vulnerability of 
the Hindu community -  a notion that was linked to the fears about the ‘strength and integrity’ of the Hindus in a 
conflict with the Muslims in India.
Conclusion
In the early twentieth century, Nagari and the cow emerged as the rallying symbols in the formation and 
articulation of Hindu nationalist ideology in India. The Nagari campaign began first as a movement to replace 
the Persian script with Hindi in the courts and administration of the UP in the late nineteenth century.162 The 
Hindu Mahasabha adopted the Nagari movement, which was started by Hindi intellectuals and fostered by Hindi 
institutions and the Arya Samaj, as an issue of the identity and cultural self-assertion of the Hindu community: it 
centred its attack on Urdu.163 The strong support for Nagari as well as the attack on Urdu’s predominance 
became an important element of sangathan ist narrative, strengthening the Mahasabha’s drive for the creation of 
a self-conscious ‘Hindu nation’ in India. Hindi was projected as the language of the national and cultural 
descendants of the ancient Hindus and the mother tongue of the masses of the country with an Aryan 
ancestry.164 Urdu, on the contrary, was seen as a symbol of the ‘dominance of the Muslim elite’ and an 
instrument of the preservation of ‘Muslim tyranny1 in India. Sangathanists favoured an ‘independent progress’ of 
Hindi, insisting on its cultural separateness from the Perso-Urdu tradition. By the late 1920s, the sangathanist 
campaign had helped to accelerate the transformation of Hindi from a spoken language into a dialect of political 
and educational communication, more so with Congress nationalist support: it dealt a blow to the dominance of 
Urdu writing in the UP.165
156 ‘Report on Azamgarh’, by H.E.L.P. Dupemex, Officiating Magistrate of Azamgarh, to Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, 
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Tharu [eds.], Subaltern Studies X: Writings on South Asian History and Society, Delhi, 1999, pp. 221-4,230-33.
158 Poem on the cover of Gaudharma Prakash, 1, 5, December 1886; Home Poll., File No. A 71-73, January 1912, NAI.
1*> Home Poll 71-73, January 1912, A, NAI.
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161 Charu Gupta, The Icon of Mother in Late Colonial North India: “Bharat Mata", “Matri Bhasha" and "Gau Mata’” , Economic 
and Political Weekly, 24 November 2001, pp. 2261-5.
162 Report by M. Kempson, director of public instruction, NWP, 12 February 1870. IOR L/P&JA//23/129,1870, p. 31, IOL.
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The Hindu Mahasabha incorporated in its sangathan\si discourse the long-existing movement for cow 
protection, which had been launched by the Arya Samaj in the late nineteenth century in India.166 In the 1920s, 
the cow became a key theme in the Mahasabha’s programme for community mobilisation in avowed hostility 
against the Muslims in the UP.167 The struggle to restore the sanctity of the cow and the linking of cow 
protection to the strength and integrity of the nation were central to sangathan ist discourse on the creation of a 
‘Hindu nation’.168 The cow emerged as a metaphor for a strong ‘Hindu nation’, helping to homogenise Hindu 
society in a conflict with the Muslims. The Mahasabha represented the cow as the ‘mother of a Hindu nation’ -  
targeting the Muslims more intensely than the British in its campaigns in the UP during the 1920s and 1930s.
166 Rratap; Kanpur, 14 January 1918, IOR: L/R/5/94,1918, p. 59, IOL; Jone6, Arya Dharm, pp. 51-3r
167 Bhavishya, Allahabad, 7 August 1920, IOR L/R/5/95, File No. 33,1920, p. 262, IOL.
168 All-India Congress Committee Papers, File No. 1/1919, Pt II, p. 519, NMML.
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PART III 
Hindu Nation
10
Hindu Mahasabha and Congress Conflict
In early twentieth-century India, the notion that secular nationalism and Hindu nationalism formed two distinct 
ideologies had little meaning, as it was difficult to define ‘secular’ in functional terms. The boundaries between a 
secular imagination of the nation and a more sectarian vision of it as constituted by religious communities were 
blurred and overlapping. In a political context dominated by Hindus, writes Richard Gordon, there was little 
distinction between a ‘secular political association’ and an involvement in ‘religious or caste organisations’ in 
north India.1 A simultaneous participation in a secular organisation and a religious body was possible because 
of the communitarian-nationalist perspective of Indian politics in the early phase of British rule. The Indian 
National Congress at the local level was indistinguishable from the movement for the ‘protection of cattle’ or the 
'propaganda of Hinduism’, even though this may have been contrary to its secular protestations.2 Political 
leaders could combine Congress membership with sectarian associations or religious organisations by working 
at multiple levels -  town, district, and province -  across the religious and secular divides in the country.3 The 
Hindu Mahasabha’s social roots were drawn largely from the groups that had supported the Congress in the 
United Provinces. Its political distinction from the Congress had been quite vague since its emergence in 1915, 
as both organisations were not seen to be antagonistic to each other in the province. Hindu leaders occupied 
both ‘secular’ and ‘Hindu’ positions in a close proximity, performing political functions in the Congress and 
cultural and social work in the Mahasabha. However, by the early 1920s Hindu and Muslim identity politics had 
become the chief basis of most Indian groups -  in part a result of the British policy of ‘divide and rule’ and the 
resultant riots that occurred in north India in the post-Non-cooperation period.4 There was a deliberate 
manipulation of religious symbols by the Hindu and Muslim leaders and publicists, resulting in the development 
of sectarian consciousness and propaganda.5 In ideological terms, the Mahasabha contested the Congress’s 
secular idiom in politics and developed a Hindu interpretation of nationalism in India. It began to imagine of a 
homogenous, unified ‘Hindu nation’, claiming that the spirit of India was Hindu’.6 It ended its association with the 
Congress and became a political party in the late 1930s. This chapter revisits the extent and limitations of the 
Mahasabha’s relations with the Congress as well as their breakdown, focusing on its Hindu politics and rhetoric 
in the UP.
1 R.Gordon, The Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress, 1915 to 1926’, Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 9,1975, p. 151.
2 C.A. Bayly, The Local Roots of Indian Politics: Allahabad 1880-1920, Oxford, 1975, p. 132.
3 William Gould, Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India, Cambridge, 2004, p. 161.
4 Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communaiism in Colonial North India, New Delhi, 2006 [1990], pp. 210,235.
5 David Page, Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control, 1920-1932, Delhi, 1982, pp. 73-84.
6 K.L. Tuteia, The Punjab Hindu Sabha and Communal Politics, 1906-1923’, in Indu Banga [ed.], Five Punjab Centuries, New 
Delhi, 1997, p. 133.
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I. Malaviya’s ‘Hindu’ Congress
The early Hindu Mahasabha was not a political party in its own right, but decisively tied to its links with the 
Congress and often described as a 'pressure group’ within the latter.7 Its relationship with the Congress was 
characterised by a vast complexity in the United Provinces. There were three political groupings in the UP: the 
advanced ‘secular1 group controlled by Motilal Nehru, the centre ‘Hindu’ party led by Madan Mohan Malaviya, 
and the moderates who had quit the Congress in 1918 to form the Liberal Party. The UP Congress was in effect 
dominated by two rival factions -  Nehru’s ‘secular1 group and Malaviya’s ‘Hindu wing’ -- in the province 
throughout the 1920s and early 1930s.8
M.M. Malaviya, a Congressman since 1886, became president of the all-India Congress in 1909 and 1918 
and simultaneously established his leadership of the Hindu Mahasabha. He was the most influential leader of 
the Mahasabha in this period, its president in the period 1922-1924, and a leading force to revive it in the 1920s. 
The Mahasabha’s organisational growth and development followed typically the path of Malaviya’s constitutional 
politics, which had focused on petitioning the government for reforms in India. During the course of the 
Congress’s Non-co-operation, Malaviya had become vocal in opposition to the movement and lost control of the 
UP Congress. He found himself at odds with the leadership of the UP Congress, controlled by Motilal Nehru.9 In 
political conflict with Non-cooperation, most of Malaviya’s ‘Hindu wing’ entered the UP Legislative Counil in the 
November-December 1920 elections as independents or in association with the Liberal Party, as the Congress 
had boycotted the elections.10 Malaviya’s followers -- Gauri Shankar Misra, Siva Prasad Gupta, Iqbal Narayan 
Gurtu, H.N. Kunzru, and Iswar Saran -  used the Mahasabha as a factional tool against Motilal Nehru’s faction, 
their main rivals in the UP Congress Committee, in a bid to reassert the ‘Hindu wing’s’ authority over the 
Congress organisation.11
In the 1920s, Motilal Nehru did not have the local support and influential connections that Malaviya had built 
up through his Hindi work, Seva Samitis, and Kisan Sabhas in the UP. However, he asserted his decisive 
authority over the UP Congress Committee [UPCC].12 In the post-Non-cooperation period, Nehru organised 
new Kisan Sabhas, took active part in political agitations and went to jail; and his stature grew enormously 
among the nationalist circles in the UP. In 1923 with the Non-cooperation movement at an end, Nehru and C.R. 
Das -  the ‘pro-changers’ -- launched the Swaraj Party which was able to use both the organisation and prestige 
of the Congress in the anti-British agitations in north India. In contrast to the Gandian boycott of the councils,
7 Gordon, ‘Hindu Mahasabha’, pp. 145-203.
8 Gordon, ‘Hindu Mahasabha’, pp. 180-91.
9 The Leader, 4 February 1922, p. 5, Microfilm, NMML; .Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 
1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity-building, Implantation and Mobilisation, London, 1996, p.33.
10 Rampal Singh, Sukhbir Sinha, and Moti Chand Gupta were elected to the central Council of States; Iswar Saran, Girdhari Lai
Agarwala, Radha Kishen Das, Bishambhar Nath, Mahadeo Prasad, Suraj Baksh Singh, and Sankata Prasad Bajpai to the
central Legislative Assembly; and K.K. Malaviya, H.N. Kunzru, Iqbal Narayan Gurtu, and Anand Swarup to the UP Council.
11 The Leader, 27 August 1923, p. 4, Microfilm, NMML.
12 Home Poll, D, August 1918, 28, NAI.
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the Swara] Party sought elections and attempted to overthrow the Montford constitution through non-coperation 
from within the councils. It refused to accept official office and resolved to vote down government measures, 
especially the finance bills, as part of its demand for swaraj [freedom]. The party’s immediate object was to 
secure the right to frame a dominion constitution for India. After Das’s death in 1925, Nehru had become the 
undisputed leader of the Swaraj Party; and the adoption of the party’s programme by the Congress added to his 
influence in north India.
In the UP Congress, Motilal Nehru faced a challenge to his leadership of the party. At the Kanpur Congress 
in December 1925, Nehru proposed a resolution, reaffirming the faith of the Congress in civil disobedience in 
India. The resolution insisted on the non-acceptance of office as the Congress’s programme, calling for the 
withdrawal of Swarajists from the legislatures if the national demand of swaraj had not been met by February 
1926. Nehru’s main agenda, the non-acceptance of office, was dictated by his concern to preserve a strong 
national alliance against the British. However, Malaviya proposed an amendment, urging the Congress to work 
the reforms to the best possible advantage and deleting all reference to civil disobedience in the country. He did 
not approve of the alliance with the Khilafatists and was no longer willing to support the Muslim issues in the 
nationalist struggle. However, Nehru won support over Malaviya at the Kanpur Congress.13 The political battle 
continued to be fought by the Nehru and Malaviya factions for the control of the UP Congress in the entire 
decade of the 1920s.
In the elections to the Legislative Councils and the central legislature in 1926, the main arena of political 
campaign was dominated by the Nehru and Malaviya groups in north India. The Hindu Mahasabha held its ninth 
session in Delhi on 13 March 1926: one important issue before the session was the question of setting up 
candidates in the elections. Motilal Nehru, in an attempt to capture the UP Hindu Sabha, declared in a 
statement read in his absence at the Mahasabha’s session that the Congress was and had always been, except 
during the brief period of Non-cooperation, predominantly a Hindu organisation. The true remedy,’ he 
suggested, 'lies in the Hindu Sabha as a body joining the Indian National Congress and thereby influencing the 
whole programme of work in the Councils.’ 14 He encouraged the Mahasabhaites to remain in the Congress in 
the hope of securing a victory for its anti-British alliance based on civil disobedience in India.15 The Mahasabha 
rejected Nehru’s offer, however, reaffirming its decision to set up candidates in the elections in the UP and at 
the national level where necessary. A large segment of the party from the Punjab led by Bhai Parmanand and 
Rajendra Nath, the Mahasabha’s working president, was adamant that the organisation should field candidates 
in the elections in opposition to the Congress. The Congress, they argued, had brought the Hindu community to 
the ‘brink of a ruin’ by sacrificing Hindu interests in pursuit of ‘Hindu-Muslim unity*. In his presidential address to
13 N.N. Mitra [ed.], Indian Annual Register, Vol. II, 1925, July-December, pp. 331-40.
14 The Leader, 17 March 1926, p. 6, Microfilm, NMML.
15 Motilal Nehru’s letter to Dev Ratan Sharma, dated 22 May 1926, File No. 24/1926, AICC Papers, NMML.
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the Delhi session, Narendra Nath called for a vigorous assertion of ‘Hindu interests’ in the country. He declared: 
‘We cannot refrain from devoting serious thought to the consideration of those [Hindu] interests simply out of 
fear that such a course ... may delay the achievement of the goal of Swaraj.’16 In a bitter tirade against the 
Congress, Bhai Parmamanand called on the Hindus to suspend the ‘struggle for swaraj and all other activities’ 
for five years in order to strengthen the communal organisation of the Hindus in India. ‘Let us protect our rights 
and stand against... the National Congress,’ he insisted.17 A compromise was finally reached: the Mahasabha 
decided not to participate in the elections as a political party but to oppose the candidates who were ‘inimical to 
Hindu interests’. A resolution was passed, urging the Hindus to oppose candidates who were likely to ‘prejudice 
Hindu interests' in the elections planned in India for November 1926.18 The Mahasabha did not wish to become 
an explicitly political organisation at this juncture -  particularly before the start of the 1926 election campaign in 
north India.
Nonetheless, the Hindu Mahasabha had eventually made a radical departure from its non-political role and 
decided to nominate candidates on its own behalf across north India. The party’s Working Committee -  
comprising M.M. Malaviya, Deva Ratan Sharma, Rampal Singh, Narendra Nath, Lala Ram Saran Das, and Neki 
Ram Sharma -  decided on 10 May 1926 to undertake the election work and authorised the provincial Hindu 
Sabhas to to take all proper steps 'which included the running of its own candidates, where necessary, to 
safeguard Hindu interests’ in the country. The provincial Hindu Sabhas could nominate candidates in 
consultation with the Reforms Committee of the Mahasabha, or support the candidates of other parties whom 
they endorsed; and the Mahasabha’s Working Committee ultimately assumed control of the election work in 
entire north India.19 In the UP, the Malaviya group supported a move by the provincial Hindu Sabhas to set up 
‘election boards’ in August 1926. These boards would not only nominate their own candidates but support 
candidates nominated by others who were prepared to sign the Hindu Mahasabha’s pledge binding them to 
abide by the decision of either the majority of Hindu members in the legislature, or the Hindu Sabhas. The Agra 
Provincial Hindu Sabha formed an election board at its annual conference in Allahabad on 1 August 1926; and 
a similar board was established by the Oudh Provincial Hindu Sabha.20 Krishna Kant Malaviya, nephew of 
Malaviya and his right-hand man in the election campaign, issued a notice to all the candidates seeking election
161. Prakash, A Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sangathan Movement, Delhi, 1952, p.21.
17 N.N. Mitra [ed.], Indian Annual Register, 1926, Vol. 1, Calcutta, 1927, p. 401; Jayakar Papers, File 435, Item 141, NMML.
18 B. Cleghorn, ‘Religion and Politics: The Leadership of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha -Punjab and Maharashtra, 1920-1939’, 
in B.N. Pandey [ed.], Leadership in South Asia, New Delhi, 1977, p. 403.
19 The Mahasabha Reforms Committee comprised: Punjab -  Narendra Nath and Lajpat Rai; UP -  Rampal Singh, C.Y. 
Chintamani, and Sukhbir Sinha; Bihar -  Rajendra Prasad, Dwarka Nath, and Kumar Ganganand Sinha; Bengal -  Yatindra Nath 
Chaudhuri and Braj Kishore Chaudhrui; CP -  M.S. Aney and B.S. Moonje; Maharashtra -  N.C. Kelkar and Karandikar; Madras -  
Satyamurthi; Andhra -  T. Prakasam; Bombay -  M.R. Jayakar and D.V. Belvi; Gujarat -  Dr S.B. Mehta; Sind -  Jairamdas. The 
Leader, 14 May 1926, p. 6; 15 May 1926, p. 7, Microfilm, NMML; AICC Papers, File F24 of 1926, NMML.
20 The Agra Hindu Sabha election board comprised: Rampal Singh, M.M. Malaviya, C.Y. Chintamani, Mukat Behari Lai Bhargava, 
Durga Narayan Singh, K.K. Malaviya, Narmada Prasad Singh, Bhagwat Sahai Bedar, and Raghava Das. The Oudh Hindu 
Sabha election board included, among others: Raja Prithvipal Singh, Hari Krishna Dhaon, Harish Chandra Bajpai, Sankat Prasad 
Bajpai, and Ram Charan Vidyarthi. The Leader, 11 August 1926, p. 5; 25 August 1926, p. 4, Microfilm, NMML.
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with Mahasabha support in the UP to submit their names and statements of political opinions, which were to be 
forwarded to the election boards across the province.21 The Mahasabha as an organisation had launched itself 
more openly and fully into the elections, with its political role becoming irreversible; and its avowed policy was to 
prepare the Hindu electorate to vote for Hindu sangathamsis who pledged to safeguard ‘Hindu interests’ in India.
The 1926 elections precipitated a political realignment against the Congress in north India. The old 
Congressmen in the leadership of the Hindu Mahasabha -  M.M. Malaviya, Lajpat Rai and the Tilakites -  were 
all united in a coalition against the Congress-Swaraj Party.22 The Mahasabha’s entry into the electoral arena 
came at a time when the Congress had officially passed into the control of the Swaraj Party. The All-India 
Congress Committee [AICC], at its Patna session in late March 1926, formally entrusted the Swaraj Party with 
the responsibility of conducting the elections on behalf of the Congress in India.23 Malaviya launched the 
Independent Congress Party [ICP] in association with Lajpat Rai in September 1926 to further the aims of the 
radical Hindu sangathan.24 The ICP adopted a policy of responsive co-operation with the government and 
aimed to contest the provincial and central assembly elections against the Congress-Swaraj Party controlled by 
Motilal Nehru. Its programme included the working of the reforms, the acceptance of office, and freedom to vote 
on sectarian issues in the central legislature. The ICP was the electoral front of the Hindu Mahasabha, carrying 
the representation of commercial and landed notables in north India. An election board -- comprising Malaviya, 
Narendra Nath, and Lajpat Rai -- was set up to select candidates for the provincial councils and the central 
assembly in consultation with the Hindu Sabhas of the UP, the Punjab, Bihar, and the Central Provinces [CP] - 
Hindustani. Among the ICP candidates in the UP were big landlords like Rai Rajeshwar Bali, Raja Durga Narain 
Singh of Tirwa, Raja Vishwanath Singh of Tiloi, and Raja Raghuraj Singh of Mankapur, commercial magnates 
like Lala Prag Narayan of Agra, Jwala Prasad Jigyasu of Aligarh, Chunnilal Garg of Kanpur, and Calcutta 
business magnate G.D. Birla, the party’s chief financier.25 The leading members of the ICP were mostly 
Mahasabhaites, and the executive committees of the ICP and the Hindu Sabhas were largely identical.26 The 
Mahasabha gave its formal support to the ICP and its sangathan candidates in the elections due in north India 
in late 1926.
In the UP, the protection of ‘Hindu interests’ dominated the 1926 elections, which were marked by direct 
appeals to sectarian issues spearheaded by the revived Hindu Mahasabha. Hindu sectarian concerns and
21 Letter of Krishna Kant Malaviya, Convenor of the Election Board, The Leader, 16 August 1926, p. 4, Microfilm, NMML.
22 Motilal Nehru’s letters to Jawaharlal Nehru, March-September 1926, Vol. XII; AICC G-571 [IV], Pt. 1/1926, NMML.
23 Home Poll, File 112 of 1925, NAI; Hindu, 11 March 1926, p. 6, Microfilm, NMML
24 M.M. Malaviya launched the abortive Responsivist Cooperation Party, later named the Indian Nationalist Party, in March 1926. 
Its leaders were N.C. Kelkar, B.S. Moonje, and M.R. Jayakar. The party, an organised wing within the Congress, was a non­
starter. The Leader, 27 March 1926, p. 3, Microfilm, NMML.
25 The ICP president was Lajpat Rai, general secretary, Malaviya, joint secretaries, E. Raghavendra Rao [C.P. Hindustani] and 
Lala Ram Prasad [Bihar]. The Leader, 28 February, 1926, p. 7; 27 March 1926, p. 6; 7 April 1926, p. 7; 12 May 1926, p. 5; 28 
August 1926, p. 4; 15 September 1926, p. 6, Microfilm, NMML; Gl Home Poll., H2/X/1926: UP FRI November 1926.
26 The Leader, 4 August 1926, p. 5, Microfilm, NMML; Gaya Prasad Singh’s letter to A. Rangaswamy Iyengar, dated 1 October 
1926, File G57[IV] of 1926, AICC Papers, NMML.
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community issues became central to the campaign of Malaviya, who used the elections as a means of 
undermining Nehru’s credibility and defeating the Swaraj Party in the UP.27 A correspondent from Bijnor, UP, 
reported on 5 November 1926 that Malaviya and Bhai Parmanand were trying to ’create and fan the communal 
fire among the electorate’ against the Swarajists in the province.28 Motilal Nehru and his Swarajist colleagues 
launched the campaign with the clear avowal of a secular policy in India, arguing that the rights and interests of 
the Hindu and Muslim communities were identical, and that the Congress stood for complete freedom and 
protection of all the communities in matters of religion.29 Sampumanand, Swaraj Party candidate for Banaras, 
claimed that while the Mahasabha performed a vital role in the sphere of social and religious affairs, it had little 
reason to enter politics because the Congress would protect the interests of all -  the Hindus and the Muslims.30 
The Swarajists strongly denounced the Mahasabha’s involvement in the 1926 election campaign, attacking its 
role as ‘sectarian’ and a ‘Hindu-centred politics’ in north India.31
Nevertheless, the Swaraj Party was defeated in the elections and lost ground almost everyhere in north India, 
suffering such heavy losses that Motilal Nehru spoke of a ‘disaster1 and a ‘veritable rout’ and seriously 
considered 'retiring from politics’. ‘Publicly,’ Nehru stated, ‘I was denounced as an anti-Hindu and pro- 
Mohammedan ...’ 'I have been fully denounced as a beef-eater and destroyer of cows, an opponent of 
prohibition, of music before mosques ... I could only contradict this in public meetings but they permeated 
hamlets and villages which I could not reach.’32 The sectarian propaganda of the 1920s as well as the outbreak 
of the riots took a heavy toll on the Swaraj Party’s electoral chances in the UP, the Central Provinces, and the 
Bombay Presidency. In the UP, the Swarajists lost seats to the Independent Congress Party, winning only 16 
seats in 1926 -- compared with 31 in 1923. Motilal Nehru was routed by Malaviya in Oudh. The ICP on the 
whole performed well in the elections, as the majority of the elected council members were those who had 
contested on the ticket of Hindu sangathanP ‘Swarajism’, it was claimed, had become synonymous with the 
‘betrayal of just and legitimate Hindu interests’ in the country.34 The protection of ‘Hindu interests’ was the 
principal campaigning issue, which had worked against the Congress-Swarajist efforts to woo the Muslims in
27 Gl Home Poll., UP FR June-September 1926,112/IV/1926, NAI. In the municipal elections of 1925, the Malaviya family had 
defeated Nehru’s Swarajist alliance and resumed control of the Allahabad Municipal Board. Home Poll, 112/1925, UP Fortnightly 
Report I, September 1925, NAI.
28 AICC Papers, File No. 21/ Part 2,1926, NMML; Home Poll. 1926, File No. 26, NAI.
29 Motilal Nehru’s statement to press, 10 December 1926, ‘Statements’, Motilal Nehru Papers, NMML.
30 Motilal Nehru’s telegram to the manager, Aj, Benares, 26 November 1926, p. 5; File No. 10/1926, AICC Papers, NMML.
31 Motilal Nehru’s telegram to Rangaswami Iyengar, dated 5 September 1926, File No. G 57 [IV]/1926, AICC Papers, NMML; 
Motilal Nehru’s letter to Raja Indrajit Pratab Bahadur Sahai, dated 18 September 1926, File 10 of 1926, AICC Papers; Motilal 
Nehru’s letter to Sri Prakasa, dated 15 February 1927, Sri Prakasa Papers, NMML.
32 Motilal Nehru’s letter to Jawaharlal, dated 2 December 1926, cited in Jawaharlal Nehru, A Bunch of Old Letters, London, 1960, 
rept. New Delhi, 2005, pp. 49-50,52.
33 In the Punjab, the Swarajist Party lost six seats, only two of Nehru’s nominees being elected compared with nine of Lajpat 
Rai’s candidates. In the CP, from the strength of 35 in 1923, the Swarajist Party was reduced to 17 members in 1926. The 
Responsivists won nine seats and Malaviya’s Independent Congress Party ten. Both these parties formed the government in the 
CP on 11 January 1927. Letter of Secretary, Gl Home [Public], to Secretary, Public and Judicial Department, dated 20 January 
1927,1OR L/P&J/6/267/1927, IOL.
34 The Leader, 19 April 1926, p. 6, Microfilm, NMML.
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north India. In the post-1926 period, Malaviya’s ‘Hindu wing’ and Motilal Nehru’s ‘secular group’ continued to 
compete for the capture of the UP Congress, which represented a coexistence of the rival streams of politics in 
the province.
II. Mahasabha and Congress Nexus
In the 1920s and 1930s, the Congress had maintained informal contacts and nexus, despite its ideological 
differences, with the Hindu Mahasabha in the towns and districts of north India. Several leaders connected with 
the Congress -  prominently Gokaran Nath Misra, Iqbal Narayn Gurtu, Hriday Nath Kunzru, Gauri Shankar 
Misra, Shivprasad Gupta, and Iswar Saran -  had been involved in the Hindu Mahasabha movement in the UP. 
A majority of the incipient UP Hindu Sabha Committee members had been associated with the Congress: seven 
members attended the Congress session in Bombay in 1915.35 On three occasions between December 1922 
and December 1926, the Mahasabha had held its special sessions simultaneously at the same venue as the 
Congress. In August 1923, the Mahasabha was relaunched in Banaras by M.M. Malaviya; and the session was 
attended by prominent Congressmen -- Jawaharlal Nehru, Rajendra Prasad, Purushottam Das Tandon, 
Bhagwan Das, and Ghanshyam Das Biria.36 In 1924 Malaviya presided over the Mahasabha’s session held at 
the Congress venue in Belgaum, which was attended by Gandhi, Muhammad and Shaukat Ali, and Motilal 
Nehru.37 In this period, it was possible and even encouraged by the Mahasabha for its members to be 
associated with the Congress in north India. Neki Ram Sharma, Hindu Mahasabha secretary, stated that the 
Mahasabha had not been created as a rival to the Congress, but to facilitate the ‘establishment of swaraf in the 
country.38 Congress leaders retained less formal associations with the Mahasabha, believing that the Congress 
worked as the main political organisation, whereas the Mahasabha dealt with the social issues of Hindu 
society.39 Sections of the Hindu Mahasabhaites had held dual membership, working for the protection of Hindu 
interests within the Congress in north India during the 1920s and 1930s.
At the national level, sections of the Hindu Mahasabha leaders had simultaneously become part of the 
Congress, utilising its affiliation to expand the Mahasabha in north India. A substantial number of old 
Congressmen had shifted to the Mahasabha in the UP, the Central Provinces, and Maharashtra by the 1920s 
and 1930s. Lajpat Rai, the Punjabi Congress ‘extremist’ leader, had presided over the Calcutta session of the 
Congress in September 1920, which proposed the boycott of the new councils as part of the Non-cooperation 
movement in the country. He subsequently worked together with M.M. Malaviya at the helm of the Mahasabha 
organisation, continuing his association with the party until his death in Lahore in 1928.40 Swami 
Shraddhananda was an important sangathan leader associated with both the Congress and the Mahasabha in
35 Report of the Proceedings of the 30* Indian National Congress, 1915, Bombay 1916, p. 10.
36 The Leader, 22 August 1923, p. 3, Microfilm, NMML; Gordon, ‘Hindu Mahasabha', p. 151-73.
37 Craig Baxter, The Jana Sangh: A Biography of an Indian Political Party, Pennsylvania, 1969, p. 14.
38 The Tribune, 24 July 1923, p. 6, Microfilm, NMML.
39 The statement of Satyapal, Congress leader from the Punjab: The Tribune, 13 October 1926, p. 4, Microfilm, NMML.
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the 1920s. K.B. Hedgewar, who became Mahasabha general secretary before founding the RSS in 1925, had 
first joined Congress politics and was elected to the Central Provinces Congress Committee as its joint 
secretary: he quit the Congress along with other Tilakites over its support for the Khilafat movement in 1920- 
2141 T. Prakasham, later Congress chief minister of Andhra, and Jairamdas Daulatram, Congress leader in 
Maharashtra, had been involved in the Mahasabha’s activities and programmes durig its formative period. For 
the Congress old guard dissatisfied with Gandhi’s leadership, the Mahasabha had evolved itself as an 
alternative platform to express an ideology of nationalism and regional loyalties steeped in Hindu idiom.42 
Sangathan as well as Hindu revivalist rhetoric in defence of Hindu society was closely identified with the 
Congress ‘extremist’ leader Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s nationalist vision and deployed against the Gandhian 
Congress. The Congressmen who had been Tilak’s close associates mostly took control of the Mahasabha in 
north India. The most prominent of the Tilakites were: B.S. Moonje, the leading figure in the Central Provinces 
Congress; M.S. Aney, Congress politician in Berar; N.C. Kelkar, the Swarajist legislator in Poona; and M.R. 
Jayakar, the Swarajist Party leader in Bombay.43 The majority of the Tilakites -  including L.B. Bhopatkar in 
Poona, Chandragupta Vedalankar, Ganpat Rai, and Indra Prakash -- had once been Congressmen before 
becoming the Mahasabha’s hardliners. The Mahasabha served as a means of challenging the Gandhian 
Congress whose mass campaigns had displaced the Tilakites from the positions of prominence in north India. 
There had been a distinct opposition to Gandhi form the Hindu right due to his alliance with the Muslim elites 
during the Non-cooperation movement. Inevitably, several prominent Congress leaders became important 
personalities in the Mahasabha after the organisation had been re-launched in the early 1920s.
In the UP, the Congress’s associations with the Hindu Mahasabha had persisted well into the late 1930s. 
There were a number of Congressmen influenced by the Mahasabha’s nationalist rhetoric in the province. A 
strong advocacy of India’s need to end Britsh rule was central to the Mahasabha and the Congress, both urging 
self-rule and the struggled for an ‘undivided India'. However, the presence of the Muslims in the Congress 
worried the Mahasabha, which had held a more restrictive attitude towards them.44 B.S. Moonje suggested that 
all the Mahasabhaites should join the Congress as ‘a prophylactic against the Muslim contamination and influx’ 
of the latter party.45 In the UP, political activity in both the Congress and the Mahasabha was merely one aspect 
of ‘public work’ and an extension of the activities of interest groups and leaders.46 Several members of the 
Congress were active in the Mahasabha and on the executive committees of the Hindu Sabhas in the province. 
The UP Congress group, headed by Raja Bahadur of Tiloi and Pandit Jyoti Shankar Dikshit, had retained its
40 V.C. Joshi [ed.], Lala Lajpat Rai: Writings and Speeches 1920-1928, Vol. II, Delhi, 1966, p. 27.
41 Narayan Hari Palkar, DrB.K. Hedgewar [Translated from Marathi by Mrinalini Davale], Poona, 1964, pp. 79,104.
42 Nandini Gondhalekar, ‘Indian Nationalism and “Hindu" Politics: Maharashtra and the Hindu Mahasabha, 1920-1948’, 
Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1999, p. 23; Prakash, A Review, pp. 54-5
43 N.C. Kelkar presided over the Hindu Mahasabha’s session in Jabbalpore in 1928; Cleghom, ‘Religion and Politics’, p. 409.
44 Henrik Berglund, Hindu nationalism and Democracy, Delhi, 2004, pp. 63-4.
45 Gondhalekar, ‘Indian Nationalism’, p. 108.
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loyalty to the Mahasabha till the early 1930s.47 Conversely, the UP Hindu Sabha clique -- led by Raja 
Maheshwar Dayal Seth, J.P. Srivastava, and Krishna Gurtu Narain -- had proposed to set up an 'All-India Hindu 
League’ to revive the Mahasabha’s political activities in the province; but it also attempted to forge an alliance 
with the Congress and conducted a propaganda for the latter party in the province, a line that repeatedly 
brought it into conflict with the Mahasabha’s central leadership.48 Prominent members of the Mahasabha held 
responsible positions in Congress organisations and were permitted to join the Congress reception committees 
in Agra, Oudh, Aligarh, Badaun, and Bundelkhand, UP.49 K.M. Ashraf, a Congress socialist, complained to the 
secretary of the UP Congress Committee that prominent Hindu Mahasabha members were allowed to occupy 
'responsible positions’ in the Congress in the UP.50 However, the inability of the provincial Congress to 
overcome the Mahasabha cadres pointed to the presence of a strong Hindu ideological influence among the 
party ranks; and Congress radicalism in a way co-existed with the elements of Hindu politics across the UP in 
the 1920s and 1930s.
There was a strong Hindu Mahasabha association with the Hindu Tight wing’ of the Congress in the UP. In 
Banaras city, the Swaraj Party, the Hindu Sabha and the Kshatriya Sabha were virtually the same organisation. 
‘Often the Secretary of the Kshatriya Sabha takes the chair at meetings of the Hindu Sabha.’51 The Banaras 
Hindu Sabha kept an affiliation with Dharm Deo Shastri, a Congress leader.52 Sri Prakash, a dominant figure in 
the Banaras Congress organisation, associated himself with Hindu sangathan in the early 1930s.53 Purushottam 
Das Tandon, a patron of the Arya Samaj with an active involvement in Hindu volunteer organisations, was a 
supporter of the movements associated with Hindu revivalism, advocating Sanskritised Hindi in India.54 
Sampurnanand, the first Congress 'dictator1 of Banaras, maintained close Hindu Sabha connections and was 
involved in the organisation of a Hindu Sabha meeting to mobilise support for Gandhi’s harijan campaign in 
October 1932.55 He showed admiration for the ideals of the Arya Samaj and persistently championed the 
causes of Hindi versus Urdu and Hindu social reform, depicting the Indian nation as an Aryan one -- faced with 
the threats of Islam and Christianity.56 In Kanpur there had been a strong institutional overlap and affiliation 
between the city Hindu Sabha and the Congress by the early 1930s. In the city the Hindu Sabha’s membership 
was drawn from urban middle-class educated supporters who were not only members of the Congress but
46 Gould, Hindu Nationalism, pp. 67,75.
47 Home Poll, File 25 of 1923, NAI; Gould, Hindu Nationalism, p. 246.
48 ‘UP Hindu Sangathan Committee’, 12 October 1940, All-India Hindu Mahasabha Papers, File No. P-13/1940, NMML.
49 Gould, Hindu Nationalism, p. 228.
50 K.M. Ashrafs letter to MahavirTyagi, dated 5 March 1938, AICC Papers, B-9,1938, NMML.
51 The Leader, 20 July 1925, p. 7, Microfilm, NMML.
52 Police Abstracts of Intelligence [PAl], Lucknow, UP, 4 March 1933.
53 The Leader, Allahabad, 8 August 1923, p. 6, Microfilm, NMML.
54 Gould, Hindu Nationalism, p. 271.
55 Gould, Hindu Nationalism, pp. 178.
56 The Leader, Allahabad, 23 October 1932, p. 6, Microfilm, NMML.
156
patrons of many religious and cultural movements.57 In 1926 Dr Murarilal Rohatgi and other Congresss leaders 
of Kanpur city joined the local Hindu Sabha in an effort to gain control of it, even though they were critical of its 
ideology and objectives.58 After the Kanpur riot in 1930, witness statements pointed to a covert relationship 
between the city Hindu Sabha and the local Congress bodies, leading to the Muslim League’s charge that the 
Congress was ‘under the thumb of the Hindu Maha Sabhaites’ in the UP.59 There were accusations in the Urdu 
press that local Congressmen had worked in alliance with the Hindu Mahasabha to oust the Muslims from the 
positions of power across the province. The organised ‘legal attack’ on the mosques in Kanpur district, the 
‘calculated harassment and impoverishment’ of the Muslims in the UP towns, and the exclusion of the Muslims 
from power were termed ‘deliberate and communally inspired’ and linked to the Mahasabhaites.60 In Allahabad, 
Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, a Congress leader, was a protege of Malaviya and a member of the UP Hindu 
Mahasabha committee.61 In the city, Narmada Prasad Singh, a prominent Hindu Sabha leader and a general 
secretary of the Agra Hindu Sabha in 1929, was also a well-known Congressman, a member of the UP 
Congress Committee in 1925-26, and a leader of the Malaviya group in the Allahabad Congress in 1926 and 
1927.62 In many instances, the Hindu Sabhas and the Congress right-wing shared resources and personnel in 
the towns of the UP, with their active organisational overlap continuing well into the 1920s and 1930s.
However, an outright opposition to the Congress had developed within the Hindu Mahasabha organisation 
by the late 1920s.63 B.S. Moonje initiated a more militant approach and rejected Congress politics during his 
presidentship of the Mahasabha in the period 1927-1933, largely withdrawing the organisation from the mass 
nationalist struggles launched by Gandhi. He argued: ‘Due to the Congress mentality, a misguided tendency 
towards generosity ... has created obstacles in the path of Hindu life and progress ... Faced with the British 
bureaucracy’s promotion of Muslims on the one hand, and with the Congress’ conciliatory and yielding mentality 
on the other, the Hindu race is being strangled to death ,..’64 The radical Hindu Mahasabha started the process 
of establishing itself as a political party, competing with the Congress in the central legislature and provincial 
council elections in the late 1920s. Its overt militancy converged into a strong anti-Congress political opposition 
under the leadership of Bhai Parmanand, who succeeded B.S. Moonje as party president at the Ajmer session 
in October 1933.65 In Parmanand’s sangathan programme, India was to be a Hindu country with ‘one language,
57 Nandini Gooptu, The Politics of the Urban Poor in Early Twentieth-Century India, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 192-3.
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one religion, and one culture’ -  a vision that clashed with the Congress’s secular ideology.66 A vocal advocate of 
the sangathanist break with the Congress, Paramanand oriented the Mahasabha’s programme to a strong 
commitment to Hindu unity, calling for the promotion of ‘Hindu politics’ in India.67 He demanded that the 
Mahasabha contest elections as a separate party with its own sangathan ist candidates and become a true 
political party in the country, for it was the only hope for the ‘salvation of the Hindu community1. He declared: ‘I 
think the most important weapon which could be of service to us [Hindus] in this work is the capturing of the 
Legislative Assembly and Councils.’68 However, Parmanand’s dream of making the Mahasabha a political party 
potent enough to challenge the Congress was far from a success, as the party had not yet become ‘a fully 
developed organisation’ in the country.69 The Mahasabha did not participate in the 1930 Civil Disobedient 
movement as an organisation -  a position that tarnished its national image among the people. And there had 
been little progess on the recruitment front in India.70 There were the divergences of approach among the 
Mahasabha leaders on the anti-British struggles in India, but the majority insisted that the party ought not to be 
accommodating and break with the Congress in its programmes and politics in the country.
The existing institutional overlap between the Hindu Mahasabha and the Congress, if informal, had declined 
completely by the late 1930s. The Congress’s success in the 1937 elections in the provinces that were once 
considered the ‘Hindu strongholds’ challenged the Mahasabha’s claim to be the sole representative of ‘Hindu 
interests’, making it appear as ‘politically irrelevant’ in India.71 The election defeat established that the 
Mahasabha had little influence among the masses: it had a narrow political base, while the support from the 
masses was limited and sporadic in the country. It did not create an effective party organisation at the 
grassroots, or broaden its appeal as a political party in the country. The party had little monoeuvrablity in linking 
the local concerns to those of the province and the nation due to its domination by the conservative elites and 
the aristocracy.72 The Congress, on the contrary, appealed for the ‘organic unity1 of all the classes and religions 
as well as the advantages of a ‘secular state’, mobilising political support in the towns and villages of India. It 
had broadened its mass base following an effective organisational and branch structure and the strengthening
66 Keith Alexander Meadowcroft, “ ‘From Hindu-Muslim Unity” to Hindu Raj: The Evolution of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha 
1922-1939’, Unpublished Masters Dissertation, Concordia University, Montreal, 1995, pp. 76-7.
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70 M.M. Malaviya, B.S. Moonje, and M.S. Aney broke the salt law and pledged support for Civil Disobedience. B.S. Moonje’s 
letter to M.R. Jayakar, enclosed wire sent to Gandhi, dated 20 April 1930, File No. 63, Moonje Papers NMML; Judith Brown, 
Gandhi and Civil Disobedience: The Mahatma in Indian Politics, 1928-34, Cambridge, 1977, p. 150.
71 In the 1937 elections, the Hindu Mahasabha was mostly defeated: it won 11 seats in the UP and the Punjab, two in Bengal, 
one in Bihar, one in the Central Provinces, four in Sind, and one in Bombay. The Congress got majority in six out of eleven 
provinces, including the UP, the CP, Madras, Bihar, and Orissa. Home Poll., FR, Punjab, File No. 18/2/1937, NAI.
72 Home Poll., FR, UP, File No. 18/10/1936; Walter Anderson, The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh II: Who Represents the 
Hindus?’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 7, No. 12,18 March 1972, p. 634.
1 5 8
of control from the top since the adoption of its new constitution in 1934.73 By the 1930s, the Mahasabha- 
Congress confrontation had deepened in the struggle for electoral gains and popular support in the country. The 
Hindu Sabhas in the UP began to detach themselves from the Congress from the time of the tetter's ministry 
formation in July 1937.74The Hindu Sabhas of Agra and Oudh condemned the UP Congress ministry for its 
‘pro-Muslim’ policy; and there were a series of complaints about the deliberate ‘negligence of Hindu rights’ by 
the Congress government, particularly in Farrukabad and Mathura, UP75 The final break-up came when the 
Congress Working Committee, through a historic resolution of 16 December 1938, blacklisted the Hindu 
Mahasabha and the Muslim League as the ‘communal’ organisations and banned Congress members from 
holding a duel membership with a ‘communal organisation’ in the country76 The ban was forced by those who 
were anxious to maintain the ‘secular1 character of the Congress in India. The Congress subsequently tightened 
its organisation, ending the close and informal connexions between the district Congress committees and the 
Hindu Sabhas across the country. However, the Mahasabha protested, declaring that ‘it is the only national 
organisation in the country’, and that ‘there is no other national politics than that of the Hindu Mahasabha for the 
country as a whole and for the Hindus particularly’.77 The break-up was obviously probable because the 
Congress no longer needed the Mahasabha’s support electorally; and the ban had resulted in a definite 
Mahasabha policy to move away from the Congress.
III. Savarkarite Mahasabha
The Hindu Mahasabha formally transformed itself into a full-fledged political party under V.D. Savarkar’s 
leadership in the late 1930s, ending its ties to the Congress in north India. Savarkar, who succeeded Bhai 
Parmanand as president in 1937, made the institutional difference between the Mahasabha and the Congress 
extremely radical, providing a philosophy and charisma as well as ‘new vigour and fresh hope’ to the 
organisation.78 The Mahasabha’s power base shifted from the UP and the Punjab to central India, especially 
the Bombay Presidency, the Central Provinces and Berar, where B.G. Tilak had prepared the ground for the 
development of Hindu nationalist politics.79 It acquired a more centralised decision-making process dominated 
by the president with little space for a democratic election unlike in the Congress: its overall programme was 
dominated by Savarkar’s advocacy of a Hindu rashtra [nation] and sangathan*0Savarkar resolved to build the
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Mahasabha into a political party in order to represent the Hindus of India as much as the Muslim League did for 
the Muslims in the country. He declared: The Mahasabha is not in the main a Hindu-Dharma Sabha but is pre­
eminently a Hindu Rashtra Sabha and is a pan-Hindu organisation shaping the destiny of the Hindu Nation in all 
its social, political and cultural aspects.’81 He emphasised the need to gain political power by challenging the 
Congress in the electoral field. Savarkar explained: ‘If Hindu voters voted at the next election for Hindu 
candidates standing on the ticket of the Mahasabha they would come into power.’82 He proposed to expand the 
Mahasabha’s organisational network, encouraging the formation of new branches of the party all over India in a 
plan to make it a 'progressive and living organisation’.83 He stated: ‘Whoever does an act helping Hindu 
Sangathan deserves our backing up on that particular point whatever be our differences or even 
animosities ...,84The Mahasabha adopted its new constitution in 1938, pledging to protect ‘Hindu interests’ not 
only in ‘religious but also in political spheres’. Its central aim was to supplant the Congress in the political arena 
across the country.85 Savarkar urged Hindu sangathamsts to capture political power wherever possible -  
municipal boards, legislatures, provincial and central governments. He demanded that the tricolour be rejected 
as the national flag. ‘Gerva [saffron] Flag shall be the Flag of the Hindu Nation. With its Om, the Swastik and the 
Sword, it appeals to the sentiments cherished by our race since the Vaidik days.’ 86 In the 1930s and 1940s, 
Savarkar’s ideological goal centred on transforming the Mahasabha into a credible political challenger of the 
Congress at the all-India level.87
Savarkar’s sangathan programme aimed to distinguish the Hindu Mahasabha’s ideology from the stated 
policies of the Congress in India. Savarkar urged all the different Hindu organisations to unite under the banner 
of the Mahasabha, which consciously carried the motto of protecting ‘Hindu interests’ in the country.88 This 
union would, he asserted, help the Mahasabha maintain a central fund at its disposal as well as the press which 
would enable it to continue its determined fight against the ‘pseudo-nationalists’ [Congress] and the Muslims.89 
In an appeal to the Hindus, Savarkar urged a strong resistance to the policies and programmes of the Congress 
and Gandhi. He warned about the ‘unstable nature’ of the Congress policies in the country. ‘Prepare the Hindu 
electorate,’ he insisted, ‘to the utmost measure possible to vote only for those Hindu Sangathanists who openly
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pledged to safeguard Hindu interests’ and not the Congress.90 Savarkar insisted: ‘I warn the Hindu Electorate 
categorically for the thousandeth [sic] time that that unless they remove these Pseudo-nationalist leaders from 
the helm of our state, the Gandhistic Indianism will allow Moslems inside India to capture key posts in the army, 
the police, the state.’91 ‘As ... neither the Gandhistic ideology nor the pseudo-nationalistic ideology of the 
Congress,’ he emphasised, ‘can ever cope with this Islamic offensive and as the Hindu Sangathanist ideology 
alone can and will be able to fight out this danger successfully, the Government should consist of such Ministers 
alone who are pledged to the Hindu Sangathanist ideology alone.’92 He explained: ‘If in spite of our efforts that 
the Hindu Electorate persists in its suicidal folly and votes the Congress ... [the Mahasabha] shall acknowledge 
the defeat and share the humiliation.’93 Savarkar’s plan to carve out a political constituency and ensure electoral 
support for the Mahasabha had represented a crucial sangathan ist challenge to the Congress in India in the 
1930s and 1940s.
However, Savarkar’s ambitious vision fell far short of achieving the much publicised goal of transforming the 
Hindu Mahasabha into a political party potent enough to challenge the Congress in the country. The 
Mahasabha could not build an extensive network of support such as the Congress had acquired under Gandhi’s 
leadership during the 1930s.94 The lack of support for sangathan programmes in the mofussil areas of the 
country forced the Mahasabha to launch a membership drive in the towns and villages in the late 1930s; and 
the occasions were often used to denounce the Congress. Shyama Prasad Mookherjee suggested that the 
Mahasabha open its ranks to non-Hindus in order to stage a revival, but the party hardliners rejected the plan.95 
There was no realistic prospect of the party securing a majority through elections in the immediate future. The 
Mahasabha had remained inflexible in its sangathan ideology and was oriented towards a Hindu brand of 
politics, failing to be truly represented in the elective institutions of India during the 1930s.
The ideologies and programmes of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Congress were in a deep divide and 
conflict, despite all the weight of expediency and political calculation to maintain an informal association 
between them in the 190s and 1930s. Personalities, more so the Mahasabha hardliners, played their part, too. 
The Mahasabha’s ideology was markedly different from the Congress’s goal of secularism as well as its 
principles of freedom by constitutional advance.96 The party demanded a religiously-defined ‘Hindu state’ much 
in the same pattern as the Muslim League and started to see the Congress as an enemy of the nation due to
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the letter’s alleged ‘pro-Muslim’ bias and ‘appeasement’ of the Muslims.97 The Congress’s nationalist 
programme bore a distinct stamp of Gandhi’s ideology based on ahimsa and Hindu-Muslim unity, which clashed 
with the Mahasaba’s search for a Hindu political constituency in India. The Mahasabha rejected the Congress’s 
ideal of secular nationalism based on the equality of religions and communities and instead sought to capture 
the Hindu sentiment for the one-nation cause of a Hinutva rashtra [nation] on the basis of sangathan in the 
country.
Conclusion
In the early twentieth century, the early Congress represented a coexistence of secular idiom and Hindu 
nationalism; and the division between its secular discourse and the idiom adopted by its orators had remained 
ambiguous and indistinct in north India.98 It maintained an informal relationship with the Hindu organisations 
due to its loose and informal style of politics, particularly in the 1920s and early 1930s. Since the Hindu 
Mahasabha’s emergence in 1915, there had existed a nexus and informal associations between the Congress 
and the Hindu Sabhas at the local level in north India. The overlapping membership and association created a 
conducive climate in which both organisations strengthened and reinforced each other, more so in the UP. The 
Mahasabha’s association with the Congress had persisted in more informal forms into the late 1930s until the 
blacklisting and rejection of the former as a ‘communal’ party in 1938. The Mahasabha became a full-fleged 
political party under the leadership of V.D. Savarkar, who advocated an overt and militant Hindu nationalism in 
opposition to the Congress’s secular ideology. Savarkar’s advocacy of a ‘Hindu nation’ became the central tenet 
of the Mahasabha’s sangathan ideology, resulting in the breakdown of its ties to the Congress. The ideal of 
national unity based on the construction of a ‘Hindu nation’ emerged as the Mahasabha’s chief ideological 
doctrine, clashing with the Congress’s secularism as well as its anti-British struggle predicated on non-violence 
and Hindu-Muslim unity in India.99
96 Gopal Krishna, The Development of the Indian National Congress as a Mass Organization, 1918-1923’, The Journal of Asian 
Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3, May 1966, p. 425.
97 Chatterji, Bengal Divided, pp. 137-41; Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Movement, p. 33.
98 Bayly, Local Roots, p. 153.
99 Chetan Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism: Origins, ideologies and Modem Myths, Oxford, 2001, p. 100.
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Sangathanist Plan for Hindu Majority Nation
In the early decades of the twentieth century, the Indian National Congress made concerted efforts to 
negotiate a settlement on Hindu-Muslim representation as the basis of a renewed struggle for independence 
from Britain. The Hindu Mahasabha questioned the Congress’s legitimacy to negotiate on behalf of the Hindus, 
insisting that it and not the Congress was the principal spokesman of the Hindu community. It rejected separate 
electorates for the Muslims and proposed joint electorates and the rule of the majority -  a political system 
strongly opposed by the Muslim elite. The 1928 Nehru report, which accepted joint electorates as the basis of a 
settlement, was rejected by the Muslim parties; and the Round Table Conferences in London in 1930-31 had 
failed to break the impasse in the country. This chapter argues that the Mahasabha’s resistance to the Muslim 
demands for safeguards in India’s legislatures and its campaign for a permanent ‘Hindu majority rule’, besides 
the irreconcilability of the Muslim demands, had precipitated the crisis on Hindu-Muslim power sharing, 
eventually leading to the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan in the 1940s. It focuses on the Mahasabha’s 
role in the breakdown of negotiations on the Muslim demands for concessions in the legislatures during the 
1920s and 1930s.
I. Separate Electorates
British rule in India was based on a strategy to win the collaboration of a wide range of native notables, rural 
and urban, and religious communities. In taking a new direction, the state granted separate electorates for the 
Muslims, besides ‘weightage’, in the provincial legislative councils under the Indian Councils Act of 1909 -  the 
Minto-Morley reforms. In addition to separate electorates, the Muslims were eligible to enter candidates and 
vote in general electorates and thereby could control additional seats in the councils of the country.1 Separate 
electorates introduced the notion of the Muslim community [qaum] as the unit of political representation, which 
had become a rationale for the British to meet the Muslim anxieties about the threat of electoral marginalisation 
in a majoritarian ‘Hindu state’. The Muslim League emphasised most strongly the value it placed on the principle 
of separate representation in order to assure the security of the Muslim community.2 In the British calculation, 
the reforms were intended to secure the loyalty of the Muslims through its elite and effectively break the 
Congress’s nationalist struggle in the country. For the state, religion had become the basis of the reforms as 
well as the defining principle of Indian identity, history and culture.3
1 S.S. Pirzada [ed.], Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents 1906-1947, Vol. I, Karachi, 1990, p.129.
2 S.R. Wasti, Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905 to 1910, Oxford, 1964, pp. 129-31.
3 John Morley, Secretary of State for India, presenting the 1909 Act in the British Parliament on 23 February 1909, stated that 
‘the difference between Mahmedanism and Hinduism is ... a difference in life, in tradition, in history, in C.H. Philips [ed.], The 
Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947: Select Documents, Vol. 4, London 1962, p. 86.
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The grouping of the Muslims into an all-India political category was a watershed event with disastrous 
implications for the Congress’s vision of inclusionary nationalism in the country. Congress moderates opposed 
separate electorates, protesting against the grave risks involved in Muslim over-representation and the resultant 
sectarian cleavage between the Hindus and the Muslims in India.4 Surendranath Banerjea moved a resolution 
carried by the Congress unanimously in 1910, objecting to the ‘excessive and unfairly preponderant share of 
representation given to the followers of one particular religion [Muslims] ...’5 Bishan Narain Dar attacked the 
unfairness of separate representation for the Muslims and supported the formation of new Hindu Sabhas by 
Hindu publicists in north India.6 Gopal Krishna Gokhale had initially supported separate Muslim electorates, but 
conceded that the Muslim demands were ‘unreasonable’, expressing a grave concern that the ‘weightage’ being 
accorded to the Muslims in the councils was so excessive as to be ‘monstrously unjust’.7 The Congress 
nationalists feared that separate electorates were a potential threat to damage the unity of the Indian nation with 
crippling effects on social relations between the Hindus and the Muslims.
In the United Provinces, the home territory of the Muslim League and for long the heartland of Muslim 
separatism, the Muslim elite had gained most from separate electorates and ‘weighted’ representation in the 
provincial Legislative Council, thereby adversely affecting the political sphere of Hindu leaders.8 Hindu publicists 
attacked separate electorates as a threat to reduce the influence of ‘lawyer politicians’ by adversely affecting the 
election of the Hindus to the council.9 Madan Mohan Malaviya deplored that separate electorates tended to set 
one religion against the other, reducing the non-official majority provided under the 1909 Act to a ‘farce’.10 The 
‘Hindus,’ he stated, 'should protest against their [Muslims] being given a number of seats in excess of what they 
would be entitled to by virtue of their proportion of the total population.’11 Four out of the 20 elective seats in the 
UP Legislative Council went to the Muslims as of right after 1909, he pointed out, even though they were only 
14.5 per cent of the population in the province. The Muslims were sure to secure two more seats from the mixed 
electorates in the UP; and two non-official appointed members were also to be Muslims, which ensured that out 
of the 26 non-official members, eight were to be Muslim in the province. In the Legislative Council, controversial 
amendments could always be defeated by a combination of official members and conservatives, despite the 
formal majority of non-officials.12 For Hindu leaders and publicists, separate electorates threatened to spell a
4 Report of the 25th Indian National Congress Session, Calcutta, 1909, Calcutta, 1910, p. 47.
5 Report of the 26th Indian National Congress Session, Bombay, 1910, Calcutta, 1911, p. 84.
6 B.N. Dar’s Presidential Address, India National Congress Session, Calcutta, 1911: Bishan Narain Dar, Collected Speeches and 
Writings ofPt. Bishan Narain Dar, Vol. 1 [Editor: H.L. Chatterjee], Lucknow, 1921, p. 325.
7 G.K. Gokhale’s letter to W. Wedderburn, 3 December 1909, File No. 203, Part II, No. 159, Gokhale Papers, NAI. Sir William
Wedderburn [1838-1918] founded the Indian National Congress along with A.O. Hume and was its president in 1889 and 1910.
8 Francis Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces’ Muslims 1860-1923, Cambridge,
2n edn. 1993, [1975], pp. 98-104.
9 Home Public ‘A’, August 1909, File No. 1824, October 1909, pp. 44-8, 51-5, NAI.
10 M.M. Malaviya’s Presidential Address, Report of the 25th Indian National Congress Session, 1909, p. 31.
11 M.M. Malaviya’s letter to G.K. Gokhale, dated 4 March 1909, Gokhale Papers, NAI.
12 Home Education, Municipal A, April 1914, 22-31, NAI.
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regressive impact on provincial politics with a potential to heighten conflicts and sharply define the religious 
divide in the towns and districts of the UP.
More significantly, ‘weighted’ representation for the Muslims was also introduced in the municipal boards of 
the UP in 1916, followed by generous representation on district boards after 1922.13 Under the UP 
Municipalities Act of 1916, separate representation was extended to the municipalities with the ‘weightage’ of up 
to three-tenths for the minorities -  chiefly the Muslims.14 Congress leaders Motilal Nehru, Tej Bahadur Sapru, 
Jagat Narain Mulla, and Ishwar Saran had backed the Act as part of the Congress’s initiative to secure Muslim 
support in a united front for reforms from the British.15 The Act accorded a disproportionately larger 
representation of 38.5 per cent to the Muslims in the UP municipalities.16 The Muslim groups taking power 
under the Act could control not only the posts of the subordinate bureaucracy but also civil institutions which 
supported the overall networks of local influence in the towns of the province.17 The municipalities Act had 
created a deep discontent among the Hindu publicists, driving them into a vigorous opposition over the 
‘grievous injustice’ to the non-Muslims.18 The fear was that the Hindus might be placed in a minority on the 
municipal boards, seriously affecting their representation in the UP Legislative Council and the central 
legislature.19
To the Hindu right, the 1916 Act had become a rallying cry in its agitation against separate representation to 
the Muslims across the UP. M.M. Malaviya and C.Y. Chintamani, editor of the Leader, led an agitation against 
the Act in Allahabad;20 and the stir was supported by Hindu Sabha men -  Babu Bhagwan Das, Sundar Lai, Rai 
Bahadur Anand Swarup, and Lala Sukhbir Sinha, ‘who’, T.B. Sapru told a friend, ‘every now and again reminds 
me that the Municipal Act has "ruined” [he uses no other word] the Hindus ...’21 Twelve Hindu members of the 
Allahabad Municipal Board and all the Hindu members of Lucknow municipality resigned in July 1916.22
13 Letter of Sir James Meston, Lieutenant Governor of UP, to Secretary, Legislative Department, Government of India, dated 21 
March 1916, Home Public ‘B’, September 1916,70-72, NAI.
14 The Act, which incorporated the Jehangirabad amendment moved by the Raja of Jehangirabad, was passed on 26 March 
1916 in the UP Legislative Council with the dissent of three Hindu members, including Pandit Radha Krishna Das. Proceedings 
of the Council of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Assembled for the Purpose of 
Making Laws and Regulations, 1916, Allahabad, 1917, p. 218; The Leader [Allahabad, daily, editor -  C.Y. Chintamani], 29 
March 1916, IOR L/R/5/91,1916, pp. 272-73; Abhyudaya [Allahabad, weekly, editor: K.K. Malaviya], 29 March 1916, IOR 
L/R/5/91,1916, p. 322; Advocate [Lucknow, tri-weekly, 1,100 copies], 30 March 1916, IOR L/R/5/91, p. 273, IOL.
15 Francis Robinson, ‘Municipal Government and Muslim Separatism in the United Provinces, 1883-1916’, Modem Asian Studies, 
Vol. 7, No. 3,1973, pp. 428-41.
16 Under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act, when the Muslims formed less than 25 per cent of the municipal population, they would 
receive 30 per cent of the seats, and they would get 38 per cent of the seats, or above when they constituted 25 to 38 per cent of 
the population. UP Municipal, File No. 230 E, 1916, UPSA; Home Poll., April 1916, No. 19, p. 7, NAI.
17 Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, Imperial Power and Popular Politics: Class, Resistance and the State in India c. 1850-1950, 
Cambridge, 1998, p. 181.
18 Pratap [Kanpur, weekly, editor -  Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi, 2,000 copies], 17 April 1916, IOR L/R/5/91,1916, p. 342; Anand 
[Lucknow, weekly, editor: Pandit Shiva Nath, Brahmin, 48,200 copies], 22 April 1916, IOR L/R/5/91,1916, p. 362; Abhyudaya, 3 
August 1916, IOR L/R/5/92,1916, p. 329, IOL.
18 Pratap, 10 April 1916, IOR L/R/5/91,1916, p. 233; Abhyudaya, 22 July 1916, IOR L/R/5/92,1916, File No. 31, p. 695, IOL.
20 Home Poll, FR, UP, June 1916, File No. 25,1916, NAI; C.A. Bayly, The Local Roots of Indian Politics: Allahabad 1880-1920, 
Oxford, 1975, p.205.
21 T.B. Sapru’s letter to Sita Ram, dated 10 August 1916, Sita Ram Papers, NAI.
22 Home Poll. Dep. June 1916, No. 25, NAI; UP Proceedings of the Municipal Department, File No. RB 81, Block, 1916, UPSA.
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Similarly, the Hindu members of Bijnor municipality resigned, while those in Unao, Ayodhya and Etawah district 
boards threatened to quit in protest.23 A protest meeting, attended by nearly 6,000 Hindus, was held in 
Allahabad on 16 July 1916, where M.M. Malaviya condemned separate electorates for the Muslims.24 The local 
Hindu Sabhas led the protest against the municipalities Act across the province.25 At its conference held in 
Banaras on 20 August 1916 under the presidentship of Raja Sir Rampal Singh, the UP Hindu Sabha strongly 
attacked the Act and rejected separate electorates altogether.26 Evidently, it was feared, an alliance existed 
between the British and the Muslims in order to ‘limit the political power of the Hindu community’ in the 
country.27 At its annual meeting in Lucknow in December 1916, the All-India Hindu Sabha condemned the Act 
and the Congress’s ‘sell out’ to the Muslims, urging the Hindus to keep aloof from the Congress, as ‘it could not 
protect the Hindu rights against the Muslim demands’.28 The Hindu right was apprehensive about the negative 
implications of a decline in Hindu representation in the municipal councils and district boards of the UP under 
the 1916 Act.
1.1. Lucknow Pact
In a historic reappraisal of its policy and reconciliation, the Congress formally conceded separate electorates 
to the Muslims under the Lucknow Pact in 1916 after having consistently opposed them since 1909. Moderates 
like Motilal Nehru and Tej Bahadur Sapru had persuaded the Congress to adopt separate electorates in the 
interests of securing a joint programme for reform and self-government in India.29 Under the pact which the 
Congress had concluded with the Muslim League as part of an initiative led by Annie Besant and Bal 
Gangadhar Tilak, separate electorates were conceded to the Muslims [21 per cent of the population against 68 
per cent Hindus in Indian subcontinent], besides a ‘weightage’ of seats in excess of their population in areas 
where they were in a minority in the country.30 The Muslims were accorded substantial weightage in the Hindu 
majority provinces of the UP, Bihar, Bombay, Madras, and the Central Provinces. In the UP, the Muslims [14.5
23 Abhyudaya, 24 June 1916, IOR L/R/5/91,1916, p. 580, IOL.
24 The Leader, 19 July 1916, IOR L/R/5/92,1916, p. 691, IOL; Home Poll., ‘D’, 2 August 1916, File No. 25, UP, NAI.
25 Extract from the diary of the SP, Cawnpore, 8 April 1916, Municipal 1916, File No. 230 E. No. 70, UPSA.
26 Letter of H.V. Lovett, D.M., Lucknow, to James Meston, dated 27 August 1916, Meston Papers, MSS. Eur. F. 136, Vol. IV, IOL.
27 Saddharm Pracharak [Kangri, Bijnor], 1 July 1916, IOR L/R/5/92,1916, p. 612; Oudh Akhbar, Lucknow [daily, editor: Lala 
Naubat Rai, 52,550 copies], 23 July 1915, IOR L/R/5/90, File No. 31,1915, p. 753.
28 The Leader, 30 August 1916, IOR L/R/5/92, File No. 37,1916, p. 821.
29 F.C.R. Robinson, ‘Municipal Government and Muslim Separatism in the United Provinces 1883 to 1916’, in John Gallaghe, 
Gordon Johnson and Anil Seal [eds.], Locality, Province and Nation, Cambridge, 1973, pp. 69-121.
30 The All India Congress Committee [AICC] members [34] who met from 22 to 24 April 1916 and discussed the schemes of 
reforms were: UP: M.M. Malaviya, Motilal Nehru, Dr. T.B. Sapru, Samiullah Beg, Gokaran Nath Misra, C.Y. Chintamani, Pt.
Jagat Narain, Munshi Ishwar Saran, H.N. Kunzru; Madras: Annie Besant, N. Sabbarau Pantulu, L.A. Govindaraghava Aiyer, B.N. 
Sarma, V.V.S. Sastri, C.P. Ramaswami Aiyer, A.P. Patro; Bengal: Bhupendranath Basu, P.C. Roy; Bihar: M. Haque, S. Sinha, 
C.B. Sahay; Bombay: N.M. Samarth; Punjab: Lala Harkishen Lai; CP: N.A. Dravid; and Berar: 1.
The Muslim League reforms committee comprised Maulvi Abdul Majid, Syed Ali Nabi, Syed Raza Ali and A.A. Khan from the UP; 
Nawab Ali Chaudhuri, Mujibur Rahman, Abdul Rasul, and Fazlul Haq from Bengal; Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Mohammad Shafi, Malik 
Barkat Ali, and Syed Mohsin Shah from the Punjab; Ibrahim Rahimtullah, the Aga Khan, Jinnah, Bhugri, Faiz Tyabji, and Abdul 
Husain Adamjee Peerbhoy from Bombay and Sind; Ali Imam, Mazharul Haque, Wasi Ahmad, and Maulvi Fakhruddin from Bihar. 
Besides, there were three representatives from madras, one from the Central Provinces, and two from Burma. Home Poll., 
January 1916, File No. 540, NAI.
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1 per cent of the population] were given 30 per cent of the seats in the provincial Legislative Council.31 In Bihar 
and Orissa [10.9 per cent of the population], the Muslims were to receive 25 per cent of the seats, in the Central 
Provinces [4.4 per cent] 15 per cent of the seats, in Bombay [19.8 per cent] 33.3 per cent of the seats, and in 
Madras [6.7 per cent] 15 per cent of the seats. The Muslim League in turn gave up its claim to legislative 
majorities in the Muslim-majority provinces of the Punjab and Bengal: the Muslims received 50 per cent of the 
seats [54.8 per cent of population] in the Punjab, and 40 per cent in Bengal [52.7 per cent].32 The pact provided 
that one-third of the elected members in the central Legislative Assembly should be Muslims elected by 
separate electorates in the country.33 No bill affecting a community could be passed by a legislature if three- 
quarter of that community’s legislators opposed it -- a safeguard given to the Muslims in Hindu-dominated 
provinces.34 The pact proposed a Dominion status for India and demanded that India be granted a 
representative government elected on a broader franchise.35 The 1919 Montford reforms had implemented in 
substance the Lucknow Pact’s scheme of representation, even though the proposal for a communal veto on 
legislation was rejected. The Congress viewed the pact as a reasonable price to pay for Muslim co-operation in 
the larger goal of securing self-rule in India.36 For the Muslim League, particularly Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Zafar 
Ali Khan, and Wazir Hasan who had pressed for closer co-operation with the Congress, the pact signified a 
decisive step towards the definition of a common ‘nationalist’ programme for self-rule in the country.37 The 
pact’s true significance lay in the formal recognition of the League as the authoritative spokesman of the 
Muslims or, as Jinnah put it, ‘the chief representative of Muslim India’.38 It recognised a ‘distinct Muslim entity* 
whose representation was deemed to be the Muslim League’s ‘exclusive responsibility* in the country.39
However, the Hindu Mahasbha attacked the Lucknow Pact as ‘surrender* by the Congress, opposing 
separate representation and ‘weightage’ granted to the Muslims in the country.40 At its third conference held in 
Lucknow in December 1916, it expressed a strong opposition to separate electorates, rejecting the Muslim 
League’s claim as an equal partner in shaping India’s future.41 V.P. Madhav Rao, in his presidential address, 
claimed that the concessions made to the Muslims by the Congress were at the expense of the Hindus, and that 
the Mahasabha and not the Congress should negotiate on behalf of the Hindus. The object of the Mahasabha,
31 UP Government, GAD, 1917, File No. 140, UPSA; Home Poll., FR, UP, 6 January 1917, File No. 540, NAI.
32 Home Poll B, November 1916, File No. 452-53, NAI.
33 Home Poll., FR, UP, 6 January 1917, File No. 540, NAI.
34 Weekly report of the Director of Central Intelligence, 25 November 1916, Home Poll. B, November 1916, File No. 452-53, NAI.
35 Letter of Sir James Meston, Lt. Governor of UP, to Lord Chelmsford, Viceroy, dated 11 January 1917, Chelmsford Papers,
IOR MSS. Eur. E. 264, Vol. 28, IOL.
36 Report of the 31st Indian National Congress Session, Lucknow, 1916, Allahabad, 1917, p. 70; B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, History 
of the Indian National Congress, Vol. 1, New Delhi, 1969, pp. 202-3.
37 F. Shaikh, Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860-1947, Cambridge, 1989, p. 170.
38 Jinnah’s speech at the League’s Lucknow session on 1 January 1916, Pirzada [ed.], Foundations of Pakistan, Vol. 1, p. 354.
39 The Raja of Mahmudabad’s address to the All India Muslim Leagu, 30 December 1917, Pirzada [ed.], Foundations of Pakistan, 
Vol. 1, p. 431.
40 Letter of Deva Ratan Sharma, Secretary, All-India Hindu Sabha, to Mrs A. Besant, dated 28 December 1917, cited Hugh F. 
Owen, ‘Negotiating the Lucknow Pact’, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3, May 1972, p. 561.
41 Home Poll., January 1917, Deposit 42, p. 44, NAI.
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he explained, was to ‘educate the public mind on the evils likely to follow from [the] recognition of this principle 
[separate electorates] and giving effect to it in the coming reforms’.42 Lajpat Rai repudiated the pact as a 
‘negation of nationalism’ on the basis that separate electorates would deal ‘severe blow1 to India’s nationhood.43 
In a circular to prominent Hindus of all the provinces in India, he condemned the Congress’s role in the 
negotiation of the Lcknow Pact and urged them to make the Hindu Mahasabha their ‘political mouthpiece’ in the 
country.44 Bhai Parmanand condemned the pact as a ‘sectarian curse’ and reiterated that separate Muslim 
electorates resulted in an ‘injustice to the legitimate rights of the Hindus’ 45 An electoral policy based on ‘one 
man, one vote’ was the Mahasabha’s ideological principle that in effect rejected separate electorates in entirety 
in the country.46 The Congress’s acceptance of separate electorates under the Lucknow Pact had a galvanising 
effect on the Mahasabha’s ideology, making Hindu identity and rights an entrenched feature of its sangathan 
discourse in north India.
In the UP, the discontent over the Lucknow Pact was most acute among the Hindu right. The UP Hindu 
Sabha bitterly rejected the pact, attacking it as ‘anti-Hindu’.47 M.M. Malaviya and C.Y. Chintamani, who had 
taken part in the negotiations on the pact, bitterly resented the reduction in Hindu representation resulting from 
the ‘weightage’ conceded to the Muslims in the province. The Hindu Sabhas of Allahabad, Banaras, and Kanpur 
denounced excessive representation given to the Muslims under the pact.48 The protest had gained legitimacy 
in view of the fact that the Muslims were far more advanced than the Hindus in the administration and economy 
of the UP. Since the early twentieh century, the British had actively sought to employ far too numerous Muslims 
in the administration of the province, which contained the best educated and most articulate leaders of all-India 
Muslim politics. The Muslims had held 41.94 per cent of government positions across the province by 1911. In 
the 1920s, they made up roughly 44 per cent of the deputy collectors of the province, 38 per cent of 
superintendents of police, 50 per cent of the vets, and 52 per cent of the constables.49 The Muslims 
outnumbered the Hindus in the army and police; and in liberal professions and arts, they were well represented 
as lawyers, doctors and teachers. In industry and commerce, they were clearly over-represented in both the 
census of 1911 and 1921.50 In contrast, the proportion of the Muslims engaged in agriculture was very small, 
but they were over-represented in the rent-receiving category of landlords across the province.51 The Hindu 
right was in uproar against the Lucknow Pact on the basis that the Muslims were accorded separate
42 Home Poll., FR, UP, February 1917, File No. 26, NAI.
43 Cited in Ravindra Kumar [ed.], Selected Documents of Lala Lajpat Rai 1906-1928, Vol. 3, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 149-56.
44 Purushothamdas Thakurdas Papers, 40: Circular letter, 13 December 1924, NMML.
45 Bhai Parmanand, The Story of My Life, Lahore, 1938, rept. New Delhi, 1982, p. 168.
46 B.S. Moonje’s letter to Gandhi, dated 5 August 1929, File No. 437, B.S. Moonjwe Papers, NMML.
47 Home Poll., D, March 1916; File No. 49, NAI; The Leader, 6 January 1917, IOR L/R/5/92,1917, p. 11,IOL.
43 The Leader, 6 January 1917, IOR L/R/5/92,1917, p. 11, Anand, 8 January 1917, IOR L/R/5/92,1917, pp. 26-7, IOL.
49 Census of India, 1921: United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Vol. 16, Part II, Allahabad, 1923, p. 413.
50 Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, 
1968, p. 118.
51 William Gould, Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India, Cambridge, 2004, p. 209.
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representation, despite the fact that they had been over-represented compared to the Hindus in the services 
and economy of the UP.
The British policy on the council reforms in India had come under a review by 1917-1918. There was a 
strong argument in favour of territorial constituencies as the basis of representation for the communities in India. 
It was put forward most forcibly by William S. Marris, Commissioner of the Reforms Office, Government of India, 
in drafting the Montagu-Chelmsford report in 1918. Viceroy Edwin Montagu and Secretary of State for India 
Lord Chelmsford reviewed the option of ‘wiping out’ the Morley-Minto reforms and making ‘a new start’ with 
territorial constituencies in the country; but they concluded that they had ‘no alternative for practical and political 
reasons, but to follow the path already set out’.52 Territorial representation was seen to favour the urban 
professional elite, which was deemed unrepresentative of Indian society; and it would work best with adult 
franchise which had not yet been proposed. Communal representation as revealed in separate electorates was 
seen as a way not only to ensure the representation of different interests but also as a potential leveller, 
exposing communities hitherto uninitiated in the ways of liberal democracy in India. It was logical that separate 
electorates were extended under the Government of India Act of 1919 -  the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms.
In the early 1920s, the Muslim League dominated Muslim politics and sought to achieve for the Muslims in 
India the goals of political representation that had been set by the ideologues of the Aligarh movement. It 
expressed an opposition to the elective principle based on ‘western’ representation in India.53 The final sanction 
of the 'Muslim consensus’, it argued, did not lie in numerical configurations or a majority rule, but the 
charismatic community predicated on the notions of 'Islamic solidarity’.54 The League’s assumption was that 
Indian society was rigidly divided into immovable political blocs consisting of the Muslims and the non-Muslims, 
and that only a Muslim could represent the Muslims as a community in any constituency of the country.55 It 
stated that religion and politics were not to be divided -  an ideal that strengthened the Muslim community as the 
basis of political representation in contrast to representation by the individuals on the western model. It viewed 
with alarm the possible introduction of territorial constituencies that threatened to undermine Muslim interests in 
India.56 Sayyid Amir Ali, the founder of the National Mohammedan Association that advocated separate 
electorates, feared that the institution of territorial constituencies implied by ‘western’ representation would 
enable the Hindus to dominate the outcome of elections to the legislatures in the country.57 M.A. Jinnah
52 Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1918, Part VIII, London, 1919, pp. 256-7,307-10; Peter Robb, The Government of 
India and Reform: Policies towards Politics and the Constitution, 1916-1921, Oxford, 1976, p. 87.
53 Farzana Shaikh, ‘Muslims and Political Representation in Colonial India: The Making of Pakistan’, Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 
20, No. 3, 1986, pp. 539-557: p. 539.
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i underlined the supremacy of the ‘Muslim consensus’ that was not open to democratic criteria based on the 
arithmetic of fluid majorities and minorities. The true expression of the Muslims demands, he argued, was not 
always to be found in the sum of votes cast, or the application of arithmetic in representation. The counting of 
heads,’ he declared, ‘may be a very good thing, but it is not the final arbiter of the desiny of nations.’58 ‘You may 
think that the counting of heads is the final judgement... But let me tell you ... You will never be able to destroy 
the culture we have inherited, the Islamic culture.’59 In the Muslim League’s theory, the Muslims were a 
permanently defined, distinct social category that enabled it to claim a parity of status and representation vis-a- 
vis the Hindus in India. The demand was for a representative parity independent of numerical proportions or a 
majority rule, which consisted of the Muslim League as the sole representative of the substantative ‘Muslim 
consensus’ in the country.60 The League’s campaign had centred on the important issues of exclusive Muslim 
representation in India: the proportion of seats to be allotted to the Muslims in the legislatures, the creation of 
Muslim-majority provinces, and the retention of separate electorates.61
By the mid-1920s, the Congress had launched the ‘National Demand’ for a representative government in 
India. It sought the revision of the 1919 Act with a view to establishing a full responsible government, a 
representative round table conference to frame a constitution, and the presentation of the new constitution to 
parliament for enactment. The demand, stated by Motilal Nehru in February 1924, was not for a full responsible 
government ‘in a bundle’ but the recognition of India’s right to ‘self-determination’ and a round table conference 
to revise the constitution.62 The official response was the appointment of the ‘all white’ Simon Commission in 
November 1927, which was charged with the task of evolving a constitution to grant full Dominion status to 
India.63 The commission had no Indian representative. The Congress protested that Britain had acted contrary 
to the national will and urged all the parties in the country to boycott the commission.64 The Muslim League 
boycotted the seven-man commission, and so, too, did the other nationalist parties.65 The Hindu Mahasabha, at 
its Madras session in December 1927, decided to follow the Congress’s policy of boycott in protest against the 
government’s ‘pro-Muslim policy’ based on ‘imperial considerations’.66 The prospects for unity and a common 
national front had seemed positive by the end of 1927 when the different strands of political opinion came
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together in an outcry against the Simon Commission.67 Intense negotiations took place among the parties and 
leaders on Hindu-Muslim representation because an agreement was required that would be incorporated into a 
new constitution for India.68
II. Jinnah’s Delhi Proposals
In the negotiations leading up to a draft constitution for India in the late 1920s, the Muslim League declared 
that further constitutional advance was not possible unless the Muslim demands for safeguards could be fulfilled. 
At its Lahore session in1925, the League reiterated the strategy of a federation, provincial autonomy, and 
separate electorates -  which was representative of most shades of the Muslim opinion: nationalists [M.A. 
Jinnah], British loyalists [Muhammad Shafi], and Khilafatists [the Ali brothers].69 Nonetheless, a Muslim overture 
was made in 1927. Under the ‘Delhi Muslim Proposals’ which M.A. Jinnah had helped draft on 20 March 1927, 
the League offered to give up separate electorates -  a keystone of Muslim constitutional politics since 1909 -  in 
favour of joint electorates if four demands could be guaranteed. The demands were: one-third Muslim 
representation in the central Legislative Assembly; the reservation of seats in proportion to population in the 
provincial legislatures, including the Punjab and Bengal, with minorities receiving ‘weightage’; the creation of a 
new Muslim-majority province of Sind;70 and the extension of the 1909 reforms [separate electorates] to the 
North-West Frontier Province [NWFP] and Baluchistan, raising both to the same administrative status as the 
other full-fledged provinces.71 The League’s plan was to develop provincial autonomy by expanding the number 
of Muslim provinces to five [the Punjab, Bengal, Sind, the NWFP, and Baluchistan] as a counterweight to Hindu 
majority provinces in the country. In a press statement on 29 March 1927, Jinnah declared that the 'four 
proposals’ had to be accepted or rejected in toto. The Muslims, he explained, ‘should be made to feel that they 
are secure and safe-guarded against any act of oppression on the part of the majority’ during the transitional 
stage towards the development of a national government.72 The Congress accepted all the Delhi proposals at 
its Calcutta session on 26 December 1927, giving full assurance that the legitimate Muslim interests would be 
secured by ‘the reservation of seats in joint electorates on the basis of population in the provinces and the 
central legislature’. It agreed to the elevation of the NWFP and Baluchistan to the full status of governors’ 
provinces and the creation of linguistic provinces, including Sind.73 The Muslim community, it was believed, had
67 The Simon Commission, in its 1928 report, recommended the continuation of separate electorates with ‘weghtage’ in the 
provincial legislatures. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission Recommendations, 1928, Vol. 2, London, 1930, pp. 33-4,44-8.
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in away become a political force, if a minority, by representing persistent political interests in the country.74 The 
Muslim League’s proposals signalled a drive for a rapprochement with the Congress, paving the way for a new 
constitution for India.
However, the Hindu Mahasabha rejected the Delhi proposals in toto. At its session held in Patna in April 
1927 under the presidentship of B.S. Moonje, the Mahasabha categorically demanded the abolition of 
‘weightage’ in Muslim-minority provinces and condemned the proposals to create legislative majorities in the 
Punjab and Bengal. If there was to be community representation, it insisted, it should be strictly according to 
population and available only to the minorities. ‘In no circumstances, however, shall there be any reservation of 
seats in favour of any majority community.’ 75 The Mahasabha rejected the separation of Sind, the Muslim- 
majority region, from the Bombay Presidency, as it would create an ‘Islamic empire from Angora to Karachi’. 
Baluchistan and the NWFP were ‘too backward’ for the 1909 reforms, it argued, and time was ‘not ripe for the 
discussion of such a question’ in the country.76 Moonje warned the Congress that it should confine itself to 
ratifying agreements negotiated by leaders of the communities. He wrote to the Congress Working Committee: 
‘I have to request you on behalf of the Hindu Mahasabha to confine your resolutions at present only to what has 
been mutually accepted by the Hindus and the Moslem leaders... if the Congress were to adopt any resolutions 
concerning these details before the differences on them are reconciled the Congress may not only fail in 
achieving its object but I am afraid undesirable complications may arise.’ 77 The Muslims faced a threat of 
boycott, Moonje warned, if they did not prove subservient to the Hindus. ‘Leave the Muslims severely alone,’ he 
counselled, so they might ‘realize their folly, and in dejection ... throw themselves at our feet ...’ 78 The 
Mahasabha rejected any reconciliation with the Muslim League and firmly resolved to intensify an agitation 
against Jinnah’s Delhi proposals in the country.
The Hindu Mahasabha put forward counter-proposals, demanding constitutional safeguards for the 
representation of the Hindus in India. On 21 April 1927, M.M. Malaviya on behalf of the Mahasabha proposed: 
joint electorates for all legislatures throughout the country; the reservation of seats on population basis in the 
legislatures; safeguards for the protection of religious and quasi-religious rights; and the issue of the re­
distribution of provinces on linguistic and other criteria to be left open for consideration in the future. He 
proposed elections to elective bodies on the basis of joint electorates, besides seeking a uniformity of franchise 
for all communities in India. A uniform franchise, if coupled with joint electorates, would increase the political 
leverage of the Hindus in the Muslim-majority provinces. The Mahasabha’s position was how best to secure the
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sectional interests of the Hindus.79 The lack of the advocacy of a ‘single nation’ -- the Congress’s goal which 
was imperfectly pursued due to its loss of political courage -- was the underlying problem in the negotiations on 
Hindu-Mulim power sharing in India.
However, the Congress negotiated an amended version of Jinnah's Delhi proposals. In the All-India 
Congress Committee meeting in Bombay on 15 May 1927, a truce -  the Delhi-Bombay Compromise -  was 
adopted: reforms for the NWFP became conditional on the provision of suitable judiciary, and the separation of 
Sind conditional on the separation of Andhra. The Hindu Mahasabha opposed the compromise, nevertheless.
B.S. Moonje, in a press statement, ‘clarified’ the Mahasabha’s protest, dissenting from the Delhi-Bombay 
Compromise ‘clause by clause’. He declined to accept the terms set for the separation of Sind from the Bombay 
Presidency and made a strong appeal in a circular to the Hindu Sabhas across the country to oppose the 
Congress’s resolution on the Delhi proposals.80 In the Mahasabha’s programme, provinces were not to be 
reorganised to produce statutory religious majorities for the Muslims, while the residuary powers lay with the 
centre in India.
III. All-Parties Conference
In 1928 the Congress convened an All-Parties Conference as part of an independent effort to resolve the 
deepening disagreement over Hindu-Muslim representation and draft a constitution for India. The conference 
was the nationalists’ answer to the claim made by conservative Secretary of State for India Lord Birkenhead 
that India was ‘reliant on British rule’ and incapable of devising a constitution for itself.81 The conference was 
attended by the representatives of the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Independent Congress Party, the 
Liberal Party, the Muslim League, and the Khilafatists. It opened in Delhi on 12 February 1928 and reconvened 
again in Bombay in May 1928. In all the conference meetings, the Mahasabha categorically rejected the 
reservation of seats for the Muslim majority in the Punjab and Bengal. On this point, it was supported by Sardar 
Mangal Singh, secretary of the Central Sikh League, as well as Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, and other 
Congress leaders. The Mahasabha resisted the creation of new Muslim provinces as ‘a price for securing joint 
electorates’ and rejected the Congress resolution on Sind. B.S. Moonje, M.R. Jayakar, and N.C. Kelkar issued a 
manifesto, condemning the ‘attempts to constitute new provinces in India in which a particular community [the 
Muslims] is in a majority1.82 In view of the Mahasabha’s formidable ‘opposition and hostility’, the Muslim League 
had decided to boycott the subsequent meetings of the All-Parties Conference planned in 1928. Motilal Nehru 
expressed an alarm over the role of the Mahasabha and blamed it for the failure of the meetings of the All- 
Parties Conference.83 The negotiations faced a threat of deadlock over almost all the substantive issues of
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concessions to the Muslims, deepening the Congress’s difficulty and dilemma in evolving a formula on Hindu- 
Muslim representation in India.
III. 1. Nehru Constitution
In the deepening row over Hindu-Muslim power sharing, the All-Parties Conference appointed a committee 
to settle all issues related to representation as part of its plan to draft a new constitution for India.84 Motilal 
Nehru, who was appointed the committee chairman with Jawaharlal as secretary, emphasised the need for 
achieving a unanimous formula, as ‘an agreed report would be a strong weapon to carry on a campaign in the 
country against the [British] Government'.85 He declared: The support of the Hindu Maha Sabha is most 
essential, specially as there is no knowing how the Muslim opinion will finally shape itself;..86 However, at the 
Lucknow session of the Nehru committee held in August 1928, the Mahasabha’s opposition to the Muslim 
demands had remained insurmountable -  particularly over the reservation of one-third of seats to the Muslims 
in the central legislature and the separation of Sind.87 The Mahasabha condemned these demands as a 
‘strategy1 to isolate it and the Hindus by getting the Congress to ‘agree to the Muslim claims’. In its discourse, 
the Muslim demands were sectarian in nature and ought to be opposed as ‘injurious’ to Hindu interests in the 
country.88
The Nehru committee unveiled its constitution on 15 August 1928. The Nehru report -- chiefly the work of 
Motilal Nehru and T.B. Sapru -- stated its goal as ‘Dominion’ status instead of full independence -  which meant 
something indistinguishable from independence, except for the link with the British Crown. The report accepted 
joint electorates and eliminated separate Muslim electorates, removing the ‘weightage’ fixed for the Muslims 
under the Minto-Morley and Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. It offered the Muslims reservations in provinces 
where they were in a minority, but rejected the reservation of seats for the Muslim majority in the Punjab and 
Bengal.89 The real blow to the Muslims was that the report restricted Muslim quota in the central assembly to a 
fourth [25 per cent] instead of a third [33 per cent] as demanded, thereby denying the Muslims a share of power 
which would ensure them a status at the centre virtually equal to the Hindus. The report argued that the 
overwhelming opinion in Sind was in favour of separation, but that it rejected the demands for its creation as a 
separate province in India. The reorganisation of states would only take place on linguistic grounds and, in the 
case of Sind, when it was deemed to be in an economically viable proposition. Any suggestion for the creation 
of further Muslim-majority provinces was rejected. The report proposed an Indian federation based on a unitary
84 The ten-member Nehru committee was formed in Bombay on 19 May 1928 and included: Sir Ali Imam and Shuaib Qureshi 
[Muslim group]; M.R. Jayakar and M.S. Aney [Hindu Mahasabha]; Sardar Mangal Singh [Sikh League]; Tej Bahadur Sapru 
[Liberals]; G.R. Pradhan [non-Brahmins]; M.M. Joshi [trade unionist]; and Subhash Chandra Bose [Bengal].
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government at the centre and called for all the departments of the central government -- including defence, 
finance, foreign affairs, and relations with the Indian states -- to be made responsible to Indian legislatures.90 
The decentralisation of power was to be extended no further than in the Montford constitution, while residual 
powers lay with the centre. In reality, the Nehru report, which was perhaps the first significant attempt of the 
Indian parties to draft a constitution for a free India, demonstrated how intractable the problem of Hindu-Muslim 
representation had become in all-India terms.91
The Nehru constitution had come under the scrutiny of the parties and their leaders in a drive for its 
ratification by the end of 1928. The National All-Parties Convention, meeting in Lucknow on 28 August 1928, 
resolved that India should have a responsible government, ‘that is to say a government in which the executive 
should be responsible to a popularly elected legislature’ -- a status no lower than that of a self-governing 
dominion in the country.92 The conference accepted the separation of Sind with two provisos: that after inquiry 
the new province was found to be financially viable, and that the Hindu minority obtained ‘weightage’ similar to 
the Muslims in the Muslim-majority provinces. Sind’s status as a separate province was to be specifically 
dependent upon the establishment of a ‘dominion’ in India. The conference accepted the NWFP and 
Baliuchistan demands and the principle of general electorates without the reservation of seats in the Punjab and 
Bengal.
The All-Parties Convention’s second session opened in Calcutta on 28 December 1928, where Jinnah on 
behalf of the Muslim League offered to endorse the Nehru report, inclusive of joint electorates, if a few 
amendments were made, but they were fundamental: one-third of the seats reseved for the Muslims at the 
centre, reserved seats for the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal until adult suffrage was established, that the 
separation of Sind should not depend upon the achievement of dominionhood in India, and the vesting of 
residual powers in the provinces. Jinnah’s demands met with a hostile opposition from the Hindu Mahasabha. 
The Mahasabhaites bitterly attacked the demand for 33 per cent of the seats in the central legislature and 
condemned the demand for the reservation of seats for the Muslim majority in the Punjab and Bengal as 
‘irrelevant’. ‘We do not,’ they insisted, ‘contemplate any such contingency.'93 The demand that the residuary 
powers should be vested with the provinces and the claim for the separation of Sind were rejected. The most 
formidable opposition came from M.R. Jayakar, Mahasabha Working Committee member, who attacked 
Jinnah’s demands as ‘incompatible with a national constitution’. If one word was changed in the Nehru report 
regarding the Hindu-Muslim question, he warned, the Mahasabha would withdraw its support to it. ‘If you 
accede to Mr Jinnah's demands,’ he insisted, ‘the report will be torn to pieces and will be rejected by important
90 All Parties Conference 1928, pp. 48,52; Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, pp. 44-51.
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communities who have now accepted it as the final word in the matter.’94 The Calcutta convention rejected 
Jinnah’s offer. Jinnah, in an interview with the Associated Press, blamed the Mahasabha for the failure of the 
negotiations on Hindu-muslim representation, terming December 1928 the ‘parting of the ways’ for the Muslims 
in India. He called for Muslim unity and solidarity. Only through organisation and unity, he argued, could the 
Muslim minority protect its ‘rights and interests’ against ‘a permanent Hindu majority’ in India.95 The debate on 
the Muslim demands had become highly contested, as there was disagreement over how far the reservations 
for the Muslims protected the unity and integrity of the Indian nation.
By early 1929 Jinnah had drafted the historic Fourteen Points as part of the Muslim League’s programme, 
which formed the basis of a settlement on joint electorates in India. The Fourteen Points, which were unveiled 
on 3 March 1929, chiefly reiterated the old demands on the provision for a federal constitution and provincial 
autonomy, but also reintroduced the demand for separate electorates for the Muslims until the Hindus were 
willing to reconsider the Muslim position in the country.96 The League’s demands embodied the essential 
principle of a constitutional strategy that it had evolved since the early 1920s on Muslim representation: 
autonomous provinces within a federal structure in which the Muslims would have weighted representation. The 
League demanded a weak federation of autonomous provinces in which the provinces and not the centre had 
the real power.97 The Congress rejected the Fourteen Points as ‘preposterous’.98 In its view, the only 
circumstance in which provincial autonomy could be conceded was if its divisive influence was counterbalanced 
by the unifying effect of a strong centre in the country. If progressive concessions were made to the Muslims, it 
was argued, little would remain of India’s unity. The Congress’s predicament had deepened, and the Muslim 
League’ bargaining position left little room for agreement on Hindu-Muslim representation in the country.
The Nehru report had failed to satisfy the majority of Muslim parties and their leaders in India. The Muslim 
opposition to the report grew in volume and intensity, with calls demanding the retention of separate electorates 
and ‘weightage’ for the Muslims. The report was attacked as a ‘Hindu document’ designed to establish a ‘Hindu 
Raj’ under British protection in the country. For the Muslims, it was claimed, ‘the maintenance of separate 
electorates is a necessity, as without them the Mahasabhaite mentality of the Hindus cannot be countered’. 
Joint electorates would eliminate ‘Muslim representation’, it was asserted, and the Muslims elected from such 
electorates would be ‘tools in the hands of the Hindus’.99 Mohamed Ali said that the Hindus would establish a 
‘legalised tyranny of numbers’ in India.100 Shafa’at Ahmad Khan, a member of the UP Legislative Council, 
claimed that because the number of non-Muslim voters in certain mixed constituencies was large, Muslim
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candidates failed to get elected in the legislatures of the country.101 Shaukat Ali, the elder of the famous Ali 
Brothers and president of the UP Congress Committee [UPCC] in 1925-26, blamed Motilal Nehru for making 
concessions to the Hindu Mahasabha and denounced those Muslim leaders, especially M.A. Ansari, who 
supported Nehru, calling them the ‘Congress stooges’.102 Muhammad Yakub, president of Jinnah’s Muslim 
League [1927], protested against the ‘poor’ treatment of the Muslim claims in India. Saifuddin Kitchlew, a 
Congress Khilafatist, rejected the Nehru report as ‘a mere scrap of paper meant to compromise ignorant people’ 
-  the Muslims. Ataullah Shah Bukhari, a Deobandi alim, condemned the report, ‘deprecatpng] the attitude of 
Malaviya, Moonje and Gandhi who had never advised their co-religionists to play fair with Muhammadans’. He 
rejected any ‘conciliatory attitude towards the Hindus’ in future India.103 The large majority of the Muslims had 
little use for the constitution as outlined by the Nehru report, which threatened to widen the gulf between the 
Hindus and the Muslims in the country.104
The All India Muslim Conference -  organised by Fazl-i-Husain who had assumed the leadership of the 
Muslim League after Jinnah -  was held in Delhi from 31 December 1928 to 1 January 1929 under the 
presidentship of the Aga Khan. It reaffirmed its right to ‘speak authoritatively on behalf of the Muslims of India’, 
demanding separate Muslim electorates, statutory Muslim majorities, ‘weightage’ for the Muslim minority, and ‘a 
federal system with complete autonomy and residuary powers vested in the states’ of India.105 It revived the 
demand for one third of the seats for the Muslims at the centre as well as the concession of the state status to 
Sind, the NWFP, and Baluchistan. The conference declared that ‘as long as Musalmans are not satisfied that 
their rights and interests are adequately safeguarded in the constitution, they will in no way consent to the 
establishment of joint electorates, whether with or without conditions’, in the country.106 More crucially, the 
Muslim conference had demonstrated a decisive rejection of the Nehru report by claiming to represent the 
Muslim opinion and parties across the country.
However, the Hindu Mahasabha hailed the Nehru report as a 'bold, outspoken and fearless exposition of the 
national demand’ in India. In an emergency meeting presided over by B.S. Moonje in Simla on 26 December 
1928, it accepted through a unanimous resolution the recommendations of the report, terming it an ‘epoch- 
making constitution’.107 It was euphoric on the abolition of separate electorates and ‘weightage’ for the Muslims 
in India. ‘Personally,’ declared M.R. Jayakar, ‘I am inclined to agree with the Nehru Committee’s Report not 
perhaps as an ideal arrangement, yet on the whole being more beneficial to the Hindus than any scheme so far
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suggested on the Congress side.’108 M.M. Malaviya welcomed the report, giving full support to its proposals.109 
Lajpat Rai urged his followers to accept the report, endorsing its verdict on joint electorates in the country. He 
feared, however, that the Congress might make concessions to the Muslim League and declared in late October 
1928, shortly before his death, that the Mahasabha would not accept any substantive changes in the report. If 
the Muslims persisted in seeking to amend the report, he warned, ‘the Hindus will be perfectly justified in 
rescinding their support’.110 If the Muslims did not accept the Nehru report, Ramanand Chatterjee asserted, the 
Hindus would then return to ‘pure nationalism’, meaning that there would be no reservation of seats for the 
Muslims anywhere in India.111 The Mahasabha was jubilant over the Nehru report primarily because the 
privileged position of the Hindus had not been disturbed in India’s legislatures under the provisions of the new 
constitution.
More fundamentally, the Hindu Mahasabha’s plan was to stop any further negotiations on the Nehru report. 
At its Surat session on 30 April 1929, a motion moved by B.S. Moonje and seconded by Bhai Parmanand 
threatened to withdraw the Mahasabha’s support to the report if any changes were made in it. Moonje declared 
that if Jinnah would any moment consent to accept the Nehru constitution, the Mahasabha would be prepared 
to do so. The situation, therefore,’ he explained, ‘is entirely in the hands of our Muslim brothers ... If the 
Muslims are pleased to give up their narrow communalism and accept the Nehru Report, I am sure the Hindu 
Mahasabha will respond suitably.’ The Mahasabha claimed to stand uncompromisingly by the report, insisting 
that it should not be altered by one ‘jot’, or ‘tittle’.112 In the Mahasabha’s belief, the Muslims would eventually 
come to accept the Nehru report as the 'second best’ constitution for India.
Gandhi was keen on reaching a Hindu-Muslim settlement on representation and asked the Congress to stick 
to its pledge on the reservation of seats for the Muslims until an alternative formula was devised in the country. 
Motilal Nehru urged Gandhi to make the Hindu Mahasabha agree to the main Muslim demands so that the 
whole scheme of the Nehru report would be adopted by the Muslim League. But this could not be achieved. 
Gandhi wrote to Motilal Nehru: ‘How that can be done or whether it should be done, you know best. My mind is 
in a whirl in this matter. The atmosphere is too foggy for me to see clearly.’ 113 Gandhi’s views had remained 
unheeded: he had no alternative but to wait on God for ‘a solution’. At the Jamiat-ul-Ulema conference in Delhi 
on 2 March 1931, Gandhi declared: ‘As a Congressman and as a Hindu, I say that I wish to give the Muslims 
what they want. I do not wish to act like a Bania. I wish to leave everything to the honour of the Muslims. I would
108 M.R. Jayakar’s letter to N.C. Kelkar, dated 28 August 1928, File No. 442, Jayakar Papers, NMML.
109 Home Poll., FR Punjab, 30 August 1928, NAI.
110 Lajpat Rai’s letter to Motilal Nehru, n.d. File No. 108 [Supplementary], AICC Papers, NMML.
111 R. Chatterjee, Presidential Address to 12th session of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, 30 March 1929, Surat. The Leader, 
Allahabad, 1 April 1929, p. 12, Microfilm, NMML.
112 N.N. Mitra [ed.], Indian Annual Register, 1929, Vol. 1, January-June, p. 359.
113 Gandhi's letter to Motilal Nehru, dated 23 August 1929, Motilal Nehru Papers, NMML; Gandhi, CWMG, Vol. 26, p. 232.
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like you to put down whatever you want on a blank sheet of paper and I shall agree to it.’114 In a speech to a 
public meeting in Delhi on 7 March 1931, he advised the Hindus to concede whatever the Muslims wanted.115 In 
Gandhi’s plan, the Congress had a commitment to give the Muslims all that they wanted as the price of securing 
a united nation in India.
Nonetheless, there were apprehensions and alarm in the Hindu Mahasabha that Gandhi would fall a victim 
to the ‘intrigues of the Muslims’ under Jinnah’s leadership to accept their demands on representation in the 
country. At an emergency meeting on 23 March 1931, the Mahasabha discussed the threat contained in 
Gandhi’s conciliatory speeches and issued a statement that it had no intention of following Gandhi’s suggestion 
of ‘unilateral gesture of generosity1. If Gandhi yielded to the Muslims, it warned, he would lose ‘Hindu support’ in 
the country.116 B.S. Moonje wrote to Gandhi urging him not to agree to any concessions in order to conciliate 
the Muslims. He asserted: ‘If you want to find a radical solution of the Hindu-Muslim relation, so far as the public 
administration of the country is concerned, I think there could be no safer position than that taken by the Hindu 
Mahasabha which is one of pure unalloyed nationalism ... [I]f the Musalmans cannot trust and remain in the 
Congress and give up their separatist mentality, let us leave them alone ...’117 Moonje insisted that nationalism 
not reservations was the answer to the representation of the communities in India. M.R. Jayakar urged Gandhi 
not to yield to the Muslim demands because the government would deliberately make these concessions part of 
a constitution which would be entirely different from the Nehru report. He warned: ‘My purpose in writing this 
letter to you is to make you acquainted with the apprehensions of a very large body of the Hindus that any 
attempt at this time to vary the solution of the Hindu-Muslim question adopted in the Nehru Committee’s Report 
is fraught with the far-reaching consequences ,..’118 The Hindu leaders from the NWFP, the Punjab, and Sind, in 
a joint conference held in Lahore in early May 1931 under the auspices of the Hindu Mahasabha, asserted that 
they would not conciliate the Muslims at their own expense in India. B.S. Moonje, presiding over the conference, 
personally conveyed their misgivings and fears to Gandhi. A deputation of the Hindu Mahasabha led by Bhai 
Parmanand had met Gandhi in Delhi and warned him not to give concessions to the Muslims. If Gandhi did so, 
Parmanand insisted, the Mahasabha would oppose him tooth and nail across the country.119 It was part of the 
Mahasabha’s plan that Gandhi would not to be allowed to give concessions to the Muslims in the negotiations 
on representation in India.
By 1929, the Congress had abandoned the Nehru report and decided not to accept any settlement on 
representation without the concurrence of the Muslims in the country.120 The Congress’s failure to achieve unity
114 The Times of India, 3 March 1931, p. 3, Microfilm, NMML. 
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in 1928 had proved irreversible, resulting in the abandonment of any significant initiative for agreement on 
Hindu-Muslim power sharing until Independence for India in 1947.
IV. Round Table Conferences
The problem of Hindu-Muslim representation was finally taken up for negotiations in England. The first 
Round Table Conference was held in London from 12 November 1930 to 19 January 1931. It comprised 89 
members: 16 from the three British parties, one from each of the 20 native states, and 53 members from the 
different Indian parties, including the Hindu Mahasabha [B.S. Moonje and M.R. Jayakar], the Liberals [T.B. 
Sapru and C.Y. Chintamani], the depressed classes [B.R. Ambedkar and Rao Bahadur Srinivasan], the Muslims 
[the Aga Khan, Fazl-i-Hussain, M.A Jinnah, Muhammad Shafi, and Fazl-ul-Haq], the Sikhs [Sardar Ujjal Singh], 
and the Indian Christians [K.T. Paul]. The Congress, which had launched the Civil Disobedience movement in 
India, boycotted the conference. The conference had collapsed and failed to reach agreement on representation, 
nevertheless.
The Second Round Table Conference began in London in late 1931. It differed significantly from the first, this 
time with the Congress represented and Gandhi participating as its sole representative. It was during the 
second round of negotiations in September 1931 that the issues of federation and reservations and safeguards 
for the minorities were fully taken up in an effort to reach agreement on representation in India. The Congress’s 
position was that ‘except for the Sikhs and the Muslims, for historical reasons no other communities should be 
recognised as separate political entities’. In other words, the other communities -- the Christians and the Anglo- 
Indians - were excluded from the ‘minority’ status. Gandhi presented the 'Congress formula’ at the conference, 
echoing the 1916 Lucknow Pact that had made a commitment to separate electorates for the Muslims in India. 
‘Now,’ Gandhi insisted, ‘it was a point of honour... not to recede from the position.’ In an open support to the 
Muslim demands, he declared: 'I will surrender to the Muslims. Hindus form the majority and as such I will 
laddie [sic]out with generous hands, I will be satisfied with what is left behind.’121 The ‘Congress formula’ stated 
that joint electorates should form the basis of representation in the future constitution, and that seats should be 
reserved in the central and provincial legislatures for the Hindus, the Sikhs and the Muslims in any province 
where they were less than 25 per cent of the population, with the right to contest additional seats. The formula 
rejected the reservation of seats for the Muslim majority in the Punjab and Bengal, but offered to constitute Sind 
into a separate province if the province was to bear its financial costs.122 The ‘Congress formula’ fell through at 
the conference, however.
The Muslim League rejected the ‘Congress formula’ as ‘more harmful and destructive than even the Nehru 
report’ on representation in India. In the negotiations in London, Fazl-i-Husain directed the Muslim League to
121 2-3 October 1931, B.S. Moonje’s Diaries and Letter Pads, Reel 1, NMML.
122 Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai [eds.], Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-47, Vol.1, Bombay, 
1957, p. 251.
180
jsecure a weak federal centre and autonomous constituent units in order to counter the potential threat of a 
permanent ‘Hindu majority’ in India.123 Under Husian’s ‘Punjab thesis’, the constituent units of the federation 
were to receive the fullest autonomy in the country: the provinces were to be created on an equal footing with 
the Indian states and given all the residuary powers as well as the right of secession from India at all times.124 In 
particular, the Muslim League demanded the retention of separate electorates, secure Muslim majorities in the 
Punjab and Bengal, the creation of Sind province, and the elevation of the NWFP to the status of a governor’s 
province.125 If the Congress was ‘not willing to recognise the Muslim demands,’ warned Shaukat Ali, prominent 
Congress leader from the UP, ‘they [Muslims] would ask the Government to satisfy them and make the 
peace’.126 The opposition meant that the Muslim League had held tightly on to the constitutional safeguards that 
established much of the structure of interests on which the subsequent emergence of Pakistan was to be based. 
The Hindu Mahasabha denounced the ‘Congress formula’ as ‘unacceptable’ to the Hindus, too. It expressed its 
loss of faith in the ‘credibility of Gandhi and the Congress’ in negotiating a settlement on representation. It did 
not trust the British, too, because the colonial state was definitely ‘pro-Muslim’.127 B.S. Moonje made it clear that 
the Mahasabha’s sole objective was to protect Hindu interests from ‘Muslim communalism’, declaring that the 
Hindus would not make any concessions to the Muslims unless the latter backed the demand for India’s 
dominion status.128 In a moment of historic defeat, Gandhi confessed to British prime minister Ramsay 
MacDonald that ‘it is with deep sorrow and deep humiliation that I have to announce utter failure on my part to 
secure an agreed solution of the communal question through informal conversations among and with the 
representatives of different groups’. However, he noted, the failure was temporary. He explained: ‘I have not a 
shadow of a doubt that the iceberg of communal differences will melt under the warmth of the sun of 
freedom.’129 The hopes for a settlement on Hindu-Muslim representation had collapsed, despite Gandhi’s efforts 
at a ‘blank sheet’, at the end of the the multi-party negotiations in London.
In a final arbitration, Britain had unveiled the Communal Award, echoing Fazl-i-Husain’s ‘Punjab thesis’ on 
provincial autonomy in India. The award announced by Ramsay MacDonald on 16 August 1932 was the result 
of Britain’s decision to divide power in the provinces among the rival communities and social groups which, in its 
view, constituted Indian society.130 It recommended that the Muslims, the Sikhs, the Europeans, the Christians,
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126 Indian Round Table Conference [Second Session], 7 September 1931 to 1 December 1931, Proceedings of Federal Structure 
Committee and Minorities Committee, London, 1932, p. 528.
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and the depressed classes were all to receive separate electorates in the country.131 It granted substantial 
powers to the provinces and guaranteed the Muslims not only separate electorates but more seats than any 
other community in the Punjab and Bengal: the Muslims received 49 per cent of the reserved seats in the 
Punjab, and 48 per cent in Bengal.132 The Congress vociferously opposed the award, and so did the Hindu 
Mahasabha, even though the Muslim League accepted it. The day after the declaration of the award, 18 August 
1932, Gandhi wrote to MacDonald declaring his decision to undertake a ‘perpetual fast unto death’, demanding 
the withdrawal of the scheme for separate electorates for the depressed classes.133 The outcome was the 
Poona Pact under which representatives of the depressed classes would be elected by the general electorate 
under the common franchise in India.
In the negotiations on Hindu-Muslim representation, the central problem lay in the inability to determine the 
place of the Muslims in the future Indian nation. The Hindu Mahasabha insisted that reservations and legislative 
concessions for the Muslims would fragment the unity of the nation, reiterating the idea of a democratic majority 
that was effectively ‘Hindu’.134 Its notion of democracy was based on a ‘Hindu majority rule’, posing a potential 
threat to wreck any constitutional agreement conciliating the Muslim demands for safeguards in the country. Its 
campaign put extreme pressure on the Congress, complicating the latter’s bargaining position on the future 
distribution of power between the Hindus and the Muslims. The conflict was in part an outcome of the 
irreconcilability of the Muslim demands, too, which had come full circle. The crisis was intimately tied to the 
failure of the Congress to pursue a ‘single nation’: it had faced obstacles as it strove to win Muslim support for 
the nationalist movement and hold them within it. The Mahasabha’s opposition to the Muslim demands was 
formidable and proved to be a central factor that had deepened the crisis, which remained unresolved 
throughout the period of negotiations in the 1920s and 1930s. A decade later, in March 1940, the Muslim 
League under Jinnah’s leadership called in a resolution, if ambiguous in its particulars, for a sovereign Muslim 
state of ‘Pakistan’.
Conclusion
Eearly twentieth-century India witnessed a conflict and political antagonism between the Hindus and the 
Muslims due to the grant of separate electorates to the latter, a safeguard demanded by the Aligarh elite, under 
the Moriey-Minto reforms. The Congress accepted separate electorates and ‘weightage’ for the Muslims under 
the 1916 Lucknow Pact as part of its efforts to enlist Muslim support for the nationalist struggle in India. The 
Hindu Mahasabha rejected the pact and demanded its abrogation, disputing the Congress’s claim to represent 
the Hindu community. It reiterated its insistence on unconditional joint electorates as its core principle and
131 Moore, Crisis of Indian Unity, p. 121.
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supported the ‘one-man one-vote' system that favoured the Hindu majority in the country. In the negotiations 
leading up to the draft of the 1928 Nehru report, the Congress and the Muslim League had come close to an 
agreement based on joint electorates, but were unable to bridge differences over the Punjab and Bengal and 
the percentage of Muslim seats in the central legislature. The collapse of unity in 1928 marked the end of the 
Congress’s last initiative for a settlement on Hindu-Muslim representation in the country. At the 1931 Round 
Table Conference in London, Gandhi made the offer as part of the ‘Congress formula’ to accept a substantial 
part of the Muslim demands, provided the Muslims endorsed the demand of swaraj and agreed to a referendum 
on the possibility of joint electorates when the new constitution came into operation. The ‘Congress formula’ 
failed to win Muslim support, resulting in the collapse of the multi-party negotiations in England. The Mahasabha 
sought to overturn Gandhi’s initiative and took a formidably tough position against any concessions to the 
Muslims in the legislatures of the country.135 The fallout which attended the Mahasabha’s hostile campaign was 
the Congress’s inability to surmount the opposition to the Muslim demands that had remained inflexible and 
irreconcilable throughout the period of negotiations, precipitating the crisis on the path to the Muslim League’s 
Pakistan movement in the 1940s.
135 Letter of Padmaraj Jain to B.S. Moonje, dated 12 April 1931, File No. 21-VI, Hindu Mahasabha Papers, NMML.
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Conclusion
A central theme of this study has been the development and evolution of Hindu nationalist ideology through 
sangathan that expressed extreme hostility and conflict with the Congress’s secular nationalism in India. The 
1920s constitute the point at which Hindu nationalism emerged as a persistent feature of political life in north 
India; and its narrative targeted chiefly the Muslims in contrast to the Congress’s nationalist struggle against 
British rule in the country.1 Hindu nationalism developed as an ideological discourse in the context of issues 
connected to the representation of the Hindus in colonial politics. It was first formulated by the middle class 
Hindu elites in the Punjab against the backdrop of constitutional reforms, particularly separate electorates, 
introduced by the colonial state in India in the early twentieth century. The Hindu Mahasabha, the institutional 
voice of Hindu nationalism and revivalism, was founded as an ideological representative of Hindu politics in 
1915 in the United Provinces, a province which had become the crucible of India’s anti-colonial movement in the 
1920s and 1930s.2
V.D. Savarkar first articulated the ideology of Hindu nationalism in the 1920s, theorising the construction of 
a ‘Hindu nation [rashtra]' as the chief doctrinal component of Hindutva. Hindutva expressed deep-rooted hostility 
against Islam and the Muslims, echoing an ethnic criterion of the Indian nation. It portrayed India as the ‘sacred 
territory’ of Aryavarta [the land of the Aryans], defining a ‘Hindu’ as one to whom India was both a ‘fatherland’ 
and a ‘holyland’.3 For Hindutva, the Hindu majority embodied the nation, whereas the religious minorities -  the 
Muslims and the Christians -- were ‘un-Indian’ as well as ‘outsders’ who must show an adherence and 
assimiliation of Hindu culture, which was the national culture in India.4
The Hindu Mahasabha represented a movement for Hindu unity and consolidation, inheriting its articulation 
of a ‘Hindu nation’ from the late nineteenth-century revivalism developed by the Arya Samaj. At the heart of its 
narrative was the promotion of sangathan -  the assertion of Hindu unity and organisation as the principal ideal 
of a ‘Hindu nation’.5 Sangathan in essence articulated the ‘homogeneous’ and ‘pure’ elements of Hindu culture 
as well as the rationale of a unified Hindu community as a means of consolidating Hindu society in response to 
the spectre of Muslim ‘strength’ and ‘cohesion’.6 The Muslims were depicted as a ‘unified political force’ and a
1 John Zavos, The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism in India, New Delhi, 2000, pp. 99-100.
2 Indra Prakash, A Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sangathan Movement, New Delhi, 
2nd.edn. 1952 [1938], pp. xv-xvi.
3 V.D. Savarkar, Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?, New Delhi, 2003, p. 33.
4 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity-building, 
Implantation and Mobilisation [with special reference to Central India], London, 1996, p. 25.
5 Zavos, Emergence, pp. 167,176.
6 Swami Shraddhanand, Hindu sangathan: Saviour of the Dying Race, N.p., 1926, pp. 29-31.
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‘threat’ because of their ‘pan-lslamism’ as well as their ‘aggressiveness’ in opposition to the Hindus in India.7 
The conscious articulation of sangathan, including the Malkana shuddhi campaign in the western UP, was 
intimately linked to the ascendance of the Hindu Mahasabha as a political force in north India in the 1920s. The 
path to sangathan as well as the idealised vision of Hindu society was supplemented by a defence of the varna 
[caste] system: caste was perceived as essential to Hindu identity primarily as a category of Hindu 
differentiation from mlecchas [foreigners/barbarians] -  the Muslims.8 Hindu publicists attempted to project 
Hindu unity and coherence by integrating into Hindu society the untouchables and lower castes, as caste 
oppression and disunity had resulted in conversions to Islam or Christianity across the centuries in India.9 
However, the projection of Hindu homogeneity stood in conflict with the caste hierarchy, failing to overcome the 
realities of upper caste values and practices. The integration of the untouchables into Hindu society was a 
persistent problem for sangathan ideology, which in its ‘Hindu’ orientation had become an apologia for the 
reinforcement of the varna hierarchy and the Brahmanical order; and the relationship of the untouchables to 
caste Hindus had become increasingly problematic to the parameters of Hindu unity based on caste as 
advocated by sangathanists in India.10
The chief aim of this study has been to explore the ideological trajectory in which the Hindu Mahasabha 
attempted to contest the Indian National Congress’s principle of territorial nationalism which cut across the 
communities in India. The Mahasabha developed an alternative political culture to the dominant secular idiom in 
Indian politics and rejected the Congress’s secular nationalism. Ideologically, it was in conflict with the 
Congress’s conception of the Indian nation, which was secular, inclusive and universalist. The Mahasabha gave 
primacy to a ‘Hindu’ identity in India’s history and culture and, like the Muslim League, rejected the universalist 
view of nationalism articulated by the Congress.11 Its sangathan narrative also clashed with the Congress’s 
doctrines of ‘non-violence’ and ‘Hindu-Muslim unity1 that constituted the legitimate modus operandi of the 
struggle against British rule in India. Inevitably, the Mahasabha had failed to join the Congress’s anti-colonial 
struggles, or launch any mass movement in the country. More crucially, the Mahasabha’s sangathan 
programme could not make an impact in India because of the prevailing political system dominated by the 
Congress. The Mahasabha had remained a political force confined to north India; and its narrow social base 
and the uneven spread of its movement in geographical terms challenged its claim to be the representative of 
the Hindus in the country.
7 C. Jaffrelot [ed.], Hindu Nationalism: A Reader, New Delhi, 2007, pp. 15-6.
8 Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Movement, p. 45.
9 Joya Chatterji, Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 261-8.
10 Zavos, Emergence, p. 149; Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Movement, pp. 13, 522.
11 G. Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India, Delhi, 1990, pp. 210-11; Antony Copley, ‘Introduction: 
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The ideological fallout of the Mahasabha’s sangathan doctrine was a political battle to explicitly set out the 
connection between Hindutva and the Indian nation based on a ‘Hindu-majority rule’ in the country. In the 
crucial multi-party negotiations of the 1920s and 1930s on constitution-making, the Mahasabha resisted the 
Muslim demands for reservations in the legislatures of India; and its formidable opposition had a regressive 
impact on the Congress’s all-India bargaining position, contributing in part to the loss of a settlement on Hindu- 
Muslim representation and hence a ‘single nation’ in India. The sangathanist crusade for a Hindu majoritarian 
rule and its anti-Muslim antagonism had become central to the Mahasabha’s movement for the ideological 
construction of a ‘Hindu nation’ -  which was based on the centrality of Hindu culture and rights in India during 
the 1920s and 1930s.12
12 Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Movement, pp. 6-7,19.
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